



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

















INTERNATIONAL  
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical  
Knowledge and Practice.

---

ISSUED QUARTERLY.

---

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE.

HENRY C. ADAMS, PH.D., ANN  
Arbor.

FELIX ADLER, PH.D., New York.

GIACOMO BARZELLOTTI, PH.D.,  
Naples.

STANTON COIT, PH.D., London.

ALFRED FOUILLÉE, PH.D., Paris.

HARALD HÖFFDING, PH.D., Copen-  
hagen.

FR. JODL, PH.D., Prague.

J. S. MACKENZIE, M.A., Cardiff, Wales.

J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., London.

JOSIAH ROYCE, PH.D., Cambridge,  
Massachusetts.

---

Managing Editor, S. BURNS WESTON, Philadelphia.

---

VOL. VII.

OCTOBER, 1896, JANUARY, APRIL, AND JULY, 1897.

Philadelphia: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1305 Arch St.

London: SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., Paternoster Square.

Paris: FÉLIX ALCAN.

Berlin: SPEYER & PETERS.

1897.



A.25271.

JAN 31 1898

# CONTENTS OF VOL. VII.

## ARTICLES.

	PAGE
BOSANQUET, HELEN. The Psychology of Social Progress . . . . .	265
BURNET, JOHN. Law and Nature in Greek Ethics . . . . .	328
DAVIDSON, THOMAS. When the "Higher Criticism" has done its Work .	435
DEVAS, CHARLES S. The Restoration of Economics to Ethics . . . . .	191
FIORE, PASQUALE. Settlement of the International Question . . . . .	20
FLEXNER, ABRAHAM. The Religious Training of Children . . . . .	314
GHANI, MUHAMMAD ABDUL. Social Life and Morality in India . . . . .	301
GRANGER, FRANK. The Moral Life of the Early Romans . . . . .	281
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. Philosophic Faith . . . . .	464
JACKSON, A. V. WILLIAMS. The Moral and Ethical Teachings of the Ancient Zoroastrian Religion . . . . .	55
McTAGGART, J. ELLIS. The Conception of Society as an Organism . . .	414
MEYER, RICHARD M. The Reformation of the Nineteenth Century . . .	63
MORRISON, WILLIAM DOUGLAS. The Treatment of Prisoners . . . . .	448
MUIRHEAD, J. H. Is the Family Declining? . . . . .	33
RASHDALL, HASTINGS. Professor Sidgwick on the Ethics of Religious Conformity: A Reply . . . . .	137
RITCHIE, ELIZA. Morality and the Belief in the Supernatural . . . . .	180
STIMSON, F. J. The Ethical Side of the Free Silver Campaign . . . . .	401
STURT, HENRY. Duty . . . . .	334
WARNER, JOSEPH B. The Responsibilities of the Lawyer . . . . .	204
WESTLAKE, JOHN. International Arbitration . . . . .	1
WOODBIDGE, FREDERICK J. E. The Place of Pleasure in a System of Ethics . . . . .	475
YOKOI, TOKIWO. The Ethical and Political Problems of New Japan . . .	169

## DISCUSSIONS.

BALL, SIDNEY. "The Moral Aspects of Socialism" . . . . .	85
BALL, SIDNEY. Concluding Note . . . . .	229
BOSANQUET, BERNARD. "Aspects of the Social Problem": A Reply . .	226
BROCKLEHURST, F. "The Moral Aspects of Socialism" . . . . .	91
CALDWELL, WILLIAM. Professor Patten's Theory of Social Forces . . .	345
CALDWELL, WILLIAM. A Reply . . . . .	496
EVANS, E. KERI. The Idealist Treatment of Egoism and Altruism . . .	486
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. The Relation of Philosophic Theory to Practice . . . . .	354
JOHNSON, ROGER BRUCE. "Morality and the Belief in the Supernatural"	497
MACKENZIE, J. S. The Translation of "Sittlich" . . . . .	97

	PAGE
MACKENZIE, J. S. The Relation of Philosophic Theory to Practice . . .	358
MACKENZIE, J. S. "The Moral Aspects of Socialism" . . . . .	230
PATTEN, SIMON N. The Theory of Social Forces.—An Explanation . . .	492
RITCHIE, E. A Reply . . . . .	501
STAWELL, F. MELIAN. "Hegel's Theory of Punishment" . . . . .	95
WEBB, SIDNEY. "The Moral Aspects of Socialism" . . . . .	80
WULF, MAURICE DE. A Note . . . . .	502
FAIRBROTHER, W. H. The Late Professor Wallace . . . . .	504

## REVIEWS.

ALDEN, PERCY. <i>Rich and Poor</i> , by Mrs. Bernard Bosanquet . . . . .	506
BALDWIN, J. MARK. <i>Analytic Psychology</i> , by G. F. Stout . . . . .	522
BALL, SIDNEY. <i>Rights of Man</i> , by Thomas Paine . . . . .	133
BALL, SIDNEY. <i>Knowledge, Faith, and Duty</i> , by the Right Hon. Thomas Dyke-Acland . . . . .	260
BALL, SIDNEY. <i>Paradoxes</i> , by Max Nordeau . . . . .	260
BALL, SIDNEY. <i>The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte</i> , by Harriet Martineau and Frederic Harrison . . . . .	261
BALL, SIDNEY. <i>Methods of Social Reform</i> , by Thomas Mackay . . . . .	383
BALL, SIDNEY. <i>Classes and Masses</i> , by W. H. Mallock . . . . .	383
BALL, SIDNEY. <i>The School of Plato: Its Origin, Development, and Revival under the Roman Empire</i> , by F. W. Bussell . . . . .	397
BEARE, JOHN I. <i>The Philosophy of Belief: or, Law in Christian Theology</i> , by the Duke of Argyll . . . . .	238
BONAR, J. <i>Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms</i> , by Adam Smith	385
BOSANQUET, BERNARD. <i>Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic</i> , by J. E. McGart- gart . . . . .	391
BOSANQUET, BERNARD. <i>Hegel's Philosophy of Right</i> , translated by S. W. Dyde . . . . .	524
BRINTON, D. G. <i>The History of Mankind</i> , by Friedrich Ratzel . . . . .	526
BURNET, JOHN. <i>The Metaphysical Basis of Plato's Ethics</i> , by Arthur Ber- nard Cook . . . . .	131
CROTHERS, SAMUEL M. <i>An Ethical Movement</i> , by W. L. Sheldon . . . .	236
CROTHERS, SAMUEL M. <i>The Gospel for an Age of Doubt</i> , by Henry Van Dyke . . . . .	516
D'ARCY, CHARLES F. <i>Philosophy of Theism</i> , by Alexander Campbell Fraser . . . . .	125
D'ARCY, CHARLES F. <i>Christian Ethics</i> , by Thomas B. Strong . . . . .	514
DEVAS, CHARLES S. <i>Co-operative Production</i> , by Benjamin Jones . . .	379
DEVAS, CHARLES S. <i>Modern Civilization in Some of its Economic Aspects</i> , by W. Cunningham . . . . .	381
DEVAS, CHARLES S. <i>Family Budgets</i> . Compiled for the Economic Club .	528
DAVIDSON, THOMAS. <i>Études historiques sur l'Esthétique de Saint Thomas D'Aquin</i> , par Maurice de Wulf . . . . .	392
DAVIDSON, THOMAS. <i>La Politique de Saint Thomas D'Aquin</i> , par Edouard Crahay . . . . .	394

# Contents of Volume VII.

v

	PAGE
DAVIDSON, THOMAS. <i>Francesco D'Assisi e alcuni dei suoi Recenti Biografi</i> , di Raffaele Mariano . . . . .	242
DAVIDSON, THOMAS. <i>Le Premesse Filosofiche del Socialismo</i> , di Alessandro Chiappelli . . . . .	527
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE. <i>A System of Synthetic Philosophy</i> . By Herbert Spencer . . . . .	359
FAIRBANKS, ARTHUR. <i>The Principles of Sociology</i> , by Franklin H. Giddings . . . . .	253
FLUX, A. W. <i>The Coming Individualism</i> , by A. Egmont Hake and O. E. Wesslau . . . . .	98
GREENSTREET, W. J. <i>On Education</i> , by H. Holman . . . . .	108
GREENSTREET, W. J. <i>The Great Didactic of John Amos Comenius</i> , by M. W. Keatinge . . . . .	109
GREENSTREET, W. J. <i>Les Caractères et l'Éducation Morale, Étude de Psychologie Appliquée</i> , par F. Queyrat . . . . .	110
GREENSTREET, W. J. <i>Sketches of Lessons in Moral Instruction</i> , by E. Reynolds . . . . .	110
HAYCRAFT, JOHN BERRY. <i>Parasitism, Organic and Social</i> , by Jean Massart and Émile Vandervelde . . . . .	112
HOPKINS, E. W. <i>Buddhism: Its History and Literature</i> , by T. W. Rhys Davids . . . . .	123
HUGHES, H. M. <i>Studies of Childhood</i> , by James Sully . . . . .	105
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. <i>The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green</i> , by W. H. Fairbrother . . . . .	127
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. <i>Love's Coming of Age</i> , by Edward Carpenter . . . . .	387
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. <i>The Greek Theory of the State and the Nonconformist Conscience</i> , by Charles John Shebbeare . . . . .	120
JACKSON, A. V. WILLIAMS. <i>The Religions of India</i> , by Edward Washburn Hopkins . . . . .	121
JONES, E. E. C. <i>Cosmic Ethics, or the Mathematical Theory of Evolution</i> , by W. Cave Thomas . . . . .	510
LATTA, ROBERT. <i>Socialism and Modern Thought</i> , by M. Kaufmann . . . . .	101
LATTA, ROBERT. <i>Moral Pathology</i> , by Arthur E. Giles . . . . .	132
RITCHIE, DAVID G. <i>Essays and Notices, Philosophical and Psychological</i> , by Thomas Whittaker . . . . .	102
RITCHIE, DAVID G. <i>Introduction to Political Science</i> , by J. R. Seeley . . . . .	114
RITCHIE, DAVID G. <i>The Principles of International Law</i> , by T. J. Lawrence . . . . .	250
SALTER, W. M. <i>An Examination of the Nature of the State</i> , by Westel Woodbury Willoughby . . . . .	116
SALTER, W. M. <i>Handbook to the Labor Law of the United States</i> , by F. J. Stimson . . . . .	369
SALTER, W. M. <i>Labor in its Relations to Law</i> , by F. J. Stimson . . . . .	369
SORLEY, W. R. <i>Social Rights and Duties</i> , by Leslie Stephen . . . . .	232
STAWELL, F. MELIAN. <i>Socrates and Athenian Society in His Day</i> , by A. D. Godley . . . . .	131

	PAGE
STAWELL, F. MELIAN. <i>Antimachus of Colophon and the Position of Women in Greek Poetry</i> , by E. F. M. Benecke . . . . .	397
STAWELL, F. MELIAN. <i>Some Recent Protestant Theology</i> , by Charles Strong . . . . .	398
STAWELL, F. MELIAN. <i>The Greek View of Life</i> , by G. Lowes Dickinson . . . . .	531
TAWNEY, G. A. <i>Mental Development in the Child and Race</i> , by J. Mark Baldwin . . . . .	517
THOMAS, F. W. <i>The Idea of God and the Moral Sense in the Light of Language</i> , by Herbert Baynes . . . . .	530
THOMSON, J. ARTHUR. <i>Character as seen in Body and Parentage</i> , by Furneaux Jordan . . . . .	531 532
THOMSON, J. ARTHUR. <i>Genius and Degeneration</i> , by William Hirsch . . . . .	532
THOMSON, J. ARTHUR. <i>Evil and Evolution</i> , by author of "Social Horizon" . . . . .	531
THOMSON, J. ARTHUR. <i>Criminal Sociology</i> , by Enrico Ferri . . . . .	110
THOMSON, J. ARTHUR. <i>Vivisection: Can it Advance Mankind?</i> by Charles Selby Oakley . . . . .	129
THOMSON, J. ARTHUR. <i>Nature vs. Natural Selection: an Essay on Organic Evolution</i> , by Charles Clement Coe . . . . .	132
TROTTER, W. F. <i>The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche</i> . . . . .	258 Y
VAUGHAN, C. <i>The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings</i> , by J. N. Figgis . . . . .	395
WALLACE, W. <i>Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None</i> , by Friedrich Nietzsche . . . . .	360 Y
WALLACE, W. <i>Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance</i> , by William Caldwell . . . . .	388

## LIST OF AUTHORS REVIEWED.

ARGYLL, DUKE OF . . . . .	238
BALDWIN, J. MARK . . . . .	517
BAYNES, HERBERT . . . . .	530
BENECKE, E. F. M. . . . .	397
BOSANQUET, MRS. BERNARD . . . . .	506
BUSSELL, F. W. . . . .	396
CALDWELL, WILLIAM . . . . .	388
CARPENTER, EDWARD . . . . .	387
CHIAPPELLI, ALESSANDRO . . . . .	527
COE, CHARLES CLEMENT . . . . .	132
COMTE, AUGUSTE . . . . .	261
COOKE, ARTHUR BERNARD . . . . .	131
CRAHAY, EDOUARD . . . . .	394
CUNNINGHAM, W. . . . .	381
DAVIDS, T. W. RHYS . . . . .	123
DICKINSON, G. LOWES . . . . .	531
DYKE-ACLAND, THOMAS . . . . .	260
DYKE, HENRY VAN . . . . .	516
FAIRBROTHER, W. H. . . . .	127
FERRI, ENRICO . . . . .	110

*Contents of Volume VII.*

vii

	PAGE
FIGGIS, J. N. . . . .	395
FRASER, ALEXANDER CAMPBELL . . . . .	125
GIDDINGS, FRANKLIN H. . . . .	253
GILES, ARTHUR E. . . . .	132
GODLEY, A. D. . . . .	131
HAKE, A. EGMONT . . . . .	98
HARRISON, FREDERIC . . . . .	261
HEGEL . . . . .	524
HIRSCH, WILLIAM . . . . .	532
HOLMAN, H. . . . .	108
HOPKINS, EDWARD WASHBURN . . . . .	121
JONES, BENJAMIN . . . . .	379
JORDAN, FURNEAUX . . . . .	534
KAUFMANN, M. . . . .	101
KEATINGE, M. W. . . . .	109
LAWRENCE, T. J. . . . .	250
MCTAGGART, J. E. . . . .	391
MACKAY, THOMAS . . . . .	383
MALLOCK, W. H. . . . .	383
MARIANO, RAFFAELE . . . . .	242
MARTINEAU, HARRIET . . . . .	261
MASSART, JEAN . . . . .	112
MORRISON, W. DOUGLAS . . . . .	110
NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH . . . . .	258, 360
NORDAU, MAX . . . . .	260
OAKLEY, CHARLES SELBY . . . . .	129
PAINE, THOMAS . . . . .	133
QUEYRAT, F. . . . .	110
RATZEL, FRIEDRICH . . . . .	526
REYNOLDS, E. . . . .	110
SEELEY, J. R. . . . .	114
SHEBBEARE, CHARLES JOHN . . . . .	120
SHELDON, W. L. . . . .	236
SMITH, ADAM . . . . .	385
SPENCER, HERBERT . . . . .	359
STEPHEN, LESLIE . . . . .	232
STIMSON, F. J. . . . .	369
STOUT, G. F. . . . .	522
STRONG, CHARLES . . . . .	398
STRONG, THOMAS B. . . . .	514
SULLY, JAMES . . . . .	105
THOMAS, W. CAVE . . . . .	510
VANDERVELDE, EMILE . . . . .	112
WESSLAU, O. E. . . . .	98
WHITTAKER, THOMAS . . . . .	102
WILLOUGHBY, WESTEL WOODBURY . . . . .	116
WULF, MAURICE DE . . . . .	394

532



# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

---

OCTOBER, 1896.

---

## INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.

### I. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONTRASTED WITH INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

IN the early years of the sixteenth century, Henry IV. of France and his minister Sully were busy elaborating what they called the Great Design. Christian Europe, excluding Muscovy, was to be formed into an organized body with a government—legislative, judicial, executive—backed by a common force of two hundred and seventy-three thousand soldiers and one hundred and seventeen great ships. For this purpose its political boundaries were to be rearranged in a very thoroughgoing manner, so that six hereditary and six elective crowns with three republics should form the fifteen states of the federation, sufficiently equal in strength to secure its stability. Even the internal affairs of these states were to be so far subject to the common government that domestic wars of religious and political factions should be prevented equally with international wars. The king and the minister well knew that such an institution could only be established by force, and it may be doubted whether they dreamed of its establishment as possible even as the result of the enterprises which Henry was preparing when the knife of Ravaillac ended his life.

But even the visions with which kings and ministers amuse themselves require some explanation when they depart so far

from the common. Arbitration and mediation were not unknown. There has never been a time in history when they were unknown, and they had often been the instruments of maintaining peace. Why, then, did Henry and Sully not take them as the basis of the method by which they dreamed of securing perpetual peace? The answer is that the renaissance had not quite spent its force, and the renaissance, like France herself, was bold and logical. Over independent states there could be no power to enforce submission to arbitration or performance of an award. The path which had led to the existence of so much social order as was enjoyed within a state was the submission of individuals to government. Perpetual peace could not exist between states unless they, too, submitted to some government, sacrificing a part of their independence to found an ordered commonwealth of nations. At the same time the slow processes of evolution had not been studied; what the best spirits of that age saw to be ultimately necessary they could not believe to be immediately impossible.

The vision of the Great Design long haunted thinkers, though statesmen had done with it. Saint Pierre, Bentham, and Kant in the eighteenth century—even Saint Simon in the opening of the nineteenth—formed projects of perpetual peace, founded on the submission of states to government, though, not having armies at their back, they could not imitate their illustrious forerunners by proposing the preliminary rearrangement of Christendom. But, now, thinkers, too, are no longer under the spell. They have turned from sketching imaginary international governments to the more practical, or more immediately practical, task of promoting international arbitration. Two powerful causes have contributed to this change of line.

First, the idea of national independence has grown so much in strength that even a theorist would now hesitate to advocate the surrender of any part of that independence. The world of Henry and Sully was one in which a very large number of men, including many of the best and most earnest, felt themselves nearer, even for purposes of action, to foreigners of their religion than to their fellow-countrymen of a different religion.

Of this state of things the only remaining trace is the sentiment which would disturb national politics in order to restore the temporal power of the papacy—a sentiment of such limited influence that it may be regarded as one of those exceptions which prove rules—the rule in this case being the supremacy of the state tie in the modern world. Again, in the time of Henry and Sully the liberties known and valued in the larger part of Europe were chiefly provincial and municipal liberties. If these were left untouched, a province or a city bore with equanimity its transfer from one larger political aggregate to another, in neither of which was it allowed much influence on the conduct of the greater affairs of state. But now every Christian country is permeated by a national life; its people are powerful and conscious factors in determining its international attitude, even though their power to do so may not be recognized in its constitutional forms; they are deeply attached to the independent national existence which they feel to be their own existence.

Secondly, abundant experience of international arbitrations has proved that the awards given in them are generally carried out. Logic may reiterate the warning that there is no security for their being carried out, but the theoretical imperfection of arbitrations arising from this cause is not felt to be practically a great deduction from the value of the service which they can render to peace.

The two causes which have been noticed may be summed up by saying that thinkers have turned from schemes of international government to promoting international arbitration, because the surrender of any part of national independence is felt to be at once less possible and less necessary.

Here, however, before I leave the subject of international government, I would guard myself against being supposed to imply that the ultimate destiny of civilization will not be in that direction. What is clear is that an ordered commonwealth of nations will not come about by constitution-mongering, but it is not clear that evolution is not working for it. Let any one consider the authority which during the present century has been assumed by the great powers of Europe, and exercised

by them at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, and at that of Berlin in 1878. Let him consider the prohibitions against exercising the belligerent right of blockade, to which powers not recognized as great ones have now to submit—as the Chilian insurgents of 1891, who were not allowed to blockade Valparaiso and Iquique, though their belligerent right in respect of contraband of war was not disputed; and Japan, which was not allowed to blockade the treaty-ports of China. It will be difficult for him to resist the conviction that the tendencies are already in operation which in a remote future may crystallize into some form of international government. But the hint, though it may be given, is not one on which it would be useful to enlarge. In certain matters of politics it is easier to look forward a thousand years than fifty. By observing the point towards which the great streams of tendency in history converge, a glimpse may sometimes be obtained of a distant goal, but the route by which that goal will be reached will depend on those unpredictable combinations which we call chance. Your friend is in London; you have reason to believe that he is going to Edinburgh, but whether he will travel by York, Leeds, or Preston depends on circumstances in his affairs of which you are ignorant. The streams of tendency may be deflected in their course by obstacles which loom large for a time and then disappear in their turn. We may believe that a thousand years hence there will be a United States of Europe and a United States of all America, without pledging ourselves to the belief that that consummation will be sensibly nearer fifty years hence than it is now. Our duty in the interest of peace is to pursue it on the line which at present is that of least resistance, and that is certainly the promotion of international arbitration without demanding an organized security that the awards of arbitrators will be obeyed; in other words, without trying to convert international arbitration into international judicature.

## II. ARBITRATION CONTRASTED WITH MEDIATION.

Having thus cleared the ground for our subject on one side by contrasting arbitration with government, it will be well to

clear it on another side by pointing out the difference between arbitration and mediation. Arbitration is a proceeding in which a difference is referred, by the agreement of the parties, to the decision of one or more arbitrators. The agreement may be a special one made for the case, or it may be a general one for referring differences of a certain defined class, whenever such may arise between the parties, or it may be one for referring all differences which shall arise between the parties. The essential point is that the arbitrators are required to decide the difference—that is, to pronounce sentence on the question of right. To propose a compromise, or to recommend what they think best to be done, in the sense in which best is distinguished from most just, is not within their province, but is the province of a mediator.

Arbitrations may take place either between private persons in a state or between states. If the parties are private persons, the agreement by which they refer their difference to the arbitrators may be a binding one by the law of their state, so that, as the result of contract, the award of the arbitrators will be enforced as effectually as if it were the judgment of a court. When the parties are sovereign states, the sentence of the arbitrators will merely create a new right between them. Suppose that state A was in the right in the original difference, but that the award is given in favor of state B, the good faith of the arbitrators being unimpeachable, B now has a right by contract to have the award performed, though he cannot invoke any legal process for its enforcement. If B was also originally in the right, it has this new right added to its original claim.

Mediation also may take place either between private persons or between states, only in the former case the term would scarcely be used, because it is so simple for private persons to seek the advice of a common friend that a formal name is scarcely wanted for the proceeding. But between statesmen giving advice is a serious matter. Neither between private persons nor between states does a new right arise out of the advice given, but when a state commits itself to an opinion about what two other powers had best do, the hope arises on

the one side and the fear on the other, or perhaps the fear on both sides, that it may interfere actively in support of its opinion. Even if the state which has given the advice is so plainly without any interest in the question that its interference is not to be expected, still, the advice may add a moral weight to the side towards which it most leans, and moral weight is of great importance in the society of states, in which approval or disapproval has to find an outlet in any way that it can, for want of organized channels in which its pressure may be brought to bear. Hence, between states trying to bring two parties together, every amicable means, even without passing sentence on the justice of their respective claims, is an important proceeding, known by the technical name of mediation, or, in its less formal shape, by that of good offices.

We may now mark the position of international arbitration as a mean between mediation on the one hand, and the Great Design, or what Tennyson called "the parliament of man, the federation of the world," on the other hand. Unlike mediation, arbitration calls for a sentence; but, unlike the Great Design, arbitration, when international, calls for no enforcement of that sentence, trusting to the good sense and good feeling of the party against whom it is pronounced, and to the pressure of international opinion on him.

### III. GENERAL CONSENT THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.

Such being the nature of the subject with which we are concerned, the first question which meets us is whether the efforts of statesmen should be limited to promoting arbitration in every special instance to which it seems possible to apply it, or whether they should try to conclude general arbitration treaties, by which the states that may be parties to them shall agree to refer to arbitration either all their differences or all falling within a certain description. Here we encounter at the outset the fact that scarcely any one appears to think that the reference of all international differences to arbitration is possible. The Pan-American Congress of 1890 adopted a "Plan of Arbitration," of which Article 4 ran thus: "The sole ques-

tions excepted from the provisions of the preceding articles are those which, in the judgment of any one of the nations involved in the controversy, may imperil its independence, in which case for such nation arbitration shall be optional, but it shall be obligatory upon the adversary power." This plan received the votes of sixteen of the nineteen American republics, including the United States, the three wanting being Chili, Uruguay, and San Domingo. Similarly, M. Dreyfus, one of the latest and most enthusiastic supporters of arbitration, writes: "There are controversies to which there can be no obligation to apply it. When the independence or the integrity of a nation is at stake, all the treaties in the world could not force that nation to accept it." \* Other writers add honor to independence and territorial integrity as excepting a difference from arbitration. It is true that treaties have been concluded by which states have pledged themselves to refer to arbitration all differences without exception, but so far as I am aware these have only been between Switzerland, Spain, or Belgium on the one side and American or African republics on the other side, and between Portugal and the Netherlands; all of them countries between which any difference falling within the principles of exception above noticed is so improbable that their governments might well think it unnecessary to be at the trouble of formulating a condition to meet such a case. We must, then, admit that, by general consent, there are some limits to international arbitration, and we have to ask whether it is possible to assign those limits in a treaty with sufficient clearness.

#### IV. CAN THE LIMITS TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION BE ASSIGNED?

The word "independence," when used in this connection, is extremely vague. The independence of a nation is at stake, not only when the continuance of its separate existence as a

---

\* *L'Arbitrage International*, par Ferdinand Dreyfus, avec une préface de Frédéric Passy, membre de l'Institut, Paris, 1892, p. 355.

nation is directly brought into question, nor even only when the question is one of reducing its limits so far as to make it difficult for the residue of the nation to maintain its separate existence. A state is injured in its independence whenever, without menacing its separate existence, it is hindered in doing or not doing anything that an independent state may justly do or abstain from doing. Such a case will never appear on the face of an arbitrator's sentence, because the sentence will always profess to follow the principles of justice in what it awards to be done or not to be done, but it will exist in fact whenever the sentence does not really follow the principles of justice. Therefore a clause in an arbitration treaty, by which a signatory state is allowed to refuse arbitration whenever in its judgment the controversy imperils its independence, will bear the interpretation that it may refuse arbitration whenever in its judgment a decision adverse to it would be so plainly unjust as to be an outrage to its independence. An exception, however, which was openly expressed to be of that width would go far to destroy the value of the treaty; while, on the other hand, if it should be meant to restrict the exception to cases in which the continued existence of the state as a separate member of the society of nations is thought to be imperilled, then, first, it should be distinctly so expressed, and, secondly, it is doubtful whether any two great powers would conclude a mutual arbitration treaty in which the exception was so restricted.

The word "honor," though as above mentioned it has been used by writers, need not be particularly considered. If any satisfactory definition could be reached of the outrage to independence which should exempt a difference from arbitration, that definition would cover all the cases in which the honor of a nation was so deeply at stake as to make arbitration impossible.

It is, perhaps, not difficult to perceive the idea which underlies all the limitations of arbitration that have been proposed. It turns on the distinction between legal and political questions. Legal questions are suitable for arbitration; political questions are in general not so. But the terms "legal" and

"political," though they would probably be found intelligible enough for practical purposes, are not suitable for use in a treaty, seeing that they are not technical terms of international law recognized in diplomacy for the purpose of expressing a distinction. It will be worth our while to analyze the distinction which they are suggested for expressing, and if the analysis should not result in hitting on language which might be used in a treaty, it will at least clear our views on the subject.

By a legal difference between states, one is meant which can be settled by reference to known rules, having at their back that force which is derived from the general consent of the international society. We have nothing here to do with the circumstance that the force referred to, though very real, is unorganized, and therefore irregular in its action. Having agreed, as students of international arbitration and not of international government, to dismiss the question of enforcing awards, we have nothing to do with the mode of action of the force in question. We have only to do with the existence, in favor of each particular rule, of the consent from which the force arises. The rules which must govern a difference between states, in order that it may properly be described as a legal difference, must be known and generally consented to as the ground of international action, whatever form that action may take. This may be illustrated by examples.

An arbitration is now pending between Great Britain and the Netherlands, the distinguished Russian jurist, M. Fr. de Martens being the arbitrator, in which damages are claimed for Carpenter, the captain of an Australian ship, the "Costa Rica Packet," by reason of his arrest in the Dutch East Indies and the mode in which he was dealt with there by the Dutch courts. Here the award must turn on the questions whether the Dutch authorities had jurisdiction in the case, and whether they exercised their jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the practice of civilized nations. International law is clear that the claim must fail if these questions are answered in the affirmative, and all that will be required, beyond the ascertainment of the facts, is therefore Dutch law and a moderate dose

of comparative jurisprudence. No case could more clearly be suitable for arbitration.

Next let us consider the recent Behring Sea arbitration. No part of international law is better settled than the rules for the exercise of authority in time of peace on the high seas, and the conditions under which any part of the sea can be claimed by a state as being within its exclusive sovereignty are equally clear, subject to some question of measure in cases near the border-line of right, which did not arise with regard to the Behring Sea, and which, if it had arisen, would have fallen as reasonably within the discretion of an arbitrator as certain questions of measure in applying the principles of national law fall within the discretion of a judge. Here, therefore, was another legal difference marked out for arbitration by its nature, though the rules to be applied were exclusively those of international law.

Now pass to the famous "Alabama" arbitration. Here there had been a divergence of opinion between Great Britain and the United States as to the international rules with regard to the conduct required from neutrals in war, and so long as that divergence continued the question was not one for arbitration, unless any one will contend that arbitrators should be intrusted with the power of fixing doubtful law, as to which more will be said later. At any rate, the divergence in question made it impossible to settle the difference between the countries by rules known and consented to, and so prevented its being what is here called a legal difference. But as soon as the parties agreed on the Three Rules as applicable to the case, it only remained to apply those rules to the facts; in other words, the difference became a legal one and suitable for arbitration.

As an example of a political difference we may take the following: By the treaty of Paris, which England and France imposed on Russia in 1856, at the close of the Crimean war, the Black Sea was neutralized, and Russia and Turkey engaged not to maintain or establish any maritime arsenal on its coast. Experience has not shown that such limitations of what a great power may do within its own territory can be

permanently upheld, however their imposition may suit the circumstances of a given moment; but where, as in this case, the treaty does not fix a term for its duration, the lapse of time or the change of circumstances that may give a claim for its rescission is quite indefinite. The claim to rescission depends on the political configuration of the world. How far have the dangers ceased to exist against which the limitation was intended to provide? And in answering this it must be remembered that not only the might of the different powers has to be looked to, but also their respective policies and designs. Again, if the dangers against which the limitation was intended to provide have not ceased to exist, it may still be asked whether the limitation is any longer the wisest method of providing against them, whether the attempt to perpetuate it would not cause greater dangers in the actual political configuration. These are questions which elude all definition by rules. In 1871, Russia, taking advantage of the disablement of France, denounced the clauses which were obnoxious to her and proceeded to re-establish her arsenal at Sebastopol. The opinion was widely, perhaps generally, entertained in England that Russia had no fair claim so to act, but it was beyond the strength of any single power to maintain the clauses. A conference was assembled, a verbal tribute was paid to the binding character of treaties, and the limitations were removed by consent. Now, suppose that France had not been disabled, and had concurred with England in thinking that the Black Sea clauses of 1856 ought to be maintained, could such a difference between those powers and Russia have been referred to arbitration? An arbitrator must have said that from a legal point of view, which was the only one he could entertain, there were not two sides to the question; that it was past all doubt that a state cannot by a unilateral act put an end to a stipulation it had signed. But would any great power have been content for the political question to be so disposed of? Clearly not. As little would Parliament be content to be prevented from modifying contracts on the ground of public policy by the declaration of a judge, true as it would be, that a party cannot free himself single-handed

from a contract. Till "the parliament of man" becomes a fact, powers have to do for themselves what parliaments do for private persons. The case supposed would have been one in which the claim for relief would not have been repugnant on its face to the principles of international law. Almost all theorists on the subject agree that the tacit but undefined condition, *rebus sic stantibus*, is attached to treaties. Even in England, thinkers like J. S. Mill approved the claim of Russia to relief. But the claim did not admit of being put in a legal shape, because the appreciation of the circumstances on which its true value depended could not be reduced to rule, but was a question for statesmen.

Two objections may be anticipated to what has just been said. One will come from those who desire that every international difference shall be settled on what have been here distinguished as legal grounds—that is, by rules known and consented to. They would condemn all international action which could not show such a ground, and respect the existence of every legally existing arrangement for the alteration of which the approval of every state concerned could not be obtained. But not much time need be spent in repudiating a view of international duty which, for example, would condemn all interference on behalf of the Armenians or the Cretans, because it is impossible to qualify the independence of the Sultan or of any other power by legal definition.

The other objection will take this shape. It will be admitted that arbitration, strictly speaking, is a proceeding for obtaining a sentence on the legal right or wrong of a dispute. But it will be said that that is not what was meant in advocating arbitration as capable of being resorted to in all international differences. It will be said that every international difference can and ought to be referred to some one with power to settle it in one way or another; on legal grounds if such can be found and are satisfactory; if not, then on all the grounds which would be open to statesmen in dealing with the case. The arbitrator is to be both judge and, if need be, legislator. He is to combine the offices of arbitrator and mediator, with the addition that when in the latter character

he proposes a solution not as what is legally just, but as what is best, his proposal shall have what the advice of a mediator has not, the same force as the award of an arbitrator, binding the parties and creating a new right between them. But this objection is not more practical than the other. It is very likely that in some cases of no great importance two nations may by special agreement create over themselves a jurisdiction of so far-reaching a character, but it is not to be imagined that any nation should in advance surrender its destiny to such a jurisdiction by a general treaty.

#### V. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREGOING.

The foregoing considerations may lead us to the following conclusions:

International arbitration is not a proceeding that can ever be applicable to all international differences, and some reservation must therefore be contained in every general arbitration treaty.

It is difficult to describe the cases which are intended to be reserved by any terms which the negotiators of general arbitration treaties could trust to be understood in any precise sense, though some help may probably be given by well-chosen words. Even the danger to independence, which the Pan-American plan gives as the only reason for declining arbitration, may be a useful expression to employ, though it will not bear defining further. The reservation, in whatever terms it may be couched, must leave it substantially to the parties to decline the application of the treaty whenever they think it necessary to do so.

But the nature of the cases which will not admit of arbitration is clear enough, both from the reason of the thing and from the experience of arbitrations which has been gained, to make it probable that between parties of good faith there will be little difference of opinion as to the applicability of the remedy in particular cases. Therefore between such parties the employment of loose words to express the reservation will probably not do much harm. On the other hand, every refusal to apply a general arbitration treaty in a case in which

it ought to be applied will embitter the original difference by adding a charge of bad faith to the original cause of difference. It will therefore be best to abstain from concluding general arbitration treaties except between states which can count on one another to work them in good faith.

I believe that Great Britain and the United States are nations between which a general arbitration treaty may usefully be concluded, provided that it be concluded, not under the impression that any treaties can be panaceas for international differences, but after such discussion as may enlighten both nations about the reality and meaning of the reservation which the treaty will have to contain.

#### VI. SHOULD ALL QUESTIONS OF LAW BE REFERRED TO ARBITRATION?

The cases for international arbitration have been described as legal ones, without pretending to scientific accuracy, but it is hoped with some practical degree of clearness. On this it may be asked whether, even where law is concerned, it is proper to intrust arbitrators with an unlimited power of declaring it. Where the law is so openly a matter of controversy that that controversy is a principal part of the difference to be settled, in which case the difference is not a legal one in the sense of calling only for the application of known and admitted rules, it is scarcely possible to regard an arbitration as a proper means of declaring the law. International jurists of any eminence will almost certainly be known to lean to one side of the question or the other, and will therefore be unacceptable as arbitrators. Other jurists, and even judges of state courts who are not eminent international lawyers, would not be considered qualified to take what would be a great step towards legislating for the world on subjects with which they were not conversant. Crowned heads and statesmen, accustomed to weigh such questions, and acquainted by experience with their ramifications and bearings, are the class by whose judgment the disputed rule will in the main be ultimately fixed; but this will only be by their judgment as a class, when time and the varying circumstances of different occa-

sions have eliminated transient bias. Impartial and wise members of that class are difficult to find on each particular occasion. The best, and perhaps the only, way in which cases of disputed international law can be submitted to arbitration is that which was adopted in the "Alabama" case—namely, by the parties agreeing, if possible, on rules to be applied *pro hac vice*, leaving those rules to make their way in the world afterwards or not, according to their merit.

But another case may arise. The international rules to be applied may be well known and generally consented to by civilized mankind, and the claim of one party may have been brought forward in defiance of them. Is it a duty of the other party to submit to an arbitration on such a claim? Demands made in open defiance of law are common enough in private life, and are sometimes pushed as far as into the courts of justice, which in that event have the means of dealing with them quickly and sharply enough. They cannot be excluded from the courts, and the protection which private persons enjoy from the law of the land compensates them for the occasional annoyance which arises from the courts being open to all. But the law of nations, wanting as it is in organized instruments, confers no equal protection. Is it therefore always a sufficient argument as between states, "if your case is so clear, trust it to an arbitration"? This is a very important question, both as to the use which a state may properly make of the liberty reserved to it in a general arbitration treaty, and as to the propriety of refusing an arbitration in the absence of such a treaty. An illustration will best enable it to be understood, and one is unhappily at hand.

In the difference now pending between Great Britain and Venezuela as to their boundary in Guiana, the Venezuela case avowedly comprises the following points: I do not say that it rests on them, for we are not here concerned to inquire what other points it may comprise. It is alleged (1) that the whole of Guiana came under the sovereignty of Spain by means of a papal grant and of discovery; (2) that the effect of these titles in conferring sovereignty was not and is not limited by possession in fact, wherefore the Dutch could not advance

by settlement, even over unoccupied territory, beyond the limits within which Spain recognized them by the treaty of Munster in 1648, while the Spaniards were free to extend their settlements beyond the limits which they had then reached; and (3) that, on questions of territorial sovereignty, international law admits no prescription but an immemorial one. Now, international prescription, short of being immemorial, is admitted in principle by the great majority of jurists: no term of years has been fixed for it, and the necessary term may well vary with the circumstances, and be left to the decision of arbitrators if the principle be conceded. And the doctrines put forward by Venezuela concerning the papal grant and discovery without possession had been denied by Queen Elizabeth as early as 1580; the American colonies of England, past and present, had been built on their denial; they are not maintained by any school of jurists; and the King of Spain had placed himself on much narrower ground during the Nootka Sound controversy in 1790. In these circumstances it appeared to me that the doctrines adduced were frivolous, but that the demand for an arbitration on them was supported in a manner which might make mere frivolity serious. I accordingly wrote (*London Times* of 10th February, 1896) that it did not lie in the mouth of any nation to say that its claim was reasonable enough for it to be entitled to an arbitration on it, and at the same time that the other party might feel secure of the arbitrators rejecting it. And I recommended that England, by a proceeding similar to that of the United States in the "Alabama" case, should make it the condition of an arbitration that certain rules of law relating to the title to territory should be laid down to guide the arbitrators, or else should limit an arbitration to such part of the territorial claim of Venezuela as did not plainly depend on the inadmissible doctrines.

My opinion on the particular case which has been mentioned may have been sound or otherwise. But in an article on international arbitration it would be impossible to pass over the point that a self-respecting nation can scarcely be called on to discuss before arbitrators doctrines which cannot

be denied without impertinently calling in question its own history and the general judgment of the world.

## VII. THE USE OF MEDIATION.

Where the difference between two states is what has been roughly described as a political one, or where for any other reason an arbitration is impossible, it is a plain duty to seek the good offices or mediation of friendly powers. It is very unfortunate that this is so rarely done, at least in circumstances promising success to the remedy. Thus, the plenipotentiaries assembled at the Congress of Paris in 1856 recorded in their protocols the wish that states, "before appealing to arms, should have recourse, as far as circumstances may allow, to the good offices of a friendly power;" and in the treaty which they concluded it was stipulated that, before the employment of force between Turkey and any of the other contracting parties, an opportunity should be afforded of preventing such an extremity by the mediation of the other contracting parties. Turkey appealed to this stipulation in 1877, as an answer to the declaration of war against her by Russia, after all the circumstances had been the subject of prolonged discussion between her and the great Christian powers, whose united demands she had refused; and the appeal was naturally in vain. Though Russia alone was in arms, it was Christian Europe with which Turkey was in difference, and her appeal for mediation was substantially an appeal to her opponents to abandon, and to induce Russia to abandon, a part of their exigencies. If, in pursuance of the wish expressed by the plenipotentiaries of 1856, France and Prussia, in 1870, had invoked the mediation of the powers which were not concerned in their difference, there can be no doubt that means might have been found to save the honor of each country without a resort to war.

It may be further observed that there is a class of cases in which mediation might usefully be combined with arbitration—namely, where a difference which calls for the application of legal rules can nevertheless not be entirely disposed of by such rules. For instance, suppose that in a boundary dispute

referred to arbitration it appeared that there was some territory to which neither party could establish a title in accordance with the acknowledged rules of international law. It would be desirable that the arbitrator, after awarding to each party all that it could lawfully claim, should possess the power of a mediator to propose a division of what remained. And he might be clothed with that power by special agreement, where the possibility that occasion might arise for its exercise could be foreseen. I proposed that this course should be taken in the difference between Great Britain and Venezuela, considering that, after due effect had been given to possession and prescription, there might remain forests untrodden by civilized men to which no legal title could be made out (*London Times*, January 6, 1896).

#### VIII. GENERAL CONCLUSION.

It now only remains to impress on all whom this article may reach the duty of promoting international arbitration. To the statesmen who are believed to be engaged in negotiating some general arbitration treaty between Great Britain and the United States, it is only possible to wish God-speed. Those who are not engaged in such a task can more usefully occupy themselves with ideas than with plans: too little can be known from the outside of the mental attitude of those who are concerned in negotiating the treaty, or who will be chiefly concerned in working it if concluded, what difficulties may appear to them the most formidable, and what amount of good-will and flexibility can be relied on for overcoming in practice difficulties that look formidable on paper. And after all, a treaty of which the philanthropic provisions can only be concluded or applied with reservation bears a resemblance to those formal promises of amendment of which the moral value to a sinner depends on at least an attempt being made to carry them honestly into effect. Without such an attempt, the idle words may scarcely have even the negative merit of insignificance which may be predicated of the Paris protocol in favor of mediation, they may lull the conscience to sleep and discredit a good cause. What is wanted is actually to have an

arbitration on every international difference which can be brought to admit of it, whether by application of a general arbitration treaty, if there should be such a treaty between the parties, or by special arrangement for the case. Every actual instance confirms the habit: it secures peace on the occasion, and makes it more likely that peace will be secured on future occasions.

I spoke just now, advisedly, of international differences which can be brought to admit of arbitration. The great number of international arbitrations which there have been in recent years is sometimes paraded as though we were in the presence of the beginning of a process which only had to be continued in order to lead of itself to all but universal arbitration. There is some truth in that view, but there is also another side of the facts. Arbitration is already applied between states to almost every difference which appears on the face of it to fall within the category which has been roughly described as legal. Those are not the differences out of which it need now be seriously apprehended that wars will arise. What is wanted is earnest effort to bring more or less within the range of arbitration differences which do not at first sight admit of it. It should be considered on each such occasion whether some part of the difference does not admit of arbitration; whether, as to the rest, the powers of a mediator might not be given to the arbitrator; whether, if unlimited arbitration be impossible, it may not be possible to fence a reference by conditions securing the honor of the parties, and those real and great interests which they must not allow to be imperilled. If it should be found practicable to bring the parties together for the quasi-judicial discussion of any points before arbitrators, so much will have been withdrawn from the dangerous part of the case, and their temper for the diplomatic discussion of the remainder will probably have been improved. Shall I go further, and say that even some questions of politics and honor, questions affecting independence in the large and true meaning of the term, may be referred to arbitrators? To persons from whom, as from ordinary arbitrators, a sentence binding the parties should be required, although it cannot be

given on legal grounds? It is possible that this may be so, where the questions are not of vital importance, and where the arbitrators are carefully chosen with a view to the special nature of the difference. But to extend the practical bounds of arbitration in the ways indicated would be something more than to continue a process which can as yet be pronounced to be working, and will demand the active and intelligent co-operation of statesmen and of public opinion on each available occasion.

But for the encouragement of the lovers of peace it may be said that from various causes, some of which have been touched on above, international arbitration is in the air. When this happens to an idea, and as long as it continues to be the case, the power of the idea for good cannot be measured by logic, necessary as it is that we should do our best to understand the conditions in order to work with them. It is the season to raise our hopes, and do our utmost to try what the idea of international arbitration can accomplish.

J. WESTLAKE.

CHELSEA, ENGLAND, July 2, 1896.

---

## SETTLEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL QUESTION.

ONE of the facts which demands the attention of scientific men and statesmen at the present day is the condition of international society. Indeed, there is no system of concrete, positive laws on the subject, determining what each state may do and what it must refrain from doing; that is to say, laws of the *modus vivendi*. Hence it is that an incessant warfare is being waged between politics and right, nourished by the tendency of governments to subordinate all their actions to the triumph of their own temporary interests in their relationship to actual conditions.

In the graver questions politics ordinarily takes precedence of right. Thus, for instance, in order to decide whether

certain provinces should be added to one state or another, whether the state's territorial possessions should be enlarged or curtailed, whether the balance of power in certain regions should be settled in favor of one or another, whether such colonial expansion can be attained and justified, and so on,—the settlement of all these and similar questions depends on the secret labors of diplomacy and on the preponderance of the interests of one or the other.

Now, since each government can sustain its political pretensions only by means of its superior strength, each state endeavors to increase its military force; and, as the power of a single government can no longer suffice, each seeks to strengthen itself by making alliances, by constantly increasing its armament, in order to gain by its own military resources and by the aid of such alliances the most effective means for insuring the triumph of its political policy.

Conflicts are of frequent occurrence. Therefore, as there is no system of law obtaining among nations fitted to determine on which side justice lies, and as besides we have no method for legally repressing abuses and preventing and repairing injuries to the rights of others, the state which considers itself offended has no other redress than to rely upon its own strength and to resort to the ruinous method of declaring war, in order to obtain reparation of the offence or execution of the obligations assumed. And since in war it is always the strongest that triumphs, the mistaken idea is admitted and accredited that in practice any pretension can be upheld if it only has force to back it up and make itself respected by others. For this reason every state during times of peace endeavors to prepare for war and aims at constantly strengthening its military power; and those states most anxious to be first study the most powerful means of offense and defence in order to be able in due time to succeed in war, and thus secure the triumph of their own political interests.

From such a necessity arise the following results: that all the states of Europe are incessantly increasing their armaments during times of peace, the actual cost of which absorbs the greater part of the income of each country; that the Par-

liaments of these countries, in order to counterbalance the preponderance of rival powers, find themselves inevitably drawn into the current and obliged to approve of ever-increasing grants for military expenses. The worst of it is that no one can foresee to what point this incessant need of new armaments will be carried; for, as science every day perfects new methods of attack, this renders indispensable a continual revision of the methods of defence in order to enable the state to present sufficient resistance. It can thus be said that the chief energy of the nations during times of peace is expended in efforts to increase their military forces in order to preserve the equilibrium of power; but they never seem to arrive at a point when they may safely consider themselves sufficiently prepared for war. When ordinary resources do not suffice for the purpose, recourse must be had to extraordinary means. The appropriations are distributed over the balance-sheet for several successive years, and if it is found necessary to make still further provision, the governments that possess credit take refuge in a loan,—a policy accepted by the Parliaments as a painful necessity imposed on all in order to sufficiently protect the life and security of the state. It is true, wars have become less frequent, both because no government can positively rely upon success in war, and because all nations hesitate to begin hostilities, in dread and horror of its inevitable consequences. At the present day armed peace prevents war. But in order to lessen the danger of war with its dreadful consequences, the disposition to increase the armament has become a perfect mania. In justification of the vast expenses caused by the excesses of militarism, ex-Chancellor Bismarck was wont to say that the money expended for the maintenance of military armaments is an insurance premium paid by the nations for the maintenance of peace,—a heavy premium, to be sure, but one which cannot be compared with the cost of war, even though successful.

The attention of men of all classes has been turned to the evils which are the inevitable result of a condition so costly and insecure as the present one of armed peace, including the possibility of war with all its horrors and attendant economic

misfortunes; and of late years the regrets and complaints caused by this state of things have become more general and more frequent.

Not only students who contemplate the dangers of the present situation and of the future, but also the working-people and their associations, and all those who live by industry, by commerce, by enterprise, or by manual work,—all have acquired the earnest conviction that it is necessary to put an end to the social disorder resulting from armed peace and excessive militarism, and that some method must be found to provide for the *modus vivendi* of civilized nations. This conviction, which is everywhere becoming popular, finds a powerful echo in the minds of those who observe how this state of things aggravates the social problem. Indeed, thoughtful men are convinced that, in order to satisfy the just demands of the social democracy,—which asks for a more just distribution of the profits of industry, a larger field for the development of every kind of activity and labor, and greater well-being for all,—it is needful, at all costs, to multiply and not to diminish the sources of wealth, to quicken the development of agriculture, of industry, and of commerce, to prevent the oscillations of credit, and to organize an international division of labor. All understand, moreover, that the social condition cannot be remedied during times of armed peace; for, on the one hand, it is constantly necessary to increase the armaments in order to prevent war, and, on the other hand, the difficulty of each state being able to begin the fight with any chance of success puts off the disastrous results of a general war without eliminating the danger of it. The truth is, that if menaces are not translated into action, it is because the governments concerned adopt the prudent course of taking time in order to be sure of measuring themselves against each other with success.

People generally being convinced of the necessity of getting rid of present evils, and of those still graver ones which might be the consequence of war, the proposal which has met with most general approval, and which may be considered most familiar and popular, is that the nations should be induced to settle all their disputes by arbitration. It has been thought,

indeed, that by forcing the nations to assume such an obligation the necessity for war would be removed and disarmament made possible, or at least excessive armaments considerably reduced. With such praiseworthy intentions in view, several legislative assemblies have passed a solemn vote inviting their own governments to agree with foreign ones in substituting arbitration for war.

Can arbitration become a legal and efficacious means for settling international questions? Can it settle controversies between nations so as to prevent and eliminate all the causes of war? Could the actual condition of international relations—which all must recognize as truly perilous and harmful by reason of excessive armaments—be substantially changed if the civilized nations would bind themselves to submit all their disputes to a tribunal of arbitration? What would be the practical influence of such an institution?

The proposal to make arbitration an ordinary and effective institution which shall take the place of war in settling international controversies has greatly interested the present generation ever since the settlement by arbitration of the Alabama question between Great Britain and the United States. We certainly do not desire to minimize its importance. It is not, indeed, a new thing, inasmuch as Thucydides and Plutarch tell us that controversies between cities belonging to the Greek confederation were submitted to arbitration. In the Middle Ages, too, the jurists and professors of universities, those especially of Perugia and Bologna, were, as is well known, called on to act as arbitrators in disputes between the various states. In modern times, moreover, arbitration has resulted in important decisions.\*

---

\* To be convinced of this, it will suffice to recall only a few of those of recent date:

Arbitration by the Emperor of Austria between Great Britain and Nicaragua, 1881.

A mixed commission to arbitrate between France and Chili, 1882.

Arbitration by the President of the French Republic between the Low Countries and the Republic of San Domingo, 1882.

Arbitration by Pope Leo XIII. between Germany and Spain. The affair of the Caroline Islands, 1885.

We would not be overestimating its importance, if we admit that the international question would be completely solved by the nations agreeing to submit to a tribunal of arbitration all controversies that might arise between them.

The difference that arose between Great Britain and the United States in the Alabama question could be opportunely solved by arbitration, because both governments had previously become convinced that their true interests required a pacific settlement. Great Britain, which is annually obliged to import grain worth about three hundred million francs to support its inhabitants, and which could not have carried on its industries without trade in cotton, was right in considering that if war was declared the United States would blockade the ports of the north and south of England, break up the trade in cotton and produce a famine, and that about five hundred thousand weavers would have been thrown out of employment. A pacific settlement was therefore sought, the chief difficulty being to find an expedient or a method of satisfying the dignity of the United States without hurting the pride of England. Great credit is due to the prudent men selected to arbitrate this important and difficult question for having been able to render a verdict acceptable to both countries, and for thus preventing war.

---

The commission to arbitrate between the Argentine Republic and Brazil, 1886.  
Arbitration by Spain between Columbia and Venezuela, 1887.

Arbitration by the minister of Spain at Bogota between Italy and Columbia, 1887.

Arbitration by President Cleveland between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 1888.

Arbitration by the Queen of Spain between Peru and Ecuador, 1888.

Arbitration by the Baron Lambermont between England and Germany. Affair of Lamoo, 1888.

Arbitration by the Emperor of Russia between France and the Low Countries. Affair of the boundaries of Guinea, 1888.

Arbitration by Sir Edward Momson between Denmark and Sweden, 1888.

Compromise between the United States and Venezuela, 1890.

Compromise between Germany, the United States, and Great Britain. Affair of Terranova, 1891.

Arbitration by Switzerland between England, the United States, and Portugal. Affair of the railroads at Delagoa Bay, 1891.

Arbitration between Great Britain and the United States relating to the question of the delimitation of territorial power in Behring Sea, 1893.

In other cases, too, arbitration has had good results, because the controversies related to special interests of the states in question. Hence we may reach the conclusion that arbitration is adapted to settle all questions and controversies between states that relate to their particular interests ; that it would be proper for the states to assume a formal obligation to submit to arbitration all disputes that may be settled by compromise ; and that even when they have not previously pledged themselves to such a course, those states that desire to act with prudence, rectitude, and justice should nevertheless feel themselves obliged to prevent serious conflicts by recognizing the evident reciprocal utility of submitting to the decision of a tribunal of arbitration all those differences of a legal kind which relate to their particular interests and which arise in the execution of a treaty agreed upon between them. But can we therefore conclude that by inducing the nations to agree to arbitration, and by getting them to make a treaty to that effect, we have found a solution of the international question ? Would war be eliminated by the substitution of arbitration ? This seems to us a generous desire, but looked at practically it appears an exaggerated hope.

In order to thoroughly solve the international question a broader conception is indispensable. We are convinced that, as long as the present condition of things remains, a proclamation that arbitration must take the place of war would not solve the international question nor do away with the excesses of militarism and the serious discomforts of armed peace. Indeed, we must realize the fact that the peril of a general war and the need which each state feels of increasing its military force is not the result merely of the desire of each nation to obtain power in order to be able to solve all political controversies in its own way. Enlightened governments—those which comprehend the political, economic, and financial results of war and the serious social disturbances it inevitably brings about—will not be inclined to go to war for any trifling reason ; for whenever it happens that some dispute of a special kind arises, such as the affair of the Caroline Islands, the boundary disputes in Guinea, or the question of the seal fish-

eries, governments generally show their willingness to submit to arbitration, mutually bound as they are by the imperious necessity of avoiding war.

It is the larger problems of a general political nature which are liable to provoke war that render armed peace necessary. Have those who propose arbitration considered whether these latter questions are fit subjects for compromise? Can such controversies as the Eastern question, such problems as the ways of communication, free trade, the annexation and separation of certain territories, maintaining the equilibrium or moderating the preponderance of power,—can these complex political questions of international interest be settled by compromise? Will nations be inclined to submit to the decrees of, say, three statisticians or of three eminent jurists for the settlement of the controversies that may arise? Have the advocates of arbitration reflected that the decrees of the tribunal would remain ineffective if the same state that had agreed to submit to the judgment of the arbitrators would afterwards, for good or pretended reasons, refuse to obey? Do they realize that in order to make the proceedings of arbitration an effective means of international justice it is absolutely indispensable to ascertain the legal methods according to which the arbitrators must act? There being deplorable uncertainty in regard to some questions, and serious gaps of information concerning others, and regarding still other points a lack at the present day of any consensus of opinion among writers, as well as any uniform understanding among governments, what can be the good of a decree of arbitration with regard to those governments which are not previously convinced that their true interests require a pacific settlement? It is admitted that the principles themselves on which arbitrators must base their judgments cannot remain permanently fixed and have absolute authority upon all. It is admitted that every government can determine at its pleasure what laws it will consider legal, according to its own political views, and that it can carry out its pretensions whenever it has the power to do so. In a word, it is admitted that at the present day there is no system of rules and laws common to

all nations which would determine their rights and their duties in times of peace and in the eventuality of war. If all this is admitted, what would be the advantage of arbitrating with a nation that would render all useless by determining in its own way the legal rules of compromise, and which proposes, whether right or wrong, to support its own claims by force of arms?

Taking into consideration all this, it is clear, first, that we cannot consider arbitration effective in the case of general political controversies and complicated interests; second, that it can only be useful for disputes concerning special questions of a legal nature, and that in respect to these it is of supreme importance that the nations should agree to abide by the decisions of the tribunal; third, that in order to make arbitration effective the nations should agree to lay down the common principles according to which the arbitrators should judge, or at least to establish how common principles could be determined in each case where the interested parties cannot come to an agreement.

We have already said that in order to solve the international question we consider a broader conception indispensable. Indeed, it seems to us that in order to thoroughly solve the question it would be necessary to excogitate a plan for giving to the association of civilized states a form of legal organization.\*

It does not seem likely to us that we shall succeed in giving this association of states a form of organization similar to that of a great state. According to Bluntschli, this would be the ultimate form of the state in its highest manifestation.† The same idea has prompted Professor Lorimer, of the University of Edinburgh, to publish his own proposal for the organization of an international government with the plan of three departments, like the interior government of every state.‡ We maintain that it would be better to have an inter-

---

\* We have explained our own views on this subject in a volume entitled, "Ordinamento giuridico della Società degli Stati."

† Bluntschli's Works, Book I, Chap. I.

‡ See the article by Professor Lorimer, "Ultimate Problems of International Law," in the *Review of International Law*, Vol. IX. (1877), p. 161.

national congress with a clearly-defined authority and mission.

Such congresses should not aim, as they have done, at regulating the consequences of war, but should rather provide for safeguarding the common interests of nations; should try to prevent dangerous complications by agreeing upon the laws of the *modus vivendi* and placing them under the combined guardianship of the nations that proclaimed them. We do not aver, as Lorimer does, that a congress should be similar to a permanent parliament, convened to elaborate and proclaim the laws of international relations as one of its ordinary functions, but we believe that the civilized nations assembled in congress should do what was done at the Congress of Paris in 1856, when, in order to prevent all controversy resulting from the uncertainty of the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents during maritime war, the plenipotentiaries agreed to establish a common code of laws relating to piracy, blockades, and seizure of property during a naval war.

It seems to us that, in order to solve pending questions, and to prevent the continuance of a state of armed peace, with its more or less remote danger of a general war, it would certainly be timely and useful for the European states to call together a congress so as to come to an agreement concerning present problems, and in order to establish such laws as would forestall future troubles concerning particular interests, as well as those of a more general and complex kind. The latter, which could not be submitted to arbitration, it would be better to defer to a conference which, with more authority than that of a tribunal of arbitration, could decide concerning them. The congress should also determine how the conference should be held and what subjects it should discuss. It would also be well to determine the jurisdiction of the tribunal of arbitration, and how far its rules should be obligatory on the nations (independently of special cases agreed upon) in order to settle all disputes concerning questions of fact or relating to special interests. Besides, it would be necessary to determine how the rules of international law

are to be fixed by which arbitrators are to decide when the parties cannot arrive at any agreement, how their decrees should be enforced, in what way a state that refuses to submit can be made to obey, what, in short, should be the fundamental rules of procedure in arbitration, and how its execution could be secured. It would also be necessary to determine what steps could be taken during times of peace to force a state to respect such international regulations.

We do not dare to look so far ahead as to imagine that the states assembled in congress could ever succeed in compiling a body of laws having the authority and form of an international code. This would be an undertaking of the greatest importance. We must remember that in mundane matters we can only expect an end proportionate to the means, and that we cannot hope to attain the very best possible, but only what is relatively the best and helps us to avoid what is worse. Bearing this in mind, we cannot indulge in the hope that the nations will come to an agreement and compile a complete digest of international law. They might certainly recognize the common utility of solving questions that are undecided and coming to an agreement on less debated points in order to avoid settling them by war. It seems to us, however, that the nations could enlarge and complete the work initiated by the congress of Paris in 1856. At that congress the nations united in council, established several principles of maritime law to prevent future conflicts, and succeeded in establishing a common law relating to the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents during war. At the present time, however, there are many pending questions which tend to keep up a horrible state of things and which impose the necessity of armed peace and constantly threaten more and more a general war.

Unquestionably such a state of things cannot be indefinitely protracted. However long the solution may be put off, it is, nevertheless, sure to come. Recognizing that the excesses of militarism exhaust most precious resources and aggravate the social question ; that armed peace is an obstacle to all social progress and to general security ; that, if not forestalled,

the nations will sooner or later be forced into a ruinous war, the governments ought to assemble a congress in order to come to an agreement concerning the solution of the international problem as it exists to-day. They could establish the rules for a *modus vivendi*. If such laws were made, they would naturally be under the protection of those states which had united in proclaiming them, as was the case at the congress of Paris. If the laws of the *modus vivendi* were once determined, the reasonable limits of armaments could be settled and disarmament effected. This being agreed upon, and the power and authority of the conference established and the power and authority to be conferred upon arbitrators determined, then arbitration as an institution might realize the effective mission of eliminating the agitations which disturb peace and lead to the excesses of militarism. Until we have reached this point, the generous desire for substituting arbitration for war will always be praiseworthy, because prompted by humanitarian sentiments, but will not result in its realization.

But who in fact could take the initiative in assembling such a congress as we desire? This is without doubt the most difficult question. The rivalry of the great powers prevents any initiative coming from among them. Politics does not inspire generous desires, nor actions not prompted by actual interests or immediate utility. The only power that possesses the authority needed to translate into action this great scheme is the Pope. He, who should not be actuated by political motives, who desires peace between civilized nations, and who seeks to abolish war and to alleviate evils of all kinds that render the social question more serious, he alone is in a position to invite all the states of Europe to assemble in congress. Not being a political leader, the initiative of the Pope would certainly not excite suspicion and would appear in its true light,—that of providing in the best possible manner for the alleviation of present evils and the promotion of civilization. In a conversation with Cardinal Rampolla, in 1895, I laid before the eminent prelate these ideas. While with admirable benevolence he recognized that “an initiative on the

part of the Pope would be entirely in harmony with his high mission," he realized that "in order to induce him to make the attempt it would be necessary to be sure of success." That the Pope understands and appreciates the absolute necessity of abolishing war is made apparent by a letter written by Cardinal Rampolla to the *Daily Chronicle* in April, 1895, wherein the Cardinal, in the name of the Pope, makes manifest "his great satisfaction in the beginnings made to promote the institution of a permanent tribunal for deciding international controversies, and thus do away with the danger of war."

If the Pope wishes to carry out effectively the noble design of eliminating war, the indispensable means would be to promote general disarmament. And since the initiative of inviting the nations of Europe to a congress to establish the laws of a *modus vivendi* which will make disarmament possible and arbitration effective cannot be taken by any political power, we trust that the time will arrive when the Pope, with his great power for moral and humanitarian ends, will feel inclined to take the first step in such an undertaking.

PASQUALE FIORE.

UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES.

## IS THE FAMILY DECLINING? \*

THE title of this paper was suggested by the chapter on the "Decline of the Family" in Charles Pearson's interesting book on "National Life and Character." The writer there only gives form to a widely-spread impression that we are in the middle of a movement the issue of which can only be the disintegration of the family group and the transference of the functions that have hitherto been performed by it to the state. The object of my paper is to examine more closely than Mr. Pearson appears to have done the grounds of this impression, and to inquire whether it is really supported by the facts.

## I.

In the first place, as to the facts themselves and the causes to which they are referred, it must be admitted at once that there are many facts which lend countenance to the view that the family is on the decline. There are facts to prove that there are fewer marriages in proportion to population; that the families which result from these marriages are smaller; that they are less coherent; and that they are less lasting. Thus, Mr. Ogle † has shown in reference to the first of these points that, taking all classes together, the marriage rate in England fell between 1851 and 1881 from 17.2 to 15.2 per cent., and that between 1873 and 1888 the ages of men and women who marry rose respectively from 25.6 and 24.2 to 26.3 and 24.7, and this notwithstanding the fact that the average price of wheat went down from 38*s.* 6*d.* in 1851 to 31*s.* 10*d.* in 1888, while the price of British exports per head of population rose during the same period from £2 14*s.* 4*d.* to £6 4*s.* 11*d.* The statistics of divorce which go to establish the last point, viz., the diminished stability of marriages, are still more striking. The rise in the number of divorces during the quarter of a century between 1860 and

---

\* A lecture given for the London Ethical Society.

† *Journal of Statistical Society*, June, 1890, p. 254.

1885 seems to have been universal. To quote the case of England and America alone, while in 1871 England and Wales show 1 divorce to 1020.4 marriages, in 1879 this had become 1 in 480.83. Between the years 1867 and 1886 divorces in the United States is said to have increased 157 per cent., while the population showed an increase during the same period of 60 per cent.\* Some of the individual States showed a very high average. An American writer † quotes statistics from Massachusetts showing that divorces rose from 1 in 51 marriages in 1860 to 1 in 21.4 in 1878.

When we pass from the enumeration of the bare facts to inquire into their causes, the general impression that we are committed to vital changes in the institution of the family, and that there is no saying where they will stop, seems to receive further confirmation. Of these causes the first and most general is, of course, the whole modern movement of liberation. The century and a half which has witnessed the emancipation of nations from sovereigns, and of slaves from masters, has witnessed also the emancipation of the wife and mother from the state of dependence upon man, in which law and custom had so long detained her, and of children from the selfishness and caprices of parents.‡

Another of the more general causes is the disappearance in Protestant countries of the ecclesiastical and even the religious view of marriage. Here, also, the statistics are striking. To take only two examples. In Switzerland, in the year 1879, there were eight times the number of divorces in the Protestant as compared with the Roman Catholic cantons, although

\* See Lecky's "Democracy and Liberty," vol. ii., p. 173.

† Thwing, "The Family," p. 153.

‡ Höfding, "Ethik," p. 249, quotes an interesting indication of the growth of the idea of the rights of children in the middle of the present century. Speaking of the Danish Constitution of 1849, he mentions that the first draft of the clause that related to education claimed it as a right of parents, who were unable to send their children to school, to have them educated at the public expense. The clause was afterwards altered to a claim for children whose parents were not in a position to care for their education, that they should receive free instruction in the public schools, on the express ground that it was not the parents but the children whose rights were in question.

the population is only a half larger. In Alsace-Lorraine, since that province came under the Protestant system, in 1871, a large increase of divorce has taken place. Between 1874 and 1878 the number of divorces increased fourfold.\*

Of more special causes affecting the constitution of the family we have the growth of large cities both here and in America. This has completely altered the environment in which this organism lives and moves. Men have thus become less dependent upon women for the supply of their home needs. The immense development of club life both in the working and middle classes is probably inimical to the old idea of the home. And along with this goes the sadder consequence of the extent of prostitution. On the other hand, women have resources and interests which the simple life of the country or small town denies them. Another consequence is the bringing together of people of the most diverse antecedents, traditions, and even nationalities, and the rapid development of attachments formed on no deep acquaintance with the underlying traits of character or prevailing motives of action.

Among the more special causes ought to be mentioned the increased facilities for the higher education of women. A recent analysis of some fifteen hundred cases of women who have passed through a university training in England has shown that the number of marriages is distinctly lower than among an equal number chosen at random from the same class.† The writer draws the conclusion that the British mother ought to realize that in sending her daughter to these institutions the chances are much higher in favor of her becoming a teacher than a wife. The reason is partly that new intellectual interests are opened up and college friendships formed which make such women comparatively independent of the companionship of men. But, of course, facts like these can only be understood in connection with a second group of special causes, viz., the economic.

---

\* Oettingen, "Moral-Statistik," third edition, p. 168.

† *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1895. Of 1486 ex-students of the chief women's colleges in England whose after careers had been followed only 208 (about 14 per cent.) had married; 680 had become teachers.

That new economic opportunities for women of the middle class should act in a double way upon the institution of the family is only natural. On the one hand, they are a formidable rival in the mind of women themselves to the domestic and merely social life which marriage offers. On the other hand, they bring into the industrial market a new class of competitors with whom the standard of wages is no longer what is sufficient to support a family, but what is sufficient for an individual. So far as this is so, the tendency is to lower the general standard of wages and to make it more difficult for men to earn sufficient to justify them in marrying.

The effect of modern economic conditions upon the working-class family is of course different. It is noticeable rather in what I have called diminished coherence than in the diminished number of family groups. The workman is more dependent on a wife for the comforts of a home and for an addition to his wages. It is therefore not surprising to find that, contrary to what might be at first expected, marriages on the whole are more numerous in those counties in England in which women are earning independent wages.\* On the other hand, the home, when once formed, is apt to be more comfortless on account of the temptation the wife is under to go out to work or to take work home with her.†

## II.

We have seen that there is a general impression that the family is declining, and we have attempted a short analysis of the facts on which this impression rests. Do they really justify the conclusions drawn from them? Do they bear the interpretation that is put upon them? Others have been before us in this field, and not only accepted the view in question but endeavored to represent it as an inevitable and highly desirable result of social evolution. To give a point to my criticism, I take this extreme view at the outset. It has many sup-

---

\* *Journal of Statistical Society*, June, 1890.

† That this is not always the result of dire necessity seems proved by cases in which the wife's wages are supplementary to total weekly earnings of from fifty to sixty shillings. (Jevons, "Methods of Social Reform," p. 169.)

porters among socialistic writers, and has been stated with great vividness by Mr. Edward Carpenter in his recent book upon "Love's Coming of Age."

It is maintained by these writers that the monogamic family is a relic of a decaying form of civilization. All the ideas on which it rests,—the subordination and dependence of women, the ownership of children, the belief in the sacredness of marriage as a divine institution, above all, respect for individual ownership of property and the rights of inheritance as permanent elements in our social organization—have been undermined. The foundations are sapped and the superstructure is ready to topple in. The sooner it does so the better, seeing that it merely serves to propagate those habits of selfish isolation from common interests which it is the aim of the new *régime* effectually to stamp out, and thus forms one of the most serious obstacles to genuine social reform.

The view that is here taken of the present state and future prospects of the family is supported by an account of its historic origin, which stamps it from the outset as a morbid outgrowth upon the natural relations of male and female. "Far back in history," writes Mr. Carpenter,\* "at a time when in the early societies the thought of inequality had hardly arisen, it would appear that the female, in her own way—as sole authenticator of birth and parentage, as guardian of the household, as inventress of agriculture and the peaceful arts, as priestess and prophetess or sharer in the councils of the tribe,—was as powerful as man in his, and sometimes even more so. But from thence down to to-day what centuries of repression, of slavehood, of dumbness, of obscurity have been her lot!" The monogamic family owes its origin to the greed for private possession. What, therefore, more natural than that on the overthrow of the ideas on which this long interregnum of selfishness and oppression has rested the family should revert to the earlier type, which recognized the complete freedom and independence of wife and mother.

The view thus summarily stated opens, of course, questions

---

\* "Love's Coming of Age."

which it is impossible to discuss here, as, for instance, the justification of private property and the right of inheritance. Keeping clear of these larger issues, I shall confine myself to stating one or two objections to it from the point of view of the nature and origin of the family itself. They seem to me sufficient to throw discredit on its claims to be a true interpretation of the facts with which we started.

1. To begin at Genesis, the picture of the prehistoric woman and of the origin of the monogamic family here presented bears about as close a relation to fact as the corresponding picture of the prehistoric man and the origin of civil society in writers of last century.

The casual reader of the above passage quoted from Mr. Carpenter would naturally suppose that the so-called "matriarchate" was the common parent of all other forms of marriage, that it was widely spread over the globe, and that the position of the woman at this stage of development was far superior to that which obtained after the institution of monogamy. He will be surprised to learn that there is not a shadow of justification for any of these statements. All the best authorities prove that monogamy exists to a large extent among the lower animals,\* that polygamy has never been general, but is only an exceptional form of marriage,† that there is no trace in the great majority of the tribes that practise it of any superiority in the position of women over that which they occupy in monogamous societies,‡ and that in the one instance we have of a comparatively complete and logical polyandric system,—viz., the Nairs of Malabar, the woman is as much the property of man as she is in the closest monogamic system,—the only difference being that the man is her brother instead of her husband.§

\* Letourneau, "Evolution of Marriage," Chapter II, Section 3. I quote Letourneau in preference to others because Mr. Carpenter acknowledges him as an authority.

† Ibid., p. 77.

‡ Ibid., p. 105.

§ Ibid., p. 312. The actual condition of the polyandrous wife, as we have it from Strabo (see Letourneau, p. 39), throws a curious light on the idyllic picture Mr. Carpenter draws of the primitive woman.

2. The theory that the monogamic family, of which the institution as we know it among western nations is the lineal descendant, is founded on male egoism is equally devoid of support. Mr. Hearn, in his classical book on the Aryan Household, has shown beyond controversy that the relation of single wife to single husband performed from the beginning a social function. It is true that the wife was in theory owned by her husband, but he owned her as he owned the rest of his property,—in trust for the corporation of the family. In the Aryan household, at least, the free, independent man of the monogamic stage is as mythical a personage as the free, independent woman of the polyandric. The husband is responsible to the family, and might even be said to belong to the family in the same sense as the wife is responsible to and belongs to him. He is the representative of a larger body, which includes the great company of the dead and the unborn as well as the little group of the living. The object of securing the legitimacy of the children was not primarily to establish them in the rights of private possession, but to guarantee the due performance of the religious rites on which the whole prosperity of the family, and through it of the community, was thought to depend.

3. The same is true of the monogamic family as it exists to-day. Whatever we are to say of its origin, its *raison d'être* is not to be looked for merely or chiefly in its service to the institution of private property. To maintain, as some writers do, that its chief justification is the necessity under an individualistic system to secure the rights of the children to the family inheritance, is to mistake an accident for the essence of the institution. Even though inheritance were abolished to-morrow, society would have the strongest reasons for upholding the monogamic family.

In the first place, there are the ethical functions which the family performs in the nurture and education of the children. Nothing is more striking, in the utterances of the writers now referred to, than the airy assumption that the functions of the parent in this field can be taken over not only without loss, but with appreciable gain by the public nurse and school-

board teacher. It is, of course, true that much may be done in the intelligently managed crèche and kindergarten to supply the place of the family in training the affections and developing the germs of the social will; but there is not a particle of evidence in the whole history of human experience to show that these can be more than useful supplements to home discipline, when this is either absent or defective. I am, of course, perfectly aware of all that has been said as to the antisocial influence of the modern family. Much of it is only too true. The family has often fallen very far short of its ideal as the nursery of social virtue. It has too often been a stagnant pool of self-centred interests into which the fresh currents of social feeling have found no entrance. But, so far as it has been this, it has been itself the loser. I should be surprised to learn that families of this type possess a greater internal coherence or greater stability than those through which the fresh stream of the larger life continually breaks. In any case, that such an abuse is possible is no more an argument against the institution itself than the abuse of the franchise to promote a class interest at the expense of the community or freedom of speech; to preach anarchy is an argument for the abolition of these rights. It proves that in the use of the family, as in the uses of the franchise and the right of free speech, the community has still much to learn. It does not prove that it could ever learn it without the aid of these institutions themselves.

The sociological basis of the family has received even less notice from socialists of this type than the ethical. We hear a great deal about social evolution from these writers; most of them, probably, accept the view that natural selection operates in human societies as among animal organisms; and yet it is not too much to say that their whole teaching on the subject of the family is in flagrant contradiction to this admission. One looks in vain in their writings for any intelligent appreciation of the fact that not only has civil marriage established itself in all western nations, but, as Westermarck\*

---

\* "History of Human Marriage," pp. 459, 505.

has recently shown, contrary to current preconceptions, monogamy has all along been the predominant form. This fact alone might have suggested to them that, quite apart from the passions of individuals, there is something socially advantageous in the system which makes the parent responsible for the support of his own children. What this is, it is, of course, not difficult to discover. The society which, by the pressure of public opinion or of legislation, has encouraged the idea that a man shall not undertake the responsibilities of a family without some reasonable hope of being able to fulfil the obligations implied, has, at least, some guarantee that only those shall do so who possess the qualities required for co-operation in its common life, and has tended to reap the advantage that such a selective agency confers. And if this has been so in the past, is there any reason to expect that it is otherwise to-day? On the contrary, all the evidence that is to hand points to the still greater importance of maintaining, under modern conditions, the idea of parental responsibility. It seems certain that, owing to improvements in the material environment, many, who in former times would have succumbed to such forms of selective agency as are represented by bad sanitation and preventable disease, are now preserved and enabled to propagate their disabilities. A fact like this does not, of course, provide us with an excuse for the neglect of material improvements. It does, however, constitute an additional reason why those who have at heart the permanent improvement of the condition of the people should realize on what forces they have to depend in the future for the continued improvement of the race. One of the most important of these is, undoubtedly, the sense of social obligation on the part of the would-be parent. Surely, there is every *a priori* reason why the social reformer who is in earnest about his business should be anxious to strengthen this sense where it already exists, to create it where it is absent. And if this is so, what are we to say of proposals, such as those advocated by some prominent socialists, for the indiscriminate support of children (not to speak of adults), one of the first effects of which would be to weaken this guarantee? Only

one conclusion as to the scientific pretensions of these writers is possible. It is the one drawn by a recent critic of current socialism. "Nothing," he says, "is more certain than that if Socialism means the total suppression of the personal struggle for existence, as above described, and the collective guarantee of support to all children, and, still worse, to all adults, without enforcing the responsibilities of parents, or of sons and daughters . . . it really is in hopeless conflict with the universal postulate of the struggle for existence, and natural selection, as justly interpreted of human society."\*

To the policy of standing staunchly by the modern family as one of the main conditions of social progress, there is, of course, an alternative. We may adopt the plan of guaranteeing support to all parents and children alike. But in this case we shall have to discover a means of guaranteeing also *the kind* of parent and *the kind* of child who shall be supported. How this could be done, we all know from Plato's "Republic." But how Plato's method would suit the views of writers who make a practice of denouncing the interference of the law with the delicate relations of wedded life† is another matter. It would be a curious instance of the irony of events if these writers had their way, and society abolished the family, only to find itself saddled with the responsibility of improving the breed by a system of state-authorized and state-authenticated unions. Love would have become "free," but only by having become a public nuisance, perhaps a crime. The legal marriage which we know would be no more; but where should we look for the "real marriage" that was to take its place?

### III.

The interpretation put by revolutionary writers upon the facts above quoted is an impossible one. But apart from high-flying theories as to their import, there is sufficient in them

---

\* "Aspects of the Social Problem," p. 306. See the whole essay, "Socialism and Natural Selection."

† Carpenter, *op. cit.*, p. 109. His views on the duty of the community to at least one of the parents are to be found on p. 54 and (by implication) pp. 160, 161.

to cause serious uneasiness to many people, and to justify a closer analysis of the tendencies actually at work. The rest of this paper contains a few suggestions by way of assisting such an analysis. I admit that there is danger ahead. The opinions I have just been criticising are in themselves I believe a real danger. But I shall make my position clearer if I state at once my belief that the danger has been greatly exaggerated, and that the changes that are proceeding in the structure of society, and are so deeply affecting the family, are capable of quite another interpretation. So far from being an evidence of decay in the institution itself, I believe they are preparing the way for its reconstruction on a higher plane of national and individual life. Before offering any proof of this contention, I shall try to put the question in proper focus by fixing your attention on the line of the changes through which the monogamic constitution we have inherited has passed in historical times. We shall then be in a better position to understand the continuity of the whole process, and the naturalness of the transformation it is at present undergoing.

Setting aside the fantastic theory that the family as we know it began in polyandry, went through the grand circle of individual ownership—first polygamic and then monogamic—to return in the twentieth century to a species of sublimated promiscuity, we may notice two phases through which we actually know it to have passed. First, we have what we may call the tribal family. I have already alluded to this phase. It is sometimes said that the modern monogamous family is the product of Christianity. This, of course, is pure perversity. If there were no other proof that the Christian idea of the family is derived from an earlier source, we should have such proof in the fact that Christian feeling has all along acquiesced in the greater leniency with which society treats unfaithfulness on the part of the husband. This is an obvious survival, coming to us from a time when the unity and continuity of the family were matters of vital importance, and when the birth into the family circle of a son belonging to another was one of the greatest misfortunes that could

befall it. Of this phase of the European family we fortunately know a good deal. It is the form familiar to us among the early Greeks and Romans. I have already alluded to its general functions. The housefather was here the temporary representative of a corporate society. On him devolved the duty, in the first place, of performing in his own person the family rites, and, secondly, of securing that, when he was gone, the hearth should not be left desolate for want of a legitimate heir. People often speak as though the hardship and constraint of the early household pressed only on the women and children. It is quite true that in theory the wife and the children were the property of the man. From our point of view this constitutes the blot on the system. But by the same theory the man was the property of the family. Under certain circumstances, the theory might press with equal irksomeness on him. This was the case when, for instance, a housefather died childless. Under these circumstances the nearest male relative was compelled to divorce his own wife and to marry the widow, in order to raise up seed unto his brother.

This is the first stage of the historical family. How firmly it was rooted in the Roman political system is indicated by the boast that for five hundred years there had been no case of the divorce of a Roman mother. But by the end of the republic and the beginning of the empire a great change had passed over public opinion. The old religious marriage had fallen into the background, and its place had been taken by a new form of civil union, which, while it gave a woman of the richer classes considerable control over her own property, gave to women, as a whole, a far less secure and dignified position. The wife had passed out of the protection of the tribe; she had not yet passed under the protection of the church. The strictness of the Christian view on the subject of divorce was the natural reaction from the extreme laxity that prevailed in the Pagan world. "For this cause," Christ had declared, "shall a man leave his father and mother and cleave unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh." It is not surprising that Christianity, with its promise of a wholly new position

for the wife and mother in a regenerate society, should have appealed, as we know it did, with a peculiar force to the educated women of the Roman communities.

To us, as we look back, the teaching of Christ himself seems to contain the germ of a higher ideal of family life, which we might call the ethical as distinguished from the tribal. But the time had not yet come. The teaching of the Gospels is one thing, the teaching of the Church is another. Two influences in the latter were hostile to the new ideal,—the Pauline theology and the Roman Law. Paul distinctly teaches the subordination of women. "The husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church" At times he seems to extend only a cold toleration to the married state. "He that giveth [his daughter] in marriage doeth well; but he that giveth her not in marriage doeth better." On the other hand, the Church adopted from the Roman Law the whole theory of the civil position of women. "Women," said the Roman Law,\* "are removed from all civil and public functions, and consequently cannot act on juries, nor hold offices of state, nor sue, nor intervene on behalf of another, nor be procurators." "The law," says Bodin, interpreting the Christian theory, "has forbidden to women all burdens and offices proper to man, such as judge, advocate, and similar affairs, not only from prudence, but as much because manly actions are contrary to the sex, to feminine shame, and modesty."† It is true that the Council of Trent declared marriage to be a sacrament, and that the Church has always regarded it as indissoluble; but in other respects it left the position of women where it found it as defined by the Roman Law. As Sir Henry Maine truly says, "The Christian ideal of the family is the Roman purified from license of divorce."

The Middle Ages created no essential change in the idea of the family and the position of women. It would not be true

---

\* Ulpian, Dig. L. 17.2.

† Speaking of the old law of England, an American writer truly says that just as under Roman law the husband held his wife's life in his hand, so by the old law of England he might castigate her for certain offences. He adds, "to this right the men of the lower classes of the English people still fondly cling."

to say that new influences were not at work. The worship of the Virgin, the poetry of chivalry, and the dignity that attached to the baron's wife in the long absences of her lord and master could not have failed to suggest new ideals. But glimpses, such as Chaucer gives us in the tale of the patient Griselda, show how slow they were in bearing fruit, and there is every reason to believe that Sir Henry Maine is again right in maintaining that in its ultimate results "the disruption of the Roman Empire was very unfavorable to the personal and proprietary liberty of women."

We have here, then, the second type of the historical family in Europe. As contrasted with what I have called the tribal, we might call it the mystical or ecclesiastical. The woman's position is no longer one of ownership. Yet it is one of subjection, and the very fact that the man's position has meantime changed from one of responsibility to the tribal group to one of comparative freedom—"from status to contract"—makes it in some respects worse than before. This ideal has lasted down to our own time, and it is the changes it is at present undergoing that we have to interpret. What surprises one is not that it is being subjected to a systematic attack, but that the attack should have been so long delayed. One might have supposed that the rights of woman would have been included in the rights of man as understood at the end of last century, and that the constitution of the family would have undergone changes analogous to those effected in the constitution of civil government. We need not stop to note the causes to which the comparative neglect of the claims of women is due. It is sufficient to notice that in our own day and generation they have been put forward with sufficient power to make it impossible any longer to ignore them.

These claims come before us under three main heads corresponding generally to the great watchwords of the French Revolution. There is, first, the claim for liberty, personal and economical. Secondly, there is the claim for equality, equality of political rights and equality before the law. These two explain themselves, and need not detain us. We all know

what they are and to what extent they have hitherto been satisfied. But there is a third which calls for a word of explanation. I have said it is analogous to fraternity. It is the claim for what, in want of a better word, I may call ethical consideration. Men are asked to "consider" women not in the sense merely of considering their comfort,—every decent man, of course, does that,—but of considering their lives as beings with intellectual, social, and æsthetic interests like their own. They are asked to remember that unmarried women are their fellow-citizens as well as prospective wives; that wives are their fellow-laborers in the more public business of life, as well as their partners in the management of the household and the education of their children.

The question that presses upon many is whether the organism we call the "family" will be able to adapt itself to these new demands. We have already seen that there are some to whom the new position claimed for women and the general trend of our whole civilization seem incompatible with its continued existence. The view for which I contend, on the contrary, is that while the new conditions undoubtedly suggest many new and serious problems, yet on the whole, so far from being hostile to it, they are only preparing the way for a purer and more beneficent form of family life. To prove this position in any detail would carry me beyond the limits of a single paper. One or two remarks on the effects of the new movement under each of the above heads must suffice.

1. The claim that is being put forward for the economic independence of women suggests serious problems. There is, for instance, the whole question of the employment of married women in the factory, the shop, and the school. That such employment is bound to act unfavorably on the health, cleanliness, and moral influence of the home needs no proof. But we are all awaking to the danger. The best workmen are said themselves to be opposed to the employment of married women in factories, not out of any selfish desire to limit competition, but out of an intelligent appreciation of the loss involved to the household, and ~~through~~ it to the community as a whole. Government is not unlikely to

take up the subject. In so far as it does so, legislation may be socialistic, but it is a socialism that tends to restore and not to destroy the family.\*

With regard to the higher education and the new economic opportunities of the middle-class girl, I have not the slightest doubt they act on the whole favorably upon the family life. One of the chief sources of ill-assorted and unhappy unions in the past has been the necessity girls have been under of providing for themselves by marriage. The want, moreover, of more serious interest has left them a prey to the sentimental novel and other social influences that have tended to drive them into marriage at the earliest opportunity. The new chances which are now opening up offer them in the life of the school-mistress or the government clerk an attractive alternative. That it has proved so is shown by the statistics above quoted relative to the number of this class who actually marry. These statistics are not to be explained by any aversion on the part of these women to marriage as marriage. It is the *kind* of marriage that they see in too many cases around them that disheartens them. For themselves, they are quite properly determined, as has been said, in a matter so important, to have nothing but the genuine article. They look in marriage not only for the old-fashioned "union of hearts," but for the union of heart and head in some serious interest which will survive the mere attractions of sex and form a solid bond of union even in the absence of others which, like the birth of children, depend on fortune. In all this men have nothing to complain of. If they fail to rise to the occasion, it is their loss. But who that is "a good hopper" can entertain any fear upon this head or help regarding the reaction that the new

---

\* The same is true of legislation undertaken in the interest of the children. It is not the protection of the child from parent or employer that endangers the family, but the unrestricted employment of children. It is true that the child has been withdrawn from the factory to be sent to the school. But for every hour it spends in the school it used to spend two or three in the factory, and while the influences to which it was there subjected were in their nature hostile to the recognition of family claims, the moral training of the school-room may be directed to reinforce the family virtues of purity, gratitude, and obedience.

movement is already beginning to have upon men as one of its most hopeful signs?

Before leaving the economic side of the problem, there remains to be mentioned the argument one sometimes hears that the transference to machinery of most of the tasks, from the spinning of cloth to the making of candles, which made the wives of our grandfathers so indispensable a part of creation, has acted hostilely upon the family. Here, again, it may be shown that on the contrary this was an essential condition of the possibility of a higher ideal of family life. Machinery is to the life of a people what habits are to the individual. As it is the essential condition of individual progress that acquired dexterities should be handed over to the unconscious mechanism of the lower centres of the nervous system, so it is the condition of the progress of a nation that the hands and minds of the men and women who compose it should be set free to provide for the higher needs that are always emerging as the lower come to be more easily satisfied. To think that women who have not to scrub and bake, to spin and brew, will find nothing for their hands and minds to do that is worth doing, and when done well is of essential value to family, and through it to national happiness, shows a poor ideal of the equipments that are needful for a truly human life.

2. There is still less doubt that the steps that have been hitherto taken, or are likely to be taken in the immediate future, to meet the claim of women to legal and political equality, make on the whole for the improvement and not for the destruction of the family. The enfranchisement of unmarried women by assigning to them rights of citizenship independently of their function as child-bearers acts in the same direction as improved economic opportunities. It renders them less dependent for social consideration upon the accident of marriage. The case of married women is thought by some to be different. It may be so. But if it is, the proposal to differentiate cannot be supported on the ground of the danger to family tranquillity. Where husband and wife are in political agreement no such danger can exist; where the wife feels strongly on the opposite side from her husband, to assign her

a vote would at any rate remove the rankle of injustice. On the head of the improved *legal* position of women it would probably be difficult to find any educated person who is prepared to regard the married women's property act and the recent decisions which give a liberal interpretation to what is technically known as cruelty as a ground of separation or divorce in any other light than as tardy measures of justice, which, so far from endangering, tend to sweeten and purify family life.

3. There is, finally, what I have called the ethical claim. It is this, probably, which causes most uneasiness in the minds of conservative people. "What," it is asked, "is to become of the family, if the abler class of women either refuse to marry altogether, or, when they have married, show a rooted objection to undertake the responsibility of children; or, again, after children have been born to them allow their attention to be diverted from their nurture and education by intellectual or artistic interest, public duties, or the pursuit of an industrial calling? Above all, what is to become of the unity of the family under a dual control of equals, neither of whom owes subordination to the other?"

Some of these points have been already considered, as, for instance, the alleged disinclination of educated women to enter marriage. With reference to the supposed objection to undertake the responsibility of children, it is highly doubtful how far this really exists. The maternal instinct is, happily, not confined to the uneducated. What is certain is that there is a well-grounded objection among all women to have the best years of their life consumed, and, perhaps, their whole health undermined, by the necessity of giving birth to and bringing up an unlimited number of children. Nor is this always or by any means exclusively the result, as some \* would lead us to suppose, of an unsocial desire on the part of the wife to escape personal pain and trouble. It is just as often the result of a higher sense of the duty she owes to the children already born to her; and who can deny that both the family and the community at large may be very much the gainers by the restric-

---

\* Among them apparently Mr. Benjamin Kidd.

tion of the children to such a number as can be carefully nurtured and educated?

That there is a real danger to the family in the more showy life of art, literature, or the public platform may readily be admitted. The danger, however, is not to be met by making it harder for women to enter these fields, but by permitting them to discover for themselves the real value of the results the average woman may hope to achieve in them as compared with the narrower one of the family. It is quite true that the public lecturer, the artist, and the journalist or writer, reach a wider audience (when they reach any at all, which is not always), but when you consider the *power* of the influence which the mother of a family exercises over her children, and the comparative certainty of producing the precise effect she aims at and not (as is so often the case with the politician and writer) something quite different, the balance seems more than redressed.

The question of the division of power exercises many good people. "To avoid contentions," it is urged, "must there not be one head? Must not one decide?" The answer surely is simple. Where there is an uncompromisable difference, one must certainly decide if there is to be any decision at all. But why need it always be the same one? It is certain that in some matters the husband ought to decide. It is equally certain that in others the decision ought to be with the wife. What these matters respectively are must depend upon the different education and experience of each. But surely it would be strange if, while in every other department of life we are learning more and more to rely on the opinion of the expert, in the most important of all our businesses, the management of our households, we should still insist on acting on the discredited theory of the omniscience of the official head.

#### IV.

I have tried to show that the circumstances alleged in proof of the view that the family is on the decline, when rightly interpreted indicate, on the contrary, that a basis is being prepared for a structure that will give more room for the free

play of all that is best in human nature. I have hitherto said nothing of the general form this new structure is likely to take, or the changes in law that are desirable to give it stability. I am not sure that much can profitably be said, but shall venture on one or two remarks.

In the first place, it may be taken for granted that the form will be monogamic. The causes which have favored polygamy in the past—viz., war, the early decay of female beauty, the desire for large families of children or industrial establishments of wives, general disregard of the feelings of women themselves are gradually disappearing. The decrease of war has equalized the proportions of the sexes. The modern woman depends less on physical charms for the power she exercises over man. The body grows old;

“But the soul whence love comes—all ravage leaves that whole;  
Vainly the flesh fades; soul makes all things new.”

A wife's labor is no longer so necessary, and there is a growing consideration for the feelings of women.\* Finally, we have the authority of Professor Bain for the view that monogamy is the form that has the best psychological support.

All this is admitted even by the advocates of the most advanced views upon marriage.†

The question is not of the general form of marriage, but of the legal arrangements and social habits that are most favorable to its development as a purely ethical institution.

The decision of this question must depend of course on the special circumstances of individual communities. In view of prospective changes in the English law, I should like merely to refer to a distinction which is often overlooked, but which, perhaps, goes to the root of the matter. In proposed alterations of the existing law, we ought to draw a broad line between a law which has for its purpose merely the recognition of the fact that a family has already been hopelessly destroyed as a moral organism, and a law which may have the effect of

---

\* On the whole subject, see Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 505, following.

† See Carpenter, *op. cit.*, chapter on “Marriage.”

itself aiding in the destruction. To the former class, as we probably should all be agreed, belong laws recognizing unfaithfulness as a ground of divorce. Improved moral feeling will probably demand an extension of this principle. The present inequality of husband and wife before the law ought undoubtedly to be abolished. It is a survival from the tribal ideal of family justice, and ought to have no place in the ethical. There is also much to be said from this point of view in favor of recognizing desertion after a sufficiently long period as a ground of divorce.\* On the other hand, laws which permit divorce on the ground of mutual consent or of incompatibility of temper belong to a wholly different category. The very fact that these circumstances will be taken as valid reasons for a divorce tends to disincline the parties to make any sustained endeavor to overcome the initial friction, which, I venture to think, every marriage, however "happy," necessarily entails, and which it sometimes may require a serious, though by no means an unwholesome effort to allay.

These, however, are all details, and may be left to the sifting criticism of time and experience. The chief thing for us to do is to clear our minds of cant, and to remember that there is a cant of the new naturalistic school as well as of the old mystical. It is cant to say, "what God has joined let no man put asunder," and to appeal to "a divine institution" against social expediency. It is no less cant to say that "Love is Free," and to appeal from the legal to the "natural marriage." I am not sure that the latter kind is not the more pernicious cant of the two. As a reaction against the ecclesiastical theory of the indissolubility of marriage, the free love movement has a certain justification. It is, at any rate, perfectly comprehensible. Its error lies in abstracting from the power of the will in disciplining and controlling the affections. In this respect it is the opposite of the older French view of the marriage of suitability, the so-called *mariage de convenance*,

---

\* This has long been so in Scotland, in most of the United States of America, (the period varying from one to five years), in Prussia, Austria and Hungary, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

which takes the will to be all and leaves the growth of affection to time and habit. Extremes meet, and the error of both these views is seen in the tendency of public opinion in France to sanction both forms of marriage and to permit them to exist side by side as naturally complementary.

To sum up, I have tried to show that the new circumstances, while they undoubtedly portend change, are not a sign of decline in the family. Decline is defined by the physiologists as "the diminution of the formative activity of an organism." It has yet to be proved that the family is incapable of transforming itself to suit the new environment. The evidence is in reality all the other way. It goes to prove that its energies are unimpaired, that the required transformation is in the very act of taking place, and that, when it is accomplished, we shall have a form of family life at once more coherent, and more stable than any we have yet seen.

The real danger to the family is not to be looked for in any of the things that are alleged, but in the moral paralysis that comes of the idea that the difficulties in the way of its maintenance and reconstruction are insuperable. The cure for this is for each man to realize for himself, in the first place, how much society depends for the strength of its tissue on the health and strength of the cells that compose it, and especially of that primeval cell we call the family; and, secondly, how much each can contribute to this health by the intelligent appreciation of what the new circumstances demand of him as a partner in the life of such a group.

Yet here, too, there is a danger of cant. After all, the family was made for man not man for the family. It is only one of the forms, though a very fundamental one, in which man expresses his spiritual life. In this respect, it is to him what the material is to the artist,—a medium wherein he embodies his ideal of what life should be. If it should ever cease to be a fit medium for that purpose, the time will have come for its destruction. I have argued that there is, as yet, no appearance of such a time. Alteration and adaptation, it will, of course, require from time to time. In seeking to effect this alteration, the chief precaution is to make sure that we

do so in the interest of a higher and not of a lower ideal,—that it is the human will, in its effort after fuller self-expression and not mere individual caprice, that finds itself hampered by its present form.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

---

## THE MORAL AND ETHICAL TEACHINGS OF THE ANCIENT ZOROASTRIAN RELIGION.

THE moral and ethical code which a people sets up for itself, and the way in which it lives up to this, may be taken as a sort of thermometric register by which the social, physical, and spiritual condition of the nation can be judged. The history of the ancient race of Iran affords a fair illustration of this truth; and the moral status of Persia throughout its earlier history, including the mighty empire of the Achæmenian kings and the sovereign sway of the Sasanian rulers in early Christian times, will briefly here be sketched. It is the lessons of the past that teach the wisdom of the present and the future.

In order better to understand the moral and ethical code of Zoroastrianism, however, a few words regarding the nature of the religion itself may be given by way of introduction. The devoted believers in this early faith, worshippers of light as they are sometimes termed, paid pious devotion to the great god Ormazd, or Ahura Mazda, as he was called, and by creed they were the faithful followers of Zoroaster. This was the Prophet of Ancient Iran, whose clarion voice of reform rang out over the land six centuries or more before the birth of the Christ, or many years previous to the time when the Jews were carried up into captivity at Jerusalem, or the gentle Buddha preached to thirsting souls of India the doctrine of salvation from misery through renunciation. A characteristic tenet of the old Zoroastrian creed was Dualism. This dogma recognized the existence of two primeval spirits, Ormazd and Ahriman, the Good and the Evil, whose influence pervades the world. The incessant warfare and constant struggle of

these primordial principles is evinced at every turn in human life. This cardinal doctrine is one of the hinges on which the entire system of Zoroastrian ethics turns. The moral and ethical law of this creed is based, indeed, upon a systematic theory of morality and is founded on philosophic principles. A contrast may be aptly drawn between India and Iran with regard to the effect produced on each nation by the working of its respective philosophic ideas. The ancient Iranian, by influence of his creed, is characterized by action, exertion, and practical views of life; the Indian, in the development of his religious faith, became a creature of inaction, of introspection, and of meditation. The Hindu, with his pantheistic speculations, ended in the Upanishads in quietism; the Persian, whose sacred books ring with the call of "up and doing," like a valiant soldier girt with the armor of faith, was summoned to fight boldly the good fight in the mighty struggle between the warring powers of good and of evil. As a prime factor in the dualistic tenet of the contending kingdoms of Ormazd and Ahriman, as taught by Zoroastrianism, we must recognize the great doctrine of the freedom of the will. This article of the religion forms the basis and foundation of the ethical and moral part of Zoroaster's religious system. Man is Ormazd's creature, and by birthright he belongs to the kingdom of good; but, created as a free agent, he has the right to choose. Upon that choice, however, his own salvation and his share in the ultimate triumph of good or of evil in the world depend. Every good deed that man does increases the power of good; every evil act he commits augments the kingdom of evil. His weight thrown in either scale turns the beam of the balance in that direction. Hence, man ought to choose the good. It is to guide him in this choice that Zoroaster believed himself to be sent. This is the great teacher's mission. How far he succeeded in fulfilling that mission must be judged from the character of the faith that this prophet of the Magi founded, and from its effect and influence in ancient days, if the kingdom of Media, of Bactria, of Persia, in fact, the whole of Iran, has stood for anything in the world's history.

As a second important element in the general ethics of the religion, we must notice the doctrine of man's responsibility to account. A strict watch over each man's actions was believed to be kept by the divinities. All good deeds were carefully recorded; all sinful acts were sternly set down. No doctrine of a recording angel could be clearer and more precise than this of the Zoroastrian creed. Whether these actions were written in a Life-Book, or whether they were heaped up to be weighed in the balance when the soul was placed on the judgment scale after death, as the later development of the religion taught, it is not necessary here to decide. Allusions to such a record, account, or weighing are often found throughout the sacred books of Zoroastrianism from the earliest days to latest times.

To pass from the general to the particular, however, the quintessence of the moral and ethical teachings of Zoroaster may best be summed up in that doctrinal triad, so familiar to every reader of the Avesta, "good thoughts, good words, good deeds." In the original text these words run as *humata, hukhta, hvarshta*. The brief triad of this article of faith forms the pith and kernel of the ancient Prophet's teaching. "I practise good thoughts, good words, good deeds; I abjure all evil thoughts, evil words, evil deeds," is the watchword of the faith, the ever-recurring phrase in the sacred liturgy, the note on which constant changes are rung from the period of the Gāthās, or Zoroastrian Psalms, to the latest recorded utterances of the religion. Good thoughts, good words, good deeds, gathered together respectively, form the three mansions or stages through which the soul of the righteous man ascends in onward steps after death into the infinite light (*anaghra raocāo*) of heaven. Evil thoughts, evil words, evil deeds are the grades through which the spirit of the damned falls to endless darkness and perdition. In the Avesta, the man who practises this triune doctrine of the holy faith is the *Ashavan*, or "righteous;" he is the man who lives according to the Law of Righteousness, as opposed to the *Anashavan*, or "wicked man," the *Dregvant* or follower of Falsehood.

Space does not permit of cataloguing the virtues and duties

that are inculcated and enjoined, or the vices and faults which are denounced as to be shunned. The virtues may be comprised, in general terms, as purity alike of body and soul, uprightness, charity, generosity, and benevolence; and no people are more renowned, perhaps, for their princely generosity to-day than are the Parsis or Modern Zoroastrians of Bombay. In addition to these good qualities, the ancient creed laid particular stress upon the faithful keeping of one's word and pledge, the avoidance of all deceit, especially of lying, and the importance of keeping out of debt, as well as of shunning theft and robbery. According to Herodotus, the Persians taught their sons three things,—these were “to ride horse-back, to use the bow, and to speak the truth.” And next to the sin of lying they considered it the greatest disgrace to be in debt, because, beside incurring many other evils, this fault implied also an additional evil, the necessity of telling lies, “for a man who is in debt,” says Herodotus, “must of necessity tell lies.” In the magnificent Old Persian rock-inscription of the great king Darius, there is hardly a line that does not emphasize this mighty monarch as the foe to duplicity and the lover of truth.

Connected with the spiritual side of the Persians' education was also the side of physical obligation, the duty of out-door exercise, which played a prominent part in the theory of youthful bringing up. In the conduct of life, moreover, from the very beginning, the importance of maintaining soberness and chastity was not lost sight of, although the ideas may have been somewhat more lax than would be to-day. Incontinency, sexual excesses, seduction, abortion, and unmentionable sins are evils that are strongly denounced in the Avesta; the outcast woman is anathematized. But it must be remembered that among the ancient Iranians, polygamy and concubinage were doubtless the rule, or at least they were not uncommon. The Persians appear to have drunk wine freely; still, the vice of intemperance seems to have been severely punished, if we may judge from some classical allusions to the subject; and Strabo speaks of the Persians as being moderate in most of their habits. It is true that no Brahmanical asceti-

cism was practised in ancient Iran, and, as the Avesta shows, the Zoroastrian religion allowed a wholesome and whole-souled enjoyment of life. The family was the unit in the state, and a large family of children was a virtue rewarded by the king as a bulwark to the throne. But with all this, in the oldest days, temperance, discretion, restraint, and a certain self-control seem in general to have been a racial characteristic. The whole tone of the Avesta, for example, and of the Pahlavi writings is exceedingly chaste. The position of woman in ancient Iran was apparently in nowise inferior to her standing in the Vedic times of early India. As among other oriental nations, however, submission to her lord and master is taken for granted, and the woman who is "obedient to her husband" comes in for a special meed of praise in the Avesta and elsewhere; but it is perfectly evident, as a rule, there was not that subjection which results in loss of personality and individuality. The Zoroastrian scriptures plainly show this fact.

Among general virtues, also, a feeling of national pride was cultivated, as we gather from the Avesta and from classical authors. Submission to those in civil and religious authority was insisted upon. Contentment, industry, courage and valor, love of wisdom and of knowledge—all were instilled; and reverence for the divine power and practice of religious rites and ceremonies were strictly enjoined. In short, we may find in the Zoroastrian moral and ethical code almost every article of our own duty towards God and duty towards our neighbor.

Among the various special rules that were rigidly enforced by the ancient Persian faith during its entire history may be mentioned those that were designed for preserving the purity of the elements, earth, fire, and water, and for freeing these from defilement, especially from pollution arising through contact with dead matter. It was the rigid observance of this law, doubtless originally in part a sanitary precaution, that so markedly characterized the Zoroastrian belief in the eyes of antiquity. In carrying out these prescriptions in daily life, however, not a few were the practical difficulties and predicaments that arose, as the Greek and Latin writers and the Persian scriptures themselves tend to show. Equally praiseworthy

in the eyes of modern times would be the Zoroastrian duty of preserving and fostering useful animal life, especially of giving care to the cow and to the dog, for both these animals were of importance to an early pastoral people. But this freedom from injury to animal life was carried to no absurd extreme, as among the wretched Jains of ancient India. The Zoroastrian creed taught that it was especially meritorious to destroy noxious animals, like serpents, toads, rats, and vermin. By destroying these evil creatures, the power of Ahriman is reduced and the kingdom of Ormazd is expanded. Expiation for faults and atonement for sins might in this way be effected, as is indicated in the Avesta.

Throughout all ages, the Persian faith upheld the practice of "the good deeds of husbandry" (Avesta), of irrigation, of agriculture and of farming occupations, as opposed to the wild nomadic life of the marauding mountaineers. The parks of the Persian kings have been famous from time immemorial, and the few Zoroastrians that are left to-day in their old Iranian home are employed chiefly in gardening and in peasant life; although their Parsi kinsmen in India have been drawn principally into mercantile pursuits. Each class in the constitution of the Zoroastrian state and in the different walks of life—the priest, the warrior, the husbandman, and the craftsman—had its own moral obligations to fulfil and its own particular duties incumbent upon it to perform. The reform of Zoroaster was in part a social reform as well as a religious and ethical reaction.

The ideal picture must not, however, be overdrawn. There was a darker side as well as the bright side. This cannot be denied. Millennial days come not at once with a reformer. It cannot be gainsaid that certain practices existed, were overlooked, or recognized, which to-day would meet with general social ostracism. The list, moreover, of sins, vices, and faults that were prevalent was no meagre one, as a glance at a passage in that Dantesque vision of hell, seen by the saint Arda Viraf, will show. Some of the offences there recorded—like walking barefoot, lamenting excessively over the dead, or the offence of a woman's performing her hair-dressing over the

fire—strike us as trivial; while the enormity of other sins may appear to us to have been underrated. But in general the Zoroastrian standard was a high one; a strain of idealism flowed in Iranian veins. A certain custom, however, which was undeniably practised with religious zeal by the worshippers of Ormazd, is in our eyes incestuous. This was the practice of next-of-kin marriages. Whatever may be the meaning of the much-discussed word *hvaētvadatha* in the Avesta, or of *khetak-das* in the Pahlavi patristic writings of Sasanian times, there can be no doubt that marriage among relatives, even between parents and children, brothers and sisters, occurred among the Iranians from the earliest ages. It doubtless originated in part from a desire of preserving the unity and perpetuating the religious strength of the faithful community. It is needless to add that such shocking marriages as those within the first degree of kinship would not be tolerated by the modern Zoroastrians, nor have they been for centuries.

It must be allowed, also, that a few grossly ignorant superstitions worked their way into the faith, which to our mind were not without unfavorable influence upon the moral and ethical stamina of the people; and certain unpleasant customs were recognized, or at least were not deemed improper, which meet with disapproval in our sight. It must likewise be acknowledged that the ancient Iranians did not shrink from cruel practices, and from inflicting horrible punishments; but in most cases these were done, it must be remembered, with a distinct purpose, to deter from national crimes or to punish great offenders. Other nations of antiquity have not acted in a manner much different. Mercy was a virtue inculcated by the Avesta. It cannot be denied, finally, that with the decadence of the Achæmenian dynasty the moral tone of Iran was weakened by the wave of luxury and voluptuous indulgence that swept over the land between the Tigris and the Indus, carrying away the ethical bulwarks of the people and swallowing up those sterling traits of the hardy mountain race that had made Persia under Cyrus the mistress of Asia. But to offset this, it must be added, the faith contained within itself

the sovereign remedy against dissolution ; and in the opening centuries of our era, under Sasanian rule, the pristine glory of Zoroastrian Iran once more returned in all its majesty, until Persia sank before the rising power of Islam, on the day when the Mussulman conquest wrought a change, or rather a revolution, in the religious spirit and national character of the Iranian folk.

Taken for all in all, it may be said that no better proof of the real merit of the Zoroastrian creed as a working hypothesis can be found than is illustrated in the character of those who profess the faith to-day. These are the community of the Parsis in India, religious exiles from Iran since the days of the Mohammedan invasion, and the small remnant of Zoroastrians that still survives in Persia. Together they number hardly one hundred thousand souls, and of these nearly ninety thousand reside not in the land of their birth but in the neighborhood of Bombay. They are the living exemplification of the true worth of the doctrines taught by the ancient Bactrian sage. They piously uphold the best of the tenets of the old faith with regard to religious observances ; they live in love and charity with their neighbors ; their life is marked by temperance, soberness, and chastity, and their fame for acts of liberality and generosity is world-wide. Among them there is no practice of polygamy ; they are strict monogamists ; unfaithfulness to the marriage vow is almost unknown ; and prostitution among Parsi women is hardly to be found. The horror of falsehood, duplicity, and of debt is as keenly felt by the Parsis to-day as it was over two thousand years ago. Or to conclude, if we take the Zoroastrian religion in its entirety, and view it in the light of the early period to which it belongs, we shall come to the conviction that outside of the light of biblical revelation it would be hard to find among the Gentile nations a higher standard of morality, a nobler code of ethics, than that set up by Zoroaster to be maintained by the ancient people of the Land of the Lion and the Sun.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

## THE REFORMATION OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

WHEN we look back upon the endless contrasts and conflicts, the retrogressive movements, violent innovations, and still more violent reforms which are summarized under the peaceful name of "History," the pregnant words of Goethe, which express his opinion concerning the development of the right, rise irresistibly to our lips :

" All rights and laws are still transmitted  
Like an eternal sickness of the race,—  
From generation unto generation fitted  
And shifted round from place to place.  
Reason becomes a sham, Beneficence a wrong,  
Thou art a grandchild, therefore woe to thee !  
The right born with us, ours in verity,  
This to consider, there's alas ! no hurry."

It may truly be said that the struggle between hereditary notions of right and the inborn rights of the individual is the underlying factor in the entire course of human history. Every one is, in fact, a "grandchild." Every one is forced to come into painful collision with social arrangements which were not made by him or for him. And the injuries thus sustained, whether of a material or a moral kind, have given the impetus to all reform movements, and especially to every revolution. But, as this conflict grows out of man's very nature, it cannot be avoided by attempting to deny the validity of hereditary rights altogether and setting up innate rights as the unique source of all law and order. Uhland has said :

" Was never prince so princely potent,  
Was never mortal raised so high,  
That he alone men's eager craving  
For liberty might satisfy ;  
That he alone the living fountain  
Of universal right might seize,  
Dispensing to the waiting nations  
Little or much as he should please !"

And this applies to peoples no less than to kings. Only by compromise—by mutual accommodation between the old and the new rights—is true development possible. But, to be sure, such compromise is rarely reached by peaceful means. "Through struggle shalt thou gain thy right," says the great teacher of law, Ihering. The French Revolution, indeed, undertook to put an end to all further conflict by proclaiming the universal rights of man; in this, it may be remarked, France only followed the example given by the constitutions of the single States of North America. It was the merit of Professor Jellinek, of Heidelberg, to point out the source of that immortal declaration. But these universal rights can be expressed under earthly conditions only in the shape of a rough average justice, which is apt to be oppressive for many from the start, and certain to become so later on for all. Nor is there any remedy, except in a periodic revision of whatever is established, whether it appear in the form of laws, political constitutions, international treaties, or in the guise of morality and religion. As certain officials are charged with the supervision of the markets, to prevent by suitable tests the sale of adulterated articles of food, so, in the case of intellectual food, examination is needed in order that reason may not turn into nonsense and benefits into nuisances. And it is indeed wonderful how, at certain epochs, such revisions of generally-accepted notions and beliefs are carried out with almost systematic thoroughness, without constraint and without preconcerted agreement, quietly and yet irresistibly, solely through the power of intellect and the force of logic.

A more extended, a more painstaking, a more exhaustive examination of the accumulated mass of hereditary beliefs and ideas has never, perhaps, been attempted than that which took place during the great epoch at the close of which we have now arrived. Germany led the movement; all nations participated in it; Science carried the banner, but all departments of intellectual activity followed its leadership. So far as Science is concerned, no less a man than Goethe had formulated the dictum, "What is the universal? The particular instance. What is the particular? Millions of in-

stances." And scientists began at this time to work in the spirit of this formula. Instead of complacently contenting themselves with some single instance of the universal as the "philosophy of Nature" and the "philosophy of History" had done, the Science of Nature and the Science of History strove with indefatigable labor to reach a deeper understanding of the millions of special instances. Johannes Müller rose to eminence in combating the abstractions of natural philosophy by means of the study of individual facts, and his pupils were Helmholtz and Virchow. Leopold von Ranke declared that he was not interested in any general formula of what ought to happen, but wished to know in every case just what had actually happened. Thus the epoch of Hegel and Schelling, with its fondness for abstractions, called out, by way of reaction, a band of great investigators. In 1769 Alexander von Humboldt was born, one year later than Schleiermacher; in 1776, Niebuhr, the reformer of the science of history; in 1777, Gauss, the king of mathematicians; in 1779, Savigny, the father of the historical school; in 1785, Jacob Grimm, its greatest representative; in 1791, Bopp, the founder of the comparative study of language; in 1793, Carl Lachmann, who led philology along new paths; in 1795, Leopold von Ranke; in 1799, Döllinger, the most learned theologian for centuries; in 1800, Moltke, who turned the art of war into a science; in 1801, Johannes Müller. What a long list of brilliant men who, step by step, wrested province after province of knowledge from the aristocratic dictation of theory and ranged them under the rule of empirical investigation, modest in its claims and democratic in its methods.

To the men of the old School, however, democratic tendencies, even in the realm of science, remained suspicious. A. W. Schlegel's sarcastic comment on the "piety towards the unimportant" of the Brothers Grimm has often been quoted. Thus the older form of Romanticism looked with scorn on a movement that, nevertheless, had sprung from Romanticism itself. And not only A. W. Schlegel, but even the far younger Brentano, regarded the care devoted by Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm to the study and preservation of fairy tales as some-

thing petty and almost ridiculous. For they were still controlled by the notion that consideration is due exclusively to what is extraordinary and exceptional, and not to what is simple and, on that very account, oft repeated. Step by step, the particular, as opposed to the general, had to vindicate its claim upon the attention.

The movement that had started in the domain of science was next carried forward into that of art, and here the study of details, as opposed to the academic rule of style, gained ground with extreme slowness. The individualizing tendency first showed itself in the matter of costume. Talma and Mlle. Mars, leaving off the undifferentiated costume of the Théâtre-Français, which had been used indiscriminately for Greek, Roman, and French *rôles*, acted in appropriate historical costumes. Düsseldorf artists studied the dress worn at the time of the Thirty Years' War. The faithful study of detail spread more and more; landscape painting, no longer subject to conventional rules of style, was treated in portrait fashion. And, finally, the School of Fontainebleau directed special attention to the momentary effects of light, atmospheric conditions, etc. At the present day, the study of detail in art has completely won its way, and is carried to extremes.

It was not till science and art had gone forward in the new direction that morality followed in their wake. The example set by these predecessors was, no doubt, a useful incentive, but the new respect for the rights of the individual which now appeared in the moral teachings of the time was, after all, chiefly the outgrowth of the same prevailing tendency that was determining the modern mind in every branch of its activity.

In all such questions, Germany formerly took the lead. It was soon again to come prominently forward; but, for a while, it lagged behind its neighbors. The speculative spirit among us had become too masterful. We had gone back to very nearly the same position which was called Realism in the language of mediæval Scholasticism, and which differs so radically from the Realism of the present day. Abstract nomina were again treated almost as if they had objective reality.

Such concepts as the State, History, *Volksgeist* (spirit of the people) were bandied to and fro until the concrete counterparts for which they stand—namely, the citizens, the laws, the actual happenings of history and the documents in which they were recorded—were almost forgotten. Even scholars who belonged to the new empirical movement fell into this error. Jacob Grimm himself made the impossible declaration, “*Das Volkslied dichtet sich selbst.*” Thus even he, at times, lost sight of the concrete personalities with which the science of History is wholly concerned.

In the field of moral science, especially, the Germans have ever been inclined to abstract speculations, and here the stimulus of foreign influence was needed to produce a change. Such a stimulus came, and from the very same quarter whence, a hundred years before, at the time of Voltaire and Rousseau, had already issued a mighty summons towards the examination of old hereditary beliefs.

Though, at bottom, closely related to the German movement which we have described, the French movement, nevertheless, clearly reveals the characteristic difference between the two nationalities. Among the French, even when war is waged on tradition, traditions must be preserved. Even when they attack ideas which, during past ages, have weakened into abstractions, they are not prepared to grapple unflinchingly with particular facts. This is most evident in their method of writing history, and in their theory of art. Thiers and Lanfrey, and Taine in history; Boileau, Victor Hugo, and Taine once more in art,—they all destroyed old “legends,” only to replace them by others which they naïvely accepted as true, and which were really so in a certain sense, as compared with the ones they superseded. A middle position between philosophical abstraction and exact empiricism suits the national character of the French. Descartes stands just midway between Hegel and Herbert Spencer. Hence one can understand that the French should be born mathematicians, psychologists, diplomatists; that they should lack stirring poetry, and should be free from the vice of minute specialism. These national differences must be taken into account

in comparing the French with the German reaction against abstractions.

Bastiat seems to come closest to the German manner when, in his article on "The State" (1848), he inveighs against the perverted use of this word. He shows up the strange illusions which may be produced by playing on this and similar terms.

"Voici les premiers mots du préambule de la Constitution : 'La France s'est constituée en République pour appeler tous les citoyens à un degré toujours plus élevé de moralité, de lumière et de bien-être. Ainsi, c'est la France ou l'abstraction qui appelle les Français ou les réalités à la moralité, au bien-être, etc. . . .' Mais, pour prendre en flagrant délit d'inanité la proposition constitutionnelle, il suffit de montrer qu'elle peut être retournée, je ne dirai pas sans inconvénient, mais même avec avantage. L'exactitude souffrirait-elle si le préambule avait dit : 'Les Français se sont constitués en République pour appeler la France à un degré toujours plus élevé de moralité, de lumière et de bien-être' ? Or, quelle est la valeur d'un axiome où le sujet et l'attribut peuvent chasser croiser sans inconvénient ? Tout le monde comprend qu'on dise : 'La mère allaitera l'enfant.' Mais il serait ridicule de dire : 'L'enfant allaitera la mère.'"

And he holds up as an example to the French the Americans whose Constitution begins, "We, the people of the United States, etc." This is highly characteristic. It is plain that Bastiat desires to get rid of the abstract notion "State," in order to come down to concrete, living beings. But he stops half-way, for the term, "the people," which he quotes with approbation, is itself only an abstraction. Still, at least, in his aim, he coincides with that of the German natural scientists who replace the mystic term "*vis vitæ*" by the definite naming of physical and chemical processes. But Bastiat, it must be remembered, is strongly subject to English influences. In the case of Frenchmen not so influenced, the attack against the ascendancy of Universals takes a totally different and highly characteristic turn. Whereas, the associates of Johannes Müller and Leopold von Ranke combined against the abstract "*idea*," the contemporaries of La Mennais and those also of Bastiat are united against the abstract "*formula*." The lifeless *word* is an abomination to one party; the petrified *phrase* to the other. And this contrast is thoroughgoing, though it cannot be denied that often enough words in the one

case, phrases in the other, were reinstated in the honors of which they had apparently been dispossessed.

At the same time that Moritz Haupt, the great philologist, was teaching his pupils how detrimental to true understanding is the use of technical terms, such as "Enallage" and the like, which cover up a psychological process by the use of obscure words, Gustave Flaubert was undertaking a crusade through the French school-books in order to impale on his sword the "fleurs d'histoire" and similar empty phrases, which, palpably untrue or half true, distort actual events beyond recognition. "Je me défie des thèses qui stérilisent l'esprit humain," says Quinet. Flaubert and Quinet are in this, as in other respects, the heirs of the French Romanticists, though Flaubert has, in many ways, departed from their teachings.

These French disciples of Romanticism, moreover, were almost as influential in disseminating throughout Europe the new ideas which they had adopted, but not originated, as were formerly the men of the French Revolution in the propaganda of English ideas concerning Constitutions and popular liberty.

They are not, however, to be simply identified as Romanticists with their German confrères. Much as both had in common, much as the former learned from the latter (Flaubert and Quinet, too, were pupils of the Germans), in other respects they were diametrically opposed to each other. What they had in common was, above all, an arrogant belief in the privileges of genius and a craze for originality. "Epater le bourgeois" might have been the motto of Clemens Brentano as well as of Theophile Gautier. Alike they hated and despised the "Philistines," and succeeded in spreading this contempt far beyond the ranks of their own followers. Henri Monnier parodied M. Prudhomme, just as Brentano and Görres had parodied the Virtuous Watchmaker. And correspondingly we find them glorifying, now in a pathetic, now in a homely vein, a mode of existence wholly free from conventional restraints. Alfred de Vigny made a tragedy of Chatterton's life, as Oehlen-schläger used the life of Correggio, and Tieck that of Camoëns. They taught alike that "the mark of poetic genius is the mark

of Cain," as Victor Hugo's disciple Freiligrath put it. And Murger depicted "*La Vie de Bohème*" with the same partiality that Eichendorff and Tieck showed in describing in their novels the enviable lot of the "ne'er do well."

But there are also marked differences that distinguish the romantic literature of the French from that of the Germans. Whereas the Germans delight in the lack of form, and remind us, by tricks of sound and suggestion, far more of the "decadents" of to-day, of the Verlaines and Mallarmés, than of such artists in verse as Theophile Gautier or Banville, the French seek to carry form to the point of highest perfection. Every one knows the celebrated phrase, "*De la forme naît l'idée*," which, rightly interpreted, is by no means devoid of relative truth, though decidedly French in flavor. Pascal, in a similar vein, had advised people to take part in church observances, promising that the devotional mood would be sure to follow. But the contrast of German and French Romanticism would be of slight importance to the subject we are considering if it were noticeable only in the realm of verse. It is, however, by no means confined to this department. The German poets and ideologists who believed with Schiller that "it is the spirit that builds the body" held aloof from political life. A few of them, to be sure—for instance, Frederic Schlegel, Adam Müller, and Görres—did take part in reactionary politics, but that was later in their career, when their literary spring-time was over. The leading spirits—as Tieck, Arnim, Brentano—remained entirely outside of political relations. In striking contrast, we remark among the French Romanticists, from the very first, a strong political tendency. In matters of the state, too, they look for the regeneration of the spirit by means of a change in form; whereas the Germans expect existing institutions to be reformed by a regeneration of the spirit. Victor Hugo, indeed, began as a Royalist, but it was certainly not personal reasons alone that led him so soon into the camp of Democracy. His sympathy with the picturesque Middle Ages did not obstruct his clearness of vision in this respect any more than that of Uhland and Grimm in Germany.

But even more marked than the political tendency among the French Romanticists is their decided interest in social questions. With them æsthetic disgust for the bourgeois turned into revolt against the institutions which had brought forth the bourgeois. Tieck and Brentano never dreamed of urging the condemnation of the Philistine to the point of hostility against the middle class. But Victor Hugo and La Mennais vigorously sound the note of pity for "*Les Misérables*," the outcast and disinherited. And with the head of the School, as was later on the case with Dostoyevski, the hatred of the sleek bourgeoisie is even carried so far as to become a glorification of the convict and the harlot. This contrast may be due, in a minor degree, to the difference existing between the middle class of Germany and that of France. The former, from which Brentano took his type of the Philistine, had fought and suffered for the independence of the Fatherland. The latter, which suggested to Henri Monnier his *M. Prudhomme*, had obeyed the celebrated counsel "*Enrichissez-vous*" of the bourgeois minister Guizot. And the same difference also existed with respect to the official class which, in both countries, was justly regarded as typically representative of the bourgeoisie. In Germany the officials strove with benevolent care to improve the condition of the poor. In France, a Marshal Soult, whose extortions while in Spain had been so infamous as even to provoke formal censure by Napoleon, could yet reply, as President of the Ministry, to the striking silk-weavers of Lyons, whose conduct had been irreproachable, that he would not confer with brigands.

Nevertheless, I do not believe this reason to have been the principal one. It was, rather, their detestation of insincere phrases that actuated the French Romanticists in their attacks on the bourgeoisie. The humanitarian phrase on the lips of a selfish shop-keeping class,—nothing is more fitted than that to excite the animosity of idealists! And this suggests to us, in passing, the celebrated name of Carlyle, whose bitterness against the hypocritical piety of England's ruling class, the merchants, led him in a similar way to take sides with the

oppressed, and who, together with Maurice and Kingsley, created what may be called Bible Socialism for England, as La Mennais created it for France and the world. La Mennais had already, in his first period, in his "Essai sur l'Indifférence," rebuked the Liberals and their "apathetic philanthropy;" and from that time on the hard-heartedness of the bourgeois was a favorite theme of the Romantic School and of their allies. "A man of benevolent phrases, coupled with inflexible egotism,"—thus Henri Monnier characterizes his M. Prudhomme. Victor Hugo depicts the wealthy after the same fashion, and down to the diaries of the De Goncourts this accusation is reiterated, growing constantly more pointed. At the time when Fichte and Schelling, the philosophers of Romanticism (for Fichte is, at bottom, more romantic than Hegel, though less so than Schopenhauer), stamped Lessing's friend Nicolai as the type of the German literary Philistine, they saw no reason to add the trait of an unfeeling heart to the caricature that they drew. But when Flaubert, in his incomparable character of Homais in "Mme. Bovary," depicted a French Voltairean, it was precisely the discrepancy between the benevolent speeches and the hard character of the man that gives its peculiar stamp to this type of the French Philistine of 1847. We can here recognize once more how æsthetic and ethical, political and social points of view condition and impinge upon each other. If a common designation is desired which may be applied to the German struggle against the empty word and the French crusade against the phrase, to La Mennais's treatment of Christianity and Flaubert's treatment of the bourgeoisie, we cannot do better than to speak of them as phases of the general movement which had set in for the revision of traditional views. A thorough sifting of expressions, propositions, opinions, assertions, once universally accepted, is characteristic of this period. It is this sifting that leads to the "discovery of the individual." As the curtain of deceptive generalities is lifted, everywhere the particular case rises into view. And thus is explained that tendency to compare semblance with reality so prominent in literature and evident even in the titles of a long list of books

which might be quoted,—from Görres's "Rome as it is," in 1824, to Lothar Bucher's "Parliamentarism as it is," in 1856. This tendency, in fact, became so powerful as to be projected backward into the past. For instance, the great German historian Gervinus, in the analysis of Shakespeare's plays which he published in 1849, believed he had discovered that the contrast between seeming and being is the one ever-recurring theme in the dramas of that most versatile of poets.

That such a revision of ideas should concern itself especially with the great "commonplaces" of human society, religion, manners, politics, is but natural. Carlyle's philosophic, satirical "Sartor Resartus" sums up the subject in a general way in the words, "All human questions and opinions are merely garments which man changes." Flaubert, with his melancholy genius, reviews the actual or imaginary illusions of mankind in a whole series of realistic novels, the basis of which is evident. "Mme. Bovary" is intended to illustrate the subject of love; "Salammbô" and "La Tentation de St. Antoine" the pagan and Christian religions. "L'Education Sentimentale" shows how an enthusiastic youth is trained, by the experience of life, to complete indifference, and learns to despise friendship and reverence, patriotism and the love of liberty.\* The unfinished masterpiece "Bonvard et Pécuchet" is designed to satirize all higher aspiration as such; a theme the terrible treatment of which goes far beyond the pessimism of Byron, Schopenhauer, Leopardi, and all their successors.

This kind of literature, which may best be called "disillusionment literature," did but reach its highest expression in Flaubert. As he was followed by Daudet, a painstaking specialist, who examines all the various forms of love under his magnifying-glass (marital love in "Fromont Jeune et Risler Aîné," illicit love in "Sappho," filial love in "Rose et Ninette"), and who, in the course of his examination, makes the same ugly discoveries as Gulliver when he approached too

---

\* This is likewise the purpose of the striking novel, "Niels Lyhne," by the Danish author, J. B. Jacobsen, though the point of view of this author is, in other respects, a totally different one.

near the giant maids of honor of the Court of Brobdingnag, so had he been preceded by Beyle Stendhal, who, in his famous description of the battle of Waterloo, sought to present a realistic study of the actual facts in contrast with the usual heroic battle-pieces. Nay, in looking for the original germs of this literature, which makes it its business to tear off the masks and the disguises, we can, of course, go still farther back; to Lichtenberg, for instance (who exclaims somewhere, "Who knows whether it is a prayer or a drink of whiskey that fortifies the roofer in going to his dangerous task?"), to Swift, La Rochefoucauld, and, finally, to St. Augustine, who sought to show that the virtues of the pagans were but shining vices. One important difference, however, must be noted. Those earlier pessimists endeavored to disclose the wicked basis of the human soul as they conceived of it. The later critics sought to attack not so much man as man's good opinion of himself. The keynote of all these revelations is to be found in Schopenhauer's indignant reflections upon what he calls the "ruthless optimism" of the Leibnitz school. But precisely because it was in France that the enthusiastic belief in the goodness and virtue of the natural man under the lead of Rousseau had been carried to its highest point, it could not fail that the process of disillusionment when it set in should show itself in that country in its most violent forms.

Next to Flaubert we must place the great epigrammatist in character-drawing, Gavarni, who gives to one of his principal works the significant title of "*Masques et Visages*," and represents his pauper philosopher, Virelocque, as shrugging his shoulders disdainfully at the pretensions of the human race. Then there are the De Goncourts and Zola. What has been signalized as the characteristic feature of the entire movement of this period, namely, the vigorous rejection of alien ideals, without any corresponding development of one's own ideals to take their place, is particularly striking with respect to these authors. Flaubert's "*Mme. Bovary*" is led astray by the false idealism which she had absorbed from certain novels,—a polemical device this which was already employed in the days of Wieland, nay, earlier still, at the time of Cervantes, and

which even Zola, Flaubert's pupil of grotesque genius, believed himself at liberty to use. (In "Pot Bouille" the heroine falls in consequence of reading George Sand's "André.") But these are tricks of warfare which great artists ought really to leave to the petty writers of edifying tracts. How easy a task it would be to turn the same weapon against the realists and pessimists themselves, to depict a modern youth, for instance, who should enter life with absolutely wrong ideas, from having read too much of Zola and Ibsen, and whose fatality it would be to discover that drunkenness, adultery, and moral enormities of every kind are not quite so common as he had been led to believe by the careful study of these fanatics of reality. And such a parody would, doubtless, strike deeper than that of the German humorist, Glasbrenner, who good-naturedly satirizes in "Berlin as it eats and drinks" those books on "Rome as it is" and "Parliamentarism as it is" which attempt to give the true instead of the conventional picture!

Every one recognizes that the present time shares with the period we have described this tendency to expose shams. Do not Zola and Ibsen represent the very present in literature? And do they not attempt to equal Flaubert and Gavarni in the task of exposing the ghosts of ever-recurring, mistaken ideals? Nevertheless, in one respect, they have not yet attained to the pessimism of their predecessors. That mankind is progressing in culture is almost universally accepted by the modern school. Ibsen believes, as did Heine and Immermann, in the "Third Kingdom" of the future. Zola trusts in the development of technical science and of democracy. Not so the older school. From the time of Perrault to that of Condorcet, as has been shown by Brunetière, the idea of progress had been developed more and more into a dogma. But then doubts began to be whispered. Already Goethe's Faust had sceptically asked of the learned Philistine, Wagner, whether we are really so gloriously far advanced as we suppose? Flaubert, on his part, contended for the very opposite theory. Whereas, hitherto, everything had been expected of the perfectability of the human race, he

believed in the hopeless stupidity of man. Man, according to him, is a born bungler and dilettant, and dilettants, on Goethe's authority, are incurable. To all mankind the author of *Bouvard and Pécuchet* would apply the lines which Platen, in his irritation, aimed against German literature: "In an ocean of imbecility there appear a few gifted swimmers." And if Tolstoi has got to the point of seeing the net result of all intellectual development, the net result of all our vaunted civilization, and of the "subjugation of the elements" in the mere increase of cleanliness, this is a repetition of what Flaubert said before him, and goes to prove what might equally be proved in other ways, that Russia has just arrived at about the year 1860. In that country the old-style calendar seems to prevail in intellectual matters also! Only it is to be noted that, in the spiral movement of human evolution, it not infrequently happens that the signs of a belated and of a too early development appear simultaneously; and so we need not be surprised if we already see a new growth of pessimism announcing itself in some of the most recent writers, like Huysman, Wilde, and others.

We must not, however, look on such extreme views as characteristic of any particular time. Singly, they may, perhaps, be found in every epoch. And, on the other hand, they never appear in any epoch except in single instances. The belief in progress seems to be innate in man. Every one observes in his own case and that of his neighbors the ripening of feeble childhood into robust manhood; and the requirements of the struggle for existence compel us to regard this process as progress. Again, to be sure, alongside of the experience of the growth and increase of strength there is the no less universal observation of the decline and decay of our powers in old age. And, as the interpretation of the world in terms of man, of the macrocosm in terms of the microcosm is, so to speak, the beginning and end of all mythology, we find among all the peoples of the earth a belief in the development of humanity, which, at one time, takes on a hopeful, at another time a mournful hue. The Golden Age, the time of greatest strength and highest efflorescence, is sometimes projected into

the future, sometimes into the past. Sometimes, as among the ancient Teutons, the end is supposed to reflect the beginning, as in a long corridor with mirrors set at either end. But, nevertheless, the conviction that there is *movement* in human history has remained a fixed belief, both of the peoples and of the philosophers. Leopardi, the saddest of pessimist poets, inverting the theory of progress propounded by the encyclopædists, taught the cruel doctrine of the constant deterioration of men and of the gods. The immobility of man even he dared not posit. Schopenhauer, his admirer, who looks forward to ultimate salvation in Nirvana, is, after all, more optimistic than those pious Christians who believe in the everlasting punishments of hell: so firmly implanted in man is the idea of development. Goethe, too, whose sceptical language we quoted above (he has said in a similar vein, "Who can think anything wise, anything stupid that has not been thought before?") is, nevertheless, one of the pioneers of the evolutionary theory, specifically so-called, which our century has baptized with the name of Darwin. And how inflexibly did the philosophers, economists, and politicians of the French Romantic School adhere to the idea of progress! I need but mention Comte among the philosophers, Fourier among the economists (if, indeed, his claim to the title be not disputed), Fourier, whose utopian dreams in regard to the manner in which the elements are to be rendered tributary to the uses of man, cause him to appear as a predecessor of the Whistlers and Huysmans, according to whose view clumsy Nature is simply raw material, and furnishes daily opportunity for human skill to put its blundering efforts to the blush. A tremendous exercise of force is needed, a pessimistic obstinacy almost unparalleled, in order to believe in the complete stability of human conditions, the absolute absence of development in human affairs. And we must therefore look upon Flaubert and the few who held with him as detached and somewhat isolated members of the pessimistic company.

After all, the belief in development did not belong in the category of *official* dogmas, and it was at these that the revision undertaken by the reformers was especially aimed.

Amongst the official *Idola Fori* two are conspicuous above the rest,—State and Church. Both of these were subjected to the same critique. The attempt was made to withdraw from the State as one may withdraw, if one likes, from the established Church. Cabet sought to establish *Icaria*, just as Owen and others before him had tried to realize an ideal State. Johannes Ronge started the German Catholic Movement. Michelet endeavored to found a new religion of humanity with his "*Bible de l'Humanité*" as a basis. All of these men leaned on predecessors that were positive in tendency; the Communists on the early Christian Church; the German Catholics on the "*Religion of Reason*," as proclaimed by Pope, Voltaire, and Frederick the Great; Michelet on the theophilanthropism of Laréveillière-Lepeaux. But their own attitude was more negative than positive, characterized by its opposition to bourgeois and police, to ultra-montanism and intolerance. Finally, this purely sentimental critique of State and Church, this mere offspring of antipathies, developed into the empty negation of the Blanquists: "*Ni Dieu ni Maître*." A fertile and truly productive criticism of State and Church was denied to these men, and Cabet's, "*Icaria*," like Owen's "*Harmony*," Ronge's German Catholic Church, as well as Uhlich's "*Free Religious Societies*," were, of necessity, short-lived, asthmatic existences, whose hectic flush was erroneously taken for the glow of enthusiastic youth at the time. The lasting work of criticism with respect to Church and State was destined to be produced by other men. The disciples of the French Romantic School were doomed to sterility, because they were too eager, too precipitate in the attempt to create what should be permanent.

But, some pessimist might object, are not then all efforts of this kind equally fruitless? Does not the most nourishing bread become mouldy after a little? Does not the clearest water turn cloudy and unwholesome? Whether "*Icaria*" continues for a few years only, or the evolution theory based on Darwin's scientific labors lives for a few centuries, is the difference at bottom so very great? Do not the revisions and reconstructions that become unavoidable after longer or shorter periods, plainly prove the impotence of the human

race to produce lasting results in the intellectual realm? The Roman aqueducts of the Provence still serve at the present day their utilitarian purpose. The Pantheon still edifies and delights the beholder. But what the intellect of man creates in order to satisfy, to improve, and to increase the happiness of generations seems fated, after a short while, to trouble the life and happiness of men and to become the very obstacle of their improvement.

We may not contradict this statement too vehemently. It cannot be denied that all attempts to permanently organize the future have failed and will ever fail. The ideal State proposed by the Socialists, if it should be established, may, perhaps, serve its purpose in its day, just as did the Absolutist or the Patriarchal States in their day, and may then become a hinderance to further development. But such reflections as these do not, for all that, land us in the conclusions of the pessimist. We recognize, rather, how tirelessly the spirit of man is ever searching and striving, nothing being good enough and high enough to satisfy his ideal aims. We recognize how perfectly the words of Goethe that refer to Faust are applicable to the whole human race:

“ Thus let him wander down his earthly day;  
Where spirits haunt, go quietly his way;  
*In marching onwards, bliss and torment find,*  
*Though, every moment, with unsated mind !”*

And, if we were to point the moral of human history we should again find no better way of expressing it than in the following lines from the same inexhaustible poem :

“ Yes, to this thought I hold with firm persistence;  
The last result of wisdom stamps it true :  
He only earns his freedom and existence  
Who daily conquers them anew.”

RICHARD M. MEYER.

UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN.

## DISCUSSIONS.

## "THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM."

THERE is assuredly no use in what Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet call "the wretched war of catchwords and party shibboleths like Socialism and Individualism," and I hope, in attempting to supplement their contribution, that I shall avoid such controversy. Mr. Ball has given reasons for thinking that Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet take an unduly low view of the Socialist movement. To this it is replied that Mr. Ball, "for whose ideals and purpose" Mr. Bosanquet has the highest respect, does not properly represent Socialism, and certain writings of my own are brought in, apparently as an "awful example" of the "penny pamphlets which go out . . . among the working-classes."

Now, Mr. Bosanquet and I suffer from an apparently incurable incapacity to agree on any one point, and I hope he will forgive me if I leave his personal references undebated. Nor can I, in a few pages, enter into an elaborate defence of Mr. Ball's presentation of the Socialist position. What I am concerned with are certain side issues of the discussion.

1. Mr. Ball urges that there has been a remarkable process of evolution in Socialist doctrine; that the best thought and best expression of the Socialist movement have left behind the cruder conceptions of human life and social organization on which unfriendly critics still harp; and that, as regards personal character and the family in particular, it is scarcely fair to represent the Socialism of to-day as repugnant to the lessons of the best social experience. Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet's reply hints that Mr. Ball's views may be all very fine, but that they have no relation to "the body of popular literature which is disseminated . . . among the wage-earning classes," by which, I gather, they mean specially the Fabian Tracts. Now, it so happens that immediately on the appearance of Mr. Ball's article, the executive committee of the Fabian Society asked Mr. Ball to allow it to be issued as one of the Society's series, and this proposal was unanimously endorsed at the next members' meeting of the Society. So far, then, as the Fabian Society is concerned, it is clear that Mr. Ball has been provided in advance with an effective reply to the suggestion that he is out of harmony with this popular "literature."

2. As Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet more than once refer to the Fabian Tracts, of which about a million copies have by this time been circulated, I crave permission to say what I think will be recognized by any one practically acquainted with the issue of popular literature, that quite exceptional pains are taken to render these as correct and as educational as possible. Every tract is repeatedly scrutinized and revised before publication, proofs being usually submitted, indeed, to expert specialists in the particular subject. After publication every criticism and suggested amendment is recorded and carefully considered. At each reprint, the whole tract is gone through for revision. More than once a considerable stock has been destroyed rather than allow a statement proved to be erroneous to continue to circulate. That the series is nevertheless imperfect and incomplete, I readily acknowledge. But we do our best, and I venture to think that any one who will candidly study the latest editions of the sixty tracts which are still in print, including the "Report on Fabian Policy" \* just presented to the International Socialist Congress, will form a different impression of part, at any rate, of the Socialist propaganda in England than that given by Mr. Bosanquet.

3. I venture to suggest that it is of little use discussing whether the Socialist movement is or is not fairly represented by any one exponent. To one man Socialism denotes an ethical aspiration ; to another it is a particular hypothesis of abstract economics. In one country we have the term used chiefly for a voluntary, anarchistic communism, based on an assumed universal agreement ; elsewhere it means a rigid collectivist state dominated by a centralized bureaucracy. Even within a single nation the most opposite definitions will be given. Had Mr. Bosanquet chosen, he could have refuted practically every proposition in Mr. Ball's article by quoting a contradictory utterance by some person calling himself a Socialist. This is exactly what, on Mr. Ball's hypothesis of an evolution in Socialist doctrine, we should expect to find. In the biological world the contemporary existence of an infinite variety of types is one of the strongest proofs of the development theory. And when among the Socialists of to-day the critic recognizes in one case the ethical ideas of St. Simon, in another those of Fourier,—in one project the economic conceptions of Owen and

---

\* The Secretary of the Fabian Society, 276 Strand, London, will send the complete set, bound in buckram, for four shillings, post free.

in another those of Lassalle, here a piece of "Early Victorian" political science, and there the latest induction from Democratic experience,—he is not warranted, I suggest, in simply dismissing the whole movement as inconsistent with itself, nor yet in persistently representing any one of these features as its essential characteristic. What the candid student infers is that there is going on an evolution of doctrine, progressing at different rates in different people. The important thing for the philosopher to discover then becomes, not what the movement has been, but what it is going to be; to distinguish the elements which are mere survivals, rapidly passing away, from those which are the growing forces. This, in the view of Mr. Ball, Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet have not done. I agree with Mr. Ball. To my mind, the criticisms which Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet pass upon the Socialist movement indicate that they scarcely recognize the existence of an evolution in Socialist doctrine, and I believe them, so far, at any rate, as England is concerned, to be quite mistaken as to its course.\*

4. A more interesting point for inquiry is why it is that intellectual discussion between Socialists and non-Socialists is usually productive of so little good result. There seems to be some subtle influence at work which, even when it does not in the controversy convert all "light" into "heat," deprives each party of the intellectual benefit of the sifting of ideas. I think I should have Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet's concurrence in this association of the extreme difficulty of useful personal discussion between exponents of the two views. In Paris, I gather that the impossibility is such that there is virtually no intellectual contact between even the best informed men on either side,—the "Economists" denouncing every phase of Socialism as absurd, and the Socialists retorting that every utterance of the "Economists" is only what is to be expected from their "bourgeois" prejudices. We are, in England, fortunately still able to recognize our opponent's point of view, and to get some benefit by clearing up the issue. But even in England there is often a difficulty in the way.

We touch here a point in the "ethics of controversy" which is

---

\* For a more correct estimate I would venture to refer to "Fabian Essays in Socialism" and the Fabian Tracts; to the many references given in my own "Socialism in England;" among non-socialist writers, the works of Kirkup and Gonner; and, for a study in English political development, to "The History of Trade-Unionism," by my wife and myself.

of more than passing interest. Whilst on the Socialist side, at any rate, the difficulty may often be caused by ignorance or bad manners, it is often aggravated by a half-conscious inability on the part of each side to believe in the intellectual sincerity of the other. I am willing to admit that a Socialist sometimes finds it hard to believe that the controversialist who accuses him of "wishing to divide everything up," or of aiming at "community of wives," can really believe what he is saying. On the other hand, I cannot help suspecting the Individualist of a feeling that his opponent is "too clever to be taken in by such stuff," and hence that he is willfully misleading the people. Perhaps I do Mr. Bosanquet an injustice. But I have more than once thought that I detected in his indignation against certain Socialists a "righteous anger" that men who *must* know better should lend their support to a movement which is, in his view, so demonstrably pernicious in its effects upon the very basis of the social order. There is certainly a feeling of this kind at the bottom of the exasperation against the more educated Socialists which is manifested in some quarters.

Now, any feeling of this kind ruins intellectual discussion. Unless we can begin the argument with a belief in each other's intellectual sincerity, we are likely to learn nothing from it. The consequence is bad for both sides. At Paris, for instance, the English onlooker cannot refrain from the feeling that the great gulf fixed between the "Economists" on the one hand and the Socialists on the other is causing both sides to fall further and further into various economic and political errors, which mutual intercourse would have checked, and which may go far to impoverish France. It is worth while trying to stop such a state of things elsewhere. We can surely bring ourselves severally to admit that, strange as it may seem, men of upright character, honest conduct, and devoted lives are to be found honestly holding doctrines which seem to us intellectually unsound and pernicious in their consequences. What happens is that men of equal intellectual ability, starting with different temperaments, base their views on widely divergent fundamental assumptions, and fortify them by acquaintance with very different sets of facts. That such men come out at conclusions diametrically opposed to each other is not only no ground for suspecting intellectual perversity, but is in itself rather a presumption of their good faith.

Critics of the Socialist position are prone, as it seems to me, to deprive their criticisms of real effect by committing two distinct

errors of controversy. They attempt, to begin with, to controvert the Socialist on the basis of their own Individualist assumptions, which seem to them so natural and inevitable as seldom to be explicitly stated. These may, doubtless, be superior in validity to those of the Socialist, but then he does not admit it, and hence is apt to find the argument quite pointless. If we wish to reason a man out of his position, we must either ignore his superstructure and explicitly attack his fundamental assumptions—usually an unprofitable task—or else we must, for the moment, *accept his assumptions*, and demonstrate that they do not support his case. To my mind, Mr. Bosanquet, like Mr. Lecky, Professor Flint, and many lesser controversialists, takes neither of these courses. What he does is tacitly to retain his own assumptions; honestly to credit the educated Socialist with too much wisdom not likewise to hold such eminently reasonable fundamentals, and then most persuasively to show that the Socialist position is inconsistent with them. But the Socialist differs on the fundamentals, and hence is not convinced.

The second error is that of “assuming consequences.” The critic persuades himself that such and such Socialist idea or project will necessarily and inevitably lead to such and such a result,—one which is abhorrent to his soul, and, it may be, no less abhorrent to that of the Socialist. How, then, can the latter continue to believe in his idea or project? The answer is simple. He does not admit the connection between what he is advocating and the terrible results which it can be “proved” to have. This may be due to intellectual obtuseness, but, more probably, to a different view of human nature or a different experience of economic or political facts. But in either case it affords no ground for exasperation. In argument, we can no more saddle our opponent with our inferences from his proposals than we can make him stand on our assumptions. The way to convince him is to accept for the moment both his assumptions and his inferences, and to demonstrate that his own argument is either inconsistent with itself or at variance with facts or authorities which he admits. The discussion to which Professor Henry Sidgwick has submitted so many problems of ethics, economics, and politics, in my humble judgment, forms a model of controversy in this respect. If only Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet would tackle Socialism in this spirit, we could none of us fail to profit. As it is, I end as I began, by declaring my agreement with Mr. Ball.

SIDNEY WEBB.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

## "THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM."

MR. BOSANQUET's criticism of my article seems to call for some reply. I am constrained to repeat that I confined myself to what was after all an incident of "Social Aspects" and to a great extent implicit. My criticism, therefore, was not meant for an appreciation of the book as a whole; that had already been given, and I heartily subscribed to its terms of eulogy. But my attention was drawn to the fact that the book had been taken as a serious and fatal indictment of modern Socialism or collectivism, and that the readers of this JOURNAL might be interested in hearing the case stated on the other side, even by an *impar congressus Achilli*. My statement was necessarily "abstract," because I was mainly dealing with theoretic considerations, and it may have appeared one-sided, because it was mainly attacking a one-sided criticism. I granted all that the essayists had said in the way of qualification and discrimination; but, having regard to the total impression of the references to collectivism, I felt justified in stating that as a matter of fact the Essays had not only put the position of Socialism at its worst,—to which there can be no objection,—but made that "worst" a standard and sign of Socialistic copyright. And the main purpose of my article was to call attention to the fact that the essayist's representation of Socialism, while it might be true enough of popular Socialism, was actually an inversion of the truth as applied to educated Socialism. I ventured to suggest that there is growing up a more thoughtful kind of Socialism which has appropriated the truth of Individualism,—I dislike these abstractions as much as Mr. Bosanquet, but they have their use,—and has made it at once the foundation and the test of social reorganization. It was certainly not a part of my design to deal with Mr. Bosanquet's social philosophy as a whole (which I agree can be made to admit all that I contend for) or to quote him against himself. I am perfectly aware of the distinction which he has made between "Moral" and "Economic" Socialism, and it was against the ultimateness of such a distinction that I wished to protest; but I was confining myself to particular references in a particular book, which any one who has closely followed the movement of Socialistic thought can only regard as indiscriminating and misleading. I need only quote as a remarkable confirmation of my contention a remark by a French writer and critic of Socialism who I can hardly suppose to be

straining after "praiseworthy audacity" or to be more observant than Mr. Bosanquet,—

"He (Mr. Webb, as representative of Fabian Socialism) avows definite collectivist views, but the turn he gives them, the end he assigns to them, and the general spirit with which he inspires them would make them *unrecognisable in the eyes of a French or German collectivist*. . . . Mr. Webb does not wish to *hand over property to the incapable*. . . . Mr. Webb's chief concern is to assure each citizen, not an equal share of wealth or happiness, but an equal chance in life. Although much in his programme may seem illusive, yet it *cannot be said that he would break the spring of individual energy like the continental Socialists*, nor does he *demoralise the working classes by promising them happiness without work*. This point is extremely important. Socialism on the continent tends to demoralize the worker by favoring his incapacity and dissuading him from personal exertion. However threatening may be the position of Socialism in England . . . its *most earnest and prominent advocates do not sacrifice to it the first essential thing in life, 'the sense of responsibility and the love of effort.'*" \*

Even Mr. Bosanquet is forced to admit (somewhat grudgingly) that Mr. Burns and Mr. Webb are "relatively wise" on the subject of "Relief Works;" though he has tried to qualify his concession by suggesting that it is only a difference of degree; it is really a difference of kind. Mr. Bosanquet, however, makes the most of an obsolete and forgotten manifesto about the "free maintenance of necessitous children." I hinted that this was not a deliberate expression of Fabian policy, and could not be maintained in that form by the thinking Socialist. The Fabian Society is at this moment issuing a tract by Mr. Graham Wallas against "Free Meals," and the cleavage between the Socialism of the chair and of the street was significantly illustrated at the International Congress by what Mr. Bosanquet, I suppose, would call the "relatively wise" report of Mr. Webb on "maintenance" and the amendment carried against him by the Social Democratic Confederation and Continental Socialists. Mr. Bosanquet's "manifesto" and even his more recent "handbill" are merely signs of an attempt on the part of certain Fabians not to break altogether with popular Socialism.† The Fabian Society has issued a tract which contains a list of

---

\* Paul de Ronsiers: "The Labour Question in England" (Macmillan), pp. 389, 390. And yet my critics (*e.g.* in *Speaker, Positivist Review*) declare that my version of English Socialism is unrecognizable and altogether "new." The italics are mine.

† The "Report" presented to the International Congress by the Fabian Society and issued as a tract seems specially designed to accentuate the divergence of view.

the errors it has worked out of and the problems it has not thought out, and this it has rightly taken to its credit. And I cannot help thinking that it would be fairer, as it certainly would be wiser on the part of philosophic philanthropists, like Mr. Bosanquet, to recognize and welcome this fact. I can quite understand the practical issue involved in a cheap and crude and mischievous propaganda. The Fabian Society may have sinned in this respect, but its propaganda is more and more directed to the middle classes; it aspires to being to English politics of the present generation what Philosophical Radicalism was to the last; and the next series of "Fabian Essays" will show what progress is being made in the direction of general political education. It can be judged (with some allowance) by its words, but still more by its works. It has influenced the Home Office, the London County Council, and the School Board, and consistently in the direction of maintaining the standard of life for the worker. It is already forming a school of Political Economic Science on concrete and historical lines. "The Tenants," "Sanitary Catechism," "Socialism, True and False," "Parish and District Councils," and Mrs. Webb's "Women and the Factory Acts" and "Sweating, its Cause and Remedy," are among the "penny tracts" which alarm Mr. Bosanquet so much. Mr. Bosanquet's suggestion (like the rest of his personal suggestions) that I am not familiar with Fabian policy is unfortunate. I have been a member from the first; I joined the small circle of which it originally consisted, because I believed in its attitude and in the ability and thoughtfulness of its leading members. And, finally, the suggestion that my version of Socialism is not representative is best met by the fact that the Fabian Society proposes to issue it as one of "the tracts." I contend, therefore, that I have some reason for thinking that Mr. Bosanquet's judgment upon Fabian Socialism, useful as it is up to a certain point, fails in perspective.\*

As regards Mr. Bosanquet's strictures upon my own shortcomings, I cannot but regret that I should be forced to follow the not very philosophical example he has set me of "the personal equation." I will content myself with saying that while Mr. Bosanquet was still a lecturer at Oxford I was a worker on the first Sanitary Aid Com-

---

\* I have not noticed Mr. Bosanquet's suggestion that the Fabian Society may find it convenient to have two views, as it hardly comes within the limits of a philosophic discussion. I should certainly not be a member if I thought so.

mittee in London, and for a long time worked upon the Charity Organization Society (of which I had previous experience), and the Board of Guardians at Oxford. Although, therefore, I could not, even if I would, describe my experience as "profound," Mr. Bosanquet (apart from the argument of "authority") is scarcely entitled to dismiss my argument as academic. As a matter of fact, it is my experience, such as it is, that has forced me to the conclusion that there are neglected elements in the philosophy of the charitable movement. Then, again, Mr. Bosanquet (in a somewhat mysterious sentence) charges me with "hitting low;" but he can only indicate this by converting statements I certainly made into inferences I as certainly did not draw. I never said that, because the writers put character in the foreground, *therefore* they reduce material conditions to a negligible quantity: I simply said that as a matter of fact they were so reduced. Nor did I say that it showed an idealistic bias to insist that sanitary improvement was useless without a determination of the individual to have the work done: on the contrary, I suggested that it could not be left, in factories for instance, to the employer, and could only be effective if the individual employ  s had some control over their own conditions,—a remark which I observe Mrs. Bosanquet interpreted to mean state-machinery. Mrs. Bosanquet makes sanitary improvement in a factory depend "only" on the education of the employer; Mr. Bosanquet makes it depend in a home on the education, not of the landlord, but of the tenant. So that it is made to depend on "the individual" the general position is saved, and if I were to adopt Mr. Bosanquet's more convenient than convincing way in dealing with an argument, I might talk of "one-sidedness," "abstractness," and even "thinness" of view. In both cases, improvement can only come through a public opinion effectively exercised and having power. Sanitary reform is a crucial instance of the reform which must come partly from above and partly from below: it needs the co-operation of an advancing public sentiment, which is able either to enlist or coerce the individual interest concerned. What about sanitary legislation? What about improvements in Glasgow and Birmingham? Here we have public sentiment or the general will armed with power and depending for its effectiveness on the individual co-operation it enlists by force of the example, the education, or the felt benefit it gives to individuals. Will Mr. Bosanquet contend that the character of Glasgow citizens has been spoilt? Paradoxical as it may seem, I am unable "to grasp the

point" which at first sight seems so profoundly obvious,—that "the man who lives in the house is the only man who can keep it clean." I venture to think that if "cleanness" includes conditions beyond the tenant's experience and control he requires the co-operation of the "general" sanitary will and knowledge, the local vestry, and (not least) the landlord,—to say nothing of other material conditions needed to make the dweller "in the slums" sensitive to sanitary responsibility. A higher standard of living must be suggested by actual conditions of living. You can no more put "sanitary ideas" into a person who does not know or has not been made to feel what a sanitary condition is than you can put ideas of duty or of space into persons who have no experience of duties or of space. And granting that what would be in real truth an abstract sanitary idea could be passed from hand to hand in this way, is the question of increased rent or notice to quit not another material impediment? And what about domestic "work" and domestic laundries (a difficulty for which the Fabian Society has demanded the interference of the state), and the general depressing effect of low earning and low living upon energy of character and aspiration? Does Mr. Bosanquet think that the system of house-owning and management—the system of irresponsible subletting and middle-men—under which many of the poor live is of no moment? What if the state could be present at every bargain between landlord and tenants, and insist on the right as well as the duty of the tenant to be healthy? Mr. Bosanquet's illustration of the discouraging effects of model barrack systems is only relevant to his particular and conventional conception of Socialism. As I have contended throughout, the thing must be done not *for* but *by* the individuals; by the individuals, for instance, as self-respecting members of a self-governing community, whether it be the association of a workman's society or, still better, the association of a democratic municipality. The real defect of the "charity organization" stand-point is that it obscures the idea of "the state" as the community democratically organized for the attainment of the common good. The officials and almoners of a private society can never represent this idea whatever else good they may do; and the inspector can only represent it when the individuals of the community can feel he is *their* inspector, and they can only feel this when they can assert themselves against the pressure of landlordism and private capitalism. "State Socialism is mere bureaucracy, if it does not rest on self-government." It is in this sense that I agree with Mr. Bosan-

quet that sanitary improvement must come from below, that is, if it involves what I have called the popular or democratic control of industrial conditions. And this is what is meant by Socialism (in England). Not that the state as something outside individuals should, to take Mrs. Bosanquet's illustration, organize devices for making tea ; and I confess I am surprised that philosophic students should generalize their conceptions of English Socialism from Schäfle's "Quintessence of Socialism" and Bellamy's "Looking Backward." It seems to me that it would be at once more philosophical and certainly more politic to recognize the higher side of the Socialistic movement (as for instance it is seen in England), and not to attenuate it, still less reduce it to or compare it with a lower level. Of course, State Socialism is a "thin" idea, if you choose (in the face of facts) to take a thin idea of it. Mr. Bosanquet seems to suggest that I endeavored to discredit the argument of "Social Aspects" by "dragging in" the Charity Organization Society. Nothing was further from my intention. But as the book has been accepted as the highest philosophy of that movement, I felt justified in extending the scope of my reference ; and I can only repeat my hearty appreciation of the rare merit and value of a book I have ventured to criticise from a subordinate point of view. I have recommended and shall continue to recommend it wherever I can ; and I regret exceedingly that my criticism should have been construed into any want of respect or consideration for writers whose services (I am thinking particularly of Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet) to the cause of Social Reform, both practical and theoretical, have been of the highest value and interest. I simply wished to put the case for Socialism in a form in which it could be recognized as a reasonable idea ; but I certainly did not hold a brief for either the voluntary or involuntary errors of Socialism as it is spoken or written. I will grant to Mr. and Mrs. Bosanquet, moreover, all the indiscretions of Fabian Socialism, but I am not convinced that it is either disingenuous or insignificant. I hope I may be allowed to follow up my provisional defence of "Socialism" as a reasoned idea of social progress by a more positive account of what I conceive to be its underlying principles. I confess that I think not only that what these writers take to be the "fuller" view of social progress, but Socialism itself, loses and suffers by the absence of a more discerning and sympathetic attitude on the part of "thinkers" towards the higher aspects of the Socialistic movement.—SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

P.S.—I regret that I misrepresented Mrs. Bosanquet's point of view in her article on the "Socialistic Propaganda." It was certainly directed to what I may call the "previous" side of the Propaganda, and that it has a "previous" side cannot be disputed. But the errors to which Mrs. Bosanquet drew attention were at any rate made *bona fide*, and it would be interesting to have a criticism from the same competent hand of Mr. Mallock's equally previous "Classes and Masses" or the Individualist Propaganda.

S. B.

"THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM."

IN dealing with Mr. Ball's article on the above subject, Mr. Bosanquet makes an attack on the "leaders and spokesmen" of the Socialist movement, charging them with want of vision of the "possible good for industrial life," and of utter recklessness as to the effect of Socialism upon the masses of our large towns. I do not claim to be one of the leaders of the movement thus indirectly assailed, but several years of active propaganda in its behalf warrant me in writing as one of its spokesmen. As such I should like to know the warranty Mr. Bosanquet possesses for dismissing Mr. Ball's opinions as "academic," and at variance with the general tenor of Socialist teachings. It may be that a study-table is the best ground on which to gain knowledge of a democratic movement, and that the conclusions drawn thereon are more trustworthy than those of actual experience. I am well aware of the danger of those in public life failing to appreciate the full significance of movements which they aid or inspire. It is possible not to see wood for trees; and by analogy it may be that the real meaning and the ultimate effect of the Socialist movement may be unknown to us who are spending our time and energy in its behalf, and yet that they may be perfectly obvious to those who, like Mr. Bosanquet, sit in a calmer atmosphere and judge its ideals and tendencies by the cold, clear light of reason. But that "its leaders and spokesmen, as a whole, have not yet acquired . . . any real, effective care—the care born of knowledge and sympathy—whether or not the classes whom the movement affects are elevated or brutalized by its impact," is a charge which cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. I have an intimate knowledge both of the leaders and speakers referred to which warrants me in denying *in*

*toto* the truth of Mr. Bosanquet's words. Notwithstanding his claim to superior knowledge, it is obvious that he is unacquainted with the individuals he has thus purposely maligned. Men and women do not devote their lives for objects of which they have no knowledge, and for people with whom they feel no sympathy. It is not at all improbable that they could not severally couch their ideals in the language of Mr. Ball, but that does not necessarily involve any breach between them. A statement of the meaning and purport of Christianity from the pens of Bishop Westcott and General Booth would differ both in terminology and conception. The one would be philosophic in idea and teleologic in scope; the other would be simple, mediate, and practical. But, upon the vital questions of the incarnation and the atonement, their differences would be such only as naturally arise out of their distinguishing capacities and methods. They are both Christians. Similarly in the Socialist movement, Mr. Ball may speak the language of the "academic wing," but the main principles he expounds are common to the most illiterate Dick, Tom, or Harry that mounts the rostrum in Hyde Park or on Bethnal Green. Differences of detail there may be, and almost certainly must be, in a scheme which embraces the whole of life, but these do not rend asunder the chain of theory which binds them both in the identity of a similar though diversified whole.

With the leading ideas of Mr. Ball's article I have much in common. His view that Socialism is the form of industrial organization which will mark the triumph of certain ideas in a process of natural selection has already been stated by Marx, though with too dramatic a *finale*, in his chapter on "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation." That it is concerned with a qualitative progress, and will result in the projection of the element of competition upon a higher plane, are also ideas familiar to the rank and file of the Socialist movement, and one can only regret the general ignorance of its significance which renders it necessary for Mr. Ball to emphasize that "Socialism implies both a superior moral idea and a superior method of business, and neither could work without the other." I am well aware of the fact that the Socialists are in some degree themselves to blame for this necessity. By an inversion of the teachings of his one-time master, Hegel, Marx makes it to appear that the material determines the moral. Robert Owen held that man was a creature of circumstance, and this theory has lately been stated with great vigor by the author of

"Merrie England." Between these writers and the extremists of the opposite camp there is a seemingly impassable gulf. They each insist upon their half-truth with so great an exclusion that it becomes a lie. The controversy is interesting as showing the ever green vitality of the unsolved problems of the past. It is the old question of "fate and free-will" dressed in the garb of latter-day theories; we have merely changed the form and length of letters without affecting the issues involved. In his treatment of this knotty problem, Mr. Ball is too ingenious to be simple, though his conclusions are in the main correct; and Mr. Bosanquet, while laying stress upon the importance of character, seems to want us to believe that he by no means endorses the views held by the fanatics on his own side. I am of opinion that, had it been stated by Socialists that "man is conditioned though not determined by his environment," there would not have arisen the assumption that they exalt machinery at the expense of character, and undervalue, if not entirely ignore, the question of moral reform.

Mr. Ball's theory of property and of rewards under Socialism, and the antagonism he suggests between it and Communism, seem to me in the former case unnecessarily mechanical, and in the latter scarcely correct. Even Communism does not deny the right to or the possession of private property. The formula, "from each according to his powers, to each according to his needs," in no way excludes the idea of the private ownership of personal effects. Communism and Socialism are but two aspects of the same social arrangement of property. The only difference between them is that one involves a wage system, while the other does not. The wage method of apportioning social rewards is a clumsy contrivance at best, and one which is rarely consistent with justice. It is only natural to expect that it will pass away with the advent of a more organic social life.

With regard to the family and the home, one ought to tread but charily. We cannot actually know the form which society will either mediately or finally assume in these important particulars. The family arrangement has passed through so many changes already that the student of sociology is warranted in considering it to be as fluctuant as society itself. One would have imagined that the several conditions represented by the words matriarchal, patriarchal, the *gens*, tribe, etc., would have preserved Mr. Bosanquet from the rash utterance that, "Unless the primary responsibility for maintenance falls on the head of the family, and in some

way depends on his services, *as it now does* (the italics are mine), selection is annihilated." An "experience" a little more practical and less "profound" would have taught Mr. Bosanquet that the bread-winners of the home in many of the Lancashire cotton districts are the wife and daughters—not the virtual head of the family. Under capitalist production the family arrangement shows unmistakable signs of breaking up, and Mr. Ball, as well as Mr. Bosanquet, are at least premature, if not wrong, in assuming its permanence. Whether Socialism or Communism will restore it upon a less material basis is one of those questions which belong to the future. The settlement of twentieth-century details lies, in my judgment, as far beyond the line of our duty as it does beyond our power. All that we can be reasonably expected to do is to gauge the trend of events and endeavor to bring society to a self-conscious realization of that form of organic relation for which, in our judgment, it is evidently preparing itself. We can do this best by affirming the leading ideas underlying the change, leaving their development and detailed application to the future as it becomes prepared for them. Posterity pays no regard whatever to the reputation of prophets. We reveal a greater wisdom as well as restraint in giving no response to those who demand cut-and-dried schemes of the new social state.

The temptations to do this are, I admit, very great, especially with an antagonist like Mr. Bosanquet, who seizes upon the palliative reforms advocated by Socialists and argues from them as though they were essential preparatives of a Socialist commonwealth. Whether "free maintenance" will form a part of the economy of applied Socialism is a question which I neither feel called upon nor able to decide. But it is obvious that no humanist (using the word in its most catholic sense) can look with equanimity upon the fact that thousands of children go to school daily without food, and it is as an expression of Humanism rather than of scientific Socialism that the Socialists, among others, are speaking in their behalf. I should make the same demand were I not a Socialist. The same may be said of old-age pensions, relief works, etc. They are not logical deductions from Socialism so much as the expression of the spirit of opportunism in its best sense in social politics. This is well understood by their advocates, and I am convinced that only the necessities of polemical debate cause Mr. Bosanquet to think and say otherwise. As Socialists, we are often driven by the miseries of the present system, and their

obvious need for immediate treatment, into the advocacy of reforms which, when adopted, would retard rather than aid the triumph of our own cause. So long as we do this deliberately and explicitly, and in those spheres only which involve no clashing with the vital principles of our own theory, no one can charge us with either ignorance or infidelity to our ultimate ideals. It is just this point of difference which Mr. Bosanquet either fails to perceive or is unwilling to acknowledge.

F. BROCKLEHURST.

NORTHENDEN, CHESHIRE.

“HEGEL’S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT.”

IN the July number of this JOURNAL there appeared a valuable article by Mr. McTaggart on “Hegel’s Theory of Punishment.” With the general drift of this article I find myself in complete agreement; but it seems to me that there is one important point which Mr. McTaggart has omitted to deal with, and to which it may be worth while to call attention.

There is an aspect of punishment indicated by the word “penance,” and it is this aspect which I think must have been uppermost in Hegel’s mind when he wrote the words quoted by Mr. McTaggart. To explain my meaning, I must take the case of punishment inflicted for conscious sin. According to Hegel, as I hold and as I understand Mr. McTaggart to hold, such wrong-doing always implies that the sinner has, for the sake of transitory pleasure, acted in defiance of his deepest self, weakly yielded up his true good at the solicitation of some passion or impulse. Lack of moral strength to suffer the effort of resistance is the cause of the fall. Now the needed strength may often be best acquired, and the fault thus retrieved, by the endurance of pain. It is this pain which it is the privilege of punishment to give. And if the criminal realizes his real position he will long for his punishment, in order that he may gain the strength, and be sure that he has the temptation under his feet at last; and in this case the punishment will have its perfect work and become penance.

The suggestion I would make to Mr. McTaggart is briefly this. He holds that Hegel places the value of punishment in the vividness with which it brings the fact of his wrong-doing being wrong before the offender. I would add to this that the discipline involved in the pain of punishment toughens the moral fibre. This

view seems to me to give even deeper meaning to Hegel's words that the punishment is the criminal's right, and an honor as well as a disgrace, while it also makes more evident the necessity of the element of pain.

It is significant, I think, that in the period of history where punishment has perhaps been most effective as a moral agent, the period of the Church's rule in the Middle Ages, it has borne the character of penance. It seems, moreover, not impossible that what is sometimes taken to be "vindictive pleasure" may be the result of a dimly-felt conviction that it is only through suffering that the criminal can be rescued. I may add that I do not consider this disciplinary and penitential view of punishment applicable in all cases,—obviously it can only be in place where there has been actual sin,—and I agree with Mr. McTaggart in thinking that punishment is needed in other cases, and can be justified on other grounds.

I should like to add one word on the question of corporal punishment. No doubt its opponents deliver themselves of much sentimental nonsense, but they have solid reasons as well. Boys, it may be granted, for the most part take corporal chastisement simply as one, and not the unpleasantest, form of punishment. The average boy would choose to "have his time caned off" rather than to be kept in. But it is both true and important, I think, that corporal punishment is of all forms the most liable to be given and received as a *deterrent*. It is here the danger lies. For girls, at least, and sensitive-natured boys the thought that they are treated "like dogs to whom the master shows a whip" is galling in the extreme. The treatment is apt to make them hardened, cynical, scornful of legitimate authority. In such cases I think it may be fairly said that it does tend to produce degradation.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

#### THE TRANSLATION OF "SITTlich."

PROFESSOR DYDE's recent translation of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" suggests the question with regard to the best way of rendering *sittlich* and its corresponding substantives. Mr. Dyde apparently adopts "ethical" as the equivalent; but this is evidently in some respects objectionable. The term "Ethics" is best used for the *science* of morals, and an "ethical system" is best under-

stood as meaning a body of moral theory, not a set of moral habits. *Sittlich* is probably untranslatable; but, as we are very much in want of some way of rendering the meaning into English, it occurs to me to ask why the good old word "manners" should not be restored to something of its old dignity in ethical literature. This term was not always restricted to the "minor morals." It is not so, for instance, in the following passages from Addison and Bacon: "His princes are as much distinguished by their manners as by their dominions; and even those among them whose characters seem wholly made up of courage, differ from one another as to the particular kinds." "The kinds of music have most operation upon manners; as to make them warlike; to make them soft and effeminate." It seems clear that in both these cases "manners" would be rendered in German by "*sittlich*." And even in much more recent times Wordsworth could, without offence, express in his sonnet to Milton the devout aspiration, "Give us manners, virtue, freedom, power,"—*i.e.*, give us *ἡθους*, or *sitten*. So also with the corresponding adjectives. When Macbeth speaks of "the murderers steeped in the colours of their trade, their daggers unmannerly breeched with gore," it is clear that he means *unsittlich*. And when Julia, in "The Two Gentlemen of Verona," says, "Let me have what thou think'st meet and is most mannerly," it is equally clear that she means *sittlich*. Similarly, take such expressions as these: "Others out of mannerliness and respect to God;" "By whatever mannerly names we may palliate the offence;" "Barefaced ribaldry is both unmannerly in itself and fulsome to the reader."\* In such examples the terms "manners," "mannerly," and "unmannerly" seem to approach very closely in their meaning to the German *sitten*, *sittlich*, and *unsittlich*. Why should not this usage be restored? Of course, I do not mean to suggest that "manners" could ever become a satisfactory equivalent for *sitten*. But sometimes, at least, it might serve.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

---

\* Several of these instances are taken from Johnson's Dictionary.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

THE COMING INDIVIDUALISM. By A. Egmont Hake and O. E. Wesslau. Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co., 1895. 8vo, pp. 347.

Were we to base our judgment on the facts most readily observable, we might believe that the social reformers who look to state interference as the most certain means of achieving social progress were not only more numerous, but better able to defend their position than those who trust to other methods. For some time past socialist schemes of reform have been propounded in considerable numbers, though not, perhaps, with great variety, and we have become accustomed to connect utopian dreams of a future condition of society, to be reached by adopting some (apparently) simple plan, with the advocacy of socialism. There has, however, recently been a recrudescence of the contrary view, and "The Coming Individualism" gives vigorous expression to the belief that the true road to social salvation lies through the gateway of liberty. We are reminded of the proofs which used to be so familiar that, in seeking their own welfare unhindered, men unconsciously wrought out the welfare of the community. It would be matter for serious regret if the great truth underlying that view were in danger of becoming obscured or of being forgotten.

With the conceptions of political economy, whether of the science in general or of particular results to which it leads, which find acceptance in this book, we cannot entirely agree. We cannot accept a proposal to limit the range of political economy to the case which is here formulated. If it be true, as it is, that our actual social condition is one in which (to use the language of the authors) "the principles of domestic economy have been largely resorted to everywhere," it cannot be rational to refuse to study the results of those principles, and, especially, the results of the combination of these principles with those of political economy as conceived by these writers. The science of political economy has always been principally occupied with the elucidation of the results of free enterprise and private ownership of property, but to assert that this is its sole object is to ask us to accept a rather rough first approximation to the solution of the real problems to be solved by the science, and to resolutely refuse to consider everything which

might assist in solving these problems more completely and more exactly. To borrow an illustration from a recent writer, it is like asking us to be satisfied for geographical purposes with the description of the earth as a spheroid, which may serve well enough for other purposes and as conveying a first rough notion of the form of the planet on which we live. We are inclined to think that the authors have somewhat misconceived the purpose of much that is characteristic in modern economic writings, and that they have condemned what they might have approved had they succeeded in getting the matter in its proper perspective.

The volume strikes the reader as resembling in the violence of its diction much of the very class of writing which its authors view with most distaste. In its descriptions of the impending fate of the Western world, and of England in particular, if the precepts here laid down be neglected, the pictures of horror unveiled before us recall very vividly much that emanates from the extreme socialists. But through the whole there rings a pleasing tone of patriotism which is refreshing. "Dynasties, oligarchies, aristocracies, and plutocracies have been weighed and found wanting, and if the democracy of Great Britain cannot rise to the height of the situation, the grand mission of the British race has come to an end." Which conclusion may, let us hope, be rejected. Here the authors and we are agreed.

We have been exercised in mind in trying to determine whether the two authors are in thorough agreement with one another and with Mr. Fletcher Vane, who has added an essay on municipal government at the end of the volume. In this essay the tone is in marked contrast, in respect to moderation, with the rest of the volume. Here we find, assigned a proper place, Burke's saying, "Liberty must be limited in order to be possessed." The regulation of music-halls by the municipality, to the extent of forbidding certain performances as having either a degraded or a degenerating tendency, is distinctly approved. Yet a whole chapter of the book is devoted to proving that the best security for the disappearance of undesirable performances is—not the veto of the authorities, but—free competition. The bad and mischievous performances will, we are assured, lack an audience if managers are not hampered by restrictions in adapting what they offer to the taste of the public. In this chapter, however, and in that which advocates the removal of licensing restrictions from the drink-trade, a note of caution is struck, a saving clause is introduced, by

the expression of the view that changes in these matters should be made only gradually. Are such limitations as these the indications of the restraint exercised by one writer on the other?

The general statement of the advantages of free-trade is one we shall make no attempt to dispute. We thoroughly agree with the conclusion, though not with some portion of the argument. We find, for example, that the "exact political economy" of the authors does not protect them from curious misconceptions of the nature of value, both in this chapter and in that which deals with money. This latter chapter contains what appears to be the pet theory of our authors, that British industry is threatened with destruction because of what they call "bank monopoly." We can agree that the organizations for the supply of credit to peasant farmers and to small employers are far from what they might be. That this is a necessary consequence of our banking laws is by no means the same conclusion, however. The authors describe two ways in which the difficulties they describe might be overcome. The one they favor is the removal of all restrictions on the issue of bank-notes, including the restriction to amounts not less than £5. They do not dwell either on the reasons for not rather advocating the introduction of the second method they describe (under the name of the French *banquiers*), nor do they tell us that it has saved France from sweating and the tyranny of the middleman, two evils which are assigned as inevitably following bank monopoly. In hesitating to accept their conclusions, we do not wish to dissent from the propositions they lay down as to the advantage which might follow if the privileges they advocate were enjoyed and not abused, but rather to express some hesitation as to whether it is just, we might say, is true, to accuse our present banking system of such widespread evil influences as are attributed to it in this volume. Can we take seriously, too, the assertion that the double function of coin as a value-measurer and as a medium of exchange is not nowadays clearly recognized?

With the object of the book, we repeat, we sympathize completely. We believe that real freedom promises far greater economic advantage than state supervision of every phase of industry. The problem not solved in this book is, how to attain real freedom. What degree of limitation is necessary that our liberty may be secure? A hasty reading of the book would leave the impression that it advocates the abolition of all limitation, and most of its pages would bear that interpretation strictly. Though this con-

clusion is so strongly suggested, as we have pointed out, our authors display some hesitation in endorsing it without qualification. Perhaps they take refuge in the conviction that there is no danger of too little limitation being attained, and hence feel free to press for the removal of every limitation whose removal has any chance of securing general assent. In insisting that much of the worst of the evil usually assigned to competition arises from the lack of competition and is removable, not by hindering, but by fostering, competition itself, they are presenting a very important truth to their readers. But is it not pushing matters somewhat to the extreme to propose that our colonies should be enabled to enjoy the benefits of liberty by the forcible imposition on them by the mother country of a free-trade *régime*?

A. W. FLUX.

THE OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

SOCIALISM AND MODERN THOUGHT. By M. Kaufmann, M.A.  
London: Methuen & Co., 1895. Pp. 184.

Mr. Kaufmann has written a number of books and articles on Social Subjects, and in this book (which is one of the series, "Social Questions of To-day") he condenses an immense amount of information, exposition, and criticism. Every vigorous movement for social reform has a double relation to the general spirit, or trend of thought, of the time in which it appears. On the one hand, the reforming movement is a strong protest against current ways of thought and life. Its denunciations are sweeping and violent, and it demands nothing less than a total renovation, a "right about turn." On the other hand, the special form, both of the condemnation and the proposed reconstruction of society, depends in each age upon the special character of the current religious, moral, and speculative thought. A quiet and orderly social progress in our own day will be greatly aided by a study of these two aspects of contemporary Socialism, so that we may come to understand more fully both the real grounds of its attractiveness and value, and the meaning and source of what in it is inconsistent and visionary. It is a work of this kind that Mr. Kaufmann undertakes. After describing the somewhat indefinite (though mainly materialistic) "Philosophy of Socialism" itself, Mr. Kaufmann examines the inconsistency with which it takes a part and leaves a part of Darwinism. Then he explains and criticises the moral conceptions of Socialism in their relation to certain aspects of modern thought; and he has some-

thing to say in moral condemnation of some methods of Socialist propaganda. In a chapter on "Pessimism and Socialistic Optimism" there are brought into clearness the author's position and the main theme of his book. "As critics," he says, "Socialists are pessimistic; whilst in the construction of their own scheme of reconstruction they are optimistic overmuch, from which it is not unfair to conclude that there must be some fault in their analysis of the present social system and some error in their forecast of the society of the future." As an escape from these errors he seeks the "middle course" of a "scientific meliorism," "social reform instead of social revolution," effecting "a gradual, though radical, change of the existing social system." The remainder of the book is occupied with interesting and well-informed discussion of the relations of Socialism to culture and art and to the Christian religion, Roman Catholic and Protestant. Mr. Kaufmann's own position is that of a liberal Protestant. His work gives evidence of very wide reading in Socialist literature of all forms; his pages are packed with quotations from books, articles, speeches, and reports. Thus there is a brokenness which is irritating to any one who likes a smooth stream of thought or a regular dialectic discussion. But the book is suggestive and in many ways worth reading.

ROBERT LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

ESSAYS AND NOTICES PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL. By Thomas Whittaker, B.A. (Oxon.) London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1895. Pp. xii., 370.

Readers of *Mind*—the English philosophical Review—have for many years been familiar with the name of Mr. Thomas Whittaker, and have been indebted to him for his careful and lucid critical notices of French, German, and English philosophical works. Nearly half of the present volume consists of reprints of these notices, which were well worth collecting in a permanent form. They are models of conscientious "reports" on the works criticised, as well as full of suggestive comment and criticism. The rest of the volume is made up of original articles which have appeared in *Mind* and other periodicals, besides an "Essay in the Philosophy of History," which was published separately in 1893. One of the four chapters into which the essay is divided consists mainly of an account of Renouvier's "Uchronie" (a book whose

subtitle explains its purposes, "*L'Utopie dans l'Histoire ; Esquisse historique apocryphe du développement de la civilisation européenne, tel qu'il n'a pas été, tel qu'il aurait pu être*"), and of Dr. H. von Eicken's "*Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung*." The problem which chiefly occupies Mr. Whittaker is the historical causation of the decay of ancient and of the rise of modern civilization. With regard to the general interpretation of history, he seems to me hardly quite just to the distinctive merits of Hegel, whose conception of progress he accepts to a great extent. He rightly (I think) classes Hegel and Comte together as philosophers whose idea—that, though in respect of the directing ideas or in respect of the social system "there may not be continuous progress, there is at least continuity"—has passed into the consciousness of historians who are not philosophers.

The interest of the greater part of Mr. Whittaker's *Essays* is metaphysical rather than ethical. His general endeavor is stated in his "Preface" to be "an effort to arrive at something positive through criticism." "The only absolute certainty," he says, "seems to me to be, not in anything that can be called Ontology, but only in what is called Theory of Knowledge. All that is demonstrable in metaphysics is Idealism in the strict philosophical sense. That is to say, the external world, not only as it offers itself to ordinary apprehension, but also as understood by science, consists of nothing but phenomena. . . . If science is the theoretic explanation of phenomena as such, it seems to require as its complement a theory of reality, that is, a metaphysic. On behalf of Metaphysic as thus understood, I have desired to put in a plea against the puritans of Agnosticism. There may be no means of demonstrating that a particular metaphysical theory is true, and yet we may have a perfect right to speculate" (pp. v., vi., viii.). These sentences sufficiently indicate the author's general standpoint.

One of the *Essays* is a very full and careful account of the philosophy of Giordano Bruno, supplemented in certain respects by a critical notice of later date relating to Professor Carrière's work on "The philosophical ideas of the Reformation-time." Of more specially ethical interest are short essays on "Individualism and State action," on "Politics and Industry," and on "The Theory of Justice." Mr. Whittaker points out the significant ambiguity in the word "individualism:" it may mean (1) "the philosophical or psychological individualism that attempts to explain society and

the state from the relations of individual men at first isolated (yet assumed to possess already all human attributes) who afterwards find their advantage in the social union and in political organization," or (2) "the individualism that places its practical ideal in a life not authoritatively regulated from without, but developing itself spontaneously from within." These two really distinct doctrines have often been held by the same person *e.g.*, J. S. Mill; and have been opposed in conjunction, *e.g.*, by Comte. The modern doctrine of the historical growth of society, "instead of destroying the individualistic ideal, restores it in a more unqualified form. 'Individuality' is no longer, as Mill described it, merely 'one of the elements of well-being,' but is that for the sake of which social well-being is in the end to be desired." (P. 115.) "State-interference with industry, whether judicious or injudicious, is in no way inconsistent with the principle of individual liberty." (P. 121.) "The conclusion, however, that the state may justifiably interfere with the industrial system does not imply that it ought always to interfere. There is, first, the condition that it should have adequate knowledge." (P. 122.) Rejecting alike the two extremes,—the *laissez faire* and the collectivist solutions of the industrial problem, and also the "hierocratic" solution of Positivists and Catholics,—Mr. Whittaker accepts "the doctrine of state-control or state-regulation of industry according to the best ideas and knowledge attainable at the time." (P. 178.) The paper on Justice is suggestive, but would gain by expansion. It restores, in the light of the theory of evolution, the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of justice as specially the political virtue: "it is the virtue that tends to maintain in existence, or to bring about, or to extend, the best type of political society." (P. 190.)

In an appendix there is a curious paper on "The Psychology of Stimulants." "The scientific man demands that the pretensions of wine to take its place among the things that minister to human happiness shall be decided by experiments performed in physiological laboratories; and that the enthusiasm of those who in former days made Bacchus a god, and the wrath of the indignant teetotal lecturer, shall be equally set aside as irrelevant." (P. 361.) It is suggested that opium may serve the psychologist as a sort of microscope and throw light on the remoter phenomena of association of ideas. (P. 370.)

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY, SCOTLAND.

**STUDIES OF CHILDHOOD.** By James Sully, M.A., LL.D., Grote Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895.

More than a century has passed since Rousseau, heralding a revolution in educational no less than in social and political thought, advocated a "return to Nature" in education,—a basing of the teacher's work upon the actual study of children. The whole trend of educational thought since then has been in the direction of emphasizing the importance of child-study. This has, however, too often resolved itself into glib talking and writing about "the child,"—a convenient, but somewhat shadowy abstraction, most satisfactory to the theorist, but not to be found in the home or the school-room. The recognition of the truth, that the science of education stands in pressing need of actual data (in the shape of carefully collected and arranged facts about children), from which trustworthy generalizations can be drawn, is a hopeful sign of advance. On both sides of the Atlantic energetic efforts are being made to secure such data, and Professor Sully's book will be welcomed as a valuable contribution.

While only claiming "to deal with certain aspects of children's minds which happen to come under my notice and to have a special interest for me," he has given us a book, not only interesting in itself, but full of the most useful suggestions for the guidance of future investigators. The task of observing and interpreting the mental acts of children is one beset with difficulties. In order that it may prove fruitful, well qualified workers are needed,—possessed of "a divining faculty the offspring of child-love, perfected by scientific training." In infant study, the very early experimental work should, he thinks, be undertaken by the father, as, in spite of the better opportunities for continuous observation on the part of the mother, she is usually lacking in scientific training, and in any case the maternal interest is likely to overshadow the scientific.

Each chapter deals with some special aspect of child-mind as shown in the there recorded sayings and doings of children. Such headings as: "Age of Imagination," "Dawn of Reason," "Child as Artist," sufficiently indicate the contents of each. The student of Ethics will find much that is of interest in the chapters entitled "Raw Material of Morality" and "Under Law." In the first of these, Professor Sully concludes that the moral content of a child's mind consists of the raw material of morality alone. The infant,

though capable of becoming moral or immoral, is as yet neither the one nor the other. We may discover pro-moral or contra-moral *tendencies*, but nothing to which we can in fairness apply grown-up standards of right and wrong. Contra-moral tendencies thrust themselves first upon our notice, a fact easily explainable from the stand-point of evolution. Admitting that the order of development of the individual child follows that of the race, we should expect to find some expression of the primitive egoism, which characterizes alike the savage and the brute, showing itself before any signs of altruistic feeling appear. The anti-social feelings, Anger (manifesting itself in violent resistance to any interference with appetite or desire), Envy and Jealousy (exhibited when objects regarded as desirable are seen to be enjoyed by others), are among the first to show themselves. But the consciousness of self is developed by the clashing of the child's own will with that of another, and what is blind fury in the brute becomes humanized through the realization of an injured self.

The egoism of children also takes the form of lack of sympathy with the sufferings of others,—a callousness that often amounts to positive cruelty in the treatment of animals. It is too often forgotten, however, that this seeming heartlessness is largely due to lack of experience and understanding on the one hand, while on the other, the child's love of power and curiosity must be held accountable for much.

On the pro-moral side, the social instinct and the imitative impulse, noticeable in even very young children, are the germs of true sympathy. The wish to do as grown-up people do leads to practical helpfulness, while generosity and the desire to please show themselves side by side with greediness and selfishness. Kindly feeling towards animals is largely the outcome of the existing similarity of position and needs, possibly also of "a sense of a common danger and helplessness, face to face with the human giant." The affectionate care given by children to dolls and toy animals, and the pitifulness often extended by them even to plants and stones, are evidence of a very real impulse in the direction of true morality.

In treating of "Children's Lies," the danger of applying adult tests is again pointed out. A lie, to be a lie, must be put forward with a full consciousness of its untruth and with the deliberate intention of deceiving. Some time probably elapses before children even realize the difference between truth and falsity, and the desire

to make play more vivid, to please by a pretty speech, the instinct of making fun and not infrequently genuine self-deception, explain most of the lies of children. Perhaps the most interesting point raised concerns the power of "suggestion," exercised by older people, in producing lying on the part of children, and we should have been glad to have had a fuller treatment of this important aspect of the question. Professor Sully challenges the idea that children are instinctively untruthful, and suggests that all lies not accounted for by any of the above conditions are probably the result of imitation,—lying being distinctly contagious. He thinks that a rightly brought-up child learns to look upon truth as customary, as coming in the fixed ordinary course of things, and that, on the first utterance of a conscious lie, a shock would be experienced as at the breaking of a law.

In the chapter "Under Law," the child's attitude towards moral government is examined. While, on the one hand, the child appears as a rebel resenting everything that threatens his freedom, on the other, it would seem that he reverences what is customary and dislikes any interference with what appears to him as the ordinary rule of life. Because he objects to some particular ruler or some special instance of the working of a law, it does not follow that he is lawless by nature. Indeed, the very evasions and excuses made by children in order to get their own way would seem to imply a recognition of law and government.

Children readily resent the violation of any precedent, and are apt to insist on the carrying out of some rule to which they have been accustomed, or even on the infliction of some punishment looked upon as the natural sequence of a given act. The importance of this early development of the sense of the sacredness of law, from the educator's point of view, is apparent. It is that which secures compliance with the commands of the governor, even when they appear irksome. The "Wise Lawgiver" will avoid unnecessary friction and any uncertainty or inconsistency in discipline. It is important "to expect the right thing as though the wrong thing were an impossibility," "to meet any indication of a disobedient spirit, first with misunderstanding and later with amazement." A statement (with many illustrations) of the bearing of quasi-hypnotic suggestion on moral education concludes the chapter. The book also contains "Extracts from a Father's Diary" and an account of "George Sand's Childhood."

It can hardly be said that Professor Sully has given us anything

very new or striking in fact or theory ; the originality of treatment and suggestiveness are what constitute the value and charm of the book. As a text-book of psychology or education, it would be found wanting in definiteness and comprehensiveness ; neither is it a book of such weight and importance as to claim rank among works of permanent scientific worth, but as an introduction to the study of children its value is undoubted. It is, moreover, most eminently readable (a quality too rarely possessed by books which deal even remotely with the subject of education), and the general reader, no less than the student, will find the book full of interest.

H. M. HUGHES.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

ON EDUCATION. An Introduction to its Principles and their Psychological Foundations. By H. Holman. Isbister & Co., 1896.

Mr. Holman has more than justified the reputation he made at Aberystwith. He has produced a sound and systematic treatise on the scientific basis of educational theory. He has wealth of illustration, force, and ability in keeping well to the front the points he wishes to drive home, even when he is hampered by a certain diffusiveness of style. The volume is full of pithy sentences, which arrest the attention of the careful reader. He possesses all the qualifications necessary to the author of a book in the first rank, and he has just failed in producing the standard work on his subject. The volume before us is a mere reproduction of lecture material. Excellent as this material is, it is nothing less than aggravating to find endless repetitions, entirely justified as they may be in a course of lectures to young students. For these the book will be found of the greatest value. But Mr. Holman has not taken the trouble to recast his lectures, and has thus missed the opportunity of making upon the mind of the general reader that impression which he is so admirably qualified to produce.

On one point I find myself at distinct issue with Mr. Holman, viz., in his remarks on the educational value of fairy tales for the young, a question to which much attention has been recently given in educational journals. I am fairly taken aback by such a statement as the following : " We will take it as generally allowed that the purpose of such stories is to introduce a more serious and exact knowledge about things" (p. 405). Of course, if this is *not* generally allowed, we cannot agree that " the proper thing to do is to

subject children to the fairy tale material of our own times and knowledge." "The fairy tales and wonders of science" will never (as far as my experience of children goes) compete with the fairy tales of our childhood. First, it is only in very rare cases that the audience will be led by them into the realms of the ideal. And, secondly, as far as teachers are concerned, we freely confess we are "beings of but dim and bounded faculties," so that the majority of us will be quite unable to utilize the fairy land of science as a means of ethical stimulus. This is, however, a minor detail in a work of substantial value. I may add that the author, although not an Herbartian fanatic, has given us a remarkably clear exposition of the views of Herbart and his school.

W. J. GREENSTREET.

MARLING SCHOOL, STROUD.

**THE GREAT DIDACTIC OF JOHN AMOS COMENIUS.** Now for the first time Englished. With Introductions, Biographical and Historical, by M. W. Keatinge, B.A. Adam & Charles Black, 1896.

Considering that the sum of the volume before us occupies no less than one-third of the life of Comenius by Professor Laurie, it is extremely doubtful if the above translation was a necessary undertaking. Be that as it may, the translation is clear and readable. The introductory matter is excellent, the sections dealing with the historical environment of Comenius being of great interest. The essence of the teaching of Comenius was his doctrine that the final end of all training of the young is morals and religion. From this stand-point he never varied, although in the later editions of the "Janua" he cast to the winds the main points brought out in the "Great Didactic." And what an ideal was his! "That only I call a school which is truly *officina hominum*, where minds are instructed in wisdom to penetrate all things, where their souls and their affections are guided to the universal harmony of the virtues, and hearts are allured to divine love." It is worth noting that this ideal of harmonizing the work and methods of the school with morality and religion is amplified in a later treatise, "Paradisus Juventuti Christianæ Reducendus," abounding with quaint conceits and forced analogies between the school and the Garden of Eden.

W. J. GREENSTREET.

LES CARACTÈRES ET L'ÉDUCATION MORALE, ÉTUDE DE PSYCHOLOGIE APPLIQUÉE. Par F. Queyrat. Alcan, 1896.

M. Queyrat's volume in the "Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine" is an instance of the great interest taken by the general public in France on all topics connected with psychology and education. It is brightly put together, but, like all of M. Queyrat's books, is nothing more than a clever compilation. There is nothing original in it from cover to cover, and the demands made on the well-known works of men from Fouillée and Guyau to Bain and Sully are unsparing. Nevertheless, at least one of these books has passed to a second edition, so that it may safely be assumed that they "fill a gap."

W. J. GREENSTREET.

SKETCHES OF LESSONS IN MORAL INSTRUCTION. By E. Reynolds. London: Neumann & Co., 1895.

To those who merely require a sketch, this little pamphlet of some forty pages seems to give too much. To those who lack the subject-matter, it gives too little. It is difficult to see for what class of teachers it is intended. In plan it contains no better arrangement than we find in Fricke, Seelye, Everett, Steele, or others. We would suggest something more in the nature of a careful and detailed *analysis* of the substance of each lesson, placing in italics the sub-sections suitable for omission in longer or more advanced lessons. Stories, etc., should be referred to by a number or letter and relegated to an appendix. Then we have a bird's-eye view of our lesson, and, if we require more than that, Mr. Reynolds's notes will not be of much use.

W. J. GREENSTREET.

CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY. By Enrico Ferri, Professor of Criminal Law, etc. Vol. II. of The Criminology Series. Edited by W. Douglas Morrison. 8vo. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1895. Pp. xiii., 284.

This volume is a translation of that portion of Professor Ferri's work on Criminal Sociology which is immediately concerned with the practical problems of criminality. It is strongly and clearly written, and should be welcomed not only by those who have professionally to deal with criminals, but by all who would face the pathological aspects of social life thoughtfully and manfully.

The first chapter discusses *the data of criminal anthropology*.

It is an inquiry into the natural genesis of criminality, into the physical, biological, and social conditions which tend to develop criminals; and it goes without saying that the author has no lasting hope in any methods of dealing with crime which are not based on a study of the originative conditions, and which do not aim at the amelioration of these. The old punitive craze, still persistent in more or less attenuated form, is typically represented by its unfailing recipe,—a hemp-rope. But as the savage desire for vengeance died away, and as society began to be dimly aware that it was more or less responsible for making its own criminals, practical measures assumed a humaner aspect and a wider aim,—in the first place still, of preserving the society; in the second place, of improving the criminal. Then as crime began to be recognized as a social disease, as a phenomenon admitting of scientific investigation, and not as a hopeless enigma, the feeling has grown that, while it may still be necessary to lop off a member, to segregate the infectious and so on, the primary problem is that of *social hygiene*. The same transition is obviously paralleled in the modern insistence on preventive medicine.

The chief points in the first chapter are: (1) a temperate insistence on the value of anthropological data in criminology, and (2) an indication of the biological and psychological distinctions between the five types of criminal which the author recognizes,—viz., criminal madmen, born criminals, criminals by contracted habits, occasional criminals, and criminals of passion.

The second chapter deals with *the data of criminal statistics*, and has largely to do with the adverse social conditions which drive people to crime, and with the inefficacy of punishment as a curative method. Crime is a function of three variables: (a) biological,—e.g., a low physical and mental type; (b) physical,—e.g., a severe winter, and (c) social,—e.g., an industrial crisis. Statistics corroborate what appears to many quite plain on general grounds, that severe punitive measures do not lessen crime. In certain cases they may deter and even cure individuals, but on the whole they must be ineffective as long as the originative conditions—organic and social—persist. “Crime has been compared to an impetuous torrent which ought to be enclosed between the dikes of punishment, lest civilized society should be submerged. I do not deny that punishments are the dikes of crime, but I assert that they are dikes of no great strength or utility.” That this is no mere assertion the book shows.

The third chapter deals with *practical reforms*, by which are meant not the innumerable measures which are or should be in action to preserve and improve the well-being of society, but particular methods in the treatment of the criminal. Punishments and penal codes will and must remain till the millennium; they are essential to the protection of society; but the author's endeavor is to show how criminal procedure and legislation, sentence and punishment, prison and asylum, may without any violent breach with the past be modified "in accordance with the inferences from a scientific study of crime as a natural and social phenomenon." Some such defensive system as the author sketches "must be substituted for the criminal and penitentiary systems of the classical school, so soon as the daily experience of every nation shall have established the conviction, which at this moment is more or less profound, but merely of a general character, that these systems are henceforth incompatible with the needs of society, not only by their crude pedantry, but also because their consequences are becoming daily more disastrous." But behind these defensive measures lie the yet more important preventive measures of *social hygiene*.

It were much to be desired that those whose business it is to deal directly with criminals, as judges, governors, commissioners, and the like, were required to have some sound knowledge of certain departments of biology, anthropology, and medicine. That is too much to hope for soon. In the meantime, however, it is their duty, even more than the philosopher's, to study such a book as this.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

EDINBURGH.

PARASITISM, ORGANIC AND SOCIAL. By Jean Massart and Émile Vandervelde. Published by Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

This interesting little volume is the work of two teachers in the University of Brussels. Jean Massart, a botanist, treats of the lower parasites from the point of view of a biologist, and Émile Vandervelde, a political economist, discourses upon the *social* parasites who are content to live a life of ease at the expense of their neighbors. The work is admirably translated by Mr. William Macdonald and revised by Mr. J. Arthur Thomson, who has added some very valuable and often critical foot-notes. There is a preface by Professor Patrick Geddes.

In the first chapter we find an interesting description of some of the more common parasites,—the bug, the tape-worm, the mistletoe, etc., and a classification of these. A parasite is defined as a being which lives at the expense of another without destroying it, and without doing it a service. Then follows a classification of social parasites on similar lines, and the organic and social parasites are compared with each other. The authors seem to be very hard upon proprietary parasites, to whom they seem to prefer the proxenetes, the prostitutes and the bully! The proprietary parasites are described as the tape-worms of the social body. “Their riches come to them as easily as its food-supply comes to the *tænia solium*, the capitalistic levy being deducted from the produce, as a first claim, with automatic regularity. From the moment when you become a proprietor of the land, of houses, or of the machinery of production (and may we not also add from the moment you become the receiver of a royalty from Messrs. Swan Sonnenschein), you may, as Henry George says, sit down and smoke your pipe, you may lie about like the lazzaroni of Naples or the lepers of Mexico, and all the time the rent of house and farm, and the interest on your other capital, will keep dropping steadily into your hands.”

In their second chapter the authors trace out the evolution of many of the organic parasites, which they derive from previously mutualistic or predatory forms. They then trace out the passage of mutualistic and predatory relations, among social individuals, to a condition of parasitism. Thus we may first have home industries, where every one helps in mutual production and sale: where the system becomes more complicated and the middleman and the capitalist step in, behold the parasitism! The predatory Arabs of the Moghreb, after their conquest of the district, settled down quietly upon the tribute they levied from the conquered population.

In their last two chapters the authors review the influence of the parasitic life upon the parasite itself and upon its host.

While this little volume is full of interesting facts, and will commend itself to many readers, it must be confessed that the authors have pushed analogy “farther than is desirable.”

Everybody from time immemorial has recognized that from the point of view of “dependence upon others” there are similarities between certain men and many of the lower animals; the Greek word “*parasitos*” was first applied to the human dependent, and was

subsequently transferred to the lower dependent organisms. The similarity is here but a superficial one, they are but similar in being dependent. Such similarity is quite of a different order from the striking and important resemblances which have enabled biologists to classify animals and plants into distinctly related families and genera. The resemblance is quite as superficial as when we speak or write of a person as "a dog," "a fox," "a shrew," or "an ass." Most persons would therefore consider that when they had called an *indolent* capitalist a "louse" or a "tape-worm," they had done more than their duty by "analogy." When, therefore, our authors gravely divide and subdivide the parasites both organic and social and pair them off together, we see that they have over-rated the value of analogy as a scientific method.

But even if the socializing biologist were to call the *indolent* capitalist a "louse" and go no further, he might have the tables turned upon him very readily. Were the *indolent* capitalist a louse, he would do his duty and carry on the pursuits he is fitted for, and that is just what he does not do. A louse's duty is to be a louse; he is fitted for it. A man's duty is to work and think, for he is fitted for it. You will only irritate the *indolent* capitalist by your analogy, and if he possesses any perceptive faculty you will fail to convince him. You may have a chance if you use the only true argument, namely, that he is not fulfilling his *raison d'être*.

JOHN BERRY HAYCRAFT.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

#### INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE: TWO SERIES OF LECTURES.

By Sir J. R. Seeley, K.C.M.G., Litt. D., etc. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896. Pp. xi., 387.

The late Sir John Seeley, as Professor of History at Cambridge (Eng.), made political science an important, nay, an essential part of his teaching of history. "History," according to him, "without political science has no fruit; political science without history has no root." The volume before us consists of sixteen lectures, edited from the MS. of the author by Prof. H. Sidgwick. The editor has based his text on two versions, an earlier and longer and a later but shorter course of lectures, using mainly the former. The result is a valuable addition to political science and, it may be added, to English literature. If occasionally, as might be expected in a series of lectures not specially prepared by the

author for the press, more diffuse than the "Expansion of England," with which one naturally compares it, this posthumous work has the same qualities of lucid and incisive style, while it expresses on a broader scale the author's fundamental views about the science of politics. These views, it need hardly be pointed out, are, at least as regards *method*, very different from those of Prof. Sidgwick, who professedly treats politics deductively and apart from history. With scrupulous "objectivity," the editor in his interesting preface gives no hint as to his own opinions of Prof. Seeley's theories.

By "history" Seeley means distinctively *political* history, and the facts of history he regards as the material for political science. The problem specially dealt with in these lectures is the classification of states. The inadequacy of the traditional distinctions of monarchy and republic, aristocracy and democracy, is shown by a wide range of historical illustration; and incidentally such terms as "liberty" are analyzed,—terms that constantly pass current in political discussion without examination. The "inorganic" state, where government is based solely on conquest, is distinguished from the organic state. Of the organic state three main forms are recognized,—the tribal, the theocratic, and the properly political. Among the last have to be distinguished "city-states, country-states, centralized or decentralized; federations strong or weak; states where government has a large province, states where it has a small one; states which have a government-making organ, states which have not; states where the power of government is in one hand, states where it is distributed" (p. 315). The antithesis between aristocracy and democracy is shown to be fallacious: "aristocracy proper is a principle which all states admit and in some degree practise, and democracy is no negation of aristocracy, but only of oligarchy" (p. 347). Such a slight summary can, however, give very little indication of the rich contents of the volume. The influence of Sir Henry Maine on the writer is very marked. In several respects,—*e. g.*, in the conception of the method of political science and in the recognition of the theocratic state as one of the most important forms of state,—the author reminds us of Bluntschli (who is not mentioned). Especially in regard to English constitutional history there are many suggestive and original interpretations of familiar facts. A few stray sentences may be quoted as a further indication of the problems discussed: "We should be slow to allege mere national character in explanation of

great historical phenomena" (p. 134). "There is no more conclusive way of establishing what I may call the relativeness of political truth than by advancing that even religious intolerance, which to the present age appears almost the unpardonable sin, was, in its own time and place, not absolutely condemnable. It may be called the test question upon which depends the choice between a dogmatic and a scientific view of history" (p. 137). "It seems strange that we should imagine the monarchical of all forms of government to rest on force, since evidently it is the only one of the three Aristotelian forms [the one, the few, the many] which cannot possibly do so" (p. 176). "We have been in the habit of saying that in England we do not have revolutions. \* \* \* We have always a revolution, and therefore, in a certain sense, we never have a revolution" (pp. 194-195).

It is a pity that the book has been issued with neither an index nor even a table of contents. This seriously interferes with its utility to the student as well as to the general reader, and it is to be hoped the defect will be remedied in future editions.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

**AN EXAMINATION OF THE STATE. A STUDY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.** By Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Ph.D., Lecturer on Political Philosophy in the Johns Hopkins University. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896. Pp. ix., 448.

Rules of conduct may be enforceable or they may be left to the spontaneity of the individual. The one class are the characteristic mark of the state, the other of ethics proper. But the ethical student may ask, Why should force be used at all? why should not freedom, which is an integral element in any *moral* action, be universally respected? In other words, he is driven to seek some sort of a philosophy of the state; or, if he is unable to find an adequate justification for it, to reject it (at least, theoretically). It is such a philosophy which Dr. Willoughby offers to us. With the art of government, or politics in the narrower sense, he does not concern himself, but he does essay to set forth "the ultimate nature of the state and the grounds upon which its authority may be justified." His book is a painstaking and conscientious piece of work. He reveals a wide acquaintance with the history of political specula-

tion, and incidentally at the same time the practical good sense that comes from touch with existing social conditions.

Dr. Willoughby distinguishes the state from society. It is society "effectively organized under a supreme authority." A society, he says, is an aggregate of men living together and united by mutual interests and relationships, but the "body politic is the social body plus the political organization." The political organization involves "authority," on the one hand, and "subjection" or "control," on the other. Dr. Willoughby sees the problem which we stated at the outset, and says, "What we wish to discover is the justification of political authority as humanly exercised, and to harmonize it with predicated personal freedom." "Is it simple usurpation," he asks, "or does it owe its origin and existence to voluntary action on the part of those over whom its authority is exercised?" It is not enough to say that the state is natural, for social aggregates may be conceived of (and have probably existed) without it; it is not a universal necessity. Nor is it enough to say that it is a useful institution, for the question is, Whence comes the authority for imposing it on individuals? Useful things are generally left to commend themselves; but the state is an institution that forces itself upon those dwelling within its jurisdiction *willy-nilly*. Unsatisfactory, also, are the Force Theory and the Divine Theory.

To the Contract Theory Dr. Willoughby 'devotes two chapters (one of history, the other of criticism). If the individuals concerned all consented to, and contracted with one another in, the forming of a state, the moral problem would be at an end. The preamble to the Constitution of Massachusetts even speaks of the body politic as "formed by a voluntary association of individuals." In the course of his criticism of this conception, we regret to say that Dr. Willoughby appears to show a certain amount of confusion. He has little difficulty in making out that in a non-political state of society the quantity of liberty is likely to be very small; the amount of compulsion that the individual "would suffer at the hands of others would far exceed that exercised by any government." "By the creation of a political authority," he says, "there is merely a substitution of a general, definite, paramount force for an uncertain, arbitrary, individual force." This is a truth of critical importance. Paradoxical as it may sound, it is true "that freedom exists only because there is restraint." But because this is so, and more liberty is created than is abridged by the state, it

does not follow that the problem he set out to resolve can be disposed of by saying that it was falsely stated, and that a moral justification of the state is shown to be unnecessary (pp. 109-111). The liberty that is the fruit of political organization is not that freedom of choice inherent in morality which, as more or less limited by the state (so far as it is an *authoritative* institution), alone gives rise to any fundamental moral problem.

There are really two senses of the word freedom. According to one, we are free when we can *do* what we will. According to the other, we are free when we can *choose* what we will do. The one relates rather to the act, externally considered; the other to the psychological conditions antecedent to the act (neither, we may add, involving any metaphysical "freedom of the will"). Because positive or external freedom is increased by the state, it does not follow that freedom in the other sense is not abridged or, in some cases, denied. The individual citizen does not *choose* what taxes he will pay, but he *has* to pay them. Both as to the amount and as to the paying, he is subject to an external authority, and the problem from the ethical side is, How is this authority to be justified? This problem still remains, notwithstanding Dr. Willoughby's excellent showing that the freedom to *do*—*i.e.*, effect, accomplish—what one wills is vastly increased (of course, so long as it is in harmony with the will of the state) by political authority,—at least, in any tolerably civilized society. *Dolus latet in generalibus*. His discussion is further complicated (if not confused) by the use of the term "rights." Even if there are no "rights" to freedom independent of organized political society, freedom may be held to be *better*, more desirable, than constraint, and to be somehow inseparably connected with morality, since, as everybody would admit, a compelled action has no moral character whatever. However right it may be in the external sense, it is not a moral action. Dr. Willoughby appears to imply this on pp. 31, 32 (without any questionable intermingling of the phrase "rights"), and the desire of the philosopher to which he there alludes is still a legitimate one,—*viz.*, "of discovering, if possible, how this condition of affairs [that of the subjection of "volitional subjects" to a "coercive control," which is, as he says, so practically universal a phenomenon in human society] may be harmonized with the character of man as naturally gifted with powers of self-determination of action."

Notwithstanding all this, the author does give the moral justification of the state which he declares to be unnecessary, in a notable

subsequent chapter on "The True Origin of the State,"—the most valuable chapter, to our mind, from a theoretic stand-point, in the book. Here he shows that the state is not really a creation of individuals, but of a people or society. A community, or tribe, or society is as much a reality as the individuals composing it. These individuals themselves have two sides to their nature,—a public side and a private or individual side. In forming a state, they do not act as private wills, but as *members* of the society, and it is only as the membership, the public nature, comes to clear consciousness that any stable basis for a state arises. Dr. Willoughby is perfectly right in saying, "The Contract Theory errs in conceiving the state as created by individuals rather than by a people. *It is thus atomistic and entirely destructive of political authority*, for as long as such authority is made to rest upon individual consent, just so long may such consent be withdrawn." From the individualistic stand-point, all government is really tyranny, as is implied (without any thought of such a thing) in Holland's definition of a state, quoted by Dr. Willoughby,—viz., "A state is a numerous assemblage of human beings, generally occupying a certain territory, amongst *whom the will of the majority, or of an ascertainable class of persons, is, by the strength of such a majority or class, made to prevail against any of their number who oppose it.*" ("Elements of Jurisprudence," 6th edition, p. 40.) A theoretical anarchist could not ask for a better definition on which to hang his criticism of government, as essentially the rule of one set of wills over another set. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to shift the stand-point, to look at the whole matter from the *social* point of view, in which case the state comes to be seen as the *society* organizing itself, and the rule of the majority or of any single class as simply one of the unavoidable incidents in the process (belonging to its mechanics, not its essence), so long as the public nature of individuals is unequally developed. Very well does Dr. Willoughby say that "by adding together a sum of private interests we can never get a public interest," and that the general or public will on which the state is founded is to be distinguished from the sum of individual wills, and "is rather a volitional unit that is obtained by *extracting from each of the individual wills certain sentiments and inclinations that concern general interests.*" (The italics in this, as in other above cases, are our own.)

The moral problem is thus pushed back and becomes, May the social stand-point be properly taken rather than the individual stand-point, and individual freedom, however essential to morality,

sacrificed, if need be, to the social interest? This is a question of general ethics, into which, indeed, fundamental political problems in general finally resolve themselves.

Other points in this valuable and learned work we are obliged to pass over, and they may be said to concern the student of politics proper rather than the student of ethics. The titles of the later chapters are "The Nature of Law," "Analytical Jurisprudence," "The Power of the State: Sovereignty," "The Nature of the Composite State," "Location of Sovereignty in the Body Politic," "The Aims of the State," "Governments: their Classification," "Recapitulation: Present Political Characteristics and Tendencies." One question we may, however, ask: Why distinguish "purely political" matters from "economic matters" (pp. 342, 343)? Is there any theoretical line of division? If economic matters "are anywise directed by the state," why do they not become as much "political" as wars or treaties or the maintenance of public order? Is not "political" whatever the *state* does as distinguished from private agencies?

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

PHILADELPHIA.

**THE GREEK THEORY OF THE STATE AND THE NONCONFORMIST CONSCIENCE.** A Socialistic Defence of some Ancient Institutions. By Charles John Shebbeare, B.A., Christ Church, Oxford. London: Methuen & Co., 36 Essex St., W. C., 1895.

This book is one of that most aggravating class in which some of the best things in life are so misused and misunderstood that one is tempted to wish that a knowledge (a *little* knowledge) of these things could be withheld from such folk as the writer.

Aristotle's famous saying that "society originates for the sake of life, but is for the sake of good life," is taken to mean that "the state" should concern itself directly with every department of human life that can be shown to contribute to the "good life" of its citizens. Starting with this confusion of end and means, the writer appeals to the "Nonconformist Conscience," which, he says, by its condemnation of Mr. Parnell, in 1890, stands committed to the view he advocates, and urges that Nonconformists should help him in supporting the House of Lords, the Established Church, Sport, and "High Fashion" (whatever exactly that may mean).

The arguments dealing with the relation of these four "departments" to the good life are neither very clear nor very cogent,

and it would have been well, in the interests of that "Socialism" in whose name Mr. Shebbeare claims to speak, if he had studied a little more the nature of the Greek ideal, the English Constitution, the good life, and the relation between these.

It is unfortunate that this adventure has miscarried, for good work might be done in pointing out how certain genuinely socialistic characteristics, not only of the Greek theory of the state, but of the Greek practice, might, with advantage to the good life, be developed in our English politics.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

**THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.** By Edward Washburn Hopkins. In the Series of "Handbooks on the History of Religions." Edited by Morris Jastrow, Jr. Ginn & Co., 1896. 12mo. Cloth. Pp. xvi., 612.

The growing interest in the historical study of religions as a special branch of scientific investigation has already been shown by the fact that several European and American universities have established professorial chairs in this department, or have endowed lectureships with a view to encouraging researches in the field. New evidence of the interest that is taken in the subject in America is given by the appearance of the first volume of a series of "Handbooks on the History of Religions," published by Ginn & Co., under the editorship of Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania. The aim of the series is to provide for each of the principal ancient and non-Christian religions a manual that shall serve both as a text-book for the student and as a book of reference for the general reader. Among the religions for the presentation of which the editor has already arranged, are: Babylonia and Assyria, Egypt, Persia, the Ancient Teutons, and also for a general volume which shall serve as an introduction to the history of religions. The editor has been happy in his choice of India as the first book to appear in the series, and he has been fortunate in the choice of the investigator to whose charge the execution of the task was intrusted.

Professor E. W. Hopkins, formerly of Bryn Mawr College, is a scholar too well known in philological circles, both abroad and at home, to need other mention than that he was the one who was called to fill the chair at Yale University left vacant by

the death of the late William Dwight Whitney. Although in the department of Sanskrit, Dr. Hopkins's name has been more generally associated with the Hindu law-books and the epics, still, the present volume exhibits no such limitation, but rather it shows a remarkable command of the great field of India's literature. The same firm touch is felt in that part of the work which is devoted to the Vedic period of the religion as is felt in that portion which deals with the more specific Brahmanic and Hindu religious developments. It may be true that Buddhism and Jainism are less elaborately treated, but the sense of proportion is well preserved ; and that same sound common-sense which has already inspired confidence by its almost blunt straightforwardness, is marked in these chapters as elsewhere in the work. The presentation of Jainism which the book offers (pp. 280-297) is a good thing to have. Some of the very marked differences, which strike one, between Jainism and Zoroastrianism, suggest to the reviewer that there may possibly lurk in those occurrences of the ill-omened word *jaini* in the Avesta something more perhaps than we have thought of ; but an investigation of the point is reserved for another occasion. In his discussion of Buddhism, it may be noted, the author is inclined to estimate the democratic purpose of the founder of the sect much lower than is generally done, *vide* pp. 298, 303, 318. With reference to Nirvāna, the following passage is worth quoting (p. 321): " It [Nirvāna] has three distinct meanings,—eternal blissful repose (such was the Nirvāna of the Jains and in part of Buddhism), extinction and absolute annihilation (such was the Nirvāna of some Buddhists), and the Nirvāna of Buddha himself. Nirvāna meant to Buddha the extinction of lust, anger, and ignorance."

As regards that field of many problems, theories, and interpretations, namely, the domain of the Vedic religion, the author's point of view seems sound and healthy. He has given a useful presentation of everything that, with our present knowledge, we may regard as fact, and he has not ridden a hobby, nor has he let imagination run away with him. It is wholesome to find more than one apt illustration or allusion drawn from beliefs of the American Indians ; and in certain likenesses noticeable in aboriginal beliefs, a lesson of caution is incidentally taught to those who are prone to build up lofty hypotheses upon the basis of a few mere outward resemblances in rites, practices, tenets, or beliefs of two religions. Throughout the discussion of the Rig-Veda the book tends to emphasize the points of agreement between Zoroastrianism and the

early Vedic belief perhaps a little more than some scholars have lately done. This is doubtless well; for, in the tendency to treat Zoroastrianism as specifically Iranian, we sometimes lose sight of the other side a little more than is proper. It must be remembered, however, that there is a great gulf in general between the two religions as far as certain beliefs are concerned. It should here be noted that Zarathushtra (not Zarathustra) is the proper spelling of the prophet's name. What is said on the ethical teachings of Brahmanism (pp. 202-204) is worth looking up. The closing chapters on the modern Hindu sects, on certain religious traits of the native wild tribes of India, and upon India and the West are instructive and interesting; a very serviceable classified bibliography (pp. 573-595), moreover, and a useful index add to the value of an already valuable work.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK.

**BUDDHISM: ITS HISTORY AND LITERATURE.** By T. W. Rhys Davids, LL.D., Ph.D. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1896.

To say that this new book contains nothing new is not to cast a slight upon its value. The author is a well-known scholar, who, in his "Manual of Buddhism," has already expressed, more fully and more satisfactorily, his views in regard to some of the fundamental questions of Buddhism. "Buddhism" itself gives again the old material in more superficial form. Presented first in the shape of popular lectures (the first "American Lectures on the History of Religions"), these six chapters recapitulate the chief points in the life and doctrine of Buddha, as they have been made known to us in late years by the Pâli texts. Mr. Davids's easy colloquial style (not, unfortunately, quite free from instances of rather questionable English) makes the Lectures pleasant reading, and the general public, for whom they are intended, may rely upon the accuracy of their guide in the presentation of facts. Especially is this the case in the exposition of Buddhism itself (Lectures ii. and iii.). More questionable material is presented in the introductory chapter on pre-Buddhistic thought, the author being here quite out of his depth, notably in the antiquated opinions held by him in regard to the "childlike" character of the early Vedic poets, and in the somewhat careless jumbling of early Vedic and late philosophical ideas. It is not to be wondered at that, in the elucidation

of Buddhistic eschatology, Mr. Davids still holds the simple, if not altogether convincing, dogma that Nirvāna has nothing to do with the next life, but that it connotes merely the idea of earthly happiness attained by him who has extinguished lust and passion. For the author himself was the first to substitute this explanation for the older one, which held that Nirvāna meant either psychic extinction or the post-mortem bliss of eternal peace. It is only to be regretted that he presents it here as the only explanation, for in the early Buddhistic works there are many passages which will not admit this definition of Nirvāna. It is, indeed, evident to the historical scholar that Nirvāna had several meanings, and that it was variously interpreted. Buddha himself was not only a deist; he was a nihilist. To him there was no hereafter for the good and perfect man. Only the ignorant, the sinful, the weak lived hereafter, their prolonged life being the penalty of their prolonged sin and ignorance. The "blowing out," *nirvāna*, of passion, was to such men identical with extinction of life. But in Buddha's public teaching all the weight was laid upon the former, none upon the latter point. It is this that makes clearly and unmistakably the difference between Brahmanism and Buddhism. The former, in one way or another, always remained theistic and deistic. The latter accepted the belief in gods as evanescent phenomena, but renounced entirely the belief in a Supreme Deity. For prayer and penance it substituted a high moral life and temperance in the literal sense. Buddha both abjured asceticism and preached against excess. It was this doctrine which, enforced by the wonderful eloquence and personal magnetism of the great teacher, took so strong a hold upon the minds and hearts of his hitherto priest-ridden countrymen. Strange that this teacher himself, in the degraded faith of later days, should become not only the inculcator of the very doctrine he abhorred, but the image of God on earth. If Buddhism has any permanent value, and our author is quite correct in intimating very strongly that it has, this value lies not in its dogma, but in the historical lesson to be learned by the rise and fall of this faith in India. For Buddhism owes its success to the fact that, for a dry theistic religion, which had become mere ritual, it substituted a fervent morality. Each man was made the fabricator of his own fortune; the divine element, the psychic element, were both eliminated from ethics. This was taught as a saving faith together with the then new doctrine that every man was the fellow of his brother man, and that he owed it to his brother, no

matter of what caste, to preach the new gospel of brotherly love and human sufficiency. The fall of Buddhism is not less instructive. The later church forgot the teacher's teaching. Gorgeous rites became the sign of religion; metaphysics took the place of morality; the founder of the faith himself became God in human form; and Buddhism became a mere superstition, long moribund and at last extinct in India, living only in the meretricious garb of superstition in foreign lands. There is enough here to make Buddhism valuable as a study even to-day.

E. W. HOPKINS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

**PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM.** Being the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1894-95. *First Series.* By Alexander Campbell Fraser, LL.D., Hon. D.C.L. Oxford, Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1895. Pp. 303.

It may seem almost impertinent to say of Professor Campbell Fraser that, in this work, he speaks out of the abundance of his knowledge as well as out of the fulness of his heart. For, as all know, there is no living authority better equipped than he for the task of viewing the problems of the present in the light of the past; and there is certainly none who brings to that task a more earnest devotion to truth or a greater measure of philosophic moderation. But, while it may seem needless to speak of Professor Fraser in this way, the fact thus expressed adds a peculiar interest to this, his latest work; for, instead of giving his great subject a historical treatment, he deliberately aims at dealing with what he justly calls "the supreme human question—Are religious beliefs, or any of them, true?" This is a question which the instructed mind that has mastered many systems and sympathized with every philosophic mood too often shrinks from facing. Abundance of knowledge seems to destroy, only too frequently, that intellectual nerve which is necessary for decision. There is, therefore a peculiar interest attaching to the deliberate and positive conclusions of a mind which for half a century has been following the course of modern thought and pondering the wisdom of the ages.

Professor Fraser approaches his subject by what seems to the English reader the most natural way, that indicated by the profes-

sedly common-sense philosophy of Locke. The whole course of this first series of lectures is "arranged throughout with reference to these postulated existences," the individual Ego, the outward world, and God; and Locke's account of "the philosophical foundation of certainty" as to these three existences is taken as the point of departure, because Locke gives expression "to the uncriticised convictions of the common mind, and at a time when natural science and theological ideas were unmodified either by the scientific conception of universal physical evolution, or by the criticism of Kant and the dialectic of Hegel."

Having gone over, in a brief though interesting and characteristic way, the well-trodden path of the innumerable enigmas and perplexities which underlie these common beliefs, Professor Fraser considers successively the theories which seek an ultimate explanation by endeavoring to resolve two of the three into the third. In this way the theories of universal Materialism, Panegoism, and Pantheism receive suggestive treatment. All these are shown to be unsatisfactory. Materialism and Panegoism are self-destructive. Pantheism is shown to be inadequate because inconsistent with those "inevitable pre-suppositions of human action, necessary implicates of all moral experience which make us refuse to call evil good, or to see deity in disorder, virtue in crime, and truth in error." "I even say truth in error," adds Professor Fraser, with special reference to Spinoza, "for if human experiences, under the disparaging name of 'imagination' are themselves modes of perfect being, how can *they* be condemned as illusions, or how can there be any error if all is divine?" Thus, it is argued, each of these three theories "leads logically into universal scepticism." "A point of interrogation becomes the symbol of human life, in relation to itself and to the outside world and to God." And thus arises the necessity to consider that mental attitude—rather than philosophy—which our author prefers to call Universal Nescience. Starting from Professor Huxley's account of the origin of the popular term Agnosticism, and having examined into the validity of the connection which modern Agnosticism claims with Kant and Hume, Professor Fraser proceeds to show that the Agnostic method must be pushed to the very end, as Hume pushed it, and there be found self-destructive.

The last two chapters contain the more constructive and positive portion of the argument. Professor Fraser finds "the signal example of the divine in the spiritual being of man," that is, in man

as a conscious and self-determining agent. From this point of view, man is "supernatural." And here is to be found the best key we possess to the solution of the ultimate problem of the universe. For, as it is excellently put, "whether conscious perception by man is a transitory or a permanent fact in the universe, matter, apart from all perception of it, is an empty, unactual abstraction. Conscious life is the light of the world." But it is not to be supposed that man's consciousness provides a principle capable of giving a perfect solution. "The human finality is not offered as the conception of God taken from the divine centre—only as the conception of God necessarily taken at a human stand-point away from the centre. It is only offered as the best conception possible at the intermediate position." "It may be that which, when held intelligently by man, alone puts *him* in absolute rational harmony with the universe, and its acceptance then becomes the condition of success in the endeavor to live according to the deepest and truest *human* relation to what is real."

It is interesting to note that this conception is far nearer to the traditional Christian conception than to the Deism which makes the Divine unity—the ultimate unity of the universe—to be the unity of a single Person. But how much nearer, it is scarcely possible to say; for, in this First Series, Professor Fraser confesses he has "hardly passed the threshold."

CHARLES F. D'ARCY.

BALLYMENA, IRELAND.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN. By W. H. Fairbrother, M.A., Lecturer in Philosophy at Lincoln College, Oxford. London: Methuen & Co., 36 Essex Street, Strand, 1896.

This is a modest, careful, and useful little book. No one will find it in any way a substitute for the philosophic teaching of which it aims at being a "simple, plain exposition," but no one could desire less than Mr. Fairbrother that it should be used as such a substitute.

"It is solely," he says, "in the belief that a short, straightforward account of Green's method of working, with the results thereby arrived at, may indirectly help to promote the study of his writings, that these few pages have been written."

The substance of the book "was originally given in the form of lectures to students of philosophy at Oxford," and, although the

lectures have been "recast and rewritten" before publication, the book bears unmistakable traces of its origin. This is a distinct gain from the point of view of its purpose.

In a short introductory chapter Mr. Fairbrother explains that "Green's philosophy begins with Metaphysics, and is based entirely upon Metaphysics." This clearing of the ground was rendered necessary by the condition of current philosophic thought in England. Man seemed to have been reduced by that philosophy to "a being who is simply a result of natural forces." Green's question was, "'Is man simply a *natural* product in this sense?'"

In the following chapter Mr. Fairbrother sketches Green's method. "Green argues throughout from effect to cause. The 'effect' or result investigated in Metaphysics is 'that which exists,' and the only 'thing which exists' for a man necessarily and certainly to begin with, is that of which he is directly conscious in his individual self." "Hence 'What are the facts of my own individual consciousness?' and 'What is the simplest explanation I can give of the origin of these facts?' are the two primary questions of Metaphysics."

"The final outcome of this method of inquiry is the establishment of the three cardinal points—self, cosmos, God." The meaning for Green of these three terms is expounded by Mr. Fairbrother in a chapter called "The Results of Metaphysic." Green's relation to Locke and Kant are here dealt with, but, oddly enough, no mention is made of Hume, Green's trenchant criticism of whom is surely one of the most illuminating parts of his philosophic writings.

This chapter may be perhaps regarded as the crux of Mr. Fairbrother's achievement, and opinions will probably differ as to how he has surmounted it. If it be felt, by those who are familiar with Green's arguments, as somewhat inadequate and unconvincing, perhaps it may be contended that this is inevitable in an attempt to compress the gist of the whole first Book of the *Prolegomena* into thirty pages, and that enough has been done if an attractive and intelligible outline has been given which will induce students, daunted by the difficulty of Green's elaborate argument, to try once more, with this clue in their hands, to master the original. The present writer is aware of at least one case where this has happened with the happiest result.

"The Freedom of Man," "Moral Philosophy," and "Political Philosophy" are the headings of the remaining chapters of exposi-

tion. They run easily for all those who have understood the preliminary inquiry.

In the concluding chapter, "Green and His Critics," Mr. Fairbrother notices criticisms by Professor Sidgwick, Professor Seth, and Mr. A. J. Balfour. Mr. Fairbrother does little more than mention the points raised and then dismiss them as irrelevant.

Would it not have been more helpful to students of Green to have directed their attention to modern developments by idealistic writers (for instance, the recent treatment of theory of identity—by which much welcome light has been shed on difficulties in the Prolegomena) rather than to the objections of critics, two of whom, at least, they might well be excused from considering?

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

**VIVISECTION: CAN IT ADVANCE MANKIND?** By Charles Selby Oakley, M.A. Formerly Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. 8vo. London: Dryden Press, J. Davy & Sons, 1895. Pp. 56. Price, sixpence.

Mr. Oakley's essay is an unusually fine specimen of anti-vivisection literature, for it is calm and dignified, while vivid with moral intensity. The vivisector who cares to answer it will have the satisfaction of dealing with a gentleman.

Mr. Oakley does not obscure the issues. He does not call the vivisector a blackguard, except in a far-off, polite sort of way; and he is too wise to deny that vivisection may have yielded results useful to the science of physiology and to the art of medicine. His argument is clear and simple: conscience is more than science, and the evolution of gentleness of more moment than the relief of disease. He appeals to the vivisector to forego the material gain to science and art, since it means a spiritual loss; it is counterbalanced by callousness, and by a dulling of moral charity.

Now, the spirit of this argument is so fine, and much of what the author says so welcome, that it seems ungrateful to say a word against it. And yet we must.

First, as to Mr. Oakley's assumptions. He assumes, though he expresses his willingness to prove, that there is a great deal of vivisection going on, if not in Britain, then elsewhere. It is difficult to deal with the wide elsewhere, but as to Britain we may be allowed to say that if there is *much* being practised here, it is without license and in secret, therefore in part self-condemned,

and at any rate inaccurately known. The author also assumes, though willing to prove, that "vivisection is detestably and unutterably cruel," meaning by "cruel," expressive of indifference to the suffering of other living creatures. Against which we can only here express our conviction that, in many cases of so-called vivisection, the amount of demonstrable pain is quite minimal, while the operators we have known seemed not more but less callous than the ordinary citizen.

We hope we have a due sense of the rights of the creature, but we believe firmly that we are of more value than many sparrows, and we can see no necessary spiritual loss either to ourselves or others in calmly and carefully giving some pain to animals in the secure hope that the life of men may be physically brighter beneath the sun. We decline to be caught on Mr. Oakley's dilemma. As to the alleged torturing of animals, we believe that there is much more in the streets than in the laboratories. It is too obviously unscientific to be useful.

The fact is that there is more than one kind of vivisection; there is careful and scientific vivisection, painstaking to lessen pain; there is careless and abominable vivisection, which is oftener a bugbear than a reality, in Britain at least. Each case must be judged on its own merits; one sighed over as a *pis-aller*, and another damned. But if there be anything worse than careless vivisection, we should think it was giving lime-light lectures (as in some Edinburgh churches) on its alleged horrors, exciting the emotions of the citizens in reference to more or less inaccurately reported cases of cruelty remote from their own lives, while cruelties nearer home remain.

Frankly, while we love animals dearly, we regard the popular notion of vivisection as largely (in Britain) a bogie, and a pharasaical one, too, since our immediate duty is to mind our own business, and see first that *we* are not cruel to our cats and dogs and other pets, to our cab-horses and tram-horses, to our cattle and stock, and above all to our fellow-men. When we have done that which lies nearest to us, and taken the beam out of our own eye, we may find—by that time—that there is no vivisector! Except perhaps the gentle angler with his exquisitely sensitive wriggling worm. Or will that, then, be a bogie, too?

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

EDINBURGH.

**THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF PLATO'S ETHICS.** By Arthur Bernard Cook, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co. London: George Bell & Son, 1895.

All students of ancient philosophy must welcome an attempt to explain the connection between the ethical and the metaphysical sides of the Platonic system. For Plato's metaphysics has plainly an ethical tendency, and, on the other hand, his view of man's life is plainly rooted in his view of the world's life. Anything that helps to clear up this question is of use, even though we may be forced to doubt whether the true point of connection has been rightly seized. Mr. Cook's work seems to err on the side of a too literal and serious interpretation of certain obscure sayings of Plato, much as do the systems erected by old-fashioned theologians on a few disconnected texts. And this seems to me the fundamental mistake of the whole school to which Mr. Cook belongs. That school has done a great service by insisting that Plato "does not talk nonsense" and "does not contradict himself." But it sometimes forgets that Plato was an artist and a humorist, and takes in dead earnest what he himself regarded as *paidia*. We have no right to turn literature into dogma like this. Plato was the least dogmatic of men, and the cosmology of his later dialogues, though it enables him to present his fundamental thoughts in a new way, is really on much the same level as the etymologies of the *Cratylus*. All the same, it is right and proper that these questions should be worked out, and Mr. Cook's labors are not in vain.

JOHN BURNET.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

**SOCRATES AND ATHENIAN SOCIETY IN HIS DAY.** By A. D. Godley. London: Seeley & Co., Limited, 1896.

The purpose of this little book is to give a picture of Socrates and his time for the benefit of the uninitiated reader. But for this we surely require a fairly full account of the different elements then fermenting in Athenian society,—the wild, brilliant dreams and theories, the reckless enjoyment, the sophistries of the self-seekers, whether men of words or men of action, the narrow-minded caution of the reactionaries, and the deeper effort of the real reformers. Among them all the figure of Socrates should stand out, a man with many of the limitations of his time, without

the fire of a great religious creed, yet a man of inspired common-sense, simple, earnest, humorous, insisting on clear and definite thought, breaking down artificial distinctions, laying foundations for ethics and metaphysics, urging his fellow-citizens forward through question and struggle to the living of a life based on reason. Mr. Godley writes with commendable freshness and a happy sense of the reality of the ancient world. Unfortunately, his treatment of the subject appears inadequate, and is even at times misleading. The greater part of the book is given to translations of extracts from Plato, Aristophanes, and Xenophon.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

**NATURE VERSUS NATURAL SELECTION: AN ESSAY ON ORGANIC EVOLUTION.** By Charles Clement Coe. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895. 8vo. Pp. xiii., 591, xx.

Mr. Coe, in his modest preface, apologizes for the hardihood of one who is not an expert venturing to criticise the masters, but this is just a preliminary trailing of the coat. For in the issue he trounces all the Darwinians with much skill and no end of good humor, trounces them till one is deafened by blows. Not one escapes, neither Darwin, nor Wallace, nor Spencer, besides scores of the lesser weights. The result is a learned political *vade mecum* for the anti-Darwinians. None should be without it.

There is an admirable chapter on what may be called "the other side of the struggle for existence," or "the altruism of nature," and a thoroughly reasonable argument against the all-sufficiency of natural selection. Though Mr. Coe sometimes condescends to purely verbal discussion, he has done good service in indicating some of the weak points in our etiology,—which is still so young,—and in particular in emphasizing the limitations of the Natural Selection theory. His book is very long, but it is very interesting, and is a treasure-house of valuable quotations. Its great defect is one we have much sympathy with—*on ne détruit que ce qu' on remplace !*

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

**MORAL PATHOLOGY.** By Arthur E. Giles, M.D., B.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. Pp. 179.

This is a readable little book on practical ethics. It professes to give little more than an outline of its subject; and while it is clearly

written, interesting, and sensible, it does not lay claim to any special originality. The purpose of the book is to draw more careful attention to the old analogy of "sin with sickness." It endeavors to do this in two ways, (1) by insisting on the close connection between moral and physical health and disease, and (2) by metaphorically applying medical terms and methods to the description and treatment of moral ailments. As to such preliminary questions as the origin of moral disease, the distinction between right and wrong, etc., Dr. Giles adopts the position of Mr. Herbert Spencer. He goes on to describe moral disease as disregard of conscience, by which he means, not that which distinguishes between right and wrong, but partly "that which prompts to right actions" and partly "that feeling of satisfaction which follows right, or of dissatisfaction which follows wrong." After a brief account of the "Moral Physician," who is warned against the "tendency to treat the disease instead of the patient," Dr. Giles discusses the characteristics and conditions of moral health, from which he passes to the consideration of "Moral Diathesis," or temperaments predisposing to certain moral diseases. The chief of these diatheses is "Egoism," which is treated in an interesting chapter that makes full use of Mr. George Meredith's subtle study. The remainder of the book is devoted to the symptoms, causes, and characteristics of various "moral diseases," and to a brief account of their consequences and some wise suggestions as to their cure. As a whole, Dr. Giles's book may be taken as a fresh, new discourse on the text of Jesus the Son of Sirach: "He that sinneth before his Maker, let him fall into the hands of the physician."

ROBERT LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

THOMAS PAINE. Vol. I. *Rights of Man*. London: A. & H. Bradlaugh Bonner, 1895. Pp. xxxvii., 291.

This handy and convenient edition, following upon the elaborate biography and edition by Mr. Moncure Conway, is a remarkable tribute to the popular qualities of Paine's writings. Mr. J. M. Robertson, who contributes a biographical introduction, remarks that the interest in Paine's life and works "is not only unabated among the working-classes in England, but on the increase among the middle classes." It cannot be said that Mr. Robertson's own appreciation of his hero is judicial; it is certainly thoroughgoing

and sincere. The distinction of the edition itself is its completeness as a text, based as it is upon a comparison of a number of editions. The original spelling and the original phrasing have been judiciously restored.

S. BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

### NEW BOOKS.

- HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. Translated by Professor S. W. Dyde, M.A., D.Sc. London: George Bell & Sons, 1896.
- CHRISTIAN ETHICS. Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford, on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A. By Rev. Thomas B. Strong, M.A. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896.
- SKETCHES OF LESSONS IN MORAL INSTRUCTION. For Use in Schools. By E. Reynolds. London: D. Newmann & Co., 1895.
- SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM in its Philosophical Significance. By Professor W. Caldwell, M.A., D.Sc. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood & Sons, 1896.
- PROS AND CONS: a Newspaper Reader's and Debater's Guide to the Leading Controversies of the Day (Political, Social, Religious, etc.). Edited by John Bertram Askew. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896. [Contains, among other things, the Pros and Cons of the "Ethical" Movement.]
- KNOWLEDGE, DUTY, AND FAITH. Suggestions for the Study of Principles taught by Typical Thinkers, Ancient and Modern. By the Right Hon. Sir Thomas Dyke Acland, Bart. Addressed to Students in University Extension Classes. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., 1896.
- LOVE'S COMING OF AGE. A Series of Papers on the Relations of the Sexes. By Edward Carpenter. Manchester: Labour Press, 1896.
- COSMIC ETHICS, or, The Mathematical Theory of Evolution; showing the full Import of the Doctrine of the Mean, and containing the Principia of the Science of Proportion. By W. Cave Thomas, F.S.S. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1896.
- THE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. Vol. XI. *The Case of Wagner; Nietzsche contra Wagner; The Twilight of the Idols; The Antichrist.* Translated by Thomas Common. London: H. Henry & Co., 1896.
- WOMEN IN GREEK POETRY: A Fragment printed for the Use of Scholars. By E. F. Benecke. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896.
- THE CROWD: A Study of the Popular Mind. By Gustave Le Bon. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1896. [A work of great psychological and sociological interest.]
- TEN YEARS IN A PORTSMOUTH SLUM. By Robert R. Dolling. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896.

- GOOD TRADE AND A LIVING WAGE. By F. U. Laycock, LL.B. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896.
- ÉTUDES HISTORIQUES SUR L'ESTHÉTIQUE DE SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN. Par Maurice De Wolf. Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1896.
- KANTSTUDIEN, Band I., Heft 1. Herausgegeben von Dr. Hans Vaihinger, oö., Professor der Philosophie an der Universität, Halle. Hamburg und Leipzig: Verlag von Leopold Voss, 1896.
- CLASSES AND MASSES; or, Wealth, Wages, and Welfare in the United Kingdom. A Handbook of Social Facts for Political Thinkers and Speakers. By W. H. Mallock. London: A. & C. Black, 1896.
- AN ETHICAL MOVEMENT. A Volume of Lectures by W. L. Sheldon, Lecturer of the Ethical Society of St. Louis. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN. By W. H. Fairbrother, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1896.
- THE IDEA OF GOD AND THE MORAL SENSE in the Light of Language; being a Philosophical Enquiry into the Rise and Growth of Spiritual and Moral Concepts. By Herbert Baynes, M.R.A.S. London: Williams & Norgate, 1895.
- THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. A Contribution to some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics. By L. T. Hobhouse, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1896.
- SOCRATES AND ATHENIAN SOCIETY IN HIS DAY. A Biographical Sketch. By A. D. Godley, M.A. London: Seeley & Co., 1896.
- THE PRESENT EVOLUTION OF MAN. By G. Archdall Reid. London: Chapman & Hall, 1896.
- AN EXAMINATION OF THE NATURE OF THE STATE. A Study in Political Philosophy. By W. W. Willoughby, Ph.D. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- OUTLINES OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS. By Professor J. E. Erdmann. Translated from the Fourth Edition, with Prefatory Essay, by B. C. Burt, Ph.D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- BUDDHISM: Its History and Literature. By T. W. Rhys Davids, LL.D., Ph.D. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1896.
- THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS PHENOMENA. By James H. Leuba, Ph.D. Clark University, Worcester, Mass.: J. H. Orpha, 1896.
- THE SCHOOL OF PLATO: Its Origin, Development, and Revival under the Roman Empire. By F. W. Bussell, B.D., B. Mus. Fellow and Tutor of B. N. C. London: Methuen & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS IN SCOTLAND. By William Galbraith Miller, M.A., LL.B., Advocate. Edinburgh: William Breen & Sons, 1896.
- THE ART OF CONTROVERSY AND OTHER POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. By Arthur Schopenhauer. Selected and translated by T. Bailey Saunders, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- THE IDEAL OF THE UNIVERSITIES. By Adolf Brodbeck, Ph.D. Translated from the German by the author and much enlarged. New York: Metaphysical Publishing Co., 1896.
- ECONOMIC STUDIES, Vol. I., No. 1. The Theory of Economic Progress. By

John B. Clark, Ph.D., etc. New York: Macmillan & Co.; London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896.

THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUST COMTE. Freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau. With an Introduction by Frederic Harrison. In three volumes. London: George Bell & Sons, 1896.

THE GREAT DIDACTIC of John Amos Comenius. Now for the first time Englished. With Introductions, Biographical and Historical, by M. W. Keatinge, B.A. London: A. & C. Black, 1896.

ON EDUCATION. An Introduction to its Principles and their Psychological Foundations. By H. Holman, M.A. London: Isbister & Co., 1896.

PARADOXES. By Max Nordau. Translated from the fifth German edition by J. R. McIlraith, M.A. London: William Heinemann, 1896.

THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS. By J. N. Figgis, M.A. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1896.

STUDIES SUBSIDIARY TO THE WORKS OF BISHOP BUTLER. By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. London: Henry Frowde, 1896.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, Vol. III., No. 2 [including "Professor James on the Emotions," by Sophie Bryant, D.Sc.; "Kant's Teleology," by C. L. Davies, M.A.; "Are Character and Circumstances Co-ordinate Factors in Human Life? or is Either Subordinate to the Other?" by B. Bosanquet, LL.D.; Miss E. E. C. Jones, W. L. Gildea, D.D., and A. F. Shand, M.A.].

THE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. VI., No. 3 [including "The Rights of the Individual," by the Rev. H. Rashdall, M.A.; "Socialism and Social Politics in Austria," by the Rev. M. Kaufmann, M.A.].

---

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:

Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.

Prof. Fr. Jodl, Gerstengasse 43, Prague, Austria.

J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., 58 Claude Road, Cardiff, Wales.

Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

---

JANUARY, 1897.

---

## PROFESSOR SIDGWICK ON THE ETHICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFORMITY: A REPLY.\*

A WORD may be desirable, to start with, as to the theoretical principles involved in the question before us. To Professor Sidgwick truth is valuable simply on account of its social utility, and social utility means greatest quantum of pleasure. I accept the test of social utility; I do not accept the hedonistic interpretation of social utility. I regard truth, that is to say the anxious pursuit, love, and enjoyment of truth, of which veracity is one of the outward expressions, as an end in itself—an element in that ideal human life which it is the aim of morality to produce. It is a good in itself, though (like other goods) it may sometimes have to be sacrificed for a greater good or a more important element in the "good life" which alone is ultimately good. Such an ethical creed might naturally be expected to lead to a stricter interpretation of the obligations of religious conformity than Professor Sidgwick's hedonistic utilitarianism. But it is a quite familiar experience to find that men's actual moral judgments are not those which seem to their opponents most naturally to follow from their speculative principles. Professor Sidgwick's personal attitude on this matter is almost what might have been

---

\*"The Ethics of Religious Conformity," by Professor Henry Sidgwick, *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, April, 1896 (vol. vi., pp. 273-290).

expected from a Kantian rigorist, though his article represents apparently a certain mitigation of the views which he once entertained. I need hardly dwell on the respect which is due to the views of a writer who has in the course of his own earlier life given so practical an exhibition of the sincerity and earnestness with which his principles are held as is implied in the resignation of a Fellowship for conscience' sake. To those who are anxious to maintain the comprehensiveness of the Church of England by a liberal interpretation of its formulæ, it must be a matter of profound regret that the judgment of such a man as Professor Sidgwick should be on the whole against them.

The fact that such an article has appeared seems to make it desirable that some one who believes in the possibility of combining honesty with a considerable measure of theological liberalism within the limits of the Church of England should attempt some kind of apology for his position. In speaking of theological liberalism, let me, however, say at once that I quite recognize that there are some kinds of theological liberalism which do unfit a man for the ministry of the Church of England. As soon as the appeal is made to social utility (however interpreted), it is obvious that there may be circumstances under which it is justifiable to make formal statements which are not strictly and literally true. To any one who regards veracity (on whatever grounds) as socially important, it is obvious also that such latitudinarianism must have limits. So much is fully admitted by Professor Sidgwick. The only question, therefore, between us is as to the exact point at which these limits should be fixed. Professor Sidgwick would fully admit that it is impossible to define exactly the extent to which formally untrue enunciations of opinion should be permitted. We should probably agree as to any general statement which could be drawn up. The difference between us lies rather in the minor than in the major premise of our moral syllogism. It is admitted that it is right to depart from strict veracity (1) to a certain extent (2) for an adequate end. On the present question the difference between Professor Sidgwick and myself is, (1) as to the

extent to which such laxity of subscription as I should advocate actually involves untruthfulness and carries with it the evils attendant upon untruthfulness in ordinary cases; (2) as to the importance of the ends to be served by the "religious conformity" which is thus made possible. In what I have to say on each of these topics I shall confine myself entirely to the case of the clergy. With regard to the slighter expressions of theological assent demanded from laymen, I should not greatly differ from the views expressed by Professor Sidgwick, except that I should strongly advocate the sort of conformity which he seems inclined rather to tolerate than to encourage, though here, too, I should quite admit that even lay conformity should have limits. There are very probably many persons who attend Church of England services for whom it would be spiritually healthier to go elsewhere.

To what extent does formal assent to statements not literally accepted involve untruthfulness? It may seem somewhat of a paradox to say that my apology for minimizing the untruthfulness involved in the practice must consist very largely in maximizing the extent of the formal divergence between the accepted doctrinal standards of the Church of England and the actual beliefs of her clergy. It will generally be admitted that for ethical purposes words must be understood to mean what they are generally taken to mean. Professor Sidgwick, at all events, is the last man in the world to encourage exaggerated scruples about using forms of politeness which fail to express the real mental attitude of the speaker. He would not hesitate to write "Dear Sir" to a man whom he hated or to address as "Right Reverend" a prelate whom he despised. He would not hesitate, I presume, as a volunteer or member of Parliament, to swear allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria and her heirs and successors according to law, although fully prepared under certain quite conceivable circumstances to take part in a republican revolution. While holding it a duty to resign a Fellowship held on condition of subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion, he would scarcely have recommended any one to resign because he had sworn or promised to observe a mass of partially obsolete University

or College statutes, or to refuse to be married with the service of the Church because he did not really expect of his wife either what the sixteenth century would have understood by "obedience," or what the nineteenth century understands by "worship." Hence, the wider and more generally recognized the difference between the formal professions and the private beliefs of the clergy, the stronger becomes the ethical justification of latitudinarian subscription.

Now, it is quite easy to show that at the present day there are few clergymen whose private belief corresponds with the letter of the formulæ to which they profess adhesion. There are few clergymen who really hold that,

"Works done before the grace of Christ and the inspiration of his Spirit are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ, neither do they make men meet to receive grace, or (as the school-authors say) deserve grace of congruity; yea rather, for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but they have the nature of sin."—Article XIII.

It can hardly be sincerely contended that the virtues of Socrates sprang "out of faith in Jesus Christ:" therefore, according to the Article, they have the nature of sin. There can have been comparatively few clergymen perhaps in any age of the Church, certainly few during the last two centuries, who really believed anything of the kind. At the present day there can be very few who even think that they believe it. Yet this is what they formally "assent" to. And the justification of their conduct lies in the fact that no reasonably well-informed person actually supposes that they mean by the statement what the old Puritan who framed that appalling sentence undoubtedly intended that they should mean by it. There are of course recognized means of evasion. I turn to the most orthodox and authoritative "Exposition" of the Articles, and I am told that "with regard to the teaching of the Article we may fairly conclude that it refers rather to the case of persons within, not without, the sound of the Gospel," and so on. But there is nothing of this in the Article itself. It would be quite easy to the most Gallican of Romanists (as many good priests no doubt have found) to assent to the Vat-

ican decrees by the aid of similar "fair conclusions." Such conduct may be justifiable or it may not, but it is not strict veracity. The people whom it is necessary to consider are not deceived.\* But yet, as it will be important to bear in mind in the course of our argument, it is not true to say that *nobody* is deceived. Doubtless many a theologically-minded nursery maid, curiously investigating the concluding pages of the Prayer-book, has really thought "Well, I suppose that is what I have got to believe," and many a man of the world, glancing through these pages during a dull sermon, has said to himself, "Well, this is what the clergy believe; what fools the clergy must be!" Yet surely even Professor Sidgwick would not hold that it is wrong to take orders because one does not believe that Socrates is damned. It is a balance of utilities. It is a grave evil that clergymen should have to make statements which by unreflecting persons, too ignorant or too indifferent to ascertain their real beliefs, may be taken as committing them to such a doctrine; but it would be a far graver evil—whether from the highest religious point of view or from that of the most materialistic social convenience—that the ministry of the Church of England should be recruited exclusively from people who do believe that Socrates is damned. If it be said that a general refusal to take orders on the present terms would speedily lead to an alteration of the Article, the answer is that neither my personal refusal nor the refusal of even quite a large number of exceptionally scrupulous people would bring about such a general reluctance to take orders; or that, if it did, the process would not be complete till the evil was done. Long before the impossibility of getting men to take orders had overcome the intense conservatism of all religious organizations, the clerical profession would consist of none but men who were *ex hypothesi* below the average standard either of intelligence or of scrupulosity.

With regard to such Articles as the one quoted there will

---

\* This remark can hardly be extended to the case of liberalizing Romanists. The objection to theological laxity within the Roman Church is that Roman priests are never allowed to explain themselves. Hence their submission really does deceive, and prevents, instead of promoting, theological progress.

be a very general agreement. It is now widely (though not quite universally) admitted that it is legitimate to subscribe to the Articles in a very elastic and unnatural sense. Indeed, among the most numerous section of the clergy—the section which insists most rigorously upon the inflexible adherence to certain other of the Church's formulæ—nothing can exceed the contempt with which the Thirty-nine Articles are commonly treated. A third of the Articles at least require much accommodation before they can be squared with the received High Church views. At least the extreme section—a section including several bishops and some thousands of clergy—do require us to believe as Articles of faith things which they do not attempt to prove by the Bible. They teach views about justification and predestination which would have been pronounced Pelagian by the framers of Articles IX., XIII., and VII. (however true it may be that the views expressed are Thomist rather than either Lutheran or Calvinistic). Many of them do hold precisely that doctrine about the “religious” life against which the Article “Of Works of Supererogation” was directed. Men who are so anxious to prevent Spanish Protestants from renouncing their allegiance to the Bishop of Rome and the Bishop of Madrid can hardly suppose that “the Church of Rome hath erred in matters of faith.” Most decided High Churchmen would ridicule the idea that “General Councils may not be gathered together without the commandment and will of Princes.” Many of their recognized theologians deliberately assert that the doctrine condemned as “the Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory, Pardons, Worshipping, and Adoration, as well of Images as of Reliques, and also invocation of Saints” is not really the doctrine of the Church of Rome (as the Article declares it to be) but a popular and ignorant misconstruction of it. The whole of the Articles on the Sacraments (xxv.–xxxiii.), it is hardly denied, would reasonably be taken to be Protestant or “Uncatholic” by any one who did not read them in the light of the Baptismal or Eucharistic Offices of the Church. The whole of the party in question is bitterly opposed to the Queen's supremacy “in all causes.” I have not a word to say against the reasons by which the

High Churchman—even the extreme High Churchman—justifies his position in the Church of England, though in this direction, as in others, I should admit that this tolerated laxity should have some limits. A clergyman who openly tells you that he sees nothing wrong in the doctrine or the practice of the Church of Rome (and there are such) has no place in the Church of England. I am simply insisting that, if anybody supposes that the Articles really express the actual views of the clergy, he must be singularly inobservant of their pulpit and other utterances. The justification of such laxity lies in a general understanding that the old formulæ shall be used in a new sense. It is a recognized principle in all such matters that it is the “*animus imponentis*” that determines the sense in which such declarations are taken; and the “*animus imponentis*” should be sought in the present rather than in the past. Whether we consider the “*imponent*” of the test to be the Nation as represented by Parliament, the Church understood in whatever sense you please, or the individual Bishop by whom the subscriber is ordained or licensed or instituted, there is a general agreement that subscription does not imply such a literal acceptance of the formulæ as would be alone consistent with a rigorist interpretation of the duty of absolute veracity, as far as regards this particular department of conduct.

It is true, of course, that there is no general consent as to the limits within which such laxity is permissible. It is true, moreover, that such liberty as now exists has been won by a gradual succession of increasing extensions of the understanding formerly accepted, each of which at the time it was introduced would have been perhaps generally condemned. And if anybody objects to our availing ourselves of a liberty which was won by acts which at the time they were committed may have been generally thought, and may perhaps have been, actually unjustifiable, we may be reminded that all accepted extensions or relaxations of any over-rigid moral rule have been brought about in the same way. A man who addressed his enemy as “My dear Jones” two hundred years ago would have been culpably insincere. He is not so now,

largely on account of the conduct of several generations of culpably insincere persons, just as a more rational Sunday has largely been secured by the conduct of people who were acting against their consciences. But personally I should not admit that every man who went one step further in the latitudinarian direction than was recognized by the current morality of his day was doing a wrong act. On the contrary, it is just because increased liberty can only be secured by the individual to some extent "taking the law into his own hands," and doing what many of his best contemporaries would think dishonest or untruthful, that I venture to contend that the principle of liberalizing interpretation may be carried a little farther than can be justified by a strict insistence upon the principle, "words must be taken to mean what they are generally understood to mean." Even the most widely recognized degree of liberty does deceive some people. And if we insist on using no religious language which could possibly be understood in a sense different from that in which we use it, it would be impossible for an educated man to talk to a young child or a country laborer about God or sin without misunderstanding. There are thousands to whom it would be impossible to speak on such topics at all without being understood to assent to the picture of an old man with a long white beard which would inevitably rise up before the mind's eye of his hearer. Yet the consequence of refusing to use any religious language at all would be to make religious instruction and religious progress impossible. So, in regard to taking orders, the question for each man's conscience is, "The actual state of society being what it is, will this non-natural use of language do more harm by weakening the respect for truth and sincerity among people who cannot understand the reasons for what I am doing, than I shall do good by accepting the office of a clergyman on these terms, and contributing to a further step in that process of religious development which has proved so beneficial in times past?" \*

---

\* If any one holds that this process in the past has not been beneficial, the difference between us is too fundamental to be argued here.

So far, I imagine, the principle would be admitted by Professor Sidgwick ; the question is as to the extent of its application.

On one subject there is happily a very general disposition to sanction an extension of the latitudinarian principle which forty—perhaps even twenty—years ago would have been almost universally condemned. The acceptance of the main results of the most advanced Old Testament criticism, by the leaders of the High Church party, has brought within the limits of toleration almost any view of the facts of Jewish history and of the Old Testament Canon which could conceivably be held by any one who could call himself—in any distinctive theological sense of the word—a Christian, and yet the declaration of belief in the whole Old and New Testament demanded of candidates for orders is immensely stronger and more precise than the assent required to the Prayer-book and Articles. Before being ordained or licensed to a curacy, or instituted to a benefice, a clergyman is required to say, “I, A B, do solemnly make the following Declaration : I assent to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion, and to the Book of Common Prayer and of Ordering of Bishops, Priests, and Deacons ; I believe the doctrine of the Church of England, as therein set forth, to be agreeable to the Word of God ; and, in public prayer and administration of the Sacraments, I will use the Form in the said Book prescribed, and none other, except so far as shall be ordered by lawful authority.” This general declaration of “assent” was (it is worth noticing) deliberately substituted by Parliament\* and both Convocations in 1865 for certain very much stronger and more explicit declarations : so that in insisting on the vagueness and generality of the present declaration and distinguishing between a general belief in the Articles and Prayer-book and an explicit belief that everything in the Articles and Prayer-book is true, no one can be accused of pressing an accidental selection of phrases. In 1865 the Nation and the Church of England solemnly declared that they did not expect that degree of subjective “conformity” which had been exacted by earlier legislation.

---

\* 28 and 29 Vict., ch. 122.

Unfortunately, when this most salutary reform was introduced, nothing was done to relieve the candidate for ordination from being solemnly asked by the Bishop before the assembled congregation, "Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament?" and from the necessity of replying by the words, "I do believe them." Nothing could be more explicit. Yet there is an all but universal agreement that a young man need not abandon his intention of taking holy orders because he has noticed that the first chapter of Genesis contradicts the facts of geology or that the narrative in the Books of Kings does not exactly tally with the statements of the Chronicles: while there is a very wide, though less general, opinion that the declaration may be made by persons who believe the whole of the Old Testament miracles and large portions of the remaining narrative to be absolutely unhistorical. Such would certainly be the attitude of the recognized leaders of the younger High Church party, and it is impossible to be too grateful to the man who—the first among recognized and trusted High Church leaders with a reputation for orthodoxy to lose—had the courage openly to proclaim views which had for many years been accepted as a matter of course in academic and cultivated clerical circles. There was, indeed, nothing in Canon Gore's view of the Old Testament which would not have been accepted by the recognized Broad Churchmen for the last fifty years.\* But the Arnolds, the Maurices, and the Stanleys were recognized heretics. Their scepticism never touched the great mass of the clergy. When it was suggested in "*Lux Mundi*"—with whatever reserve, caution, and accommodation—that the story of the Fall might be an allegory, the whole Psalter post-Davidic, and so on, the younger High Churchmen began, for the first time, seriously to ask themselves, "Are these things so?" The answer which the more intelligent, the more studious, the more courageous have given is substantially, "They are." The

---

\* Allowing, of course, for the incomplete working out of the critical problem at the earlier date.

answer which the vast majority have given is at all events, "A man may be a good Christian and a good Churchman who thinks they are so." Whatever view they may adopt as to the authority or inspiration of the Old Testament, that can make no difference. It is not the inspiration or the spiritual value of the Bible to which the candidate for orders is formally pledged, but the actual truth of its contents. No one who declares that he believes a book which in his view contains contradictory and unhistorical statements can object on grounds of strict veracity (of course there may be many objections on the ground of expediency) to a further extension of the same principle. If he contends, for instance, that the New Testament must be treated differently from the Old, he may have much to say for himself, but he cannot simply take up the position, "Clergymen of the Church of England say they believe such and such things: you are dishonest if you are a clergyman of the Church of England and don't believe them."

At exactly what point Professor Sidgwick would himself place the limit of justifiable conformity, he does not very explicitly tell us. But on two matters he seems to be prepared to draw a hard and fast line,—(1) in the matter of miracles, (2) in the matter of the creeds. Whatever else a clergyman may doubt, he must (Professor Sidgwick would seem to suggest) believe,

I. In miracles.

II. In the most literal interpretation of everything contained in the creeds.

I should like to say a few words on each of these points. Professor Sidgwick says:

"Christianity, in the course of its history, has adapted itself to many philosophies; and I do not doubt that there is much essentially modern thought about the Universe, its End and Ground and Moral Order, which will bear to be thrown into the mould of these time-honoured creeds. But there is one line of thought which is not compatible with them, and that is the line of thought which, taught by modern science and modern historical criticism, concludes against the miraculous element of the Gospel history, and, in particular, rejects the story of the miraculous birth of Jesus. I would give all sympathy to those who are trying to separate the ethical and religious element in their inherited creed from the

doubts and difficulties that hang about the 'thaumaturgical' element, and so to cherish the vital ties that connect the best and highest of our modern sentiments and beliefs, religious and moral, with the sacred books and venerable traditions of Christianity. It is not a work in which I am personally able to take part, for more than one reason; but I think it a good work and profitable for these times. But it is work that cannot properly be done within the pale of the Anglican ministry."\*

Why the line is to be drawn exactly at this point, Professor Sidgwick fails to indicate. We are left to conjecture. Such a position might conceivably be defended on two grounds: either (1) on the ground that the discrepancy between formal profession and actual belief becomes so glaring that truth suffers in a way which it does not suffer from (say) a strained interpretation of the Articles about justification; or (2) that here we are no longer able to appeal to that recognized system of understandings which remove so many formally inaccurate statements from the category of lying or dishonesty. I will examine each of these grounds in detail. Speaking generally, the first view seems to me quite untenable; the second has undoubtedly much weight, and demands most careful consideration. I can see no reason at all, so long as the question is treated as one of mere formal veracity, why a clergyman should be considered dishonest who does not believe in some particular Gospel miracle if it is admitted that he is not dishonest for not believing that Jonah was swallowed by a whale, or that the world was made in six days. Acceptance of miracles as such can only be demanded of the clergy because they are mentioned in Scripture. Just the same profession of belief is made in the miracles of the Old Testament and in those of the New. If it be insisted that certain particular miracles are asserted by the Creeds, I should answer—so long as the question is treated simply as one of technical veracity—that the clergy do not profess their beliefs in the Creeds in any other sense and to any other degree than they assent to the whole of the Prayer-book and Articles. If it is urged that in practice there is an understanding about the Old Testament which does not exist about the New, that in practice

---

\* INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, April, 1896, p. 289.

belief in the substance of the Creeds occupies a very different position in the working belief of ordinary congregations than belief in Jonah or the Garden of Eden, this I should fully admit, but this is really to adopt the second of the two lines of attack mentioned above. The question is now one of what we may call general ethical or spiritual expediency, not of mere technical veracity. And from this point of view the distinction between the Creeds and the Old Testament or the Articles becomes most important.

But the question cannot be treated as a plain and straightforward question between miracles on the one hand and modern science or criticism with no miracles on the other. No doubt, by one who is disposed to look upon the matter in this light, the rejection of miracles might very probably be held an insuperable bar of exclusion from the Anglican ministry. I don't say whether he would be right or wrong; but such a view would be quite intelligible. But to many minds the matter does not present itself in this simple fashion. It will scarcely be contended that belief in "miracles" as such is in any way demanded of clergymen of the Church of England. It is not miracles as such, but certain events commonly conceived of as miraculous in which belief is professed. No doubt the common definition of "miracle" is an "event contrary to the laws of nature." But many writers of unquestioned orthodoxy, from Augustine onwards, have maintained that miracles are not really contrary to the laws of nature.\* I am not concerned now

---

\* Personally I do not share the *a priori* philosophical objection to the idea of a miracle in the strictest and most popular sense, as distinct from the philosophical objections to the sufficiency of such evidence as actually exists. I should quite be prepared to believe a law of nature suspended upon sufficient historical evidence. But since (1) there is a great accumulation of evidence that the universe is, as a matter of fact, governed by general laws, and (2) those commonly so-called miracles for which the evidence is strongest are precisely those for which there is most analogy in other experience, it seems more reasonable to believe that such events of this character as have a claim to acceptance on historical grounds might, with adequate knowledge, be seen to fall within the ordered sequences of nature and not outside them. At the same time it would, on this view, be quite possible that some of the events may be of

with the reasonableness or otherwise of these views. I merely wish to point out that between the acceptance of the whole of the alleged extraordinary events recorded in the Old and New Testaments as due to the suspension of the laws of nature by the immediate volition of God, and the treatment of all such events as either entirely unhistorical or as merely natural events of no special religious significance, it is possible to discriminate quite a considerable variety of mental attitudes.

1. There is the position of those who would accept the whole of these events and yet contend that they were due to the operation of "higher law." Many orthodox theologians, from Augustine downward, have denied that anything ever happens contrary to the laws of nature. Such a view would no doubt be regarded by Professor Sidgwick as amounting, for all practical purposes, to a belief in miracles. But, if it is once admitted that not everything recorded in the Old and New Testaments is necessary to Christian belief, a man can hardly be regarded as disqualified because he holds some theory, critical or scientific, which compels him to discriminate between different classes of commonly so-called miracles recorded in Scripture.

2. And that brings us to some such view of miracles as is suggested, for instance, by Dr. Sanday, Margaret Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, who would possibly claim and be claimed to be a believer in some not unnatural sense of all the Articles recorded in the Apostles' Creed. Yet he has ventured to say in a valuable little tract on "Free-thinking:" \*

---

a highly exceptional or even unique character, provided that the conditions by which they are determined are exceptional or unique also. No one who finds it possible to believe, in any sense, in a unique personality, can object to the supposition that the normal control of the human will over the processes of physical nature may have likewise received in his case a unique extension. So much I feel bound to say, lest I should be held to assent to Professor Sidgwick's exclusion of a "thaumaturgical element" in Christianity in a sense in which I am not prepared to do so; but beyond this point I do not wish to enter upon any discussion of the question of miracles.

\* Oxford House Tracts, No. 9.

"Into the philosophy of these marvellous phenomena I do not enter. What is their relation to God's ordinary government of the universe I do not feel competent to say. I do not myself believe that they are in the strict sense 'breaches' of natural law. I believe that if we could see as God sees we should become aware of links and connections, at present hidden from us, binding together the mighty organism of facts and processes into a mysterious, but still harmonious whole. I am also not prepared to say that if the miracles of the New Testament had been described by competent observers in the nineteenth century, instead of their actual eye-witnesses in the first, there would not have been a perceptible difference in the narratives. All these concessions I should be willing to make; and I could understand others pressing them further than I should care to press them myself. But on one simple proposition I should take my stand, as a rock of certainty amidst much that is uncertain: *Miracles did actually happen.*"

In the same tract he goes a little nearer to a definition of "miracles" by saying (1) "I am actually certain the facts (he is here speaking of the Pauline Charismata) . . . were real;" (2) that "to account for them our conception of nature must be greatly enlarged."

Professor Sanday would probably recognize his explanation as applicable to all those so-called miracles to which special importance is commonly attached by Christians, though he would unquestionably assert the right of rejecting particular miraculous incidents on critical grounds.

3. At one degree further removed from the traditional stand-point comes the view expressed by Mr. Frederic Myers in his most suggestive criticism upon Renan:

"It is not unreasonable to suppose that such a life and work as Christ's upon earth was accompanied by some abnormal phenomena. . . . As soon as these abnormalities are conceived as possibly reducible to law, it is seen how unphilosophical it is to mass them all together. When they were looked upon as *violations* of law there was certainly a kind of absurdity in claiming 'moderation' for the Gospel miracles. But if the Gospels be taken as a humanly inaccurate record of unusual but strictly natural phenomena, it is but reasonable to sift these phenomena among themselves. All the causes alleged as working for the distortion of the history may in fact have worked, and may have had their share in shaping the account; and yet there may be a residuum highly important both to science and to religion. Historical criticism shows us that some of these phenomena are supported by better evidence than others. Scientific criticism tells us that some of them come nearer than others to known analogy. The scientific way of dealing with them will be, not to ignore all of them equally, but to begin with those which are most strongly affirmed, and for whose subsequent repetition there

is also most evidence, and to examine in detail what that evidence is worth. For instance, none of these wonders are more strongly affirmed than that Christ healed the sick with his touch, and appeared to his disciples after death. Can it be said, or rather *would* it be said, if no professional pedantry intervened, that the action of one human organism on another is thoroughly understood? that the phenomena called hypnotism or mesmerism have been explained? that the physiological doctrine as regards what is styled the influence of mind on body is settled or complete? Can it be said, or rather *would* it be said, if no polemical passion were involved, that the widely spread accounts of apparitions seen at the moment of death, or soon after death, have been collected and scrutinized as they would have been had the testimony related to any other class of facts? Notoriously they have not been so collected and so weighed. . . . Some of the outlying facts whose production Aristotle tranquilly ascribed to 'chance and spontaneity' have proved the corner-stones of later discovery. And the bizarre but obstinately recurring phenomena which thus far have been inadequately attested and incompletely disproved, which have been left as the nucleus of legend and the nidus of *charlatanerie*, may in their turn form the starting-point for wider generalizations, for unexpected confirmations of universal law. A history of primitive Christianity which sets them altogether aside may be the clearest and most consistent history of which existing knowledge admits, but it can only be a *provisional* one. It can hardly be expected, for instance, that the common sense of the public will permanently accept any of the present critical explanations of the alleged appearance of Christ after death. It will not accept the view of Strauss, according to which the 'mythopœic faculty' creates a legend without an author and without a beginning; so that when St. Paul says 'He was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve,' he is repeating about acquaintances of his own an extraordinary assertion, which was never originated by any definite person on any definite grounds, but which somehow proved so persuasive to the very men who were best able to contradict it that they were willing to suffer death for its truth. . . . Nor will men continue to believe—if anybody besides M. Renan believes it now—that the faithful were indeed again and again convinced that their risen Master was standing visibly among them, but thought this because there was an accidental noise or a puff of air, or even an *étrange miroitement*, an atmospheric effect. An *étrange miroitement*! Paley's 'Evidences' is not a subtle book, nor a spiritual book. But one wishes that the robust Paley with his 'twelve men of known probity' were alive again to deal with hypotheses like this. The Apostles were not so like a British jury as Paley imagined them. But they were more like a British jury than a parcel of hysterical monomaniacs.

"And if, as we must hold, the common sense of mankind will insist on feeling that the marvels of the New Testament history have as yet neither been explained away nor explained, so also will it assuredly refuse to concur with the view, often expressed both in the scientific and the theological camps, according to which these marvels are after all unimportant, the spiritual content of the Gospels is everything, and religion and science alike may be glad to get rid of the miracles as soon as possible. According to the cruder view of the Gospel wonders, indeed, this would be reasonable enough. To wish to convert men by magic, to prove theological dogmas by upsetting the sequence of things, this is

neither truly religious nor truly scientific. But if these Gospel signs and wonders are considered as indications of laws which embrace, and in a sense unite, the seen and the unseen worlds, then surely it is of extreme importance to science that they should occur anywhere, and of immense importance to Christianity that they should occur in connection with the foundation of that faith."\*

4. Lastly, we may just distinguish (though not without some difficulty) from the above a position which would perhaps commonly be considered to amount to a denial of "miracles." Dr. Abbott admits that Christ performed "mighty works," but would treat them as cases—perhaps exceptional and even unique cases—of the well-attested phenomenon of faith-healing. So again he would deny the Resurrection in the sense of a corporeal revivification of the buried body of Jesus, but admit the reality of the Resurrection vision. It is not quite clear how far he would account for this vision by universally admitted psychological laws (such would seem to be his position in "Philochristus"), or how far he would, like Mr. Myers, regard the occurrence as analogous to other recorded cases of vision or telepathy which are not universally acknowledged by the accepted representatives of "science," but which may quite well be accepted without any admission of "violations of laws of nature." It is clear that the religious significance of the so-called miraculous events connected with the life of Christ might be seriously affected by the answer given to this question. In his later works Dr. Abbott seems to lean to this last alternative:

"Looking at the facts in this light, we have in the first place to set before ourselves the short life of One of whom we must merely say that He was unique in the goodness and grandeur of His character, and that He died with the unfulfilled purpose of redeeming mankind from sin, deserted for the moment by the few disciples who had adhered to Him almost to the last. He died, for the time, the most pitiable, the most despair-inspiring death that the world has ever witnessed, asking in His last moments why He had been 'forsaken' by God. But His death—pardon me if I deviate for one moment from material to celestial facts, provided that I never deviate into miracles—was really the triumph over death, and His Spirit had in reality (we speak in a metaphor) broken open the bars of the grave, and ascended to the throne of the Father, carrying with

---

\* "Modern Essays," pp. 216-222.

Himself the promise of the ultimate redemption of mankind. This was now to be revealed to the world as the culminating vision in that continuous Revelation through the Imagination by which the minds of men had been led to look beyond this life to a life that knows no end. . . .

"The movements of the risen Saviour appear to me to have been the movements of God; His manifestations to the faith of the Apostles were divine acts, passing direct from God to the souls of men. Since therefore these manifestations belonged to the class of things which 'can only be apprehended by God, or in God, by faith,' I call them 'absolute realities,'—as much more real than flesh and blood, as God Himself is more real than the paper on which I am now writing." \*

Now, the question is not whether any of these views is satisfactory, whether from the point of view of orthodoxy or from that of "science," but whether it is justifiable for one who holds them to make the declarations required on taking orders, and to use the Prayer-book. I have already attempted to show that we cannot fairly exclude the holders of such views merely because the events which they thus explain are contained in the Creeds, whereas other miracles about which more latitude is admitted are not so included. Yet it may still be contended that some or all of these explanations are inadmissible on account of the position which the events themselves, and even the belief in their strictly miraculous (*i.e.*, extra-law-of-nature) character actually holds in the belief of the great majority of ordinary Christians. I will not deny the great difference which is constituted by this fact, in so far as it is a fact, nor will I deny that any one who regarded (say) the Resurrection as a mere case of ordinary subjective delusion † would, at present at least, find his position in the Church of England a somewhat difficult one. But what I do want most strongly to assert is that the question upon which the possibility of honestly taking orders depends is not primarily the question of miracles, but the question of the nature and historical position of Christ. No doubt to most ordinary Christians the two questions are inextricably bound up. They believe, or they think that they believe, the

---

\* "The Kernel and the Husk," pp. 240, 245.

† This opinion, as I have pointed out, cannot fairly be attributed to any of the above writers,—even to Dr. Abbott.

Divinity of Christ because they believe in his miracles. But there is a general consensus among modern apologists not to rest the Divinity of Christ upon his miracles, but to accept the miracles—in whatever sense they are accepted—as natural sequences, accompaniments, corollaries of the appearance in the world of a unique Personality in whom they recognize the culmination of that self-revelation of God of which all history is the record. As to the meaning which is attached to the doctrine of Christ's Divinity, there ought, I should contend, to be much liberty of interpretation, because experience shows that much liberty of interpretation is consistent with that community of feeling, of worship, and of religious and moral activity, in which Church membership consists. But the man who cannot accept the Divine Sonship of Christ in some real, distinctive, exceptional sense is (I should personally be disposed to think) too far out of sympathy with ordinary religious feeling to make his ministrations useful to the ordinary Church of England congregation, or to enable him to throw the expression of his own devotional feeling with any naturalness into the forms provided by the Church of England.

To any one who holds that the central doctrine of Christianity \* rests upon grounds other and quite distinct from the historical evidence for the miracles of Christ, the whole question of miracles becomes one of secondary importance. It does not follow that it is one of no importance, either on its own account or as affecting the power of associating oneself with the religious beliefs and the worship of others. Personally I think it probable that to most of those who do accept in some unique sense the divine Sonship of Christ, the miracles of healing will not appear either purely legendary or mere vulgar cases of "thaumaturgy," nor will they find it difficult to believe in the historical character or in the religious significance of the Resurrection vision, explain it how they may. And these are the two points on which the ordinary Christian

---

\* I mean in so far as Christianity differs from other forms of Theism. Of course, I am not contending for the comprehension of those who do not believe in God and immortality.

consciousness insists most strongly. Whatever his theory of miracles may be, the clergyman who can tell the sick man that Christ went about curing diseases and who can point to the disciples' vision as an illustration or manifestation of the immortality of Christ, and, therefore, of all men, has enough in common with the beliefs of simple people to make it quite possible for him to perform the duties of clergymen without any painful sense of unreality to himself, and with advantage to his flock.

There is one question which I should rather have passed over, but on which candor compels me to say a word. Professor Sidgwick seems to lend his sanction to those who would regard the miraculous birth of Christ as the crucial question for candidates for the ministry of the Church of England. Doubt or disbelief in this Article of the Creed is, I believe, the obstacle which keeps out of holy orders by far the greater number of those who might otherwise have become useful clergymen. It is at this point, no doubt, that many—perhaps most—liberal-minded orthodox persons would draw the line of exclusion. The idea of the Incarnation has been so closely associated in their minds with the miraculous birth that they can hardly understand the distinction between them. They have not noticed that neither of the two great formulators of the Church's belief about the Incarnation, St. Paul and St. John, have anything to say about the miraculous birth. They have not noticed that the only traces of the doctrine in the New Testament are confined to the prefaces to the first and third Gospels, neither of which seems to belong to the two early documents which modern criticism is agreed in regarding as the basis of our existing Synoptists.\* These facts place the miraculous birth of Christ in a different category from the other alleged miracles of Jesus Christ, for many even of those who do not themselves reject it. To many minds, even of those who recognize the critical difficulty, the mirac-

---

\* It may be added that the general tendency of criticism is, if I am not mistaken, as decidedly in favor of the authorship of the third Gospel by St. Luke—a Christian of the second generation—as it is against the immediate Apostolic authorship of the first Gospel in its present form.

ulous birth seems the most natural way of explaining the divine nature of Christ. The fact seems so probable upon the hypothesis of that nature, and the improbability seems so great of the Church having been allowed to commit itself so universally to an unfounded or superfluous belief, that it will be accepted as a natural corollary to the Divinity of Christ, even where it is fully realized that the direct historical evidence for it is very slight, and that its spiritual importance is at least not of the highest order, provided there is a real belief in the doctrine of which the miraculous birth seems to them an outwork, a presupposition, or a corollary. But equally certain is it that there are other minds to whom the weakness of the evidence and the possibility of aftergrowth and legendary embellishment (to say nothing of the exceptional difficulty of bringing such an event under the widest and most elastic conception of uniform law) seem so great that they will feel themselves forced to reject the miraculous birth altogether, or at least to suspend judgment about the whole matter. However wrong these last may be, it is impossible to believe that the Church will permanently exclude from its ministry those who differ from the majority as to their exact critical estimate of two documents of unknown origin which seem to them at least of no spiritual importance, when it has admitted the principles of free criticism, of accepting or rejecting miraculous narratives on critical grounds, and of declining to rest the Divinity of Christ or the truth of Christianity upon the evidence of this or any other miracle. At all events those who think that the difference between them and the orthodox party on this matter is one of no spiritual significance are fully justified (as it seems to me) in holding to their position in the ranks of the Church's ministry until they are turned out of it. And if Professor Sidgwick asks, "Who is to decide as to the essentiality of the belief?" I answer, "Undoubtedly the individual himself, but in so deciding he must have regard to the actual state of public opinion on the subject." I do not think he is bound to satisfy himself that public opinion has critically and explicitly recognized the non-essentiality of the particular disbelief which he proposes

to bring within the limits of toleration; for, by the nature of the case, the question is one which public opinion has not explicitly answered. But I think a man ought to satisfy himself that this disbelief is of the same order as those which public opinion has already recognized as falling within the permissible limits. He must feel that he has a fair case for arguing that the toleration of his own views falls logically within the principles which are generally recognized as not inconsistent with the formal pledges of a clergyman.

If the Church eventually decides against him, if the Church's constituted authorities legally exclude him from her ministry or deprive him of his position, he may regard their decision as unwise or narrow-minded, and do all he can to get it altered, but he cannot deny that they are acting within their rights. And in cases of doubt there is surely one very intelligible way of ascertaining the "essentiality of a belief." If any one doubts whether some particular tenet of his—such as disbelief in the miraculous birth—does or does not exceed the limits of the liberty which the Church by its practical conduct has proclaimed, he may surely feel justified in throwing the responsibility of his ordination upon the authorized interpreter of the Church's rules, the Bishop to whom he applies for ordination. It may be of interest to any one who is hesitating to take orders on this ground to know that the most learned and most universally respected theologian among the English Bishops of this generation consented to ordain a candidate who confessed to him that the question of the miraculous birth was to him an open question.

There are no doubt persons who will be disposed to insist that the fact of the miraculous birth finding a place in the Creeds makes all the difference. If this distinction between that portion of the Church's doctrine which has found expression in the Creeds and that which has not depends upon the belief in the infallibility of the Church, it is enough to reply that such a distinction can appeal only to those who believe in the *infallibility* (as distinct from the authority) of the Church,—a belief directly opposed to the teaching of the Thirty-nine Articles, and repudiated by many decided High

Churchmen. The Church of England attributes no authority to the Apostles' or the Nicene Creed which she does not attribute also to the Athanasian, that part of the Church's formularies to which (at least as regards the "damnatory clauses") it is most generally agreed to apply the principle of liberal interpretation. And, if it be said that the more frequent repetition of the two older formulæ makes a practical difference, it may be replied that I am contemplating cases in which there is a general acceptance in some possible sense of the general view of Christ's person and work, but that there are clauses in both the Apostles' and the Nicene Creed which most orthodox clergymen would explain in a way different from that which was probably intended by their authors. Few clergymen probably believe in a literal descent of Christ into a local Hades, and a definite intercourse with the disembodied spirits of the Patriarchs. Many assuredly would understand the Resurrection of the Body in a sense which puts a considerable strain upon the term "body."\* Few of them believe that Baptism brings about the forgiveness of sins in the instantaneous or mechanical manner which the Article "I believe in one Baptism for the remission of sins" was, as a matter of history, intended to convey. It is possible for those who reject the miraculous birth to find in the clause "Conceived by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary" a meaning scarcely further removed from its historical import than the generally received sense of not a few other Articles. The importance rightly or wrongly attached to the Virgin birth was no doubt largely due to the feeling that a birth in accordance with the ordinary laws of nature would involve the inheritance of the sinful qualities inherent in human flesh. Those who believe (as many even among Unitarians do believe) that Jesus Christ was without sin may thus be said to accept the spiritual truth which the early Church, rightly or wrongly, associated with a certain physical or historical fact.

---

\* Even St. Augustine at one time held that the resurrection body would not be of flesh and blood. See his "Retractions," I. 27.

There is this great difference between the position which the Virgin birth occupies in the beliefs of average Christians and that occupied by other miraculous events (commonly so called) in Christ's life. The miraculous birth is usually assumed, but rarely (except for purposes of controversy) alluded to or insisted upon. A clergyman who should preach on Easter Day without alluding to the Resurrection of Christ would suggest that he disbelieved it. But it is perfectly possible to teach all that an ordinary congregation expects to be taught about the Incarnation or the Divinity of Christ without touching upon the question of the Virgin birth. This is one of the reasons why the position of a clergyman who does not hold the Virgin birth seems to be in practice much easier than that of one who cannot attribute some kind of historical as well as spiritual meaning to the Article "The third day he rose again from the dead." And this brings me to another point in Professor Sidgwick's argument upon which it is incumbent upon me to say something,—the question of the duty of publicly announcing the sense in which one believes the formularies to which one has subscribed.

Professor Sidgwick rightly insists on the shock to public morality involved in the making of untrue statements by authorized teachers of religion and morality. But the real injury to truth, as I conceive it, lies not in the formal subscription to formulæ which *no one* takes or can be supposed to take quite literally, but in the practical acquiescence in and encouragement of beliefs which one does not hold. Professor Sidgwick has insisted upon the duty of a lay candidate for a Head-Mastership open to "members of the Church of England," writing clearly to the electing body "how he interprets his pledge to believe the Apostle's Creed." In the case of the clergy, however, he does not seem disposed to allow that the duty of adhering to formal pledges may be modified by an open avowal of the "sense in which he interprets his pledge." To my own mind this is just the point upon which the distinction between the permissible and the unpermissible latitudinarianism turns. The man who has told the Bishop who ordains him, the incumbent who gives him a

title, and (by the general tenor of his teaching) the congregation before whom he preaches in "what sense he interprets" his acceptance of the formularies, is exactly in the position of the lay Head-Master who has told the governing body in what sense he understands his lay membership of the Church of England. Dishonesty only begins when a man takes orders under a creed which he could not on fitting occasions avow.

In deciding what these fitting occasions are, it becomes important to distinguish between saying what one does not believe and not saying what one does believe. The use of formulæ which here and there are at variance with one's real belief is almost inevitable if any considerable number of people are to agree to worship in the same words. The use of such formulæ will not at the present day, by well-informed people, be taken necessarily to represent the private belief of the clergyman with the same fidelity as the words voluntarily chosen by himself in a sermon or a book. I hold that a clergyman should never in his sermons say what he does not believe, allowance being made for the necessity of adapting his mode of expression to different audiences. It may be necessary to use different *language* in speaking to children or uneducated persons than one would use in communicating one's views to a philosopher; but the difference should never be more than a difference of language. A preacher must always speak the truth—the whole truth as far as one goes—and nothing but the truth. But the extent to which a clergyman is bound to proclaim the whole of his beliefs and his disbeliefs must, I should contend, depend very largely upon circumstances of time and place. Unless a clergyman shares enough of the beliefs of his congregation to be able to speak freely to them about what he and they would agree to be the vital matters of religion and morality, he is out of place as the minister of such a congregation. But there are many other matters on which it would, under certain circumstances, be impossible for him—impossible for any well-educated and reflecting clergyman—to speak all his thoughts without shocking beliefs which deserve some respect.

I feel strongly that it is the duty of the clergy to educate as well as to edify. I believe that to educated congregations it is desirable to speak much more plainly than is commonly done about "Old Testament difficulties," about "inspiration," about eschatology, about the true meaning of doctrines like the Atonement and the Incarnation. With congregations of working people in large towns, the necessity for plain speaking is almost as great, though it will be plain speaking of a rather different order. Even when the congregation is too mixed for much theoretical discussion of such subjects, it will generally be possible for a clergyman to indicate his way of looking at such things in a manner which will not shock or alarm the more conservative or more uninstructed elements of his congregation. It should be his aim to help and enlighten the doubting soul, without disturbing the faith of those who find no difficulties in their inherited creed,\* and are too old or too uninstructed to benefit by a larger measure of intellectual enlightenment. But to require every clergyman, before every congregation, to say his whole mind about all manner of critical and biblical questions—it is here, rather than in matters of "doctrine," that the practical difficulty is greatest—would be to make it impossible for educated and uneducated persons to worship in the same churches, or for an educated clergyman to minister to an uneducated congregation. The difficulty is not confined to those who might be styled "extreme Broad Churchmen." Such reserve as I hold to be justified is habitually practised—often more reserve than I can defend—by enlightened men of all parties. In church, intellectual enlightenment must surely be to some extent—less, no doubt, than is supposed—subordinated to practical considerations. That, to whatever extent is possible without much breaking up of congregations or unduly scandalizing of weak brethren (some "scandal" is inevitable and even desirable), theological plain speaking is an absolutely essen-

---

\* I mean in such parts of it as are spiritually harmless; when some traditional belief or traditional interpretation of the common belief is spiritually injurious he must preach against it.

tial condition of useful preaching to thoughtful men, I very strongly hold. But there must be limits to such plain speaking,—not, indeed, to *bona fide* private inquirers, but before mixed audiences. In allowing the clergy to be silent on some matters before some people, we are only conceding to them what we concede to every one else. And it is not enough to say that other people do not profess to set up as theological teachers. Parents, lay schoolmasters, journalists, authors, are constantly being called upon to speak or write about religious or ecclesiastical matters, and yet a certain amount of “reserve” is allowed to all of them. Even in ordinary society nobody feels bound to blurt out his theological opinions in all companies whenever the talk runs upon theological or ecclesiastical topics. People are expected, or at least they ought to be expected (for in fact they are sometimes expected to lie), to reveal their real opinion in so far as they undertake to express it at all; but there are surely many matters upon which, from many considerations of expediency, they are rightly allowed to be silent or even evasive. The respect that is felt to be due to sincere religious conviction in persons of different religions or churches to one’s own, may surely be claimed by people within our own religious communion who differ from us in less essential matters. In a vague and general way I hold it to be a duty to apply the results of criticism and reflection even to the most elementary religious teaching. Particularly, as it seems to me, should this be done in bringing up children who are not yet imbued with any fixed theological prejudices. It is, I believe, essential gradually to accustom the most illiterate to look upon the Old Testament in a totally different light to that in which it was regarded when even scholars could believe it to be true from beginning to end. But it does seem to me contrary to all common sense to say that when he preaches to a congregation of rustics—brought up to the most literal acceptance of every word of the Old and New Testaments—a clergyman is bound to point out to them in black and white all the miracles or other narratives which, on critical grounds which they would not understand, he himself doubts or disbelieves. If

he thought it a matter of immediate religious importance that they should disbelieve these things, he would be bound, of course, to say so, or to retire from the pulpit in which he was not free to do so. He is at liberty to be silent precisely because he believes them to be of no direct religious importance whatever. At all events, if this principle is to be rejected, few well-educated clergymen under forty would remain. General consent has long ago, as I contend, removed the stigma of dishonesty from their conduct, and it is rapidly doing so for those who carry the same principle a little further than the majority. It may be important to add that the principle may claim to a very considerable extent the sanction of the courts, the authorized interpreters of the obligations imposed by law upon the clergy. No prosecution for heresy has succeeded in this country except that of Mr. Voysey. The opinions of Mr. Voysey, who has deliberately disavowed the name of "Christian," I quite admit to fall outside the limits of possible or desirable comprehension. But the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Councils in the case of the various writers in "Essays and Reviews" go far to constitute, within the limits contended for in this article, a charter of theological freedom for the clergy of the Church of England.

My argument is incomplete so long as it remains merely negative. The limits within which it is morally lawful for clergymen to diverge from the literal interpretation of the formulæ which they subscribe to or use must depend upon the importance of the ends which they serve by taking holy orders. And here I feel that it is quite impossible, within the limits at my command, to express all that I should like to say; nor could I well attempt such a task without entering upon theological questions to an extent which would be out of place in this JOURNAL. I must therefore be content with saying that I believe strongly that many elements in the traditional Christian belief will have to be very considerably modified,—not more so than they have already been modified several times over in the Church's history,—but I believe also that the religion of the future must still be Christian, and that,

unless there is to be a general lowering of the spiritual level, so to speak, of human life, the Christianity of the future will be something in its essence much more like the Christianity of Athanasius than the Christianity of Socinus. Yet to make Christianity possible to men who have thoroughly appreciated the consequences of modern historical criticism, the process of restatement, reinterpretation, expansion, modification, and development is absolutely indispensable. I believe it to be absolutely essential to the highest spiritual interests of the world that it should go on. And it is a process which can go on only within the Churches, not outside them. It must be carried out in the main by clergymen (for it is from clergymen that the great bulk of religious people derive their theological ideas), and in England very largely by clergymen of the English Church. I do not mean to disparage the work that is being done—often much more thoroughly and more boldly—in the other orthodox denominations, but such work for the most part affects only the members of those denominations. I only mean that it cannot be done by drawing away members of the Church of England into any existing sect, or by the foundation of new and more or less unorthodox sects. Most men will not join such sects. They will become indifferent, “non-practising” members of the Church in which they were brought up, like the mass of educated French laymen. Moreover, to those who believe that the Church of Christ is something infinitely more than a society for the provision of sermons and services on Sundays,—that it is primarily a society for the promotion of the Christian ideal of life, and only secondarily “an association of persons holding certain theological doctrines,”—no liberty of prophesying or of hearing, no increase of theological enlightenment, could compensate the spiritual and social loss of multiplied schism. The maintenance, the intensification of the Christian *κοινωνία*—the widest that is possible, the most united, and the most organized that is possible—is an essential part of their religion. In comparison with the importance of maintaining and extending it, the non-natural interpretation of a clause or two here and there in formularies with which they feel a gen-

eral sympathy will seem to them a very small evil.\* The best that they hope for human society can only be realized by the increased activity, the increased co-operation, and the increased comprehensiveness of all Christian churches, and a fatal blow would be dealt to all such prospects if every new critical discovery is to be followed by a fresh schism. Their ideal would be a single united organization of "all who profess and call themselves Christians;" failing that, the smallest possible amount of division and the largest possible amount of co-operation among the divided parties. Those who hold this view of the Church's mission will feel that nothing but the clearest of categorical imperatives ought to prevent persons otherwise attracted to the task from accepting or retaining the orders of the English Church. I have tried to show that, considering the wide latitude already existing and sanctioned by public opinion, by the courts of law, and by the authorities of the Church, such conduct (within some such limits as have been indicated) is not really inconsistent with the duties of veracity and good faith. That "general understanding" as to the limits of comprehension which Professor

---

\* If to any one this view of the Christian Church should seem to require further explanation, I cannot do better than refer him to the book from which in great measure I have learned all that I have been trying to convey,—Professor Seeley's "*Ecce Homo*." Two points in Professor Seeley's view of the Church are of especial importance in the present connection: (1) that theological agreement is not of its essence; (2) that personal attachment to Christ is the one essential of membership. This attachment must undoubtedly imply a certain view of Christ's person and authority, which naturally must express itself in some sort of "doctrine." This is the point usually ignored by those who wish to broaden the Church into an "undenominational" branch of the civil service. That the form in which the individual and the society express their sense of the unique significance of Christ's life and work is a matter of secondary importance, —this is the truth which is commonly overlooked by those who insist on rigid intellectual agreement with every clause of ancient definitions. I cannot at this moment find the passage in which Seeley compares those who refuse to enter the Church's ministry on account of exaggerated scruples about subscription, to citizens who should refuse to take civil office under a constitution to which they were heart and soul attached, because they could not bring themselves to make some formal declaration about its historical origin which criticism had disproved. I wonder whether Professor Sidgwick would refuse a civil oath whose terms seemed to treat the social contract as an historical fact.

Sidgwick apparently denies appears to me to a very considerable extent to exist already, and it is daily becoming more explicit and more general. Even when particular applications of the principle may be denied, the principle is already admitted to such an extent that no one who feels himself in general sympathy with Christianity, as it is taught at the present day with general acceptance by the recognized exponents of Church of England theology, need hesitate to join them because on this or that detail he may carry his dissent from the traditional formula, or be conscious of carrying it one degree further than they. More liberal High Churchmen who object to such comprehension have already gone too far in the same direction to make their objections reasonable on the score of honesty, though they may naturally, from their own point of view, object to the presence of those upon whose opinions they themselves look with disfavor.

In conclusion, I do not wish to suggest that the present wide divergence between the accepted formulæ and the actual teaching of the more progressive section of the clergy is in itself a desirable state of things. I have not space to show why any attempt at revolutionary change would be impossible or undesirable, but I may just mention two points upon which reform might not be impracticable. It would probably, if the proposal emanated from the right quarter, be possible to induce both Parliament and the Convocations to alter the declaration of belief in the whole Bible at the Ordination of Deacons.\* And, while any attempt to change the actual doctrinal standards themselves could only produce disruption, it might not be impossible to secure some further change in the form of assenting to them.†

H. RASHDALL.

OXFORD, ENGLAND.

---

\* The answer in the Ordination of Priests—"I believe that Holy Scripture containeth sufficiently all things necessary to Salvation"—might well be substituted.

† Canon Gore has recently been urging—at the Shrewsbury Church Congress and elsewhere—that there should be no vague "understandings" as to the sense in which the Church's formulæ are accepted. Yet he proposes that (1) the

Canticles should be dropped; (2) the Athanasian Creed treated frankly as a canticle, while acceptance of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds should be rigidly enforced without any "understandings," and apparently without any latitude of interpretation whatever. I can only describe this suggestion as a proposal to abolish the existing Church of England and to erect another with such a doctrine as is personally acceptable to Canon Gore. (He has not told us what is to become of the profession of belief in Scripture in the Ordinal.) Canon Gore is perfectly entitled to urge such a project; but until it is successful he cannot blame the conduct of those who do not draw the limit of permissible latitude at exactly the same point at which he does himself. We belong to the Church of England as it is, not to the Church of England as Canon Gore thinks it ought to be. The principle upon which the two early Creeds are treated as more important or more binding than the Athanasian Creed, the Articles, and the Ordinal is intelligible enough, but it is a principle nowhere officially recognized by the existing Church of England or the existing test of uniformity. Canon Gore holds the Athanasian Creed to be a Canticle; the Church of England holds it to be a Creed. Canon Gore thinks that it possesses less authority than the other two. The Church of England holds that all three alike "ought thoroughly to be received and believed."

Those who, however strongly they are attached to the general view of Christ's person and work expressed in the Creeds, do not hold that the Fourth-Century expression of this view is necessarily binding on the Church for all time, will be unable to concur in Canon Gore's proposal to install the two Creeds as the sole expression of the Church's doctrine. It is worthy of remark that the original Nicene Creed—as accepted by the Council—contained no allusion to the Virgin birth. The time may come when a proposal to go back to the original Creed of Nicæa may get a hearing.

## THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF NEW JAPAN.

BEFORE we enter upon the discussion of our subject, it is perhaps desirable that a wide-spread misconception regarding the nature of Japanese civilization be cleared away. It is generally believed that the Japanese are an old people, "nearly the eldest of the peoples," as the London *Spectator* once put it. The chronology of Japan, which was officially proclaimed for the first time in 1872, indeed makes her history stretch back to very great antiquity. It places the first year of the reign of Jimmu Tenno, the founder of the imperial house, 660 B.C., making him thus the contemporary, broadly speaking, of Draco and Solon, of Sennacherib and Nebuchadnezzar. But this chronology, which was compiled from the oldest extant records of the country (the two historical books, certain parts of which, largely mythical and legendary,—*Kojiki* and *Nihongi*,—were compiled respectively in 712 and 720 A.D.), somewhat as Bishop Usher's Biblical chronology was compiled, seems to be altogether too long. The scholars who have studied the subject critically all seem to think that from five hundred to one thousand years must be struck off if we would reach the solid ground of history. Now, if the opinions of these scholars are to be trusted, then Japan is really one of the modern nations of the world, instead of being "nearly the eldest of the peoples." It will be found, if certain contemporary events in the East and the West are compared, that while the modern nations of the West were in the sixth century coming under the sway of Roman Christianity and Roman civilization, Japan in the Far East was at the same time coming under the sway of Chinese Buddhism and Chinese civilization. Japan, therefore, should not be classed with the old nations, such as China, India, Persia, or Egypt, but with the modern nations, such as Germany, France, or England.

But here a question will very naturally suggest itself. If

Japan started at the same time with the Western nations in her career of civilization, why was it that she was left so far behind? I think the question can be answered by remembering the fact that Japan had, as compared with the Western nations, to labor under some grave disadvantages. In the first place, she was the only modern nation in Asia. There was no other power near by (the geographical conditions not permitting the rise of such peoples anywhere in the Far East) with whom Japan might compete in noble rivalry in the arts of civilization, as was the case with the modern nations of Europe. In the second place, Japan started with only the intellectual legacy of China and India, while modern Europe started with by far the richer legacy of Rome, Greece, and Judea. Certain intellectual elements, such as the idea of personality or the spirit of scientific inquiry, which constitute such important factors in the civilization of modern Europe, were lacking in Japanese civilization. No wonder that, after more than one thousand years of trial, she fell far behind the nations of Europe. But, strictly speaking, Japan never had joined in the race. She was a solitary nation, hid away from all Western intercourse under the mist and cloud of the Far East. It is only within the last thirty or forty years that she has been brought into close touch with the life and spirit of modern times. No sooner, however, were her doors opened to Western influence, than she was at once thrown into the whirlpool of conflicting ideas. The recent history of Japan is the history of the conflict between the new Western ideas and the old dominant ideas of the East. The problems of civilization in modern Japan are the problems created out of this conflict. The task is to find some means for the adjustment of her old life and institutions with the conditions of her new environment.

With the possible exception of the French in the time of the Revolution, probably there never was a people who showed a more intense activity in mental life, who instituted more sweeping reforms or made more hazardous experiments at reorganization, with greater self-confidence, than the Japanese during the last quarter of a century. On not a few occasions

the judgment of foreign critics, who predicted the failure of these "rash" attempts, and who waited in serene complacency for the time when bankrupt Japan would be seen on her knees begging European protection, almost seemed to come true. Yet the nation finally came out of these dangers almost unscathed and made a creditable success in the work of reformation. So far as the establishment of the fundamental institutions of modern civilization is concerned, it may be said that the achievement has been a complete success. The modern army and navy, the public school system, the representative government, the bank and the judiciary are there in all their force and integrity. Moreover the scientific spirit and the idea of personality—the two imminent forces of modern society—are there, becoming more and more potent factors in the evolution of the new social order. Yet at the same time the old ideas are also regnant. Hence it is that we see those fiery conflicts of ideas in politics, in education, and in religion which make Japan's recent history so interesting.

Let us turn our attention first to the sphere of politics. We must remember that, notwithstanding the introduction of representative institutions, the old principle of loyalty and of implicit obedience to the will of the Mikado still prevails. To be sure, the Mikado has solemnly promised to observe the principles of the constitution and respect the rights of the people as guaranteed by the laws of the realm. It should be stated, moreover, as proof of his wisdom and patriotism, that all his promises hitherto made to the people have been most sedulously kept; so that there is no reason to fear that the nation at some unexpected day may be brought back, through perhaps a *coup d'état*, to the old state of autocracy. Besides, the country is already too deeply committed to modern thought, and popular influence is increasing too fast for any minister of the crown, however reactionary, to dare advise the suspension of the constitution. How these two principles of the divine right of the sovereign and the divine right of the people, which in Europe have so often waged fierce contests for ascendancy, are to be harmonized, is the problem which is

at present taxing the efforts of the most thoughtful politicians of the country. These politicians all see that it has been the intense loyalty of the people which, more than anything else, has carried the ship of state through the troubles of recent times, and that it is the imperial house which to-day gives unity to the nation, notwithstanding the presence of a hundred divisive forces. At the same time these statesmen also see that the rights and liberties of the people are not only to be preserved and guarded intact, so far as they exist already, but that they must be more and more increased in proportion as the people prove themselves capable of a larger exercise of their powers.

In a concrete form the problem is this, Shall we have a government in which the cabinet ministers are held responsible to a parliamentary majority? To this question one party answers no and the other party answers yes. There have existed for the last ten years two dividing opinions, one favoring the German model, and the other the English,—somewhat like the two parties which existed in the early days of the American Republic, one sympathizing with French and the other with English ideas. Both sides claim that they are working for the integrity of the throne and the rights of the people. There is this difference, however, between the two: those who favor the British system insist that it is the only one that will exempt the throne from responsibility for the sins and mistakes of the government, while those, on the other hand, who favor the German model point to the growing scepticism in Western countries as to the virtues of representative institutions, and yet more to the increasing menace from European aggression in Asia, which doubtless demands a strong and stable government.

As the industrial classes rise in influence, which indeed is rapidly taking place, the cry for a more popular form of government will become still louder; while, on the other hand, the whole military and naval section of the country, whose strength will be increasingly great, will be against any change which may seem to diminish the authority and glory of the crown and make the government less stable. There would

most likely be some violent clash of interests, and perhaps an appeal to arms, if the people were less patriotic and European aggression less threatening. But, thanks to the aggressive policies of some of the great powers of Europe and to their dearly bought lessons, Japan will be saved from the evils of civil strife, and the great contention somehow settled by peaceable means.\*

In education similar conflicts are going on. When, nearly a quarter of a century ago, the modern system of education was first introduced, one of the reading-books began with a statement somewhat as follows: "God is the creator of the universe, and man is the lord of creation; wine and tobacco are injurious to health." This was a curious mixture of Christian dogma and temperance teaching. At first, these new and strange ideas did not call forth any opposition, the conservatives having been cowed by the bold domination of the reform sentiment. A whole set of translated text-books was for some ten years left undisturbed in unquestioned authority. But it was not long before the idea of nationality began to dawn upon the minds of the people, and the reactionists, seizing

---

\* Very important events have been taking place within the year past, important chiefly because of their significance as to the final settlement of the parliamentary difficulty. In May, 1896, Count Itagaki, the leader of the Liberal party (*Jiyuto*), was appointed Minister of Home Affairs in the cabinet of Marquis Ito. This was a result of the *entente* entered upon in the previous fall between the Liberal party and Marquis Ito's government. This was a very bold step on the part of the marquis, since it meant the practical abandonment of his much-discussed and somewhat vaunted "transcendental policy." He seems to have seen, however, the impossibility of carrying on a constitutional administration without the help of political parties, and recognized in this large and well-organized Liberal party his best ally and supporters. In opposition to this alliance there was at once formed a combination of several parties, with the "Progressionist party" (*Kaishinto*, Count Okuma's party) as the nucleus. This new body, about equal in number to the Liberal party, is called the "Progressive party" (*Shimpoto*). Since the resignation of Marquis Ito and his cabinet, in the last days of August, Count Matsugata has organized a new ministry, with Count Okuma as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new government is looking to the support of the former opposition party, The Progressive. Thus the inauguration of real party government does not seem to be very far off. Certainly recent events point most decidedly that way.

this opportunity, raised an outcry against what they called "republicanism," "Christianization," or the "too slavish imitation" of Western ways.

Public attention being called about this time to the subject of moral training in the schools, the educational authorities came to the conclusion that Confucianism was the most available means to that end. The gray-haired, old-fashioned Confucianists, who, either too stupid or too self-willed to adapt themselves to the conditions of the new *régime*, had been living in obscurity, were now unexpectedly brought forward to occupy the chairs of moral instruction. No contrast between the old and the new could have been more striking than this contrast between these Confucianists sitting in professors' chairs and the intelligent bright faces of the students trying to pay attention to the lectures, in halls constructed and furnished after a European model, filled with physical apparatus and American text-books. These ancient gentlemen, who were, indeed, excellent in conduct and learned in the old classic lore, did not, as a matter of course, make much impression as moral teachers. The spectacle was altogether too comical to be much longer seriously endured. Thus the attempt at the revival of Confucianism was a complete failure. But moral training must be given to the rising generation of the people somehow or other, and how to effect it was a problem nobody seemed able to solve, or even suggest a solution. The whole thing was in chaos. At this juncture, in 1890, there appeared the emperor's famous rescript on morals.\* The document was drawn up with great care. It

---

\* The rescript, promulgated on the emperor's birthday, November 3, 1890, runs as follows:

"The emperor regards his ancestors as having laid the foundations of this country high and broad, and as having established virtue deep and wide. My servants, with loyalty and filial piety, my people, by uniting as with one heart, have shown forth the worth of these virtues. Truly, herein consists my country's glory and the basis of education. You, my servants, be obedient to your parents, kind to your brothers; let husband and wife be mutually helpful; exercise self-control with humility; extend wide cordiality to the people; cultivate learning; engage in business; make wide the power of wisdom; perfect morality; and, more, extend blessings everywhere; exalt duty, always highly reverencing

was noble in style, concise in statement, and comprehensive in its exposition of moral duties. The rescript was at once hailed on all sides as a welcome shower on the sultry moral atmosphere of the time. It helped to impress upon the minds of all the importance of morality, and to free moral duties and life from the fetters of any one system, be it religious or philosophical. Although at the time a desperate attempt was made by certain reactionary educators to interpret this rescript according to their own narrow views, yet the candidness of tone and the catholicity of spirit so clearly noticeable in the document proved too strong for any such attempt to succeed. The emperor's rescript did, therefore, accomplish what it was most probably intended to accomplish. But, it must be confessed, something more was needed, in order to enforce the practice of morals, than a mere rescript, even though it be that of the adored Mikado.

The Japanese professors of morals cannot appeal to the authority of a religious system. After the failure of the attempt to revive Confucianism, no other similar project can succeed. Education has never been, at least during the last three centuries, in the hands of the Buddhist priests. Their ethical interests are to-day too weak to seek to influence the policy of moral education. Christianity is not to be thought of. It is yet new and untried, and its position, though highly respectable, is not commanding enough to take the lead in this work. The only available course left to the educators of Japan is to appeal to the sentiments of loyalty and patriotism which lie latent in the breast of every Japanese. Such appeals carry immense weight with the young and go no doubt a great

---

the power of the state and following the laws of the country. Should, perchance, any great calamity threaten, openly and courageously give aid to the unending destiny of the empire. So doing, you are not merely loyal servants to the emperor, but you thereby manifest the spirit of your ancestors. Truly, this moral path is the will of my ancestors. And you, descendants, should guard this with them. These unerring principles run through all past and present time, and belong alike to all peoples. That the emperor and you, his servants, together should with one heart hold these moral principles in highest regard is the royal desire."

This is not by any means an adequate translation of the noble original.

way in solving the problem. But this method, now almost exclusively used, needs to be carefully guarded against running into narrow fanaticism or extreme one-sidedness. It is to be remembered that the one-sided emphasis on obedience to superiors was a note of the old system of ethics. The talk about loyalty and patriotism is just now particularly popular, and the temptation to run into excess in this direction is not easy for ordinary teachers to resist. The present dissatisfaction with this reactionary tendency is deep and wide-spread. Those who oppose this tendency insist that while the sentiment of loyalty and patriotism is not to be less tenderly nourished, yet educators should not forget, as they so often do, to teach the young that in order to perform public service they must be in the first place men of good personal character. To go a step further, not only must they teach that truthfulness, temperance, generosity, thrift, are virtues which are indispensable to those who would be loyal and patriotic subjects of the Mikado, but that they are so important in themselves they ought to be freed from the domination of any other class of virtues and given independent positions.

Most likely this one-sided emphasis on the importance of the public virtues to the neglect of the private is a momentary phase in the educational development and will gradually pass away. With the increase of intelligence among the people and the growth of the privately-endowed schools, almost all conducted on more liberal lines than the government institutions, it will become more and more difficult for any one party to monopolize the education of the young. But this practical method of inculcating morals is only applicable in the education of the young up to a certain stage in their career. The moment they begin to think independently and to question the ground of moral sanctions, this practical dogmatical method will cease to be useful. Nay, it may become positively injurious, and subversive of the very end aimed at. Reason, and reason alone, can be the final court of appeal. Educators will be compelled to rely on a philosophy of ethics. But what philosophy shall it be? Here is another sphere for the conflict of the old and the new ideas. Shall it be the philosophy that

starts from the mechanical conception of the world, basing its ethics on the theory of necessity and utilitarianism? The old Eastern philosophy of pantheistic idealism, with its doctrine of the *Kharma*, of the absolutely unavoidable chain of cause and effect in the world of phenomena, will be a great support for this view. Shall it be the philosophy that starts from the idea of human personality, basing its ethics on the theory of personal freedom? Shall it be individualistic in the sense of recognizing the essential worth of each human being as a member of the whole? Or shall it be socialistic in the sense of recognizing the paramount importance and claims of the whole, say of the nation, practically ignoring the worth and claims of individuals? Which is the aim of human existence, the welfare of each individual or that of the whole in its collective capacity? Or is each view wrong, as thus stated and emphasized, and is the only true course to hold them both in the proper synthesis of a larger and more comprehensive conception? In fine, this question may be otherwise stated by asking how much importance is the idea of human personality (which is yet new) to assume in the coming ethical philosophy of Japan? The higher education and the scientific thinking of the country have not yet reached the stage of discussing these questions with deep interest and with great deliberation and thoroughness. But it seems to me that the time is fast coming when the discussion of these high themes will engage the keenest attention of the leading educators of the land.

Lastly, let us turn our attention to another department of life, where the conflict between the old and the new is not less fierce. Buddhism and Christianity have come into deadly conflict in Japan. These two religious systems represent two distinct world-views. In Buddhism we see the emphasis laid on the idea of the whole, entirely distinct from the idea of the parts. In Christianity, on the other hand, the emphasis is laid on the idea of human personality as the expression of the whole. The one regards ethical attributes to be entirely inapplicable to the nature of the ultimate reality, which lies back of this impermanent, finite existence. The other looks upon ethical attributes as constituting

the very core and essence of the world-substance, and the full possession of those attributes by individuals as the only warrant for their immortal existence. The conflict is not between one native system and another foreign system, but between two distinct world-views, which are fighting for mastery, so to speak, within the mind of the nation. For the Christian churches of Japan are now no longer a sort of foreign settlement in the midst of an unsympathetic community. They have become naturalized, and the ideas they represent have powerful supporters in the new literature of the country. Thus the conflict rages between Buddhistic pantheism on the one hand and Christian theism on the other,—the one strong in its hold upon the masses, supported by the natural trend of native thought, itself the result of that teaching, and encouraged by the unexpected aid it is receiving from a certain class of scientific thinking in the West; the other is strong in its hold upon the ethical sense of the people, so ably trained by Confucianism, and is encouraged by the enthusiasm manifested by souls newly emancipated from the fetters of pessimistic fatalism. On which side shall the victory be? A very noteworthy feature in the whole movement is that each side is casting away its old armor of scholastic dogmatism, and coming forward to meet the other, clad in the simple native attire of its own.\* To change the figure, in each the dogmatic superstructure is being battered down by some of its own followers. For higher criticism has come into Japan, and is active both in the Christian and the Buddhist communities. As a result, the essential truths of one religion will be matched with the essential truths of the other. What is yet more remarkable is the fact that religious hatred and fanaticism are gradually dying out, and friendly discussions and candid comparisons of views are taking the place of mutual suspicion and angry disputations. The one good

---

\* A very interesting movement has been going on for several years among the younger Buddhists towards attempting a critical exposition of Buddhism. There is indeed a great need for higher criticism in Buddhism, and these younger men are courageously initiating the movement. Their official organ is the review called *The Budkio*.

effect of such impartial criticism will be the clearer appreciation of the similarity, as well as the dissimilarity, between the two opposing systems. Can it be possible that as the final outcome of these tendencies some great mind will arise who will present in a larger and deeper world-view than either a complete synthesis of the essential truths of both, and thus be a means of reconciliation between the theistic West and the pantheistic East? Is such an outcome altogether a fool's dream, never to be realized? Or are the two views, on the contrary, utterly irreconcilable, and shall they finally divide the field, to remain separate and distinct forever? Shall it be again, as some persons confidently predict, that the pantheistic stomach of the giant East will easily assimilate the theistic view and transform it into a shapeless mass? Or, yet again, is ethical theism to keep its ground and remain a living force, growing in influence with the growth of the new social order, till the whole East is transformed into a land of freedom, enlightenment, and civilization?

My aim in making this brief and very inadequate sketch of the ethical and political problems of Japan has been to uncover the real heart of the Far East, and to show how *there* the same pulses of humanity are beating as in the Far West. I trust I have succeeded to some degree in my attempt. I trust I have succeeded in exorcising the demon out of the imaginary Far East, and in presenting her comely clad and in right mind, like to the nations of the West.

I claim that these problems of new Japan are not hers alone, but that they are also the problems of the West. Their right and successful solution concerns the best welfare of the West as much as of the Far East. For, can it be possible that those seven hundred millions of human beings who inhabit the other half of the globe are destined to remain forever the instrument and slaves of Western greed? What do all the social unrest and agitation in Western lands mean but this, that the great problems of humanity are not to be solved by the West alone, but that the East is to be called upon for its contribution and co-operation? Let us hope, then, that the twentieth century will open better prospects for the peoples of

the East, and that before the close of that century there may arise several civilized powers in place of the present decrepid countries. Certainly Japan needs and claims the sympathy and support of the civilized powers of the West, in the new and untried course she has entered upon.

TOKIWO YOKOI.

TOKYO, JAPAN.

---

## MORALITY AND THE BELIEF IN THE SUPERNATURAL.

THE influence of religion upon ethical progress and ethical standards has been so often discussed, as well from the standpoint of those who defend the claims of religion to be the source and the mainstay of morality as from that point of view whence the moral life is regarded as having developed quite independently of theological creeds, that the subject may perhaps seem to stand in no need of further elucidation or development. Yet the whole question is apt to grow somewhat hazy and indefinite to the student of the history of morals, because its inherent difficulties are greatly increased by the vagueness and ambiguity in the use of the word religion,—a Protean word of which the meaning changes almost as often as we turn from one author to another, sometimes even as we pass from one sentence to another. Believing that the essential points in the main controversy can be made clearer if this source of misunderstanding is removed, I have chosen in what follows to speak of the belief in supernaturalism rather than the religious belief. And this will at the same time mark clearly the limits of the present investigation. For there are, as is well known, not a few persons at the present day who discard supernaturalism and the miraculous as affording an interpretation of fact, and perhaps relegate such conceptions to the limbo of mere "Aberglaube," who yet regard their admiration and reverence for nature and its laws as a genuine and sufficient religion. But I do not propose to discuss here the possible effect upon morality of such a strictly "natural religion" as this, but rather to indicate what

those ethical consequences are which flow from religion as both popularly and theologically it is usually conceived,—that is, as implying a belief in some power or powers “above” or “beyond” the world of human beings and natural objects; in other words, as inclusive of faith in the supernatural. Supernaturalism clearly means the belief in an entity or entities, a force or forces, in some sort lying outside of or transcending the facts, whether of mind or matter, which constitute what we call the world of nature. It is the connection of this belief with the moral life of man that I propose to briefly consider.

Turning our attention first to the course of ethical progress in the past, let us endeavor to see what, in its general outline, has been the relation between supernaturalism and morality. The view that the latter originated in the former, that moral ideas sprang from the belief in supernatural agencies and from the feelings such a belief engendered, may be dismissed as incompatible with all that we know of man at the relatively primitive stages of his development. The study of the savage—the type of the race in its infancy—shows that the true source of his crude morality is to be looked for not in his religious creed, but primarily in his blind and instinctive devotion to mere custom. The maintenance of the *status quo* is the uncivilized man’s earliest moral ideal; to do as his fathers did before him is his golden rule. And when a more rational basis for moral judgment is formed, it is purely utilitarian in its character, for men early learn to stamp with social approval those kinds of action that tend to the general welfare, and to condemn such as are believed to be prejudicial to the interests of the community. Thus, the moral standard develops along two lines,—the instinctive, where the standard is the customary, and the rational, where the standard is the useful; so that moral judgments may often be hesitating or inconsistent, that being regarded as good which evidently makes for the common weal, and that as right or morally befitting which accords with the unwritten but sacred law of use and wont. In no case is the origin of the moral distinctions to be found in a supposed supernatural sphere.

Moreover, although the belief of the primitive man in the supernatural is an almost universal one, yet not only does it not originate ethical ideals and distinctions, but apparently at first it does not consciously and directly affect his moral life at all, except in so far as it leads to a cult, which is simply one instance of custom, and as such is obligatory, or as it produces motives of a purely prudential character. The ancestor spirit, *dæmon* or *fetich*, is primarily a power to be propitiated, not an example to be imitated nor a supreme authority to be referred to in matters of conscience. The wrath of the supernatural being must be shunned by all means possible, but just on the same grounds that the wrath of a strong man is to be avoided by one who is weaker. When moral distinctions are once clearly recognized, and the supernatural conceptions themselves are regarded from an ethical stand-point, the religious sanction, as we shall see, may have a very important share in determining the character and color of the moral life; but the first steps in moralization are almost certainly taken independently of the religious creed.

There are two ways in which the belief in the supernatural can have an influence upon ethical progress; first, by modifying the content of the moral law, and so affecting the ethical ideal; and, secondly, by affording an incentive to obedience to the law and to the effort to realize the ideal; in other words, supernaturalism helps to determine the standard of morality and may provide for it a sanction.

1. Supernaturalism has affected the ethical standard. The belief in the existence of superhuman beings or disembodied spirits, which is so nearly universal among the rudest savages that we may safely affirm that it must have appeared in a very early chapter of the history of human evolution, expresses itself almost always in some form of ceremonial cult. The spirits or gods, possessing as they do great and mysterious powers, must from prudential motives be propitiated by sacrifices, prayers, or ceremonies supposed to be acceptable to them. Such acts of worship naturally tend to become highly important duties to the savage mind, both because all cere-

monial readily becomes stereotyped and so acquires the sanctity which pertains to generally recognized custom, and also because the due performance of them would be held to be essential to the general safety and welfare, since their non-observance might call down upon the whole tribe the wrath of the offended spirit. Hence from a comparatively early stage of the moral development of any people with whom the belief in the supernatural is lively and strong, the transgression of the ceremonial law is apt to be regarded as especially heinous, while the consistent and faithful observance of all its details ranks as highly virtuous. It is hardly necessary to show that this may cause very serious deviations from a rational standard of morals, and that the advancement of such a people along the lines of true progress may be correspondingly retarded, since what would really promote the general good may be prohibited, while what is injurious to health and happiness may be inculcated and approved. Thus it often has happened that from foolish, cruel, or degrading ceremonials being ranked as duties, the influence of the belief in supernatural objects of worship has had a distinctly pernicious effect; the moral judgment being warped and an unworthy standard of conduct being maintained.

But it is not only by giving an undue prominence to ceremonial observances that supernaturalism has influenced the moral judgment of conduct. The depth and strength of the feelings, whether of fear, reverence, or love, that the consciousness of the mystery and grandeur of supernatural beings calls forth, readily leads the believer to attach special importance to the recognition by other men of these objects of worship. In proportion as the existence of the supernatural is intensely realized and its influence upon the individual's own life is acutely felt, is it difficult to avoid the conclusion that others ought to hold, ought even to be forced to hold, the same faith. If the spirit worshipped is a tribal god, then all the members of the tribe should acknowledge him; if he is conceived as the Lord of the whole earth, then all mankind must kneel at his foot-stool. If his wrath is to be feared above all, and his favor is more to be desired than

life, then almost any methods may seem justifiable that will lead men to believe in him and serve him. Nor is this the case only at an early stage of moralization, or while religion is crude and undeveloped. The more ardent the desire to do good to humanity, and the more earnest and deep the religious conviction, the stronger is the motive to bring about a general belief in the supernatural object of veneration. The gloomy record of forced conversions, religious wars, persecutions, and martyrdoms would not so often have darkened the pages of history had not supernaturalism enlisted on its side the altruistic feelings and the genuine convictions of men as well as their baser and more brutal passions.

And in close connection with such practical perversions of the moral standard, we find this other undesirable effect of supernaturalism, that it has tended to attach a higher ethical value to the acceptance of particular opinions than to the free and unbiased search for truth. It cannot, indeed, be maintained that this error always accompanies such a belief, or that there are not those among its opponents, as well as among its adherents, who have been guilty of it. Science and secular culture have had their dogmatists as well as theology, and many a believer in the supernatural has frankly recognized the moral worth of all sincere and candid inquiry irrespective of what its results may be. But we cannot read the long and yet unfinished story of the conflict between science and theology without perceiving that the free spirit of investigation has again and again been challenged and the progress of knowledge retarded by the demand for an irrational, because an unquestioning, faith.

So far, then, the effects of the belief in the supernatural would seem to have been hurtful rather than helpful to the development of a rational and adequate moral standard, yet in one respect it has been of very great benefit. In the more highly evolved and spiritualized forms of religion the supreme object of worship is concerned not only as the source of the moral law, but as its fullest exemplification and realization. All that is highest, most glorious and most good is regarded as actually existent in the Divine Archetype. This has inevi-

tably tended to give vividness, strength, and permanence to the moral ideal, just because the ideal is thereby held to be in the completest sense the real. The ethical standard in such a case is in no danger of being looked upon as something dependent upon habit and custom, or as being merely subjective, and therefore uncertain and fluctuating; it is "eternal in the heavens." It is fixed and immutable because based upon the Divine character and attributes. And thus retrogression in the conception of the moral law becomes almost impossible while the religious faith holds firm. It may be true that the moral qualities of the Divine ideal are in fact merely reflections of the highest moral culture of the community, but once they are ascribed to the object of worship they can hardly lose their place as virtues. By thus giving stability to the ethical ideal, and by presenting it to the imagination in concrete form while yet invested with all the mystery and glory of a power superhuman and supreme, religious faith has doubtless helped to raise humanity to a higher moral plane.

2. But it is in relation to the sanction that it has afforded to ethics that the influence of supernaturalism has been the most wide-spread and the most potent. Only very slowly and gradually has the conception of a purely *moral* motive for the moral life dawned upon the mind of man; even now it is but very vaguely and hesitatingly recognized, and the reason for good conduct is often sought for everywhere rather than in the intrinsic desirability of such conduct. Extra ethical sanctions, then, have been necessary to form a scaffolding for the building up of that rational morality which when completed can stand in need of no such extraneous and alien support.

So soon as in the gradual advance of the human race moral distinctions were generally recognized, the practical problem to be solved was how to induce men to abstain from the evil and to do the good,—how to bring into existence that sort of conduct and character that was regarded as praiseworthy. The most obvious and immediate means of doing this was by the infliction of punishment on any individual whose actions were regarded as reprehensible. Even before the moral aspect

of conduct had come clearly into the social consciousness, an injured person, in order to avenge himself and protect his interests, would try to hurt or destroy him to whom the injury was due. With the opening out of the moral consciousness this desire of the individual to inflict penalties is held to be justifiable; it becomes the "lex talionis" which society at first, by recognizing and approving, and later by modifying, generalizing, and systematizing, transforms into the legal and social sanctions. Thus those men whose conduct would naturally tend to be mischievous and dangerous are restrained, and motives are formed leading them to a better course of action. Without some such influence it is hard to see how morality could have been developed at all. For the impulsive, unreflective, and half-irrational mind of uncivilized man could not feel such a degree of satisfaction in the contemplation of actions conducive to the general welfare and his own higher life as would counterbalance the desire for his immediate and selfish enjoyment. The essential beauty of holiness demands for its appreciation a highly evolved and cultivated moral taste. Pleasant results must be closely and constantly associated with good conduct, and painful results with evil conduct, during the stages preliminary to that of a relatively perfected moralization, in which the good becomes in itself pleasurable and evil painful.

Now, to this wholesome and necessary discipline of the moral life the belief in the supernatural lends a powerful aid. The mysterious and unseen powers, which at first are often conceived mainly as the originators of strange and untoward events, disturbing the ordinary course of nature or determining the fate of men, can strike with resistless force the evildoer whom his fellows will not or dare not punish. Offences of which no human being is witness, or which are done against those who are too weak to retaliate, may draw down on the culprit the wrath of an angry deity. And while the power of men can affect him only during this life, he may recognize in the supernatural avenger a more far-reaching authority, so that the grave itself may be no refuge for him. From the Divine eye there is no hiding, from the sentence of the super-

human judge there is no appeal, from the penalty he inflicts there is no escape. But it is not only in the distant and dim vistas of a future existence that man foresees the threats and promises of the supernatural power carried out; in the prosperity and misfortunes of the present life he detects the recompense of good and evil actions. How fully such a mode of explaining the diverse fates of men may permeate the whole consciousness of a people and influence its ethical growth is clearly apparent from the Old Testament history of the Jews. The Jewish literature before the era of Christianity is profoundly ethical, and the successive periods of the national life show a progressive movement towards a pure and noble moral system. Yet seldom does the Hebrew prophet or Psalmist appeal to a higher motive to goodness than that of the divine blessing that is promised to the well-doer, nor does he urge a stronger deterrent from sin than that the face of the Lord is against them that do evil, to cut off the remembrance of them from the earth. The book of Job bears witness to the tremendous mental and moral upheaval in the mind of a devout Jew when first the doubt has suggested itself whether human fates are in truth divinely allotted to men on the basis of their personal deserts.

Nor did the influence of the religious sanction grow less when Christianity introduced its higher code of morals. Divine rewards and punishments are not, however, for the most part conceived by the Christian writers as temporal and external goods and penalties,—though this view is not altogether absent. In the main, it is either the anticipation of the joys or pains of a spiritual life beyond the grave that forms the motive to good conduct, or (and this is the more essentially Christian notion) it is the feelings that come from a sense of being pleasing or displeasing to God that determine the soul to goodness. Pains and pleasures are still recognized as forming what we may call a moral lever by which to raise human nature, but the more spiritual and internal character of the experience to which the feelings are attached gives a different coloring to the motive. We have here, in fact, an approximation to a purely ethical sanction, since, in so far as the concep-

tion of the Divine Being is identified with that of the ethical ideal, the motive becomes the recognition of that pleasure which exists for the perfectly moralized consciousness in a good action and of the pain that it feels in a bad one.

Recognizing, then, the very mixed character of the influence of supernaturalism upon the ethical standards of mankind, but recognizing, also, that to a very considerable extent the moral life of our race has been benefited by the existence of the sanction it has afforded, what conclusion, we may ask, is to be drawn in regard to the future connection between ethical progress and the belief in the supernatural? To revert to a figure already made use of, is this belief an integral and permanent part of the moral structure which civilized man has so slowly and with such difficulty built up, or is it only a temporary scaffolding which may, indeed, for a time have served a useful purpose, but which at last may be removed without loss or danger to the edifice?

It is still maintained by many thoughtful persons that the motive provided by a belief in the supernatural is an ever-necessary factor in the elevation and amelioration of human society; and that, consequently, the loss or even the weakening of this belief must at any time prove an irreparable injury to the world. This view does not always depend upon the certainty of there being a substantial support in reality for such a creed. It is the utility, not the truth, of supernaturalism that is at the present day chiefly emphasized. It may or may not express adequately the ultimate facts of the universe, but, in any case, it is asserted, there is an inestimable advantage in its acceptance by the mass of mankind as a satisfactory explanation of things. So, and only so, are they to be provided with a sufficient reason for pursuing that course of conduct which promotes the general weal. Such is the thesis maintained by Mr. Kidd in his widely-read book on social evolution. But his argument, ingenious though it is, is throughout vitiated by the wholly unwarranted assumption being made that so far as a man acts rationally he must always have his own individual pleasure as his conscious aim, to the exclusion of what is for the interests of others,—

an assumption which belongs only to the crudest forms of egoistic hedonism, and which has been repeatedly shown to be inconsistent with the results gained by a careful psychological analysis of the phenomena of instinctive and voluntary acts. In truth, long before our modern science of psychology was developed, it only needed the vigorous common sense and clear insight of Joseph Butler to show that benevolence as a motive to action is both natural and rational. If, indeed, the existence of altruistic feeling and action were based on a belief in a supernatural power that bestows rewards and punishments, then morality itself must rise and fall with the increase and decrease of the acceptance of this creed; but such a theory finds absolutely no support in psychology, ethics, or the history of civilization. Morality is not a child of supernaturalism at all, important though the influence of the latter upon the former has often been. Those who regard the religious sanction as *essential* to morality in its higher developments fail to see that it is in truth an extra moral sanction, and that the whole course of ethical development is in the direction of gradually, to an ever-increasing extent, supplanting the motives afforded by the feelings artificially or indirectly connected with conduct by those of the feelings directly arising from the conduct itself,—that is, by substituting the strictly moral for even the highest forms of the prudential motive.

There would seem, therefore, to be no ground for the supposition that were the belief in the supernatural at last to disappear, an annihilation of ethical distinctions or the elimination of all inducement to good conduct must result. And yet it may be granted that were such a change in the popular creed to take place rapidly and generally there might not improbably occur a very serious decline in morality. One motive, and that a very powerful one, deterring ordinary man from wrong-doing would be taken away. Moreover, the moral ideal having been for long centuries identified by the thought of Christendom with the Supreme Being who is the object of religious worship, the association of the moral with the supernatural is so close and intimate that theological

disbelief might for a time have a tendency to produce ethical nihilism. That in the case of individuals this has not unfrequently seemed to be the result seems certain, but it is not so certain whether this has not often been only a temporary loss, after which a true and sound basis for the moral life has been reached. Assuredly, with the nobler and more earnest minds, alike among those that are profoundly religious in their beliefs and those who reject such beliefs altogether, motives enough exist that are quite independent of all supernatural support for striving to lead lives of purity, honor, and benevolence. But for the "weaker brethren," those who are prone to do evil even when the strongest inducements to right action are present, we may well fear any sudden and violent disturbance of the sanctions that help to hedge them in to the straight and narrow path of duty. With regard to opinions that affect strongly the daily lives and habits of the masses of men, it is desirable that any great change should come about but slowly, and by the gradual substitution of other ideas rather than by a rapid and widespread mental or moral revolution. If the supernatural sanction should seem to be growing weaker and to be losing ground, it would be highly important that the other sanctions, legal, social, and ethical, should be strengthened as far as possible and enabled to take its place.

As to whether any great change in this direction will ever occur or not, whether the belief in the supernatural is fated to decline and ultimately to pass away, or whether it is a permanent part of our human endowment, or has such a justification and support in the real nature of the universe that as time goes on it will only be strengthened and deepened with the further growth and enlightenment of the human mind,—this is a question of which the answer lies beyond the scope of the present paper. No observer of mankind, no student of history, can fail to see that this belief is very far-reaching and has great vitality. In our own day, and among the most cultured communities, and apart altogether from the direct results of religious teaching, we need only look at the prevalence of "spiritualism," the credit given by intelligent persons to stories of ghosts and apparitions, and the readiness

with which many distinguished men of science and letters are ready to accept supernatural interpretations of any phenomena of which, as yet, no satisfactory natural explanation can be given, in order to realize to what a deep and strong instinct supernaturalism appeals. To the earliest dawn of human life belonged the awakening of that instinct; we need not anticipate that it will disappear either suddenly or soon.

E. RITCHIE.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

---

## THE RESTORATION OF ECONOMICS TO ETHICS.

DOROTHEA, the philanthropic heroine of "Middlemarch," complains of political economy as "the never-explained science thrust as an extinguisher over all her lights." This was in the reign of William IV.; but had she lived forty years later, she could still have repeated wellnigh the same complaint. For, at any rate in England, the efforts of Cairnes to restate, and of Jevons to revolutionize the orthodox political economy, had still left it with grounds and scope obscure, and with its general character neither human nor humane. But during the last quarter of a century, by a happy change, it has become to a great extent intelligible and ethical. Thus, for example, instead of a definition like Senior's, as the science which states the laws regulating the production and distribution of wealth, as far as they depend on the action of the human mind; Professor Marshall says it is "a study of man's actions in the ordinary business of life; it inquires how he gets his income and how he uses it." ("Principles of Economics," third edition, p. 1.) And we are told, "there is no truth in the common opinion that economics regards man as absorbed in a selfish pursuit of wealth." (*Ibid.*, p. 83.) Again, Professor Smart, the interpreter for English readers of the Austrian school of economists, justifies an ethical inquiry at the end of his "Studies in Economics," by the fact that "ethics and economics are now recognized to have such close relations." And the American Professor Hadley, who is above all suspicion of sentiment or soft money, writes, in his

recent interesting volume as follows: "No economist of reputation at the present day would attempt to ignore the ethical aspects of an institution, as might have been done fifty years ago. Instead of asserting the complete independence of economics and ethics, the modern economist . . . would insist on the close connection between the two sciences. He would say that nothing could be economically beneficial which was ethically bad, because such economic benefit could be only transitory. . . . The economist must understand the ethical bearings of the results which he discusses." ("Economics," p. 23.) Nor will the readers of this JOURNAL forget Professor Mackenzie's article (April, 1893) on the relation between ethics and economics, and the close connection therein affirmed between the moral and the economical.

Further citations are not necessary to show the general progress of economics in the ethical direction; for it will hardly be denied. But still there is much halting and hesitation, even occasional recalcitrancy; and there is, moreover, a distressing disinclination among economists to mark in plain colors their province or sphere of influence on the map of science. The object, therefore, of this paper is to throw a little more light on the matter, to suggest a little more consistency, and to express the modest hope that, having begun to amend our ways, we complete the happy reformation.

Of late there has been often heard in certain regions of philosophy the cry; back to Kant! Without discussing the wisdom of this exclamation, let us recognize that if we wish an intelligent view of the real scope and character of economics, we must in some manner exclaim, back!—back to the traditional view of the moral sciences from Aristotle through Cicero, through the Christian Fathers and the Scholastics, down to Grotius, and even in a certain sense down to Adam Smith. For be it well understood that the position of the so-called political economy as a waif and stray, with no proper place among the sciences, and with no one to put into plain English the character of the stranger, was comparatively a modern innovation. No wonder the new-comer, having obviously so little human about him, served to illustrate the Aristotelian

alternative ἡ θηρίον ἢ θεός; the second and favorable alternative being adopted by Bentham, Austin, and others who welcomed political economy as a new and heaven-born science come to illuminate the earth; whereas the other alternative was afterwards adopted by Carlyle and Mr. Ruskin, that its nature was bestial and its presence a disgrace. But in Adam Smith's view of things, such an unplaced and independent science, as what was later called political economy, did not exist. The intimate and almost inextricable union of political science with economics, and the dependence of both on ethics, seem taken for granted in "The Wealth of Nations;" and however imperfect was Adam Smith's system of moral philosophy, it at last had the merit of including within its limits inquiries into commerce and wealth, jurisprudence, and government.\*

It is, therefore, no startling innovation that I am recommending, but only to renew a broken tradition, repair a breach of continuity, restore an interrupted harmony. And the scheme that is to offer a fitting home for economics is in brief as follows:

Defining moral philosophy as the science of the moral action of man, let us divide it, with an excellent authority,† into two parts: first, *general* moral philosophy unfolding the general theory of moral action, the notions and principles of the entire moral order; and, secondly, *particular* moral philosophy, applying the general theory to the concrete relations of men, and from the general notions and principles drawing conclusions for the actions of men in the various conditions of life. To put the matter in other words, the principal business of the general part is to determine what moral obligation is, or to fix what logicians call the *comprehension* of the idea *I ought*; while the business of the particular part is to consider what things are morally obligatory, or to determine the *extension* of the idea *I ought*.‡ The term ethics may be used

---

\* See Dr. Bonar's "Philosophy and Political Economy," ch. viii.

† Victor Cathrein, "Moral Philosophie," 2<sup>te</sup>. Aufl., 1893.

‡ Rev. Joseph Richaby, "Moral Philosophy," 2d edit., p. 2.

to mean exactly the same as moral philosophy, and we should, therefore, speak of *general ethics* and *particular ethics*. This use of terms seems simplest; but a distinction is often made between ethics and moral philosophy, the former being employed exclusively for the general part, while some other term, such as natural law, is employed for the particular part. Only, if we use the term natural law, we must be careful not to use it in the novel sense traceable to Pufendorf and Thomasius, who tried to separate from morality the notions of law and of legal rights and duties. And here I must interpolate an explanation, that just as a moderate home-rule is very different from a complete and insolent independence, so in science the separate study of separate parts is very different from making the parts independent of the whole. The accumulation of experience, the advance of historical research, the opening of new fields for the application of old principles, and the growing complexity of social life, may require, in order to reduce the subject-matter of science to the level of our faculties, that we increase the number of departments, that we narrow the range of our inquiries, and that we become each of us more or less of a specialist. So Grotius may be called in a certain sense the founder, in modern ages, of politics as a distinct science; and the Physiocrats and Adam Smith the founders of economics. And it is quite right and even necessary that the bulky science of particular ethics be broken up for the purposes of study into various divisions and subdivisions. Thus it is well, first of all, to divide natural theology on the one side from the social or political sciences on the other. Then these last require in one way or another to be divided, say, into the study of men as organized for supporting their lives, and as organized for supporting justice. The household being the chief institution for the one purpose, and the commonwealth for the other, the two branches of study can be called respectively economics and politics.\* But politics requires further subdivision, say into political philosophy, or

---

\* This view of economics is practically the same as Professor Marshall's already cited; for income is primarily connected with the family and the home.

the nature and constitution of states; general jurisprudence, or the science of law; international law, or the relations of separate states; and finance, or the science of public income and expenditure; this last science forming a link between politics and economics. Only let the reader take particular notice that the subdivisions and nomenclature of these sciences are matters of comparative unimportance;\* whereas it is of primary importance to recognize that all of them belong to moral philosophy, that all live and move in an ethical atmosphere, that all have principally to do with what is right or wrong, and require the constant support of a sound system of general ethics.

Now to prove this point in the case of economics is the object of this paper. And I am fortunate in meeting, as the recognized authority for the opposed view, such a fair-minded and clear-headed writer as Mr. Keynes, the greater part of whose "Scope and Method of Political Economy" has my unqualified admiration. The issue, then, can be narrowed almost to a single point; and time and space can be saved by assuming that readers interested in this subject are acquainted with this standard work.

Herein, besides an art of political economy which seeks to formulate economic precepts, Mr. Keynes recognizes a science (one of the normative or regulative sciences) forming a branch of applied ethics, which may be called the ethics of political economy, and which seeks to determine economic ideals,—a science in which the general principles of social morality are considered in their special bearing on economic activities (pp. 36, 60).

---

\* Sometimes the term political and social science is used to cover the whole field. Again, in Columbia College, New York, there is a faculty of political science, and separate courses of lectures (besides those on history) are given on (a) economics and social science, (b) constitutional and administrative law, (c) diplomacy and international law, (d) Roman law and comparative jurisprudence, and, finally (e), political philosophy. Mohl in his "Encyclopädie der Staatswissenschaften" makes nine component parts; and Schönberg in his "Handbuch der Politischen Oekonomie" makes political economy embrace finance and administration as well as economics. It is only a question of words and convenience.

So far, so good; but then he proceeds to affirm that the primary and main subdivision—economics in the stricter sense—does not seek to determine ideals, but is a positive science, concerned exclusively with the investigation of uniformities; being, like all such sciences, a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is. And he affirms that it is both possible and desirable to discuss economic uniformities independently of economic ideals, and without formulating economic precepts (pp. 31, 34, 36).

Now, even here, we are still partly in agreement. For using "economic" to mean whatever has reference to man's actions as bread-winners, house-holders, members of a family,\* we *can* discuss many economic problems and study economic uniformities without introducing the delicate question of right and wrong. Indeed, ethical judgments would be highly out of place in a great deal of what I may call the *prolegomena* of economics, such as statistical data, the technical conditions of different industries, medical evidence, the relevant conclusions of physical science, and even in much of our historical enquiries, monographs of families, and other social observations and researches. We can, moreover, observe not a few uniformities and formulate certain "laws," without ethics to help us. But our knowledge will not be science, only an accumulation of *membra disjecta*, mere fragments, and not an ordered whole. No one has pointed out better than Mr. Keynes himself how absurd it is to suppose that "facts" will speak for themselves, that phenomena can be observed properly without a previous principle of observation, and how the proper selection of facts is all-important and most difficult. Now precisely in economics the principle of selection is in scholastic phrase the *totum bene vivere secundum domesticam conversationem*,—that in their private relations men should live a proper and rational life. What is relevant to this end is what we seek in the almost infinite array of facts; and though for a time we may appear to be far away from ethics, and only busy with

---

\* Mr. Keynes's use of the word "economic" is narrower than this, and contains a reference to the exchange of goods (pp. 96, 97). But this does not affect the argument.

the phenomena of nature or with uniformities in human action, apart from their moral aspect, nevertheless all the while we are only collecting the proper materials for an ethical judgment.

But the plain reader may grow impatient with these criticisms; may say the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and that many excellent works of professedly non-ethical political economy disprove my contention.

I reply that profession is not practice, and make an appeal from their words to their performance. They cannot escape the necessity of the situation, and they violate, one and all, with shocking uniformity, the counsels of Mr. Keynes.

But this being a commercial age and country we must judge per sample; and it will be enough to examine in detail only one example, Professor Nicholson. For so distinguished an economist and writer will furnish me with an irresistible presumption, that if he, no more than his predecessors, cannot keep ethics out of political economy, no one else can.

Professor Nicholson then makes the accustomed profession that "for the purposes of this treatise political economy is regarded as a positive science, the object of which is to unfold principles, to discover uniformities, and to trace causal connections, and not to lay down precepts, set up ideals, or pronounce moral judgments." ("Principles of Political Economy," p. 16.) But scarce fifty pages have been passed when this profession is forgotten and Mr. Keynes disregarded. For we read (the italics being mine) of "philanthropic and *laudable* desire," "to require *equitably*," "*equitably entitled*" (pp. 77, 78). And many moral judgments follow,—what "will do most *good* to the public" (p. 85); "no economic *injustice*" (p. 128); "*vices* engendered by poverty . . . partly traced to *imprudence*;" "*duty* of supporting the parents;" "*moral obligation*" of relieving the old; "*good augury* that England has followed one more of the *counsels* of Adam Smith," and has made "education compulsory and free;" "*evil influence*" of the rigidity of codes; "it is not enough to *preach* or teach *dogmatic morality*, we *must* also show . . . that the conditions of life may be improved and happiness increased;" "the *worst abuses* of home life;" "*luxury* of early marriage" (pp. 190–193).

All this is in the book on "Production." If I tried to make a catalogue of the ethical pronouncements in the book on "Distribution," I should far outrun my limits, and must only select a few. Thus Professor Nicholson attributes to the state a "*right . . . to undertake any expropriation whatever*;" warns us of the state setting the example "of *robbery and plunder*" (p. 264); praises the "power for *good*" exercised by money against the "*clamour of the Socialists*" (p. 300); pronounces that "the sooner his (the Scottish laird's) estates are absorbed or divided, the *better* for the country" (p. 311); that "the *ideal* of a trade-union *ought* to be to make freedom of contract between labor and capital a reality" (p. 387); speaks of "*undue* power to the lender" (p. 396); says "the laborer is *worthy* of his hire, . . . the capitalist *deserves* something for his abstinence, risk, and trouble" (p. 403); tells us that "the *ethics* of ownership of land . . . is by no means so simple as the ethics of wages or even profits" (p. 404).

Now the point is not whether we agree with his many moral judgments, but that he makes them. Once or twice he seems to pull himself up, and says, "to return to the more strictly economic aspects of the question" (p. 194); "to revert to economic considerations" (p. 263). But if his view and Mr. Keynes's is the right one, why ever leave them? *Que diable allait-il faire dans cette galère?* I may exclaim, and ask him, If you don't lay down precepts, why condemn Mr. Gladstone's Irish land policy? If you don't set up ideals, why tell us what ought to be the ideal of trade-unions? If you don't pronounce moral judgments, why speak of justice, equity, and moral obligation?

In truth, Professor Nicholson has essayed the impossible; and his ability has only served to furnish a test case, proving the impossibility of a "positive" science of economics apart from the ethical science. Rightly, then, has Gustav Cohn warned us that we cannot in such a fashion separate *das Seiendes* from *das Seinsollendes* any more than the waters of a running stream. And a writer so opposed in other respects to the German historical school, the Duke of Argyle, so far resembles them in urging how the heart in this science is in-

separable from the head; how relevant and important for economics are notions closely connected with theology, such as the corruption of human nature; how we must take note of war and jurisprudence, of religion and morals; how to narrow the scope of economics is profoundly unscientific ("Unseen Foundations of Society," pp. 14, 28, 546, 563, 582.)

Nor be it forgotten that the political economy of the past, whatever it professed, was really steeped in ethics, and very raw and unwholesome ethics to boot. Let us hear Dr. Bonar: "The influence of utilitarianism, and especially of Bentham's utilitarianism, on political economy has been profound and enduring. It is certainly not by accident that nearly all leading English economists, and a large proportion of continental economists since his time, have been utilitarians when they have had any philosophy at all. This applies to Ricardo, James and John Mill, Say, Sadler, Destutt de Tracy, Jevons, Cairnes, and Sidgwick. Going back to economists before Bentham, we find the conjunction in Malthus, and earlier still in Beccaria and Verri." ("Philosophy and Political Economy," p. 218.) And he points out for us later on (*ibid.*, p. 385) the sweet harmonies of utilitarian and economic doctrine: "The predominance of self-interest in the sense of regard for material prosperity, both in abstract economics and in the utilitarianism of Bentham,—the political individualism of both the common assumption that human action is due to deliberate calculation, the common assumption of the boundlessness and indefinite expansion of human wants, the common use of a calculus of pains and pleasures, and the common assumption of the infallibility of the individual where the individual's interests are concerned."

Perhaps, after all, we may find that the strictures of Mr. Ruskin and Carlyle, of Kingsley and Toynbee on the older economists, were not so unfounded as some modern apologists would have us believe.

The name of Professor Sidgwick has been mentioned above, the writer who of all others has tried with infinite patience to take in hand the wild youth named Hedonism, to clothe him

decently, chasten his discourse, and make him presentable in good society. Now concerning the proper relations of ethics and economics, and the distinction of art and science, Professor Sidgwick may be, or may seem to be, in disagreement with me; yet he confirms me by his example. For the fact is undeniable that he has erected a whole connected structure of ethics, to which his treatises on political economy and on politics seem naturally to belong as subordinate parts. And if these sciences are really independent of ethics, it is a most singular coincidence that this leading ethical writer should have happened to have selected no indifferent and neutral subject, but precisely these two compromising departments of study for his literary pastime.

Professor Marshall is still nearer to the point of view urged in this paper; and his "Principles of Economics" is full of ethical judgments. But, hampered by unfortunate traditions not wholly cast off, he is ever and anon compelled to be obscure. Thus, in dealing with pleasures, desires, and motives, he makes the attempt to use neutral terms (pp. 75-79, 3d edit.); but, in fact, either his language implies utilitarian ethics or is unintelligible. And later, in dealing with the law of diminishing utility (pp. 168, 169), the words "benefit," "benefit-giving power," or "utility," are so used as to leave us in doubt whether they mean what is good for a man as a whole—what he calls subsequently (pp. 212-13) "true happiness," "true and worthy pleasures," and "true benefit"—or merely what satisfies man's desires, without discriminating whether what he desires is good for him as a rational being, or not good. Yet the distinction is fundamental. It is an ancient commonplace of the moralists to point out the perverse choice by man of the *bonum delectabile* instead of the *bonum honestum*, and to deplore the lamentable production and consumption of mischievous goods, the multiform incentives to ruin, the manifold apparatus of intoxication, gambling, and licentiousness. All parts of economics are affected by the progress and issue of such unhappy production and consumption,—by the presence of these *negative goods* so well named and well explained years ago by Mr. Ruskin in the

suggestive pages of his "Munera Pulveris."\* Political economy is unintelligible without this distinction; and with it is ethical.

The conclusion, therefore, seems irresistible that economics must be included within the domain of moral philosophy; and I might utter a cheerful *quod erat demonstrandum*, and take my leave were there not an unhappy obstacle to the due acceptance of this conclusion. The obstacle is the survival of a belief in the existence of an abstract, theoretical, or pure political economy busy about the hypothetical doings of imaginary men: speculations which may be of service for exercise in mathematical problems, but for nothing else. Why this belief survives is a pathological inquiry that would be at present out of place; or to discuss whether it is an instance of that national weakness which Max Nordau indicates when he says, that an Englishman is content if he is supplied with measures and figures, and that he is conquered by an absurdity if it is accompanied by diagrams. ("Degeneration," p. 78.) Whatever the cause, these speculations exist, and in such a shape as to appear even to a logician like Mr. Keynes to form a genuine body of knowledge and to constitute a positive science. But if he looks closely he will see that they contradict his definition of such a science. For instead of contemplating what *is*, they contemplate what *is not*; instead of examining *phenomena*,—that is, the appearances of things,—they examine mere notions; their "man" is not a real man, not an observed phenomenon, but an *individuum vagum*, a misty idea; and their "landlords," "laborers," and "capitalists" are mere creatures of the imagination. Let us take Mr. Keynes's own specimen of a doctrine belonging to a positive science,—viz., "that under a system of thorough-going competition, normal value is de-

---

\* Thus, quite recently, Professor Pareto, of Lausanne, in his "Principes d'Economie Politique pure," has to distinguish *utilité*, with a wholesome ethical flavor, from *ophélimité*, the latter able to include impartially a church as well as a gambling-hell, home-brewed ale as well as spirits prepared for the African natives, loaves of bread as well as dynamite bombs; whatever, as Mill puts it, has "capacity to satisfy a desire or serve a purpose," without involving any further unpleasant questionings.

terminated by cost of production" (p. 61). He is, to begin with, in danger of being instantly non-suited by Professor Hadley, on the grounds of "value being essentially an ethical term." ("Economics," p. 92.) But letting this pass, and destroying by some fumigating process all ethical germs in the proposition, it is still of no use for "positive" science. "A system of thorough-going competition" is a mere notion, not a phenomenon; and is thus incapable of observation. "Normal value" again is exactly in the same plight; and "cost of production" is a vague and almost meaningless term apart from varying individual costs. So the proposition resolves itself into this, "that under a system which never has existed, something which never exists is determined by something indeterminate."

Nor let us admit as an apology the perpetual false analogy of the methods of the physical sciences; as though the complexity and changefulness in their subject-matter were like the complexity and changefulness of human actions, and one method would suit both; or as though, because in physical sciences allowance can be made for "disturbing causes," these being, in fact, of the same general character as all other physical causes; therefore, in the moral sciences we can suppose a vacuum, isolate the action of a particular force, such as covetousness, and then make allowance for sloth, treat patriotism as friction, introduce conscience as a disturbing cause. Or what profit is there in first creating a number of so-called economic terms, doctrines, and laws, which then require whole chapters of interpretation and limitation to make them tenable, when all the while we could have gone straight to the point without these superfluous deviations? They cannot help us to a rational intelligence of the concrete; and the time has indeed come to follow Professor Mackenzie's advice and think concretely on these matters.

The men of business themselves give us an example. Thus the chairman of the London and St. Katharine's Dock Company, addressing the last general meeting of the shareholders, takes credit to the directors for doing what?—for making large profits? for buying labor in the cheapest market?—not at all;

he could only announce a poor two and a quarter per cent. dividend on the capital stock. But he takes credit for "providing good terms of labor for those who work for us," for paying a "fair rate of wage," for providing a "fair pension." And his audience, unmindful of normal wages, demand and supply, or economic laws, greeted his remarks with applause. If the city conscience can thus be moved, it would be a sad scandal for the economic conscience to lag behind.

Finally, and as a matter of particular interest for this JOURNAL, it may be pointed out, that not merely would the science of economics be the gainer by having its place recognized among the moral sciences; but that the higher part of moral philosophy—namely, general ethics—would have also a share in the advantage. We all know how the presence of his children is a wholesome restraint upon a parent, involving a sense of responsibility and an obligation to give good example. Now economics can be looked on somewhat as an ingenuous youth, who, like other youths, is liable to contract low tastes, such as a desire to disregard contracts, to cancel debts, cut up ancestral parks, confiscate inheritances, appropriate accumulations. And general ethics can be looked on as the parent, who, with this young man's eyes upon him, must keep to a high standard of conduct. No doubt it may be a restraint not altogether pleasant for ethical writers to have their doctrines tested by their effect on economic theory and practice; not altogether pleasant to hear constantly the maxim, *By their fruits ye shall know them*; or to have carefully-packed and duly-despatched theories returned on their hands labelled, "Economically unworkable or economically mischievous, *ergo* untrue." And if the new article belongs to the new ethics which Mr. Lester F. Ward (in the July number of this JOURNAL) calls "warm, generous, sympathetic, and attractive," in contrast to the "cold, austere, ascetic, and forbidding" old ethics, the unpleasantness of such an ignominious return is all the greater. But a good tonic is often bitter; the very unpleasantness may serve as a measure of the wholesomeness of the treatment; and certain menacing diseases of the body politic suggest the pressing need, that our system of

general ethics be such as to furnish a solid foundation for our economics; and that our economics have an obvious and salutary bearing on the realities of the workshop and the home.

CHARLES S. DEVAS.

ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND.

---

### THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER.\*

It is a noticeable thing that the principles which determine the lawyer's duties and responsibilities are, in some important respects, unsettled. The essential character of his profession is not so fixed as to determine definitely his place in the social arrangements. What the physician stands for, or the clergyman, or the teacher, or the soldier, is pretty clearly agreed on, not to mention occupations of which the range is less wide. Each man in those callings has a tolerably definite place, specific things are expected of him, and he knows what they are. But the lawyer not only finds himself enlisted in very various and miscellaneous activities, which do not combine into a coherent whole, and which expose him to indefinite demands, but he discovers that there is an inherent uncertainty about the function which he has assumed.

The office of the advocate, old as it is, and so constitutional a part of the system of things that we cannot see how civilization could dispense with it, is still so indefinite in character, so loosely fitted in so large a place, that it is a matter of wide difference and dispute what the advocate must do, should do, or may do, in many situations—what society expects of him, what his client may require of him, what obligations morals impose on him.

The truth is that there is something essentially paradoxical in the advocate's position. He stands at the bar, in theory,

---

\* A paper read before the American Bar Association, at its annual meeting at Saratoga Springs, N. Y., August 19, 1896.

demanding justice—that is, asking to have strict principles of right strictly applied. This is simple to the point of severity. And yet he is holding himself out, at least in popular estimation (which is not wholly wrong), as ready to take any case of any man who will pay him for it, and to do his best to make that case prevail. It cannot be denied that this seems to involve a formidable inconsistency, and the best evidence that the situation is not wholly easy is that lawyers who think about it seldom shake themselves quite free from a sense of walking in rather a strait path. Not that they have a sense of wrong-doing, or even the embarrassment of being at any moment in an equivocal position, but they have a cautious feeling that they must look well about them lest they find themselves there. They are constantly exercising their minds and consciences on the question how far it is proper to push their client's cause in this or that direction with judge, jury, witnesses, or opposing counsel, and are constantly passing similar judgments on other lawyers. Very many lawyers, as well as moralists, have left on record their contributions to the discussion of the lawyer's obligation to an unworthy cause, and this question is so well recognized as still open and as a source of embarrassment that it is plain that the advocate's duties have not been determined to a point where the practitioner can feel sure of his ground in such a case. I do not mean that the advocate's work is necessarily of doubtful morality, in the sense that it is done only under a strain of conscience. On the contrary, it is one of my purposes to maintain, in this paper, that the constant exercise of the moral judgment on these questions is a proper use and healthful training of the moral sense. I am but insisting that the advocate's position is essentially one of conflicting obligations not easily adjusted.

I say that lawyers themselves are sensible of the inherent difficulty of the advocate's position. Perhaps the more significant question is, what does the non-professional world think of it? The lawyer himself usually settles down into a practical working adjustment of his business to his conscience, or of his conscience to his business, as the case may be, and

gives himself little trouble about formulating his professional relations and obligations. If he is sensitive he continues, as I have said, to feel the delicacy of his task, but he is scrupulous, and takes care to keep well on the honorable side of things. In all this, however, he is necessarily much controlled by the general professional opinion and habit in which he lives and moves. Lawyers, like all men who are part of a specially organized society, live in an atmosphere of their own, full of understandings, allowances, things taken for granted and too plain to question. But it is often these very things, the postulates of the whole professional position, which are questioned by the outsider. The clergyman, moving about in his spiritual world more real to him than the world of sense, is often staggered by finding his fundamental assumptions received, not perhaps as false, but as unrealities, out of place in an actual universe. So the lawyer, at home in an artificial system, governed by traditional judgments and supported by a pervasive sense of the agreement of his fellows, accepts some things as underlying his world which may seem to other men to be much in need of explanation.

To get at, then, the real character of the lawyer's office and settle what should be expected of him, it is well to ask what the non-professional world thinks of him and his work. I do not mean to attend to the invective, ridicule, and suspicion which literature, the drama, and the vulgar speech of men have for generations, on occasion, poured out on the profession of the law. I am inclined to say of this that as it has been mainly directed against those who abuse the profession, it has probably been, on the whole, deserved, for the profession has been abused, and is abused, beyond all possible apology. What I mean to consider is the judgment of thinking men about the essential character of advocacy. What do they think of it as a profession?

To laymen the advocate's position is, I believe, the occasion of much doubt and question. How to reconcile with the plainest requirements of sincerity, not to say common honesty, this readiness to take up any cause remains to them a puzzle in spite of explanations. They may not bluntly ques-

tion the lawyer's character as an honest man : facts are too plain for that, and they are accustomed themselves in their own needs to rely upon that character. But all the more they are curious to understand a mental and moral attitude which seems to involve such contradictions.

Jeremy Bentham, in his treatise on a "Constitutional Code," refers to a passage in Homer where Menelaus, courteously addressing a stranger, seeks to learn his occupation, and asks him what his business may be, whether by chance it is that of a pirate or what other. Bentham justly remarks on the singular state of society in which such a question could be put without either the intention or the danger of giving offence, and he goes on to find a parallel in modern society in a passage which I quote :

"You are of the Bar, sir, if I do not mistake, is a question which nowadays in England or the United States a gentleman may, with as little fear of giving offence, put to any other gentleman. That is to say, the indiscriminate defence of right and wrong, and that for hire, is your occupation ; and for the purpose of that occupation falsehood—self-conscious falsehood—is an instrument which, without stint and without scruple, you are in the constant habit of employing."

One certainly would not go to Bentham for an unbiased judgment of the legal profession, and this attack may be dismissed as too violent and too false to be treated seriously ; but it puts, with a coarse plainness, what is, I am sure, in the minds of the public the essentially perplexing thing about the advocate's position. That it is perplexing could be established by abundant quotation, and still more by the allusions, the intimations, and the tone of literature and common speech. If any one doubt it he can satisfy himself, I think, by interrogating thoughtful men and women anywhere. If, then, the office of the advocate occasion such persistent questions from the public, and some sense of difficulty and delicacy on the part of those who practise it thoughtfully, I trust that I may venture to-night to discuss some aspects of that office without a risk of finding your minds too settled to entertain the subject. To attempt to consider, in any detail, the lawyer's duties is of course out of the question here. It may be worth while, however, to discuss in general his place and function

with the effort to determine a little more definitely what responsibility he is under.

We have an accepted theory of the lawyer's place in the administration of justice which stands, and on the whole rightly, as a sufficient explanation and justification of his general position, though it is relied on to clear him of responsibility to a degree to which, perhaps, he is hardly entitled.

It is our familiar theory of practice under the common law system that the advocate's function is solely to present one side of a case. He is to bring forward such facts and arguments as may be properly presented for his client, leaving it to the opposing counsel to do the same for his side, and to the judge to weigh the conflicting claims and decide between them. When laymen ask, as laymen always have asked and always will, how an honest lawyer can maintain a bad cause, this theory is explained to them, and it is pointed out that it is the right of every man to have the law fairly applied in his case, and to have the assistance of counsel for that purpose.

This is correct as far as it goes, and if it covered the situation as completely as it appears to, the lawyer's place in the system would be comparatively plain. It seems to picture him as a spokesman, perfunctorily in the case, detached from selfish interest in it, and occupied only in presenting in proper form ascertained facts and principles of law; and it assumes, too, that the decision may be safely left to an impartial judge who is so able and so disposed to get the truth that no exaggeration or error of counsel affects him. In such a system the lawyer seems to be left with substantially no responsibility for the decision of his case.

But both of the assumptions which are made in this theory are essential. Change the counsel into something different from a disinterested spokesman, or make the judge either incompetent or partial so that he may be warped by the efforts of counsel, and you have a very different system.

Now, in fact, the lawyer, under present arrangements, is far from being merely an official intermediary, whose function is simply to expound principles of law, or to act as a mouth-piece for those who cannot speak for themselves. He is, on

the contrary, frequently the intimate and confidential adviser of the client, consulted often at every stage of the business, suggesting every step after he has once been called in, seeing, and perhaps drawing, every paper and every letter, having interviews with opposing parties, carrying on negotiations, and participating in and directing the situations which are to be called in question in the trial of the case. When litigation has begun he talks with witnesses, and decides what evidence to use and how to use it. When he appears in court he may have become so identified with the case that he is virtually his own client, and moreover the assurance of his own fee, or the size of it, may have an unexpressed but very real dependence on success. Whether things go as far as this or not, the lawyer usually has been close to his client, and has had those intimate conferences in which, unavoidably, the chances of success are discussed, hopes and fears have risen and fallen with his intimations, and he often stands before the court and jury only a little less interested, solicitous, and committed than the client who sits by his side. Of course, in some cases the lawyer is not so identified with his client, and when engaged to try a case begun by others he may be much further removed, but even then his relation to his client is generally close and his absorption and interest pretty complete.

Such being the lawyer's immersion in his client's cause, it is out of the question to consider him merely as a perfunctory representative. His responsibility for litigation in its inception, its progress, and its results, must be, to some extent at least, commensurate with his identification with the cause. If he wholly adopts the client, he must acknowledge the relationship.

This leaves the lawyer's responsibility where he chooses to put it. He may limit it by limiting his relations to those external services which are guardedly professional; he may, on the other hand, enter so far into the case as to become as answerable for it as the client is, or even more.

This is, I think, the position which the lawyer must accept. He cannot make a case his own, and push it as if he were a party, and yet disclaim responsibility for it on the ground

that his connection with it is purely official. He must openly accept the consequences of whatever he does, and expect no shelter from any theory of the professional relation which does not squarely recognize all the facts.

I did not mean to imply that the lawyer's relations to his client wholly lack the elements which we are accustomed to think of as characteristic of the profession, the elements, that is, of quasi-authority and discretion, which attach of right to expert knowledge, and the independence which enables the adviser to direct, without seeming to incur responsibility for results which he does not profess to insure. In spite of nearness to the client the lawyer still may be, and certainly should be, in a position very different from that of a non-professional person employed. He need never become a partner in his client's fortunes, and he may insist on keeping, in greater or less degree, that detachment which is hardly less necessary for the lawyer than for the physician, and which keeps the professional adviser outside as well as inside the range of sympathy with the person to be assisted. At the same time we must recognize the fact that the aloofness which we may like to associate with the lawyer's attitude towards his client is usually little sustained, and it cannot be considered to be, in any great degree, an essential part of the lawyer's habit.

I have spoken of the lawyer's position as we know it here, in America. I do not know whether the lawyer is farther removed from identification with his client under the English system which separates the barrister's work sharply from the solicitor's and which still keeps up, perhaps with some difficulty, the fiction that the barrister is unpaid except by a complimentary offering. In the case of *Ryves vs. The Attorney-General*, where Mrs. Ryves tried to establish her claims to royal descent, Dr. Smith, her counsel, in addressing the jury, began to say that "on his honor he believed his client's case to be well founded," when, as the report states, "the Lord Chief Justice [Lord Cockburn] interposed peremptorily and said he could not allow the learned counsel to pledge his honor on his own belief. To do so were a violation of the rules of the profession, and a dishonor to counsel." Dr. Smith apolo-

gized. I think that such a statement from counsel here would be considered as in extremely bad form. Whether it would be rebuked by the court, *sua sponte*, I am not sure.

It may be that the English barrister is less disturbed by interest in his client than is the American lawyer. But it is also quite possible that the professional desire for victory, the stimulus of public observation, and the competition of a crowded profession where success will always seem a necessity, may carry counsel to quite as great lengths as devotion to their clients, and be, on the whole, no more creditable to counsel or serviceable to justice.

So much for the assumption that the lawyer's place is that of an official spokesman. The other assumption, that he is presenting a case before a tribunal competent and impartial, on whom he is entitled to put the responsibility for results, remains to be considered.

The influence of powerful counsel on courts, and the unequal chances of success which follow from this alone, irrespective of the merits of a cause, are so far a result of that partiality in distributing talents for which nature is responsible that it can hardly be considered as any other than an unavoidable disturbance in the cause of justice. That it is often a powerful, and almost irresistible, disturbance every one knows who has seen overmastering legal talents matched against ignorance or mediocrity. Judge Curtis, in his address on presenting to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts the resolutions of the Suffolk Bar on the death of Rufus Choate, felt compelled, even at that moment, to notice the charge that from Mr. Choate's lips "with fatal sweetness elocution flowed." After summing up, in a happy expression, the advocate's obligation as the duty "to manifest and enforce all the elements of justice, truth, and law which exist on one side, and to take care that no false appearance of those great realities are exhibited on the other," Judge Curtis added this guarded remark: "If from eloquence, and learning, and skill, and laborious preparation, and ceaseless vigilance, so pre-eminent as in Mr. Choate, there might seem to be danger that the scales might incline to the wrong side, some compen-

sation would be made by the increased exertion to which the seeming danger would naturally incite his opponents." But the expectation that an ordinary practitioner would be stimulated by the spectacle of Mr. Choate's overwhelming power to rise to an equal height, assumes reserves of talent of which average men are hardly conscious.

It must be admitted that the possession of power with the court imposes a serious responsibility on those who have it, and they can less escape than other men the responsibility for results to which they have contributed so much more by their efforts.

But so far as courts are concerned the danger of influence is comparatively slight. With the judges of fact, however, the jury, the situation is very different. The advocate who is presenting his case to a jury is frequently, if not usually, before a tribunal which he knows is neither competent to weigh evidence properly, nor disposed to do so impartially. It is, on the contrary, so notoriously limited in its comprehension, especially of complicated or unfamiliar facts, and above all so subject to prejudice and so influenced by irrelevant appeals, that skill in managing its unreasonable impulses is often a chief reliance of those who practise before it with the greatest success.

This is, let us admit it, a dangerous spot in our administration of justice. Juries are no doubt worse in some places than in others, but in many great cities that must come near to being true which a distinguished judge lately said to me, in speaking of a system where resort to a jury is optional in civil cases: "No one seeks a jury who does not hope for prejudice."

It is impossible, then, for any lawyer who is submitting a case to such a tribunal to pretend that he is free to urge his cause without responsibility for results, on the ground that they are wholly in the hands of judges to whom society has left the task of correcting his one-sided efforts. It must be acknowledged, on the contrary, that in proportion as the lawyer purposely carries a jury against the facts, or beyond the facts, so far the verdict is his act. To that responsibility he must be held.

Such then is our system as it actually is. It is one where counsel are zealously committed to, and often identified with, one side, and where the judges of fact are limited in their ability to grasp facts, exposed to prejudice, and much influenced by counsel skilful in leading them. These conditions greatly affect the advocate's duties and responsibilities as one concerned in the administration of justice. They leave him in the open field of every-day responsibility, unsheltered by any professional immunity, and answerable to public judgment for whatever he does, or tries to do, for his client.

So much in general for the position of the advocate. What particular duties and responsibilities attach to his position I do not mean to try to discuss in detail. There are, however, one or two points to which I should like to allude; and first to a question which lies at the threshold of the lawyer's employment, the question how far he is under obligation to hold himself ready to enter any man's service in any case.

There is hanging about the profession a more or less undefined and foggy impression that there is such an obligation. It half appears to belong to the lawyer's office to be ready to spring to the relief of any one who wants his services, and it is rather assumed that his presence in any case is in response to such a call of duty. This lends an air of chivalry which it may be a pity to dispel, but, in my opinion, no such obligation exists. I suspect that it has been assumed, in so far as it is assumed, as a part of that general theory respecting the lawyer as an officer of the court which, if I am right in what I have said, is pretty much overborne, or at least greatly modified, by facts. I suspect, too, that it is now doing more harm as an excuse for lawyers who find themselves in positions where they are not comfortable than it can do good as a call to duty.

However this may be, anything like a general duty to accept any case is not only impossible because the law is now so specialized that the lawyer is often entirely unprepared to go outside of a given range of work, but it is also wholly inconsistent with the position which the profession has taken about its fees. No one can question that professional prin-

ciples do not, in general, require the lawyer to work without pay, or pay which he considers satisfactory. If this is so there is an end of the theory of obligation, purely by virtue of the lawyer's office. It can hardly be that the obligation is to help only well-to-do persons. If the lawyer may decline, without violating professional principles, because he does not see where his pay is coming from, he may as well decline because of other engagements more congenial, or from want of time, or whatever excuse is at hand. So, in fact, lawyers do constantly decline such cases as they do not want. The fact may as well be faced that a lawyer is usually in a case because he chooses to be in it. There are, of course, exceptional cases where services may be required. The court may in theory assign any lawyer to the defence of a criminal, though this is not very frequently done, and certainly cannot be said to impose an obligation with which the lawyer in ordinary practice concerns himself. There are, too, countless cases of hardship which a lawyer of any feeling cannot turn away, but these rather appeal to private conscience than depend upon any settled professional code, and they stand like all other appeals of humanity. That such cases seldom want professional assistance is due rather to the character of lawyers, and a high idea of the moral demands of the profession, than to any hard and fast rule of professional duty. As a principle of professional conduct to which the lawyer is bound by his office it cannot be said that there is any obligation to accept work unless he is disposed to.

It may be said that if the lawyer is not under this obligation society has not the services of the profession to the degree that it supposed it had; that on this theory the accused criminal may be sent from door to door unable to find any lawyer who will defend him, and the wronged man may see his property enjoyed by the oppressor, unable to find any one to take his cause. If it should happen that by reason of poverty, or an unpopular cause, any one, however mean, should find himself helpless in a court of justice, that would certainly be a reproach to the profession which could help him. But the obligation to take such a case would not be one which

rested on the lawyer as a duty peculiar to his profession, but would be only an instance of the moral obligation which lies on all men to help where they can. And certainly society seems in no danger of suffering for want of lawyers to take cases. The danger at present is rather on the other side, and is from that class of lawyers, despised by the profession, whose practice is to hunt for the man with a sensational case or a desperate claim, and the case of a poor man against a rich opponent is not likely to be overlooked.

But whatever the effect of the fact, if it be a fact it must be faced; and it must be admitted that the general duty to take any case, on request of any man, is not among the acknowledged obligations of the profession.

If, then, this idea, still half-cherished, half-doubted, is abandoned, what is the effect on the lawyer's relation to his client?

In the first place, the lawyer, being understood to have taken a case from choice, is in a considerable measure responsible for that choice. It is not, at all events, open to him to stop all questions simply by saying, "I am here because I am retained." This brings with it a responsibility to the court and the public somewhat greater, perhaps, than is always recognized. If the lawyer is understood to ask, whenever a case is brought to him, the question, "Shall I take this case?"—and that is exactly what he does do more or less explicitly—then he is forced to some examination of it, and to take it involves a measure of accountability. The lawyer consents to identify himself, to some extent, with this client in this case. It may not be a case of the kind which he prefers, and many things beside the attractiveness of the work may influence him, for all lawyers at times take cases which they would like to shirk. But still it is wholly a voluntary matter, and the lawyer must accept responsibility for this as for his other decisions in the affairs of life. He cannot stand behind any rule of uniform and unquestionable duty, but must answer for it that he is in the case at all. This responsibility, however, it is to be noticed, is light or heavy according to what is done after one is in the case. It can hardly be embarrassing to be in any case—at least for a defendant—if the activity is con-

fined to securing a proper observance of the substance and forms of law. Beyond that every one is answerable, and should be answerable, for the kind and the degree of his zeal.

Of course, there enters into this question of accepting a case that necessary uncertainty, for which laymen seldom make sufficient allowance, as to what is the actual merit of the case, and a lawyer is not under obligation to settle all his doubts against his client. A case which reaches the point of trial is pretty sure, if it has been in the hands of reputable counsel, to be a two-sided case, however plain it may seem after it has been decided. Boswell relates that he asked Dr. Johnson whether he did not think, as a moralist, that the practice of the law in some degree hurt the nice feeling of honesty, and, in particular, what he thought of supporting a cause which one knows to be bad.

"Sir," said Dr. Johnson, "you do not know it to be good or bad till the judge determines it. I have said that you are to state facts fairly; so that your thinking, or what you call knowing, a cause to be bad must be from reasoning, must be from your supposing your arguments to be weak and inconclusive. But, sir, that is not enough. An argument which does not convince yourself may convince the judge to whom you urge it; and if it does convince him, why, sir, you are wrong and he is right. It is his business to judge; and you are not to be confident in your own opinion that a case is bad, but to say all you can for your client, and then hear the judge's opinion.

*Boswell*: "But, sir, does not affecting a warmth when you have no warmth, and appearing to be clearly of one opinion when you are in reality of another opinion—does not such dissimulation impair one's honesty? Is there not some danger that a lawyer may put on the same mask in common life, in the intercourse with his friends?"

*Johnson*: "Why, no, sir. Everybody knows you are paid for affecting warmth for your client; and it is therefore properly no dissimulation. The moment you come from the Bar you resume your usual behavior."

This is a pretty extreme statement, perhaps not unmixed with a contemptuous tolerance. At all events, it goes much further than we can follow. But it recognizes the real uncertainties of the law, and of these the lawyer certainly may, and often should, take what advantage he can so long as they remain open.

Once in the trial of a case, or enlisted in the preparation of it, the lawyer's position is very largely settled for him, so far as

concerns matters strictly of law. This, too, is a consideration which the non-professional observer hardly apprehends. The layman, seeing what seems to him the monstrous injustice of the result of some case, outraged by the spectacle of a criminal acquitted, or a meritorious claim defeated, in defiance of his sense of justice, and relying on his own feelings as a final and sufficient test of justice, is not reassured by being told that such is the law. "If this is the law," he says, "all the more I hold responsible the lawyer who has lent himself to bring about such a result by a skilful use of the technicalities of the law. It is a perversion to take advantage of what the law allows, to accomplish what the law should abhor." But this takes no account of the lawyer's relations to a system within which he must act, if he acts at all. The law is a scheme of rules of conduct which the courts enforce—a scheme partly created by enactment of legislatures, partly shaped by the handling of the courts, and to be changed only in the same ways. It may or may not correspond with the moral demands of the individual observer; it may work poorly in particular cases; it is quite possible that it may permit, in this or that combination of circumstances, a result shocking to the moral sense. But this is the system adopted for the business, and adopted because there must be certainty.

Such a system the lawyer is called upon to administer. He is not to be taken to task, generally, for the results which it may produce. It is not always for him a matter of special decision whether to apply the law here and now, nor is his conscience usually to be consulted in the matter. The law, so far as it goes, is his conscience here. In invoking that he is not immoral, he is non-moral—administering a system artificial and positive, for which he is not responsible.

This principle of practice at once puts this part of the lawyer's work largely beyond criticism—the part, that is to say, which is determined wholly by the law. To hold otherwise would require the lawyer to ask, at every moment when he proposed to invoke the law, is the law right? Will it work out right results in this case? Does it conform to the highest moral demands? Such a requirement would override the law;

it would set up the private, special, and varying judgments of individuals in place of that which has been enacted for the very purpose of precluding them.

I have stated this broadly. No doubt some qualifications must be made. I should repudiate the conclusion that the lawyer is to apply the law when he himself feels that it must work an undeniable and flagrant wrong, which no just man could see without revolt. There are human demands which are above professional, and I do not mean to surrender the lawyer's privilege, on which I have already insisted, of choosing what he will be a party to, even among cases which involve law alone without dispute of facts, and of choosing on any grounds which his moral or mental comfort may demand. If this right of choice carries with it some measure of responsibility apparently inconsistent with the theory that the law, once adopted, justifies itself and shelters the practitioner, then it must be so. There is this margin of choice and responsibility surrounding all professional employment, and in that is the final accountability of the man to all ideals of right and wrong, just as there is the initial responsibility of entering at all a profession which has the character it has, and works out such ends by such means. But what I am now insisting on is that professional efforts, so far as concerns matters of law are not directed, and need not be directed, simply to moral ends as such, nor are they ordinarily to be squared by moral judgments in so far as they are occupied with a system which is furnished for them.

It results from this that a lawyer may, without blame, insist on many things for his client which he might think it dishonorable to insist on for himself. I could not refuse, without loss of self-respect, to pay a bill which my doctor had left undemanded for six years; nor repudiate an explicit promise, though made by word of mouth, if relied upon by another person, on the ground that the statute of frauds required writing. Yet if a client insist upon escaping in such cases through positive enactments of law I may aid him to do so, if I like, without responsibility for his unhandsome act; and so I may enforce the harshest contract for the client while

despising the unjust justice of his course. I reserve, however, the right to decline any such employment, and according as I exercise my judgment on such questions my brethren in the profession and my critics out of it are likely to make up their opinion of my general character. At the same time the liberty of applying the law without question must be a wide one.

So much for questions purely of law. Of the lawyer's position in preparing and presenting evidence of facts, so as to favor his client's cause, it is not possible to speak with definiteness, and it must be admitted that here the advocate's task may have many embarrassments. The advocate is not expected to present both sides with impartial emphasis: he is not a judge. No one, whatever his candor, can pretend to try or argue a case so as to give each side its due weight. His general attitude is avowedly partisan; he leaves, and is expected to leave, the urging of counter-views to his opponent. This, in general, will be conceded everywhere. Where to draw the line between fair and unfair advocacy is a thing which no principles will settle but the principles of common honesty, and no special rules can be laid down which would not be almost as varied as the circumstances to which they would apply—at least, I do not see how to lay them down. An argument is usually a partly-wrong statement. The emphasis is laid where it is wanted, favorable features are brought out, unfavorable ones pushed back, the whole is colored to suit a purpose. If this is done grossly we condemn it; if it is done within limits which we think fair we allow it. More than this it is not easy to say, at least short of attempting a treatise.

From a piece of false evidence, or a false statement in argument, every decent lawyer starts back. In offering evidence which is favorable and rejecting that which is unfavorable he selects, with bias it is true, but not without scruple, and with a purpose to get the evidence in, as he believes, truly and not falsely. This he does with more or less care, with more or less effort to get actual truth, and with more or less consideration for his opponent according as his conscience may be sen-

sitive and his nature open and fair. Perhaps all that can be said here is that in these matters, while the advocate is not expected to be as open and candid as in some other relations of life and is entitled to a bias for which due allowance is made, yet he is bound by all the ordinary rules of truth and morality, and to the full extent that these rules control men anywhere. Certainly nothing could be worse than to give any sanction whatever to a theory which, though never avowed may sometimes be tacitly assumed, that the practice of the law is a game, or a species of warfare, in which there may be a few rules agreed to, but in the main there is but one thing to consider, and that is victory. As in the strange, unethical ethics of war you may not use explosive bullets, but may use explosive shells, and may not poison the well in the besieged city, but may destroy the provision train on its way thither, so in a court of law, on this monstrous theory, though you may not actually suborn witnesses, you may take advantage of every piece of falsehood which in any other way can pass in undetected in evidence or argument. But if law is a game, it is a game in which the stakes are human happiness and character; if it is war, it is not a war for plunder, but one for principles, which cannot be set up with glory in the end if they have been first defiled and trampled under foot by the victors.

At last the moralities of the practice of the law must rest on the individual lawyer, and perhaps little more can be said by way of particular rules for professional conduct than that the lawyer is under all the obligations which the highest standard, rightly understood, imposes on any man. From these he neither gets nor claims an exemption by reason of any convention which would permit falsehood, nor by reason of working within a system which, to some extent, settles conduct by general rules of law without regard to the moral aspect of particular cases.

But, it may be asked, what on the whole is the effect of the lawyer's profession on the lawyer? What manner of men does it tend to produce? Does it, as Boswell inquired, "in some degree hurt the nice feeling of honesty"? Is it, as his question implies, laid out on lines which, though they may be

explained and defended, are still always in need of explanation, and so narrowly and nicely run that they are often within a measuring distance of what the common conscience of mankind condemns? If this is so, is it not a demoralizing business? Do not resent the question. If others can ask it, certainly we must answer it; and the answer cannot be doubtful.

In the first place, it must be noticed how small a part of the lawyer's work is advocacy. I have chiefly discussed that because it is the dramatic thing on which public attention is naturally fastened, but in fact, as every lawyer knows, it makes but a small part of the total business of the profession. Many lawyers never touch actual court work; most lawyers take it only as a part of the year's occupation; a few adopt it as their chief business, but even they are not a little occupied outside it. The bulk of the lawyer's work is examining questions, partly of law, partly of fact, for the purpose of giving advice; getting at the real bearings of business entanglements, often so confused that the client cannot even state them; winning, or driving, to comprise conflicting claims, each partly right and partly wrong: entering into domestic and personal embarrassments; leading testators to understand their own minds; drawing contracts, and so on through all the complications and difficulties of human affairs, reaching all confidences and close offices except those of which the physician and the priest take charge, and sometimes not stopping there. How potent the lawyer is as a peace-maker, what a vast proportion of all threatened litigation his hand stays, no one but a lawyer can appreciate. In all this work of the lawyer, or nearly all of it, there is this common element, the entering into other men's embarrassments and needs for the purpose of helping them, and with this go both judgment and sympathy. These characteristics are shared in similar fashion by the three great professions, and this it is which distinguishes them from most other pursuits, however serviceable.

Out of the lawyer's employment there naturally grows a judicial and temperate habit of mind which, in its final effect,

is very different from the partisan tendency which is sometimes attributed to lawyers. In fact, a habit of holding one-sided and biased views is obviously discouraged by the very practice of advocacy. The person whose experience has carried him repeatedly now to one side and now to another, only to be corrected and set right at last by a higher power, and who urges one view well knowing that he may soon be called upon to urge a different one under changed circumstances, is pretty sure to acquire a power of impartial examination and of suspense of judgment. It is by this process that the impartiality of the judge is found to have been sufficiently developed in the training which he has first received in the partiality of the lawyer.

As a final result, therefore, it is by no means prejudice or prepossession which is produced by the lawyer's practice, but rather, I think, a marked degree of open-mindedness and readiness to confront and weigh new views, and this, so far as it goes, favors a truth-loving habit of mind.

That the lawyer's work offers many temptations, and often calls for a nice discrimination between good and evil, is certainly true. Its opportunities for mischief are unsurpassed. While the profession, in the persons of its good members, is a bulwark of society, it is also, in its bad members, a menace, and an intolerable nuisance. No one knows so well as a lawyer what activity for evil goes on in the profession. We have no interest whatever in denying this. Our safety is rather in admitting it. Some considerable part of the daily friction of life, its teasing obstructions, interferences, and petty nuisances, must be laid at the door of lawyers; and of the greater iniquities,—the frauds of trade, the malignant combinations, the perverse and corrupt legislation, the miscarriage of justice,—a fair share is planted, watered, and brought to ripeness with the assistance of lawyers, and when attacked is zealously, and often too successfully, defended by lawyers, and not always by the most obscure. Society finds it among its great dangers that the worst attacks made upon it are often planned with an ingenuity which no other profession can supply. Mr. Bryce, that most indulgent critic of our Ameri-

can institutions, remarks that some judicious American observers hold that a certain decadence in the Bar of the greater cities has been noticeable of late years, and that they declare "that the growth of enormously rich and powerful corporations, willing to pay vast sums for questionable services, has seduced the virtue of some counsel, whose eminence makes their example important."

Against such evils within its own ranks the profession hardly attempts, by any regular discipline, to guard itself. Something is done by way of disbarment, and this is of great value, so far as it goes, in cases of unprofessional conduct which could not be otherwise reached. But I know of no Bar in the country which attempts to purge itself with any thoroughness. The profession cannot undertake to protect society by guaranteeing the moral character of its members. This could hardly be attempted without adopting all the closeness of a guild, and that would not improbably foster and protect more evils than it would prevent. We must be permitted, as a profession, to disclaim responsibility for unworthy members, except to the limited extent that cases of professional misconduct can be dealt with, and the tares and the wheat must, for the most part, grow together until the harvest. The world must make its own discrimination, and perhaps the most that we can do is to encourage publicity, and not to let timidity, or a mistaken feeling of professional pride, hush up what should be openly denounced.

But if there are bad fruits of the profession of the law, what shall we say of its good fruits? Conduct, says Matthew Arnold, is three-fourths of life. With the study of conduct lawyers are always busy, judging men, weighing motives, characterizing actions, publicly attacking or defending what men have done in every situation of life. Out of all this exercise of the sense of right and wrong there must grow a power and habit of discrimination, and of applying principles to acts, a trained attention to conduct as a thing to be answered for, which cannot do otherwise than powerfully affect the moral sense, and, unless by a total perversion they work destruction, they should develop an enlightened and healthy

conscience. So far from destroying the nice sense of honor nothing could bring it to a higher perfection than the constant responsibility of advising men in the difficult places of life what honesty and honor require, and in publicly asserting these great principles both in defence of right and as a terror to evil-doers.

It is always to be borne in mind that however important in ordering our ways a due regard to the scruples of conscience may be, real success in meeting the highest demands of life does not consist chiefly in the most anxious attention to the nicest refinements of such scruples. A man is to be judged even more by his ideals than by his actions, and the test is a far more searching one. So of a profession or a purpose in life. Unless its ideals are positive and inspiring, so high above attainment that they are always drawing us, half in confidence, half in despair, but always irresistibly drawing us on and up, it is nothing but an occupation—harmless, perhaps, useful and even necessary, but still nothing which can hold the great enthusiasms of men, or heat their blood to action, or compel the great sacrifices without which it is appointed that men shall get nothing which they greatly prize.

What the ideals of law and of the profession of it are there is no need to remind this body, where there is no one who does not feel, in his best moments, that his profession has bound him to the service of justice, as a priest in the temple, serving not for pay, nor for public fame, nor for that sweeter reward, the full approval of those who know and can judge, but serving, he knows not why—because he must.

It may seem to some persons that the ministers of justice ought to be something else than the paid advocates of suitors, each pressing his own cause, committed to partial and private views, warped by interest and prejudice, driven sometimes to make the worse appear the better reason, and always striving, as it looks, not for abstract right, but for success for himself and his client.

What more perfect system such theorists may propose I do not know, but this system of ours is the one in which we must do our work, and the wit of man has not yet been able

to devise a better. In this justice does not descend, in answer to our prayers, pure and undefiled from heaven. It is struck out, with pain and sweat and conflict, in the private disputes of men.

Our system is not devised primarily to discover truth, nor is the lawyer chiefly a searcher after truth. If he were, his methods would seem strange, indeed. Our administration of law is made, or rather has grown by forces which are virtually the great forces of nature, to meet human needs, to control the elemental passions of men, to regulate the affairs of life. As these affairs are complicated beyond our understanding by the confusion of the everlasting surging crowd of men, now rough, dishonest, cruel, deceitful above all things and desperately wicked, now honest, unselfish, tender, just, swearing to their own hurt and changing not, so the profession of the law, as it is practised by these same men, has the imperfections and the contradictions of all human things. It does not always conform to rules, however unquestionable and right. It touches all of life and takes on both good and evil by the contact. In its critical moments, when it is centred in a trial in court, it is the modern phase of all ancient strife, the visible struggle, old as the world, of all the passions of anger, hate, greed, and avarice, less wild than of old, but still full of their inherited spirit, and now forced into an arena which, excepting war itself, is left as the only battle-field for the irrepressible fighting instincts of the race.

That these contests should not always proceed in irreproachable methods and infallibly end in right results, is not to be wondered at: that the men who engage in them as trained contestants sometimes fight with indefensible tactics must be laid to traits which yet survive in the human animal.

But on the other hand are there any men to whom society commits with more confidence its dearest interests, both private and public?

The vigorous participation in affairs, with a purpose to do right, is the most wholesome moral tonic that our nature can have. It may not cultivate as many or as nice scruples as the theoretic studies of the casuist; it may dim some of the

splendid visions of the rhapsodist; but for the actual robust work of the world, and for the advancement of high purposes which are not to end in dreams or resolutions but in action, the one appointed way is to go down among men and work. This way lies open in the practice of the law. It cannot be said to be free from perplexities. The practitioner will not find himself in a plain way in which the fool cannot err. But he will find himself in the midst of abundant opportunities for service to mankind, will see before him ideals among the highest which our minds can reach, and will have the encouragement of examples which are not behind the farthest mark that human nature has touched in its approach to justice.

JOSEPH B. WARNER.

BOSTON, MASS.

---

#### DISCUSSIONS.

##### "ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM:" A REPLY.

THOUGH I am unable to admit the faults laid to my charge by Mr. Webb, I should like to say a few words to the readers of this JOURNAL as an acknowledgment of his attempt to find a platform for discussion. We are speaking to an audience which includes those, in many countries, who care most for progress, and on the highest grounds. I should wish, if I can be granted space, to put before them the reasons for the method of argument which I adopt, and the nature of the difficulties found in coming to an understanding; difficulties for which I cannot blame myself, excepting as regards deficient power to carry out my method adequately.

1. This discussion began with Mr. Ball's criticism of the book "Aspects of the Social Problem," of which I was editor and partly author. I think that any reader, fresh from the study of the charges made against that work in this JOURNAL, will be a good deal surprised if he turns to the book itself. The principal passage of comment upon Socialism, which occupies by no means a large portion of the book, is on pp. 305-6. I had almost asked the editor to let me reprint it at length, but, on reflection, I can hardly expect to fill the pages of this JOURNAL with extracts from my own works. The whole passage simply is a very careful discrimination between differ-

ent possible senses of the term Socialism. It is carefully explained that though some Socialists, for whose views chapter and verse are given, have committed themselves to consequences which I deplore, what I really dread is not an avowed aim, but a process of intellectual drifting. Except as regards the writers actually quoted, the whole passage is explicitly hypothetical, and a clear disavowal, which I am glad to have drawn out, at once disarms it. Let me explain again. I point out a danger, and illustrate it from facts that have occurred, and views that are in black and white. I say *if* Socialism means this, then it is ruinous. I endeavored both there and wherever I have touched these questions to point out how closely, for a time, the healthy and morbid developments may appear to coincide, and to instigate my readers to the most serious reflection upon the problem of distinguishing them. My own position is not one which any careful thinker could call Individualist. The opposition to the ideas of Herbert Spencer, and of Mill in some of his moods, which I share with the Socialists, has therefore imposed on me the task of discrimination between Socialism and the main stream of social theory due to the great thinkers of the world. The acceptance by my critics of the rule of the game, that every one must be a Socialist or an Individualist, which I absolutely reject (in agreement, I am glad to see, with Mr. Gonner), is one primary difficulty in coming to an understanding, and perhaps the chief one.

2. But it is said that I scarcely recognize the existence of an evolution in Socialism, and that I am mistaken as to its course. The second part of this charge disposes of the first, and it will be enough to deal with the second. My view is briefly this: Socialism has a core of ideas in common with the great political and social philosophy of the world, and adds to these a number of misapprehensions and extravagances which are all its own. The tendency of evolution is to purge away the extravagances which belong to the operation of powerful ideas upon a democracy to which they are new, and to leave the core of sound social theory and practice, modified, no doubt, by the conditions of a more widely distributed capacity and a more self-conscious society. Now to ask whether the resultant social theory will be called Socialism is a merely verbal question, unless we can agree what Socialism is. To say that it is in evolution is no answer; evolution may be leading up to transformation or to suppression. At present there is nothing to show that, in proportion as Socialism is purified of misapprehen-

sions, dogmatic Collectivism will not be abandoned. If this goes, then the retention of the name Socialism is a matter of indifference. It is not enough to say that Socialism is in evolution. You must show where the Socialism is, which, being in evolution, is not returning towards the main stream of social theory and practice. Let the reader carefully note the poverty of Mr. Webb's list of references. Except in his own work on "Trades Unions" there is really nothing that points to the phase required. The Fabian essays are distinctly on the old-fashioned lines, and Mr. Gonner's work no less distinctly points to the dropping of doctrinaire Collectivism. It is too soon to judge of the real nature of the Fabian Society's new policy, and one cannot be expected to draw conclusions from the unpublished work, to which reference is made. But why should I desire to make out that a large band of clever men are hopelessly opposed to the ideas which I have at heart? I can only hope and trust that what is promised may be verified, and that a literature may be produced by English Socialism really worthy of our century and of our ethical stand-point. When such a literature shall appear, I pledge myself to hail it as the dawn of a new day. That it now exists, no one has, I think, asserted.

3. I do not agree—perhaps I am incurable—with Mr. Webb's prescriptions for the method of controversy, if I am right in understanding them to recommend dealing with generalities,—that is to say, arguing about fundamental assumptions in general form. My reason is twofold; in the first place, the habit of special pleading is now so widely spread by popular controversy that the generalities put forward as the fundamentals of a given argument are merely chosen for their plausibility, and give no clue to the nerve of the argument itself. If you attack them, the plausible sense is appealed to; but in arguing from them they are interpreted as the reasoner chooses. The social question has suffered too much from generalities, and a closer analysis is needed.

And, secondly, the modern thinker is aware that no principle is understood till it is applied; while, as it comes to be applied, it ceases to be an "assumption" (which really in Mr. Webb's hands becomes a question-begging term), and displays its real meaning, and its truth or falsehood; its capacity or incapacity, that is, to deal with the facts of experience. If our principles do not seem clear, but remain "tacit assumptions," then, first, we must admit defective powers of exposition; but, secondly, we must point out that the power and patience to see a principle in the only form in

which it really exists, viz., in the complication of its real context, is not too common, and there is no insult implied in doubting whether the champions of a new and exciting gospel have altogether acquired it. The same difficulty arises as to challenging the fundamental assumption of others. We say that, in the analysis of experience, we do far more than challenge assumptions; we exhibit in detail the limitations and confusions of the ideas under examination by the same process by which every hypothesis or proposition, it matters not whether assumption, axiom, principle, or induction, is made to show itself equal or unequal to the demands of experience. But though for science our method is the only one, for effective controversy it is undoubtedly too laborious; and we are not surprised that our circle of readers is limited.

It is more than time to conclude. My answer to the charge against me is, in brief, that there is not yet in this country any appreciable body of high-class socialistic literature, by which to test the view that, when purified and developed, Socialism will be Socialism still. My critics' references to the future for their evidence are too remarkable to escape notice. Nothing of all the practical changes to which Mr. Ball refers has any distinctive connection with Socialism. When the promised literature and the new policy are developed, it will be time to see, first, whether they are rational, and, secondly, whether they are socialistic. In the mean time, we claim that no principle is known except in its concrete development, and that the careful and persistent analysis of the developments is the only method by which principles can be established or refuted. And we are always ready for discussion, except when it seems unwelcome to those who invite us.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

CONCLUDING NOTE.

I HAVE no desire to extend or magnify controversy. Readers of my article must have realized that I was attacking false prophets of Socialism as much as, or even more than, their critic. The difference between Mr. Bosanquet and myself is partly a difference of emphasis, partly a difference in method of interpretation. I admit that the signs of Socialism are not altogether on my side of the controversy: my wish is father, perhaps, to my idea of Socialism, and I can only hope that the future may prove to be on my side rather than on that of my critic. That is also Mr. Bosanquet's hope,

although it is clearly not his expectation. He has the advantage of me in the present. He will, I am sure, not grudge to me any triumph the future may have in store for my view. It is to the future, at any rate, that I desire to adjourn the present controversy. And the readers of this JOURNAL, however much I may have taxed their patience, will at any rate recognize the service I have done them in drawing Mr. Bosanquet into the field of discussion. That is the only excuse I can offer for the polemical form into which I threw what was meant for a philosophical contribution towards the understanding of Collectivist tendencies. At the same time I indulged the privilege of a philosopher in putting the idea of Collectivism at its best, but φύσιν ἔχει πράξιν λέξεως ἦτον ἀληθείας ἐπάπτεσθαι.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

“THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM.”

I DO not desire to take any part in this interesting discussion, in which I find myself, in the main, in agreement with Mr. Ball. But there is one small point on which I should be glad to be enlightened. Mr. Brocklehurst (p. 94) disclaims the  *rôle*  of prophet, and thinks that it is wiser “to give no response to those who demand cut-and-dried schemes of the new social state.” I think so, too; and I am glad to find that, so far as my experience goes, most of the leading exponents of Socialism in this country concur with this attitude. What I do not understand is the possibility of combining this position with a definite belief in the socialistic ideal as opposed to all others. My own view is that, in all probability, it will be found desirable, in the near future, to introduce a considerably greater amount of collective control in various directions than is at present exercised, while probably in some other directions a greater amount of individual freedom and a more general recognition of individual responsibility will be found desirable. I think it is possible to some extent to anticipate the nature of the provinces of social life within which these different lines of development are likely to occur; and, by means of this anticipation, it is possible, to a considerable extent, to help the development forward. Hence I might describe myself as a Socialist with respect to certain lines of development, and an Individualist with respect to others; and in both cases with the reservation that, after the

development has proceeded a certain distance, it might very probably become desirable to move in the opposite direction. Now, so far as I can ascertain, many of those who call themselves Socialists do not really profess to have any larger share of prophetic gift than is implied in this very modest anticipation. In these circumstances, I am somewhat puzzled to know what they mean by describing themselves as Socialists. Do they mean that, in some one particular direction (perhaps with respect to the ownership of the means of production) they have a quite clear prophetic insight, though on other points their vision is more dim? Even this I can hardly understand. All the aspects of social life are so closely interrelated that it seems impossible to have a clear prophetic insight into one of them and yet be in the dark about others. Might not, for instance, the collective control of the means of production involve consequences in other directions (say, with reference to the family) which would be so undesirable as to counterbalance the advantages of the control itself? If so, then any one who cannot foresee these consequences is also not in a position to foresee that there would be a net gain in the introduction of collective control. What puzzles me is the limited prophetic power that seems to be claimed by Socialists, while they admit that they have no plenary inspiration.

I can, in a manner, understand the claim of complete prophetic insight.\* I can also understand the power of anticipating, in a tentative way, the direction in which, at any particular moment, progress may be expected. What I do not understand is the possession of a definite power of prophecy with reference to one particular aspect of social life, combined with ignorance with regard to the other aspects. Of course, it may be said (and this seems to be implied at least in the view of Mr. Ball) that even this limited power of prophecy is not claimed. But, if so, I hardly understand why the term Socialism should still be thought appropriate to the movement. This term is generally understood as implying

---

\* Many of the Continental Socialists appear to make such a claim. So also do such writers as Tolstoi. Such a claim seems to be very much on a par with the claims of Casuists to be able to lay down definite rules for the conduct of individuals in all conceivable circumstances. I should have thought that any claims of this nature were by this time discredited. Life is far too large and concrete a thing for the possibility of any such abstract formulation. Yet it is only when some such claim is made that a term like Socialism seems to have any definite meaning.

at least a certain opposition to Individualism ; and, if it is admitted that the higher Socialism must include the higher Individualism, the use of terms naturally understood as implying an opposition seems confusing. On the whole, the net result of Mr. Ball's contention seems to be that "educated Socialism" has ceased to be Socialism. The "Evolution of Socialism" seems to be at the same time its euthanasia.

Perhaps, if this most profitable discussion is further prolonged, Mr. Brocklehurst may be able to enlighten me further on his attitude in this matter ; or possibly Mr. Ball may explain the point more fully in the second article which he appears to promise. In the meantime, I am disposed to agree with Mr. Bosanquet in thinking that the use of such terms as Individualism and Socialism is wholly misleading and confusing ; though, at the same time I think that Mr. Ball is right in urging that the so-called Socialists have brought out some important elements in our present social problems which the writers of the "Aspects" have on the whole tended to ignore or to minimize.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

---

#### BOOK REVIEWS.

**SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES:** Addresses to Ethical Societies. By Leslie Stephen. In two volumes. London : Swan Sonnenschein ; New York : Macmillan, 1896. (The Ethical Library.) Pp. 255, 267.

The *apologia* is a form of literature much in favor with members of Ethical Societies. Nor is this unnatural. They have still to explain and defend their existence. To the readers of these two volumes, however, any further defence will probably appear unnecessary. To have produced them is a sufficient vindication of the existence of an Ethical Society. Yet Mr. Stephen's opening address is a contribution to Ethical Society apologetics. This address is remarkable not only for what it says, but also—and even more—for what it leaves unsaid. Other apologists sometimes fail to give the reader a clear idea of the essential nature of an Ethical Society. It is represented by them as having a dual nature, the

two leading properties of which are not obviously capable of being developed harmoniously. We are left in doubt whether its primary purpose is a speculative one—the ascertainment of the nature of morality—or a practical one,—the cultivation of morality in the individual life and in social arrangements. As a result we are often not sure whether we have to do with a learned society or with a church. It may be answered, of course, that we have to do with both at the same time ; that the Society is a church ; that its object is both to ascertain the truth and to make it manifest in men's lives. But it is just in this double purpose that the difficulty lies. The practical and propagandist side of an Ethical Society's work would seem likely to be effective only if its members are agreed as to the main principles of morality. And the amount of agreement that exists does not seem to be very great. One point of agreement is indeed brought out. Dogma must be excluded from the basis of morality. Mr. Stephen frankly assumes that those to whom and for whom he speaks have thrown over the theology of the churches. Is their aim, then, to undertake the moral regeneration of mankind, an object which the churches have in their own way been pursuing ? Clearly, a certain amount of the activity of Ethical Societies would seem to run in this direction. They, too, for instance, have their Sunday-schools, to which all—even the orthodox—are invited to send their children. If proselytism is the mark of a living church, they will pass the test.

Now it is noteworthy that Mr. Stephen does not seem to take any account of this function of an Ethical Society. He regards it not as an organization for converting the world, but as a society for assisting its own members in the rational investigation of a set of problems. It is, he says, "primarily the aim of an Ethical Society to promote the rational discussion of those underlying ethical principles,"—that is, of the ethical principles underlying social questions. But these principles are allowed to be still in the stage of discussion ; and "we desire to see the great controversy carried on in the nearest approach to a scientific spirit." The phrase "scientific" is held to mean that dogma is no guide. "We hold in common that the old dogmas are no longer tenable, though we are very far from being agreed as to what should replace them." "We as members of Ethical Societies have no claim to be, even in the humblest way, missionaries of a new religion ; but are simply interested in doing what we can to discuss in a profitable way the truths which it ought to embody or reflect." These are words of

sobriety, if not of enthusiasm. When a society is still in the stage of discussion, missionary enterprise is premature. A church with only one article in its creed, and that a negative one, might be successful in destroying an old morality, but would hardly have much prospect of building up anew the moral character of man.

No doubt a positive side may be discovered to the Ethical Societies' creed. It is not only a denial of the theological basis of morality; it is an assertion (in Mr. Stephen's words) that morality is "a product of human nature." Yet this positive assertion scarcely veils the want of agreement as to what human nature is and involves, especially on its rational side. Mr. Stephen, for instance, is not only sure that theology is worthless, he is also convinced of the "vanity of philosophizing." On the other hand, speculative metaphysics flourishes even in the inner circle of Ethical Societies, and is fearlessly applied to the solution of practical questions. In view of this divergence there is much to be said for Mr. Stephen's way of regarding the functions of an Ethical Society. It seems hardly fitted to bring united action to bear upon practical questions, or to undertake any propagandism which is more than merely destructive. But it is of value for purposes of mutual stimulus and enlightenment, and also for encouraging the discussion of social and political questions from an ethical point of view.

Mr. Stephen's separate studies have a unity of character not merely because they regard social questions from an ethical point of view, but because the social aspect of morality is always prominent. Society is the bearer of morality, a moral organism; and the individual is moral in so far as guided by social instincts and interests. Thus it would appear almost all one to assert that society is a moral organism and that morality is social. If it were a question of philosophical ethics, this position would require further elucidation. But Mr. Stephen has dealt with the philosophy of ethics elsewhere, and in these volumes he limits himself to applying his point of view. As a result, we have, in particular, the admirable studies of luxury, competition, and punishment. In all of these we see the working of the double maxim that society is moral and morality social. It is when it becomes unsocial that luxury is immoral, or rather that we give to enjoyment the dyslogistic name of luxury. "Luxury is characteristic of a class with narrow outlook, and devoted to such enjoyments as are, by their nature, incapable of communication." "The direction in which we

should look for improvement is not so much in directly prescribing any Spartan or ascetic system of life, as in cultivating in every one who possesses superfluities the sense of his implicit responsibility to his fellows, which should go with every increase of wealth, and the conviction, not that he should regard pleasure as in itself bad, but that he should train himself to find pleasures in such conduct as makes him a more efficient member of the body corporate of society."

The same attitude is preserved in the sober, because modified, defence of competition. Thus the social value of competitions for rewards and places is dwelt upon. "So far as the end of such competitions is good, the normal motives cannot be bad. The end of a fair competition is the discovery of the ablest men, with a view to placing them in a position where their talents may be turned to most account. It can only be achieved so far as each man does his best to train his own powers, and is prepared to test them fairly against the powers of others. . . . If he works simply with the desire of making the best of himself, and if the reward is simply such a position as may enable him to be most useful to society, the competition which results will be bracing and invigorating, and will appeal to no such motives as can be called, in the bad sense, selfish. He is discharging a function which is useful, it is true, to himself; but which is also intrinsically useful to the whole society." At the same time, "Competition is as far as possible from being the solitary condition of a healthy society. It must be not only a competition for worthy ends by honorable means, but should be a competition so regulated that the reward may bear some proportion to the merit. . . . Competition, therefore, we might say, could be unequivocally beneficial only in an ideal society; in a state in which we might unreservedly devote ourselves to making the best of our abilities and accepting the consequent results, without the painful sense in the background that others were being sacrificed and debased; crushed because they had less luck in the struggle, and were, perhaps, only less deserving in some degree than ourselves."

A still more elaborate application of the same principle is given in the careful and lucid essay on punishment. Punishment is regarded as but one of the means by which society secures its own preservation and moralization. The deterrent theory has its rights, but an extended meaning must be given to "deterrence." What society seeks to produce and maintain is an organization which

will give security to its members. And this "involves much more than the simple execution of the criminal law; it involves the support of agencies for prevention, education, and reformation." The character and circumstances of the offender, therefore, may not be left out of account. "For the growth of the social order depends upon the growth of the corresponding social instincts. . . . The moral requirement in regard to the criminal law is, therefore, essentially that it should be such a law as is favorable, when considered in connection with the whole order, to the strength and development of the existing morality." Deterrence should, therefore, be regarded as "including or coinciding with reformation, as indicating a part of the general system of moral pressure by which the classes exposed to temptation may be gradually raised in the scale of civilization."

Enough has, perhaps, been said to show the interest attaching to the essays in these two volumes, as well as their general point of view. On such subjects it is inevitable that Mr. Stephen should often repeat what has been said before; but he never does so without himself adding point and felicity of phrase to the familiar doctrine. The addresses to which reference has not been made above are on science and politics, the sphere of political economy, social equality, ethics and the struggle for existence, heredity, the duties of authors, the vanity of philosophizing, forgotten benefactors. I must content myself here with enumerating the titles. It is almost superfluous to say that they will all repay reading.

One remark remains to be made which may, I fear, appear ungracious. But it is part of the duty of a reviewer to point out that the contents of the volumes, however excellent as Ethical addresses, do not justify the title of "Social Rights and Duties." It is a good title, and every reader of these addresses would welcome a treatise from Mr. Stephen which fairly covered the field. But it is certainly misleading where it stands.

W. R. SORLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN.

**AN ETHICAL MOVEMENT.** A Volume of Lectures. By W. L. Sheldon, Lecturer of the Ethical Society of St. Louis. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896. Pp. 349.

These sixteen lectures give an admirable illustration of the scope and spirit of that Ethical Movement to which Mr. Sheldon is devoted. They are especially to be commended to those who have

been accustomed to draw a hard and fast line between ethics and religion. Such a line is possible in certain stages of development, but one cannot read such a lecture as that entitled, "Being Religious—what it means to an Ethical Idealist," without being convinced that as the highest religion is ethical in its emphasis, so the truest ethical insight is religious.

Mr. Sheldon calls his discourses "lectures," and they have a breadth of treatment and freedom from conventionalism that distinguish them from the ordinary sermon. And yet in the best sense of the word they are sermons. They aim not at the exposition of ethical theory, but at practical guidance. They are concerned with conduct, but still more with the character out of which right conduct comes. Mr. Sheldon is distinctly a preacher, after the order of Channing and Martineau, and addresses himself always to those who desire "to live in the spirit." The questions discussed are those which come inevitably to those who would live such a life, under the conditions of free thought.

Very helpful and wise are the lectures which are devoted to the cultivation of tolerance; if that is not too cold a word to express the sympathetic attitude which Mr. Sheldon would have us assume to the religious beliefs of others. "The world," he says, "is not ripe for a uniform religion or a uniform church." He is not satisfied with mere latitudinarianism with its suave complacency. "People like to dally with religion as they do with art. They call it 'being broad' and 'seeing all sides,' when in reality they do not see any side of the subject at all." The unity for which he pleads is that which only comes through deeper experience.

In the lecture on "The Ethical Christ," Mr. Sheldon, after an ungrudging acknowledgment of the beauty of the Christ ideal, says, "and yet we make a mistake when thinking of this as a complete example of the Ethical Ideal." The Christ picture, he says, took shape when "the ideal aspect most called for was passive endurance, heroic submissiveness, gentle humility." In our time other elements are needed in addition to these; we must recognize the need of the "aggressive energy, the determined will, the venturesome mind."

In the treatment of marriage, the family, law, and private property, while the conclusions are conservative, the method is radical. The roots of these institutions are ethical, and their continued growth is dependent on obedience to ethical laws.

It is not often that one comes upon a book at once so sound and

so suggestive. It gives us what we should expect after reading the words of the preface. "The attitude taken in the volume is neither that purely of the scholar nor that of a man wholly immersed in practical life. A teacher in ethics or religion occupies a position between these two classes. He will read extensively and think a great deal; but his deepest convictions and beliefs will be shaped while he is seeking to apply his reading or thinking to the questions of life as they come up from day to day."

SAMUEL M. CROTHERS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF; OR, LAW IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

By The Duke of Argyll, K.G., K.T. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1896. Pp. xxii., 555.

In this very remarkable and interesting work the Duke of Argyll argues that natural teleology is the indispensable basis of religion, and that Christianity, which alone fits this basis, furnishes the only completely rational theory of conduct. Thus teleology bears the weight of our author's whole superstructure of belief.

Two methods are open to the natural teleologist. He may reason from the conception of the world as a world of law, and proceed deductively to show that not a sparrow can fall to the ground without the will of a controlling providence; or else he may reason from particular facts of adaptation, especially in the organic world, and conclude that mind is supreme in nature. The Duke, having in his "Reign of Law" sufficiently developed the former method, proceeds in the work before us chiefly or solely upon the latter. He contends, on the one hand, that purposiveness—the true criterion of mind—is not merely inferred, but directly perceived in organic forms and processes; that mankind have always, as a rule, perceived it; and that this perception is indelibly recorded in the etymology and grammatical structure of language. On the other hand, he wages war with certain naturalistic writers who, ignoring or not perceiving what the vast majority of mankind perceive, deny all knowledge of natural purposiveness, and discount its alleged evidence as the result of mere misconstruction. These writers the Duke charges with "garbling" the report which they should give of the phenomena of organic life, with inconsistency, or even with "conscious and deliberate juggling with words."

It is well known that the teleological argument in all its forms has been for centuries the theme of discussion and criticism. Kant

and Mill agree as to its persuasiveness. "It would be difficult," says Mill, "to find a stronger argument in favor of theism than that the eye must have been made by one who sees, and the ear by one who hears." But this argument has been shown by the greatest of philosophical critics to suffer from intrinsic difficulties of a peculiarly grave character. What the reader notices in the "Philosophy of Belief" is that these intrinsic difficulties are almost overlooked. For aught that this work has benefited thereby, the critical labor bestowed by Kant on the conception of natural purposiveness has been merely wasted. But fresh difficulties have since Kant's time been created for the design argument from organic forms,—difficulties which may be called extrinsic, consisting in the alternative suggestion of natural selection, etc., as explaining the adaptation observable in such forms. We had thought that no natural teleologist could possibly ignore these difficulties. But the Duke ignores them, saying dogmatically that "natural selection, as an agency in developing structures prior to their functional use, if it has any meaning at all, is simply a mental and directing choice." He also declares that purpose *must* be assumed as mediating between the inchoate and matured states of organic existence. This is edifying to one who has never doubted. But the *naïf* disciple of the Duke, who turns from the confident utterances of the latter to read the opinions of, let us say, Mr. Romanes, in his "Influence of Science upon Religion," will find much to dishearten him or cause him real trouble, for which the "Philosophy of Belief" provides no help whatever.

The Duke's argument for natural teleology from the implications of common speech does not justify the importance which he attaches to it. Perhaps the most general truth which can be enunciated respecting popular speech is that while it fairly corresponds to the needs of practical life, it falls far short of satisfying the requirements of the best thought of any generation. Primitive languages represent primitive modes of looking at things. The mind of the savage is disposed to personification. He is apt to regard a curious piece of mechanism—*e.g.*, a watch—as a living thing, and to ascribe to it attributes of intelligence and will. This disposition is no doubt registered in language. One of the great obstacles in the way of modern science arises from the imperfection of the instrument of expression,—the subtly misleading associations of words. The progress of science is marked by a progressive, but very slow, correction of speech. If it were quite true that, as the

Duke states, "language is the automatic expression of, and witness to, that which we really do see, all the more to be trusted because of the fact that it is an unconscious witness;" and if "words cannot report anything which does not really shine in upon the self-consciousness of man, or which he does not really see;" the words, "spook" and "fairy," should have objective existences corresponding to them, and from the words "sunset" and "sunrise" we should be justified in inferring the falsity of the heliocentric view of the solar system. The Duke's argument from language proves nothing at all, just because it would prove too much.

Scarcely less surprising, however, is his contention that purposiveness in natural objects is "directly perceived." To us it appears to be in all cases—even in the action of all persons except ourselves—an inference, and one as to which mistakes are very easily made. All so-called perception is mixed up with inference, but of the perception of purposiveness this is especially true. The Duke's assertion of the direct perception of purpose in organic forms is simply the result of defective psychology.

He argues that though we are ignorant of ulterior ends in nature, we may and do possess certitude respecting proximate ends. This is part of his general position that our "knowledge, despite its limitations, is true as far as it goes." "True" in this connection is a difficult term to explain satisfactorily. It bears totally different meanings for disciples of Hume and Hegel. But "true as far as it goes" is a highly fallacious phrase, and may actually be equivalent to "false." Not only Kepler's Laws (the Duke's illustration) are true as far as they go, but the Ptolemaic astronomy was true as far as it went. It possessed truth of a relative sort, *i.e.*, in proportion as it explained the celestial phenomena. But as a whole it was false. The peculiarity of generalizations which are "true as far as they go" is that a more advanced or wider conception may, for aught we now know, completely overthrow them, reversing the stand-point from which they have taught us to regard the particular facts. Thus the Copernican conception reversed the stand point of the Ptolemaic. The essence of the dispute between natural teleologists and naturalists lies in the question whether the "proximate ends" might not, when looked at from the stand-point of natural selection, lose their character of finality altogether, just as the terms "sunrise" and "sunset" have lost the meaning which they originally bore.

All the weakness attaching to the Duke's natural teleology af-

fects his ethics and religion likewise. Of his religious theory we do not here speak. Of his Ethics the most important thing to be said is that he bestows on the subject no systematic or general treatment. Ethics for him is the Ethics of Christianity. In his chapter dealing with this subject, the ethical relation between man and man is represented as flowing from the relation between man and God.

The faculty of distinguishing between right and wrong is "divinely implanted." The feeling of duty to our fellows is seen and felt in the light of an obligation to a known God. The moral feeling is reduced to "love," or the feeling of brotherhood and comradeship. The feeling of obligation tends to become submerged or lost in this, so that "love" would be "the whole fulfilling of the law." What the "good" for man is the Duke does not pronounce, except by describing it as a form of "blessedness" to be divinely bestowed hereafter. With the question of hedonism and its antagonists he does not concern himself. But pure altruism he holds to be an unnatural theory of conduct. Closely following Butler, he regards the notion of "desert" as inseparable from that of right and wrong. The connections between right conduct and reward, wrong conduct and punishment, are not merely arbitrary connections. The consequences of good or evil conduct as such follow organically upon the latter, as part of the divine scheme. If virtue is not always rewarded or vice punished; if we are perplexed at seeing the good man miserable and the bad man prosperous; yet we must with the apostle trust that "all things work together for good to them that love God." The question of the origin of evil under the control of omnipotent wisdom and goodness is one which the Duke does not profess to answer. He suggests, however, that the answer must be found in the conception of man's will as free, but rebellious against God. Virtue without freedom would be impossible. Vice is, therefore, the inevitable concomitant of virtue in such an imperfect creature as man. The doctrine (of, *e.g.*, Höffding) that without determinism no moral conduct and no moral theory would be possible, does not seem to have occurred to the Duke as even conceivable.

He makes God immanent in nature, and regularly treats the laws of nature as laws of God. This involves two different conceptions of law. The Duke does not confound these, but regards them as consistent, though distinct, aspects of the one fact. The uniformities of nature are the edicts or ordinances of God's will. If any

except "sensationalist" morality is to be sustained, this seems to be a dangerous identification. If nothing happens except according to natural law, and if natural law is the law of God, it is hard to escape from the conclusion, that whatever is (or has been, or shall be) is right. We need not dwell upon this. Such, however, is the Duke's philosophy, in ethics as in teleology, that at every seeming advance we are plunged deeper and deeper into mystery. We are led through a cloud of metaphysics by a guide who believes himself and his followers to be—at least most of the time—walking in the clear light of reason.

But it would be unjust to close without referring to another aspect of this work, which makes it in our opinion not only interesting but valuable. Though the author does not seem to be fully aware how deep and how widely diffused are the sources of the scepticism which he endeavors to counteract; and though, as a consequence, many of his arguments are pointless, superficial, and useless for their purpose, no reader can help being struck with the wealth of information—scientific rather than philosophical—which the work contains. A note of impatience is here and there discernible in it; an intolerance of opposition, and a seeming inability to recognize the fact that such opposition is sincere,—not to say well-founded. The Duke's own belief is so strong that to him unbelief seems incredible. He would have other men employ his own glasses. All that ardor and eloquence can do is done by him to persuade them. His zeal is admirable. As one reads, one feels somehow the better for the buoyancy and strength of the writer's spirit. Indeed, "The Philosophy of Belief"—we say it with modest confidence—could only be the work of a strong as well as a good man. What the special theologians, for whom it seems to have been chiefly intended, may think of it, we cannot venture to predict. But its tone will cheer and inspire many readers whom its arguments may fail to convince.

JOHN I. BEARE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

FRANCESCO D'ASSISI E ALCUNI DEI SUOI RECENTI BIOGRAFI. Memoria letta all' Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche della Società Reale di Napoli, dal Socio Raffaele Mariano. Napoli: Tipografia della Regia Università, 1896. 8vo. Pp. 208.

The interest attaching to this work is due not so much to the manner in which its subject is treated or the results arrived at, as

to the point of view from which it is written. The author's aim is not so much to elicit truth as to defend a thesis. Though several biographies are dealt with,—three, those of Bonghi, Sabatier, and Thode, at considerable length,—the work is, in reality, an attack upon Sabatier, an attack which is made to seem less individual by being distributed among several persons. "For Sabatier's volume were reserved the power and the good fortune to wake us up." (p. 33.) At the same time, the attack is directed less against Sabatier and his book than against the ethical and political tendency which they represent. Mariano and Sabatier—so, at least, the former thinks—stand for two opposite tendencies in thought and practice. Yielding to the desire for antiquities to give prestige to his views, Sabatier has claimed St. Francis as an ancient apostle of his gospel. Mariano, possessed by the same desire, and recognizing the value of such imposing prestige, jealously disputes the other's right to it, and claims the saint for his own gospel. Such is the purpose of the present volume. In order to understand the full bearing of the controversy, we must try to define, in general terms, the two gospels.

Hegel, whose right to speak Professor Mariano will acknowledge, once said: "Human history is a progress in the consciousness of freedom." This progress has two stages, not altogether successive,—progress in freedom from nature, and progress in freedom from institutions. Such freedom by no means implies that either nature or institutions are discredited or rendered superfluous, but merely that man has come to assume to them an attitude of mastership, and no longer one of thralldom. Through institutions man freed himself from nature; and he is now gradually freeing himself from institutions, by coming to see that they are the embodiment of his own rationality, and doing his best to make them an ever worthier embodiment of the same. In this way he rises above both natural and human laws, and, in the plenitude of moral freedom, becomes a law to himself. What we call modern, as distinguished from ancient and mediæval civilization, is mainly the result of the latter process—the liberation from institutions. In the Middle Age, institutions ruled everything. Church and State, both regarded as of superhuman origin, together claimed man's whole nature and the right to regulate his entire activity. His salvation, here and hereafter, depended upon his having no knowledge, no affection, no will, but such as these approved. There was a time, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when it seemed as if the whole civilized world

were going to stop short at this condition of things ; and, indeed, one portion of it, the Moslem world, did stop there, and has stopped there ever since, with what results we see. But, thanks largely to the energy of the northern peoples, the Christian world, in part at least, was saved from this fate. Since the days of Abelard, there has been in Christendom a distinct upward movement, slowly but surely disintegrating the institutions based on superhuman authority, and, in defiance of all opposition, brutal or bland, in defiance of axe and stake and gibbet, in defiance of thousand-fold massacre and myriad-fold martyrdom, making way for the kindly authority of human reason and human science. For many centuries this movement pursued its way unconscious of itself, its noblest bearers, Abelard, Francis, Eckhard, Bruno, Campanella, and the rest, groping in the dark and often going astray. Indeed, it was only about the middle of the last century that it reached self-consciousness, which then flashed upon the world like an electric spark upon stores of powder. Detonation followed detonation in rapid succession,—the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire, and the encyclopædists, the poetry of Goethe, the philosophy of Kant, the American War of Liberation, the French Revolution,—all contributing to rend to pieces the structure of superhumanism. Unfortunately, the last of these, in which a whole magazine of suppressed energy exploded, proved so destructive as to cause, in Europe, a reaction in favor of superhumanism and enslaving institutionalism, which has set the world back for well-nigh a century. Monarchies by the grace of God have been set up anew, and are trying to reintroduce their old despotism,—witness Russia, Austria, and Germany ; supernatural religion, despite all the revelations of philosophy, science, history, and criticism, is struggling, by fair means and foul, to prolong its immoral and doomed existence. And to justify all this, and throw humanity back into the arms of superstition, there arose a philosophy which, while professing to be the very process of reason itself, was in reality based upon a denial of its very first principle, as, indeed, was necessary, if it was to perform its function. This philosophy—Hegelianism—by a fictitious and arbitrary construction of logic and history, and a disingenuous distortion of the meaning of Christian conceptions and dogmas, sought to show that man is merely the creature of an institutional process of which ecclesiastical Christianity and military despotism are the final consummation. This system was, of course, hailed with acclamation by all the reactionaries in Church and State, and

declared by a prominent Christian divine, over the coffin of its author, to be the message of the Paraclete! As such, it demoralized Germany for half a century, and, even when the good sense of the Germans at last utterly rejected it, as it did long ago, and forced it to seek refuge among the timid reactionaries of Italy, England, and America, it left them shorn of their enthusiasm for freedom, and ready to fall, politically, under the yoke of Bismarckian dictatorship, or even of that aggravated form of feudalism styled socialism, which is merely Hegelianism in politics; and, philosophically, into a crude empiricism, which is little more than a botanizing on the grave of philosophy. "*Die Deutschen wollen regiert sein*," said the rector of a German university to me on one occasion recently; on another, "*Die Philosophie in Deutschland ist todt*." Outside of Germany, this pseudo-rational, reactionary system has gone far to paralyze the spirit of liberty in many of those very men who, by their education and intelligence, ought to have been the emancipators of their countrymen, and to induce a deadening belief that the march of civilization is due to a super-human mechanical force, a self-unwinding idea, that weaves itself, as warp and woof, into all that is or ever will be.

Within the last few years, however, there have been encouraging signs that this sad reaction in favor of authority and supernaturalism is coming to a close, and that the spirit of liberty which came to grief in France, through its youthful excesses, a hundred years ago, has learnt wisdom and caution from bitter experience, and is again abroad, reproving the wide-spread moral despair (in which even poor Renan ended his days) and calling men to that consciousness of their essential freedom and dignity which is the prime condition of all progress. So far, indeed, this spirit has not been able to muster its forces in such a way as to offer effective battle to the leaden-armed legions of reaction, and, therefore, much of its effort is wasted in sweet sentimentality of a neo-Christian sort, or in mere negation, smacking of Voltaire; but no one can read such a work as M. Henry Martin's "*L'Idée de l'État*" without feeling that this state of things cannot last long, and that, at no distant date, the same spirit which, in blind fury destroyed the Bastille and glutted the guillotine, will, in calm self-possession and with kindly yet firm hand, overthrow every structure implying that man has to look anywhere else for intellectual or moral guidance than to his own spiritual nature, his own reason and conscience.

We can now, in a few words, distinguish the two spirits that

divide and rule the civilized world of to-day. The one, the spirit of reaction, seeks to subordinate the individual to institutions, conceived as of superhuman or even of supernatural origin, trying to persuade him that the means of his salvation lie outside of himself, in the form of divine grace embodied in these; that, in the process of evolution, he is the clay and not the potter. The other, the spirit of progress, seeks to raise the individual to perfect freedom, by showing him that, as spirit and person, he is at once necessarily particular and universal, and therefore the creator of all institutions, these being simply so many expressions of the relations of his particularity to his universality,—in a word, that “Man is man, and master of his fate,” or, as Hierocles puts it, “Man must first be man and then god.” Briefly, the spirit of reaction is the spirit of superstition, the spirit of progress the spirit of truth. Between these there is incessant warfare, enlisting not only individuals, but also nations, on either side. Russia, Austria, Turkey, and the whole of Islâm are on the side of reaction, and imperial Germany seems to lean in the same direction; England and civic Italy seem preparing to follow progress. France, amid many disheartening impediments, is following it. America, from the hour of its independence, was principally and irrevocably committed to it.

Returning now to Professor Mariano's book, we may say that its chief interest consists in this, that it is mainly a criticism by a reactionary of the Hegelian sort on the work of a man inclined to follow the spirit of progress. The author's chief objection to M. Sabatier's book is that, instead of supporting ecclesiasticism, dogma, tradition, authority, supernaturalism, and superstition, it advocates what he is pleased to call “individualism” and “superstition” (not to speak of harder names! see pp. 102, 174, etc.), but what is really freedom of thought and conscience; and that it claims St. Francis, an Italian, as an early champion of the same. Professor Mariano is the ardent defender of dogma and authority, the sworn foe of free thought and conscience. That this is no exaggerated statement will be apparent from the following quotations, which will show the tone and temper of the book: “If we could, with any show of likelihood, make room for the supposition that the day would come when man should cease to concentrate his feelings and thoughts upon God, and should succeed in completely uprooting from his bosom the need and, in some degree at least, the vision of the absolute principle of the universe, nothing and no one could, in the long run, escape the fatal destiny of fall-

ing back into a state of barbarism and animality all the more violent and savage than that of primitive times, because more corrupt"\* (p. 40). The new religious wisdom of Ritschl, Harnack, etc., "teaches that the essence of Christianity consists in love to God and brotherly love among men, forgetting, and leaving too much out of sight, the concrete theological truths of faith, not created by theologians, but revealed by Christ, which form the necessary foundation and inner vital sap of brotherliness and love (p. 52 sq.). Sabatier says, 'The Reformation could do nothing else but substitute the authority of the Bible for that of the priest, —a mere change of dynasty, that was all.'† And he adds that, in accordance with the spirit of our times, all authority must lie within and not without the conscience, and consist in universal priesthood.‡ Thus he would make out that the shortcoming of the Reformation, and therefore its inanity, were due to its not having asserted the absolute right of the individual conscience,—in other words, to its not having destroyed every principle of authority, and so opened the way for the destruction of every determinate and objective truth of Christian faith. For one who but yesterday had the care of souls, such fiery championship of the reckless spirit of modern times does not produce an altogether

---

\* It is interesting, as an item in comparative culture, to place beside this the words recently uttered by Rev. Dr. Marshall Lang before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland: "I decline to measure religious life by any outside test. There is a religion without Christ, without God even, strange as it may sound. There is no feature of the present day more to be pondered than this, that we have men, and of these not a few, who are representing some of the highest features and elements of religion, who are yet unchristian and agnostic even. They show a devotion to duty, a capacity of sacrifice, a connection of life with high aims and objects that may well rebuke them who know Christ and live with God in this world."—*Glasgow Herald*, May 26, 1896, p. 9.

† It may be worth while to add here the context of this quotation, as showing how completely gratuitous is Professor Mariano's charge of "subjectivism" laid at M. Sabatier's door: "As to the majority of those who at present call themselves free-thinkers, they confound religious emancipation with irreligion: they will not see that in religion, as in politics, there is room between kingship by divine right and anarchy for a government which may be as strong as the first and guarantee liberty better than the second. The ancient mind placed God outside the world, sovereignty outside the peoples, authority outside the conscience; the spirit of modern times has the opposite tendency: it denies neither God, nor sovereignty, nor authority, but it sees them where they really are." ("Vie de S. François d'Assisi," p. v.)

‡ Sabatier does not say this; but if he had, cf. Exodus xix. 6.

agreeable impression"\* (p. 54 *sq.*). "Francis is placed too high, whereas Christ is dragged down from his divine throne. Francis is imagined as a second Christ, whereas, if we take into consideration the person of Christ and his mission of revelation, it is evident that there never has been, and never can be, another to place beside him. On the other hand, Christ is made a simple archetype which Francis imitates and reproduces, whereas, if we take account of the inmost thought that animates the two, it is no less evident that, in what Christ was, the revealer and creator of a new relation between the divine and the human, Francis cannot, even remotely, be compared with him. But, I repeat, there is no reason to be astonished at these strange excesses, intended to bring Christ down to a purely human level and rob his nature of every super-human characteristic. They spring, as necessary consequences, from Sabatier's peculiar conception of religion" (p. 57 *sq.*). "Sabatier makes this new life [initiated by St. Francis] consist in the right to the most absolute moral subjectivism, in an assertion of the individual's right to the most complete liberty of thought and conscience. And we go from bad to worse when we pass from Sabatier to Thode" (p. 63). "Francis, drawing, indeed, his inspiration from Christ, but not being, like him, a Son of God, was still able to show men how to overcome the woes of existence" (p. 77). "As for theology . . . he asserts that it has killed religion. Hence for him, the profound expression, *fides quærens intellectum*, becomes foolishness. And godliness (*religiosità*) and religious faith are, as a consequence, a mere moral idealism . . . without any intermixture of thought, intent upon scrutinizing and fathoming divine truth"† (p. 100). "There never dawns for an

---

\* Since Professor Mariano alludes to this more than once, and even goes so far as to quote, from a private letter of Sabatier's (p. 34), words plainly intended to fix upon him the stigma of vanity, it may not be amiss to quote here a few words from Lessing: "All blame, all ridicule which the critic, with the book under consideration in his hand, can make good is permitted to the critic. . . . But as soon as the critic betrays that he knows more of his author than his writings can tell him, as soon as he uses against him the slightest unfavorable touch drawn from this closer knowledge, so soon his blame becomes personal insult. He ceases to be a critic, and becomes—the most contemptible thing that a rational being can become—a gossip, a slanderer, a lampooner." ("Briefe antiq. Inhalts," No. 75.)

† To see what an utter misrepresentation and caricature of Sabatier's thought this is, compare second foot-note on page 247. Surely, divine truth does not cease to be knowable because it is the form of the human spirit.

instant upon Sabatier a suspicion that faith in the miraculous (*prodigioso*) may, peradventure, be an immanent and inalienable need of the religious sentiment. And yet he speaks of it as if it were something altogether false, frightfully corrupting, and baneful" (p. 100 *sq.*). "These outrageous (*strampalate*) manifestations, however, reach a climax when religious systems are classified into two families,—religions which turn their eye to divinity, and whose activity resolves itself into worship and sacrifice, and religions which turn their eye upon man, and direct the whole of their efforts upon the heart and conscience, in order to transform them. Just as if there were any other way of transforming the heart and conscience than by keeping the eye fixed on divinity!" (p. 102 *sq.*). "It is not permitted to speak of Christian truth that is not impressed with the Church's seal. If there was a heaven, an influence of Christianity, it was transmitted solely through the Church" \* (p. 109).

I have made these quotations somewhat extensive, because they bring out better than any words of mine could (1) the attitude of Professor Mariano, and, in general, of the whole reactionary school, (2) the nature of the movement which they antagonize and try to discredit,—the movement towards freedom of thought and conscience,—and (3) the importance of M. Sabatier's book, as an earnest contribution towards this movement. One thing we may safely say, and that is, that Professor Mariano, by his bigoted and ungenerous criticism of that work, has done much to recommend it to all liberal-minded men ; and for that he ought to be heartily thanked.

Seeing with what assurance Professor Mariano draws a hard and fast line between Christ as a "Son of God" and St. Francis as something quite different (see above, p. 248), we might suppose that he had good reason for distinguishing between the divine and the human. What, then, is our surprise to find him saying: "It appears to me certain that, properly understood, Pantheism is somehow the ultimate basis of all true philosophy, and, what is more to the purpose, of all religion, notably of Christianity. St. Paul, for

---

\* Compare with this what Dante wrote nearly six hundred years ago:

"But, lo! many there be that cry, Christ! Christ!  
Who, in the judgment, shall be very far  
Less near to him than some that know not Christ."

—*Parad.* xix. 106 *sq.*

example, when he exclaims: 'In him we live, and move, and are' (Acts xvii. 28), and again, 'Of him, and through, and unto him, are all things' (Rom. xi. 36), is as much a Pantheist as Hegel" (p. 42 n.)! This may or may not be true; but if it is, where is the distinction between the divine and the human? It is to be feared, moreover, that this is a Christian truth not "impressed with the Church's seal;" for certainly every important section of the Church repudiates it with indignation, above all the Roman. It is yet further to be feared that, in this instance, Professor Mariano, in spite of all bitter polemic against the individualism and subjectivism of M. Sabatier, has allowed himself to be guilty of a most heinous individual and subjective opinion, a "fantasticaggine radicaleggiante" (p. 174), to use his own phrase. The truth is, like all Hegelian reactionaries, he is nothing, if not individualistic and subjective, and this he even admits on one occasion. Speaking of the work of a writer, who, as the result of an inquiry admitted to be careful and exhaustive, has come to the conclusion that St. Francis's "Song of the Sun" is to be regarded as of doubtful authenticity, he says: "Now, if I must candidly speak my mind, notwithstanding the Herculean efforts he puts forth to demonstrate his thesis, and all the truly *Franciscan patience* which he evinces, I would willingly hand over to criticism all caution and prudence; and, even at the risk of passing, in its eyes, for an example of imprudence and rashness, or, worse yet, for a fool, I should prefer to go on believing that the author of the 'Song of the Sun' in the vernacular, was really St. Francis" (p. 177 n.). If this is not subjectivism, one wonders what is. In sober truth, the whole book is about as good a specimen of subjective writing as one could wish to see. It adds nothing to science or sound objective criticism.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By T. J. Lawrence, M.A., LL.D. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. xxi., 645.

The author of this work himself bears a somewhat international character. He is now "Rector of Girton and Lecturer in Downing College, Cambridge, England;" he was "lately University Extension Professor of History and International Law in the University of Chicago," and was "sometime Deputy Professor of International

Law in the University of Cambridge, England," and "Lecturer in Maritime Law at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich." The volume is dedicated to his American pupils; and in the preface are some words worth quoting,—words all the more striking because written in July, 1895, before the unfortunate excitement and misunderstandings of the following winter: "In a work written in English, and intended in the main for British and American readers, it is natural that most of the cases should be taken from British and American history. I have so taken mine of set purpose. The more the two great English-speaking peoples know of each other the better friends they will be; and on their friendly co-operation depend the fairest hopes for the future of humanity. No one, who has taught, as I have taught, on both sides of the Atlantic, can have failed to notice that the influence of old controversies and misunderstandings has not entirely passed away, even among the educated classes. I have approached these questions with a sincere desire to show to each side the strength of the other's case and deal out impartial justice on every occasion. If I have ever inclined the balance too much in favor of my own country, the error is that of one who, were he not an Englishman, would ask no better fate than to be an American."

Mr. Lawrence is fully aware of the difficulty of his task. "There should be something of the judge," he says, "and something of the philosopher in every writer on International Law" (p. 94). "The perfect publicist must take all philosophy, all history, and all diplomacy to be his province. . . . I lay no claim to the possession of these exalted qualifications. I have but attempted to trace the development of International Law in such a way as to show on the one hand its relation to a few great ethical principles, and on the other, its dependence upon the hard facts of history" (p. v.). The present reviewer can claim only a slight acquaintance with the subject; but, so far as he can judge, Mr. Lawrence has not merely written an admirable text-book, but has made many important contributions to the clearing up of theoretical and practical difficulties. His definitions are lucid, his classifications scientific and convenient, and his treatment of leading cases and of technical questions is such as to be intelligible to the lay mind. Three characteristics of the work may be singled out for special mention. In the first place it is free from that confusion of ethics and law which has been so common in writers on the "Law of Nations" from Grotius to Bluntschli, and especially in those who have been influenced by

the idea of the "Law of Nature." This confusion has, indeed, indirectly done some practical service, but it is very unscientific and may occasionally do mischief. "The great founders of our modern system of international relations were as much moralists as jurists. Indeed, the two capacities were to their minds inseparable; and though it may be true that their words lacked precision in consequence, it is also true that the high ideal set up by them had no small influence in humanizing the laws of war and introducing justice into the ordinary intercourse of states" (p. 465). On the other hand, we have warnings against "that loose mode of thinking which mistakes moral preferences for legal principles" (pp. 125, 126). Thus "some publicists deny the legality of intervention (by a foreign state) at the request of rebels, but are disposed to look more favorably upon intervention at the request of established governments. Others hold that foreign powers may assist the party (in a civil war) which appears to them to have justice on its side." Any particular intervention may morally awaken our sympathy; but that does not make it "right" from the point of view of international law. Another distinctive excellence of Mr. Lawrence's work is the thoroughly historical spirit which pervades his treatment of conflicting theories. He is not content with simply approving or condemning. He shows how principles now superseded could formerly be seriously and honestly defended. Thus the old claims to sovereignty over the high seas, "monstrous as they seem to us, were by no means an unmixed evil in mediæval times, when piracy was a flourishing trade. . . . The state which claimed to possess a sea was held bound to 'keep' it,—that is, to perform police duties within it,—and this obligation was fulfilled with more or less completeness by England and other maritime powers" (p. 168). A third merit, one that is closely bound up with the other two, is the freedom from "abstract thinking,"—the sober judgment that is brought to bear on questions of the present day. Thus it is shown how "the hysterical sentiment which deems the national flag dishonored should search be made beneath it by agents of another power," proves a serious obstacle in the way of extirpating the slave-trade (p. 218). The danger of a too wide major premise is exposed. Paintings and prints may be exempted from the rule that enemy goods on enemy ships are lawful prize of war, without asserting the principle that the arts and sciences are the property of mankind at large, as was done by a Nova-Scotian prize-court in 1812 (p. 387). The prevention of war

by means of arbitration is discussed hopefully, but without exaggerated optimism, in several weighty pages (pp. 465-472).

The subject of international law has a twofold bearing upon ethics. There is, first, the theoretical interest; in the growth of the principles of international law we see "writ large" the same processes as those by which moral ideas have grown up and been modified in societies of individuals. Customs that prove advantageous come to be adopted; competing self-interests produce compromise; under the cover of formulas such as the "law of nature," a beneficent practical utilitarianism gradually supplants harsher principles of conduct. Secondly, to the practical amelioration of the lot of mankind international jurists have been able to contribute more than perhaps any other class of "mere thinkers." The details as to the laws of war and of neutrality, in the volume before us, are in themselves an eloquent testimony to the steady improvement of the community of civilized nations since the terrible Thirty Years' War, which roused the horror of Grotius and stimulated the growth of a science that has been of more practical service to mankind than high-sounding denunciations of war as "murder."

Two misprints have been noted, *Landstrum* for *Landsturm*, on p. 422, and *Gardener* for *Gardiner*, on p. 480, note. There is a curious slip on p. 514. "Every belligerent *lays* under a strong obligation," etc. Even the authority of Lord Byron (under stress of rhyme) will not persuade us that that is good English.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

**THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA OF ASSOCIATION AND OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.** By Franklin Henry Giddings, M.A., Professor of Sociology in Columbia University. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

Professor Giddings's work in Sociology has been followed with the deepest interest by all students of the subject, and it should only be a gratification, even to those who teach a very different kind of sociology, to have at length so thorough a discussion of the subject by him. The object of the book is clearly stated in the preface, "There are principles of sociology, and they admit of logical organization. The present work is an attempt to combine the principles of sociology in a coherent theory." But this is nothing more than a host of writers have sought to accomplish, and the question in the mind of the reader is whether we have at last a

system which is both a logical and a satisfactory account of the facts.

The subject is treated in four books. The first discusses the science,—its province, its method, and its problems, and is intended as a contribution to the logic of social sciences, rather than as a contribution to sociology; consequently the beginner is recommended to pass it over. Perhaps it is natural that in a treatise of this sort the author should rely on general discussion rather than on accurate definition to convey his idea of sociology and its work. At any rate, the student who is seeking to gain a definite conception of what society is, and of what it is that sociology treats, has to be satisfied with the answer that *social* phenomena are phenomena determined by the *consciousness of kind*. This new doctrine, put forward with so much emphasis in the preface and the first chapter, receives only an occasional allusion in the body of the work. Under the heading of *Association*, where the reader looks for a discussion of this fact which is to be the basis of all sociology, he finds one reference to its development (p. 104); and again (p. 109) we read of “an elemental passion . . . to define the consciousness of kind.” Six or eight other scattered references hardly suffice to define its scope and its meaning. I do not see that the “distinguishing mark of social phenomena” is used as such by Professor Giddings, nor does it receive sufficient attention to serve the student as a definition.

What Professor Giddings calls the “physical equilibration” of society is a familiar fact to both the historian and the student of statistics. Groups of men and of animals are subject to the same general laws of the “equilibration of energy” as are physical objects that have nothing to do with life. The size of a group of wild horses is determined within narrow limits (pp. 80, 205); it must be large enough for purposes of defence and small enough to secure the necessary degree of cohesion. Certainly we are justified in asking for the psychical interpretation of this same fact. Bain says, “Next to grass, the proper study of a sheep is sheep” (“Emotions,” p. 63). The psychologist to-day teaches that a man constructs the world in terms of his own *ego*, giving to it unity and system and definiteness as his own mind develops. Inevitably the savage constructs a savage world for savages, just as the Englishman constructs an English world for Englishmen. The group arising in the process of physical equilibration is constantly strengthened and moulded by psychical bonds. The mem-

bers of it learn to understand each other ; their world is practically the same, and their individual attitude to this world and to each other is easily comprehended ; much of the pleasure in companionship is due to the pleasure of dealing with what each understands. The imagination of any one individual is limited, but within the small group he can put himself in the place of another and share his delight or his anger. The sphere of such imagining, and correspondingly of one's interest, widens as the group develops, but in all stages it is limited to what the individual can in some degree understand. We may not accept the name "consciousness of kind" for this subjective side of social phenomena, but the fact cannot be denied. Professor Giddings raises the hope that this fact will receive thorough treatment, only to disappoint the reader.

In Chapter II. the province of sociology is determined after the method which Comte used, by a study of its relations to all related sciences. The discussion is thorough, and an exceedingly elaborate classification is the result. In general, the writer shows a great fondness for schematic classifications (*cf.* pp. 70, 73, 93, 341, etc.), which no doubt are of more use in the classroom than to the general reader. The weakness of this method is that it often obscures the main point at issue, and one cannot but wish that so important a topic as that of Chapter II. could have been so treated as to leave a more clear-cut impression on the reader's mind.

Passing over the chapter on Methods, which consists of generalizations of little practical value, I should like to call attention to the plan of a sociological "system" suggested in Chapter IV. The book before us is first to describe the elements of the social structure ; secondly, to examine the historical evolution of society, and finally to study the laws and causes of the social process which has already been analyzed and described. The use of "secondary" to denote what comes second, here and throughout the book (*e.g.* p. 141), is almost the opposite of the recognized English use of the word.

Book II., the discussion of the elements and structure of society, is by far the best developed and most useful part of the work. The student of politics, economics or history, will find here an exceedingly helpful analysis of the social phenomena, some one phase of which he is studying. The opening chapter discusses, first, the increase of society by internal growth and by addition from without ; second, various phases of association and the nature developed by association, and, third, the social classes. The different

parts of this chapter are nominally united by the heading, "Social Population," but the relation of these parts to each other and to the "system" is by no means clear. Chapter II. is an admirable study (on the lines of Le Bon) of the psychology of groups of men. The practical importance of this topic has been felt by public speakers and by all who seek to influence public opinion, but even here it hardly receives adequate treatment from the standpoint of sociology. By *social composition* (Chapter III.) Professor Giddings means the fact that society is composed of certain groups which are determined physiologically or by blood or by locality without reference to the accomplishment of any particular end. Such groups are contrasted with the associations for achieving particular social ends, which, when organized, form the *constitution* of society. Strictly speaking, the state and the family must be considered under both these heads; none the less there is an important difference between the two kinds of groups, and the difference is successfully utilized in these chapters.

I can only suggest that the discussion of social constitution might be made more profitable if more attention were paid to the social functions in the performance of which these groups arise. Chapter IV. consists mainly of a mass of statistics, presented, I suppose, to illustrate the importance of the different kinds of associations. The method of the book generally is to study groups of men, their size, their relations to each other, the stages in their development; and to pay little or no attention to their function in society. The only merit of "biological sociology" was its recognition of the truth that for society, as for the organism, the "organ" took shape in the performance of a "function." The sociological importance of the groups would be made much clearer in Chapter IV., by a farther analysis of their functions.

The historical evolution of society (Book III.) is an exceedingly difficult topic to treat. Professor Giddings approaches the task with a large amount of material at command, and these chapters are full of interest. The danger of writing freely on a wide range of subjects is that one may be tempted to put forward with the facts some rather questionable theories. The discussion of animism as due to a self-analysis (p. 246), and certainly the explanation of the rise of totemism (p. 248 *sqq.*), illustrate this danger. Chapter II. includes the discussion of such topics as the origin of man, the rise of language, and the hypotheses as to the origin of the differ-

ent human races,—topics which are not directly connected with the line of argument.

The general method of Professor Giddings is to distinguish a series of stages in social evolution: the anthropogenic stage, the metronymic tribe, the patronymic tribe, the military-religious civilization, and the economic-ethical civilization; then to discuss under each head the form of the family, the clan, and the state, and the existing intellectual and religious ideas. The result of this method is that we have no distinct history, *e.g.*, of the development of the family or of industry, but we have what is more important, namely, the discussion of the influence of each form of the family on the society to which it belonged. The author's distinction between liberal-legal and economic-ethical civilization is not clearly drawn, and the discussion of these topics lacks the orderly development which marks the rest of the book.

The reader who merely turns over the pages of the "*Principles of Sociology*," as the writer of the review in the *New York Nation* would seem to have done, may receive the impression that sociology is still nothing but a mass of facts which have something to do with society. But only a little attention suffices to show that a consistent idea of sociology controls the whole book, and most of the material presented is carefully used in the development of this idea. If, however, the book be judged by the aim set forth in the preface, much remains unfulfilled; I cannot discover in it an articulated system of sociological principles. Book IV., where we should expect the system to be most clearly developed, is not elaborated with at all as much care as the earlier parts of the work. The laws of social phenomena are merely suggested, nor have we any hint of their reach and importance. The one thought which is clearly brought out is the parallelism of the psychical side of social development, of the evolution of personality, with the physical side; the outcome of the social process is the association of persons.

It is hardly too much to say that we have in this book the first critical scientific study of social phenomena; the value of it, both for the student of the special social sciences and as the basis for future work in sociology, can hardly be over-estimated.

ARTHUR FAIRBANKS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. Vol. xi. Edited by Alexander Tille. Translated by Thomas Common. London: Henry & Co., 1896. Pp. xx., 354.

The increasing attention which is being paid to Nietzsche in this country is evidenced by the appearance of an English translation of his collected works in eleven volumes. The present volume, which initiates the series, contains the last four of Nietzsche's writings, composed between May and December, 1888. There is also a eulogistic introduction by the editor. Of these four writings, the first two deal with music; the third with some problems of civilization and culture; and the fourth with Christianity. But one drift of thought pervades them all: this is what Nietzsche himself calls his "Transvaluation of all Values." The "Transvaluation" means simply the application to human society of the very same principles of explanation that we apply to the organic world outside of man. So that, just as we commend any of the lower animals for having abundance of physical strength and the ability to defend itself and acquire food, we should, Nietzsche asserts, only commend a man for the same reasons. In short, ethics is to become physiology; and physiology is made the criterion of value in morality, religion, and art.

This naturalistic conception of value is seen even in the first two parts of the volume, which are entitled "The Case of Wagner" and "Nietzsche *contra* Wagner," respectively, and which deal ostensibly with music. His great charge against Wagner is that his art is "morbid." His objections to Wagner's music, he says, are "physiological objections." "Æsthetics is certainly nothing but applied physiology" (p. 67). In an earlier part (p. 24) we are told that Wagner is a "typical *décadent*," because he has transformed art into stage playing. "This total transformation of art into stage playing is just as definite an expression of physiological degeneration (more exactly, a form of hysterics) as any of the corruptions and weaknesses of the art inaugurated by Wagner." As against Wagner, Bizet is held up to the reader for his admiration. Bizet, among other things, has understood love, which is egoistic at root. The criticism of Wagner is rather far-fetched. Certainly, we meet with some very strange sayings. For instance, Wagner's music is declared to be Hegelian, the "Idea" as music!

The third part of the volume is called "The Twilight of the Idols," and contains Nietzsche's views on things in general. It is,

perhaps, the most interesting part of the whole book. The reader will gather from it that philosophy was not to Nietzsche a matter of books and study, but a life to be lived. In this respect Nietzsche might be compared with Carlyle. Such being the case, one must not expect from him an articulated philosophic system. But his main conception seems to be this. Power or force is the essence of everything. Nature exhibits it. The "struggle for existence" is only an exception in nature; it is an exuberance which rules. Here he combats Darwin. Darwinism seems to him to savor too much of the population question. "We must not confound Malthus with nature" (p. 177). Yet the Darwinian theory of the continuity of man with the lower animals underlies his whole attempt to naturalize ethics. For Nietzsche has a grand scorn for "ideals." "Ideal man" is declared to be "distasteful to the philosopher" (p. 192). "What justifies man is his reality" (p. 191). The more "power" a man has, the better he is. Disease, sickness, etc., are not the cause of decay, but its result or symptom. They belong to the "descending scale of life." When a man is of "the ascending scale," he has "power," and his selfishness is to be commended. Nietzsche holds altruism to be immoral. This notion of "power" would be suggestive, if it were not left so hopelessly vague. On the most natural interpretation of Nietzsche's words, it lands us in an egoistic view of ethics. One may also note Nietzsche's opinions on particular questions. Thus he vindicates suicide (pp. 195-198), and insists on the permanence of the conjugal union (p. 206). Yet, strange enough, we are told that marriage *cannot* be founded on love, but is founded on the impulse to possess property (woman and children as property). Kant is called "the most deformed conceptual cripple that has ever lived" (p. 163)!

The concluding part is entitled the "Antichrist." As might be expected, Nietzsche's attitude towards Christianity is one of antagonism. He asserts it to be a religion of the *décadents*, of people who are of "the descending scale of life." The doctrine of salvation is "a sublime, extended development of hedonism on a thoroughly morbid basis" (p. 283). Again, "the gospel of the lowly makes low." Christianity, we are also told, "hates the body." These quotations may suffice to show that Nietzsche's attack is really directed against a caricature of Christianity. It is astounding to one to be informed that throughout the whole New Testament there is not a single sympathetic trait. As for the

concluding paragraph of the book, nothing could excuse the writer of it but the fact of his insanity.\*

W. F. TROTTER.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

KNOWLEDGE, FAITH, AND DUTY. By the Right Hon. Sir Thomas Dyke-Acland. Pp. iv., 250. Kegan Paul & Co., 1896.

This little work, which is designed to guide and interest university extension students in "the study of principles taught by typical thinkers, ancient and modern," admirably fulfils its purpose. It is written in a fine and earnest spirit, and is throughout readable and stimulating. One of the main objects of the book is "to induce young students to study Lotze," as representing a rival philosophy to that of Herbert Spencer, and as combining in the most comprehensive form the truth of mechanism and the truth of idealism. The book is written generally from the stand-point of spiritual and more particularly Christian philosophy, but its presentation of conflicting principles is thoroughly impartial. The sidelight which it throws upon the philosophical influences of an earlier generation, especially that of Coleridge's philosophy, "which was as the wealth of life to young men half a century ago," is exceedingly interesting; and the author's apology for failing and advanced age makes it all the more striking that his book should be so thoroughly "up to date." It cannot fail to earn the gratitude and veneration of the students for whom he writes. The account of Aristotle's ethics is, perhaps, less satisfactory than other parts of the book; and it might be suggested that in the list of books recommended, the volume "Aristotelianism" might be replaced by Wallace's "Epicureanism," and Salter's "First Steps in Philosophy" might be added.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

PARADOXES. By Max Nordau. (Translated from Fifth German Edition.) Heinemann, 1896. Pp. x., 343.

The general reader is doubtless familiar with the manner and method of "Max Nordau." The author is at all times *flamboyant* and aggressive, but in this book is less on the war-path, and the general temper is more speculative. The essays are somewhat pro-

---

\* "Thus Spake Zarathustra, a Book for All and None," by Friedrich Nietzsche, will be reviewed in the next number by Professor William Wallace.

miscuous, but some of them, such as those on "Optimism and Pessimism," "Majority and Minority," and especially the "Psychophysiology of Genius and Talent," contain matter which is not only reasonable, but interesting and suggestive. But why Max Nordau should describe his opinions in these chapters, or upon morals and æsthetics, as "paradoxes," is not very evident; "dogmas," or even "glimpses into the obvious," would have been less misleading. The point of view, throughout, is "naturalistic and materialistic;" and the thought, if wanting in *nuance*, is at all times trenchant and abounding in "animal spirits." The author has a sociological theory which bears a general resemblance to Tarde's *Lois d'Imitation*; and he finds a ready explanation of knowledge, art, and morality in the principles of "naturalistic evolution." The book bears the impress of a buoyant and vivacious personality, and it is this which gives to its multifarious contents an unmistakable unity.

SIDNEY BALL.

**THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE.** Freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau. With an Introduction by Frederic Harrison. Three volumes. London: George Bell & Sons, 1896.

Miss Martineau's popular exposition of Comte was a notable and in many ways remarkable piece of work, and is deserving of recognition. But as Mr. Harrison has not attempted to edit her version, either in the way of modifying or even indicating the translator's mistakes, or of bringing Comte's science up to date, the present issue has a somewhat antiquated flavor. Mr. Harrison admits that it is not sufficient for students of philosophy; we are inclined to go further and add that there seems to be room for a still more popular and modern—as well as more complete—exposition of Comte. Mr. Harrison puts the same limits upon himself in the "Introduction." It should be noticed, however, that he has added a condensation of the last ten pages of the "Philosophy" which Miss Martineau suppressed "without any mention." On the other hand, the list of "criticisms" of Comte is singularly incomplete; it does not, for instance, include Caird's "Social Philosophy of Comte." On the whole, we are inclined to regret that Mr. Harrison has missed an opportunity, although it is interesting and satisfactory to gather that there is a demand for Miss Martineau's original work.

SIDNEY BALL.

## NEW BOOKS.

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY. By Herbert Spencer. Vol. III. London: Williams & Norgate, 1896.

THE CIVILIZATION OF OUR DAY. A Series of Original Essays on some of its more important Phases at the close of the Nineteenth Century. By the Right Hon. Professor F. Max Müller and others. Edited by James Samuelson. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1896.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By Frank Byron Jevons, M.A., Litt. D. London: Methuen & Co., 1896.

THE WORSHIP OF THE ROMANS. By Professor F. S. Granger, Litt. D. London: Methuen & Co., 1896.

EVIL AND EVOLUTION. An Attempt to turn the Light of Modern Science on to the Ancient Mystery of Evil. By the author of "The Social Horizon." London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

HABIT AND INSTINCT. By Principal C. Lloyd Morgan, F.G.S. London and New York: Edward Arnold, 1896.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM: the Gifford Lectures for 1895-1896. By Professor A. Campbell Fraser, D.C.L. London: Blackwood & Sons, 1896.

THE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. Vol. VIII. *Thus Spake Zarathustra, a Book for All and None.* Translated by Alexander Tille. London: H. Henry & Co., 1896.

BAU UND LEBEN DES SOCIALEN KÖRPERS. Von Dr. A. Schäffle. Zweite Auflage. Erster Band; *Allgemeine Sociologie*. Zweiter Band; *Spezielle Sociologie*. Tübingen: Verlag der H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung, 1896.

[Dr. Schäffle has actually succeeded in condensing this important work into two volumes of about 600 pages each!]

ELEMENTS OF GENERAL PHILOSOPHY. By the late Professor Croom Robertson. Edited by Mrs. C. A. Foley Rhys Davids, M.A., from Notes of Lectures delivered at University College, London, 1870-1892. London: John Murray, 1896.

ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY. By the same. Edited as above. London: John Murray, 1896.

AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOLOGY. By Edward Bradford Titchener. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

[An admirable text-book,—probably, in many respects, the best introduction to the subject that we have in English, at least from the experimental point of view.]

THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. (*Völkerkunde*.) By Professor Friedrich Ratzel. Translated from the Second German Edition by A. J. Butler, M.A. With Introduction by E. B. Tylor, D.C.L., F.R.S. With Colored Plates, Maps, and Illustrations. Vol. I. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

[A valuable work, of great anthropological and considerable sociological interest.]

- CHARACTER AS SEEN IN BODY AND PARENTAGE.** With Notes on Education, Marriage, Change in Character, and Morals. By Furneaux Jordan, F.R.C.S. Third Edition, thoroughly revised, with Illustrations. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1896.
- GENIUS AND DEGENERATION: a Psychological Study.** By Dr. William Hirsch. With an Introduction by Dr. E. Mendel. London: William Heinemann, 1896.
- TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.** By Edward Carpenter. New Edition. Manchester: Labor Press, 1896.
- MODERN CIVILIZATION IN SOME OF ITS ECONOMIC ASPECTS.** By the Rev. Professor W. Cunningham, D.D. London: Methuen & Co., 1896.
- CO-OPERATIVE PRODUCTION.** By Benjamin Jones. With Prefatory Note by the Right Hon. A. H. Dyke-Acland, M.P. In two volumes. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1896.
- THE PROBLEM OF THE UNEMPLOYED: an Inquiry and an Economic Policy.** By John A. Hobson, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1896.  
[An application of Mr. Hobson's theory of consumption to the treatment of the problem of the unemployed. A work of great economic interest.]
- FAMILY BUDGETS: being the Income and Expenses of Twenty-eight British Households, 1891-1894.** Compiled for the Economic Club. With an Introduction by Charles Booth, Ernest Aves, and Henry Higgs. London: P. S. King & Son, 1896.
- THE HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES.** By F. Bowmaker. London: Methuen & Co., 1896.
- MEDITATIONS ON FAITH AND PRACTICE.** By Clare Langton. London: Elliot Stock, 1896.
- A BOOK OF SCOUNDRELS.** By Charles Whibley. London: William Heinemann, 1896.
- THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL.** By W. S. Mackenzie, LL.B. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons; London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- REPORT OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE CONGRESS, held in 1895.** London: P. S. King & Son, 1896.
- GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE.** By A. Lawrence Lowell. In 2 vols. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1896.
- WAGES AND CAPITAL.** An Examination of the Wages Fund Doctrine. By F. W. Taussig. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1896.
- THE GOSPEL FOR AN AGE OF DOUBT.** The Yale Lectures on Preaching, 1896. By Henry Van Dyke, D.D. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- INFALLIBLE LOGIC.** By Thomas D. Hawley, of the Chicago Bar. Lansing, Mich.: Robert Smith Printing Co., 1896.
- EPICURUS: a Lecture** by Professor W. Wallace, LL.D. Published by the London Ethical Society, 1896.
- THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN: a Lecture** by Mrs. Bosanquet. London: Published by the Ethical Society, 1896.
- FABIAN TRACTS.** Nos. 1, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12 to 70. [2, 3, 4, and 6 being withdrawn

and 8, 11, 18, and 53 out of print.] London : published by the Fabian Society, 276, Strand, W. C., 1896.

LA POPULATION ET LE SYSTÈME SOCIAL. Par Fr. S. Nitti. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1897.

THÉORIES MODERNES SUR LES ORIGINES DE LA FAMILLE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ ET DE L'ÉTAT. Par Adolphe Posada. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1896.

L'ÉTAT COMME ORGANISATION COERCITIVE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ POLITIQUE. Par Sigismond Balicki. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1896.

CONSCIENCE ET VOLONTÉ SOCIALES. Par J. Novicow. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1897.

LA POLITIQUE DE SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN. Par Edouard Crahay. Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1896.

IMMANUEL KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. Translated into English by F. Max Müller. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

GESCHICHTE DES MATERIALISMUS und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart. Von Friedrich Albert Lange. Fünfte Auflage. Biographisches Vorwort und Einleitung mit Kritischem Nachtrag von Hermann Cohen. Leipzig: Verlag von J. Baedeker, 1896.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. Vol. II., No. 2. [Containing "Superiority and Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology," by Georg Simmel; "Some Social Economic Problems," by Clare de Grafenried; "The Ideals of Social Reformers," by Walter Rauschenbusch; "The Function of the Church," by E. M. Fairchild; "The Mechanics of Society," by Lester F. Ward; "Social Control," by Edward Alsworth Ross; "The Criterion of Distributive Justice," by Frank Chapman Sharp; "Christian Sociology," by Shailer Mathews; Reviews of Giddings's *Principles of Sociology*, Fairbanks's *Introduction to Sociology*, and Schäffle's *Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers*, by Albion W. Small, etc.] Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; London: Luzac & Co., 1896.

THE PROGRESSIVE REVIEW. Vol. I., No. 1. [Containing "Collectivism in Industry;" "Art and Democracy," by Edward Carpenter; "The Progressive Movement Abroad: (I.) The United States; (II.) Germany," etc. This review recognizes "that the free play of the enlightened self-interest of individuals cannot suffice to secure the common good, and that the state, as the organized intelligence and will of the community, is destined to play a larger part in ordering the life of the future." This point of view is represented with much ability and spirit.] London: Horace Marshall & Sons; New York: International News Company, 1896.

THE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. VI., No. 4. [Including "The Ethics of Socialism." By Canon E. L. Hicks, etc.] London: Rivington, Percival & Co, 1896.

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:

Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.

Prof. Fr. Jodl, Gerstengasse 43, Prague, Austria.

Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Llwyn Celyn, Llanishen, near Cardiff, Wales.

Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

---

APRIL, 1897.

---

## THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS.\*

THE science of psychology has made extraordinary progress within the last half-century ; and though for a science it is still in an early stage of development, it may now fairly be said to have constructed for itself a central group of conceptions from which to work out its future. In its terminology also it has abandoned its former use of terms made vague and fluctuating in meaning by current usage, and is gradually accumulating a well-defined terminology, such as every other science achieves for itself.

So far, however, these conceptions and this exact terminology have been for the most part confined to the text-books, and have not been used, so to say, in the open air ; they have been applied only to the material collected by the professional psychologist, and the professional psychologist tends to draw his material from the limited field of instances in which his ideas are most strikingly illustrated. We have, indeed, the so-called psychological novel, which is essentially a modern product. In it, instead of being left to infer our hero's "states of mind" from his words and actions, as in the old times, we are led behind the scenes and shown his mental struggles much more clearly than he can ever have seen them himself ; and it is conceivable that before long the play of his thoughts and feelings will be imparted to us in terms of the interaction

---

\* A paper read before the Socratic Society, Birmingham.

of his appercipient masses. But so far the novelist in his analysis has kept to the old indefinite terminology, and has made no attempt to explain his motives by the use of the deeper psychological conceptions.

I have just been reading Mr. Stout's very interesting and suggestive book on psychology, and thought it might be interesting to take two or three of the conceptions elaborated and explained in it and in Mr. James's book, and see whether they would give any interesting results when applied to some of our economic and social problems. Of course, in so far as they are true and adequate conceptions, they are already implied in those problems, and nothing more is necessary than to point out their bearings, and see how far they coincide with popular and academic conceptions on the same subject.

But first of all I want to point out that between psychology and sociology there is no line to be drawn. The latter science, if science it can yet be called, is based upon psychological analysis; the question as to how societies are formed can only be answered by appeal to the nature of men's minds; while those minds themselves which are the material of psychology are developed by living in societies. Let me quote from Maudsley's "Pathology of Mind," pp. 21, 22.

"To live in social relations implies a social nature within as well as a social medium without, for were there no community of kind such inter-relation could not be. Envy, emulation, malice, hatred, vanity, ambition, and the like human passions, exist only in relation to beings of the same kind; even a fool does not envy a good-looking horse or hate an ill-doing machine. Because all men are of one kind they are so infected by a panic of terror among themselves that they behave as foolishly and frantically as a flock of silly sheep, but they are not similarly affected by a panic amongst sheep. . . . Lacking a social medium for its nurture and display, hysteria would not attack the solitary inhabitant of a desert island; it would hardly be inspired to perform to the unheeding stars. In the absence of their proper stimuli, how can the fit reflexes take effect?"

In considering psychological conception, then, we are considering the bases of sociological science, and those conceptions themselves can only be really understood in connection with social relations.

Man, it has been said, but I cannot remember by whom,

is distinguished from the lower animals by his capacity for progressive wants. The lower animals have a certain larger or smaller cycle of desires, which being satisfied are quiescent, and incapable of further satisfaction until the same cycle begins again and runs its course of craving and satisfaction. With men, on the contrary, the satisfaction of the primitive wants may lead on through a constantly widening range of what we are pleased to call "higher wants;" in such wise that there seems to be absolutely no limit to their capacity for receiving new satisfactions. When men have their fill of food and clothing, they begin to desire luxuries and ornaments; when their appetites are satisfied, they turn their attention to dancing and music; the poet, the story-teller, and the artist then find a demand for their services, and so on until the primitive cycle may be almost lost sight of.

It is a truism to point out that this capacity for always discovering new wants is a necessary condition of human progress. Had it been possible to satisfy our natures with a mere sufficiency of food and clothing we should still be living in caves, huddled up in bear-skins and devouring the flesh of wild animals. Whether civilization owes most to the discontented men who were always wanting something new, or to the ingenious men who were always discovering new ways of making themselves acceptable to their companions, does not much matter. Both were essential to the process of developing the higher nature, and though there are those who maintain that men are unfortunate in proportion as they have developed higher wants,—*i.e.*, that they are better off when left undisturbed in the primitive cycle,—this opinion is not yet widely accepted.

But the fact that there are exceptions to the rule, that certain men would seem never to pass beyond the primitive cycle, thus forming an unprogressive "knot" in the flow of human progress, makes it of interest to inquire whether we cannot get behind the mere statement of the fact to some psychological explanation which will help us to account for the exceptions. Why is it that some people are content to pass their lives in eating, drinking, and sleeping, with intervals of

comparative quiescence, and are absolutely free from the stimulus of progressive desires? There is a chapter in Mr. Stout's book which seems to me to hold the clue to such an explanation. I refer to the chapter on "Conation and Cognitive Synthesis." I will try to explain briefly what I take to be the conception expounded in these and in other parts of the book.

The stream of consciousness in the individual life is represented to us as a current, not drifting aimlessly, but always directed towards some end, whether that end be itself in consciousness or not. To explain the existence of these "ends" towards which the stream is making, the conception is used of a "vital series,"—a conception originally applied, as I gather, in physiological connections. A "vital series" takes place when the equilibrium of mental elements has been disturbed by some shock or stimulus, and they are seeking a readjustment. In creatures still confined to the primitive cycle of wants the stimulus or shock will generally be due to such organic disturbances as lack of food, and the "vital series" will take the shape of a series of efforts to obtain food and so to restore the disturbed equilibrium. Then a period of more or less total quiescence or unconsciousness—corresponding to a state of mental equilibrium—will set in, until a fresh disturbance occurs within the organism, leading to a fresh readjustment.

Now, among the lower animals these readjustments are brought about very largely by means of instincts. "The peculiar feature of the life of animals," says Mr. Stout, "which prevents progressive development is the existence of instincts, which do for them what the human being must do for himself. Their inherited organization is such that they perform the movements adapted to supply their needs on the mere occurrence of an appropriate external stimulus."

To us these instincts have not been given. Possibly because in the early days they would have been quite inadequate to the protection of a weakly animal whose desires led him to want to eat things stronger than himself. A very simple instinct of pouncing brings the cat to the attainment of the

desired mouse; the human hunter relying upon as simple an impulse would be more likely to fall a victim to his quarry.

But, whatever the reason, the fact remains that man, having no sufficient instincts for the purpose, must achieve his ends by way of consciously devised means. For him the "vital series" leading to readjustment is a complicated one consisting of a number of steps, any one or all of which may be fully present to consciousness. Each of these steps in turn becomes the object of our striving; not at first for its own sake, but as leading to the end in view. The important point is that, having once been an end in the subordinate sense of being a means, it is henceforward capable of becoming an end in the principal sense. To use a simile: the traveller from London to Birmingham who goes by train will reach his end swiftly and surely, but will know little about the way he has come, and will not be tempted to travel any part of the route again until the need for going to Birmingham recurs. His journey is analogous to the instinctive action of the animal. The traveller who walks or rides will be longer on the way, and will have many difficulties to overcome; but every stage will have its interest for him. He will note *x* as being a good place to come for a short tour; and *y* as an interesting branch road to explore; and *z* as actually capable of yielding more satisfaction than Birmingham itself. Thus, every journey he takes will open up to him new possibilities for the future.

In a similar way every conation towards an end, however simple, that passes through conscious steps or "means," may open up fresh routes for future conations to pursue. Any one of the steps may achieve an independent interest and become desired for itself,—*e.g.*, the hunter glories in the chase long after his larder is full; the workman who takes up his handiwork for the sake of a living may come to enjoy it for its own sake; and the schoolboy who plies his task to avoid punishment becomes the scholar whom nothing can bribe to leave it. It is often noticed that the busier people are the more work they tend to undertake; while idle people are very hard to move. The real antithesis is not so much between busy and idle men as between men of many interests and men of

few. Every living interest opens the way to new ones, and the more energetically they are followed up the more possibilities reveal themselves. In fact, we must all have noticed that it is fatal to our peace of mind to take a keen interest in anything at all. The more often the mental equilibrium is disturbed the more it is exposed to fresh disturbances in the way of fresh interests.

How then account for any exceptions? Why do we find some people who show no signs of being progressive in their interests, and others who are actually limited to the primitive cycle, and seem incapable of breaking through it? In other words, how do people manage to achieve for their minds such a stable equilibrium as to become practically stationary?

For animals, we have said, instinct does it. Of course, their equilibrium is disturbed by the primitive cycle of recurrent wants, but it is restored again by simple instinctive action which does not trouble the mind with new interests. For them life, though not actually stationary (that would be a contradiction in terms), is not progressive, but repeats itself like a recurring decimal.

What instinct does for the animal, habit tends to do for man. In proportion as the means by which we reach our ends becomes easy and familiar it tends to become habitual, and unconscious in so far as each step ceases to attract special attention to itself. The vital series then takes place automatically; we are again travelling by train, quickly and surely, with little chance of losing the way, but also with no chance of opening up new ways. Then we also tend to become recurring decimals. We all know, probably, what it is to look back upon some period of our lives which seems to us now to have been full of possibilities, but which we passed through in an almost apathetic state, simply because we had become too habituated to it to notice. Then some great change or shock is forced upon the life, which is obliged to enter upon new ways, which may ultimately lead it into an altogether new world of interest.

Of course there is an immense gain if, *after* we have de-

veloped the higher interests, we can relegate the lower ones to automatic action. Then we send on our heavy luggage by train and leave ourselves free to explore new regions. But the danger is that the mind should never have broken through the primitive cycle, or should have been allowed to become automatic at a low level. The child who is never made to do things for himself, to find the solution to his own problems, will be slow to develop higher interests; also the man whose trust in Providence or his relations has taken the place occupied by instinct in the lower animals; and the same stationary condition must be expected in the man whose energies are so exhausted in satisfying the elementary needs that he never has a chance of following the suggestions to higher ones.

Mental struggle, then, is the first law of progress. Peace of mind must be left to the lower animals, if by peace of mind we mean nothing but freedom from cares and contrivings, puzzles and desires, and "obstinate questionings" of all kinds. What the child, the family, the whole community needs is constant disturbance of their mental equilibrium, combined with the necessity of consciously devising *for themselves* the vital series which is to bring renewed stability,—i.e., the satisfaction of desire. If any individual or class is cut off from this necessity, whether by the stagnation of habit, or the crushing weight of circumstance, or because they are unfortunate enough to have all their wants anticipated, they are as much cut off from the possibility of developing higher interests as the jelly-fish or the penny-in-the-slot automaton.

Now, I am well aware that we hear a great deal about the overstrain of modern life, and we are told sometimes that the great mass of the people have no time to lead a higher life; we are even threatened with an enormous increase of insanity, owing to the high pressure at which we live. My own impression is that, as I have been arguing, this high pressure is nearly all to the good, and infinitely more hopeful than any approach to stagnation. In support of this opinion, I will quote from Maudsley's "Pathology of Mind," pp. 29, 30.

"The full and varied exercise of mind elicited by a variety of interests is no less conducive to health and strength of mind than a full and varied exercise of

body is to its health and strength. The intellect suffers more from rusting in disuse than it ever does from its utmost use. One fact which the statistics of insanity in England has clearly shown is that the purely agricultural counties furnish the largest percentage of insanity in proportion to the population; that is to say, there is most madness where there are the fewest ideas, the most simple feelings, and the coarsest desires and ways. . . . Railways and steamboats may have done more to prevent insanity by the variety, than they have done to produce it by the hurry, of life which they have occasioned. The more numerous and various the impressions to which a mind is subject in the complex relations of life, the less likely is its balance to be upset by the exaggerated preponderance of any one of them."

The next conception of which I shall speak is that of *apperception*, in the modern sense of the term. It seems to me to throw much light on the way in which the mind develops, and therefore to be of great practical importance to all who are either interested in or desirous of influencing the mental development of others.

The old idea of the mind, we shall remember, was that of a clear surface becoming gradually written over with the experiences of life in much the same way as this sheet of paper was gradually written over, one line after the other. Or, to take a better illustration, the conception was more like that of a nursery screen which is pasted all over with a medley of pictures bearing no special relation to each other. (One of the older philosophers—Malebranche, I believe—spoke of ideas as actual substances, emanating from objects and adhering to or in the minds with which they happened to come in contact.)

In place of this crude idea of a mind which is being pieced together from the outside, there is now substituted that of a growing and organic system of ideas, thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and emotions; developing, indeed, from the simplest germ, but from first to last influencing its own development by its selection of the elements which are to enrich it, and by its influence upon them. The process is analogous to that by which a plant appropriates nourishment from the surrounding soil and atmosphere. Its growth depends upon the elements received from without, but, while they affect its growth and constitution, it in turn completely transforms their characteristics in the process of assimilation.

Mr. Stout's definition of apperception is "the process by which a mental system appropriates a new element, or otherwise receives a fresh determination." The essence of the process, and that to which I wish to call special attention, is that it is not a mere addition of new to old, but that the appropriation of new by old involves modification of both.

The modification of old by new is a more or less familiar conception to us. We speak of a man's views and opinions changing and mellowing with experience, and we feel, as we look back to younger days, how much the years have done to alter the organization and temper of our own minds. But we must carry this principle down from generalities into detail, and recognize that every new perception of whatever kind, in so far as it is fairly taken into the mind, is not only "one more" unit there, but alters the constitution of the whole group of ideas into which it is received.

Now the blending of new and old being of this intimate kind has for consequence,

(1) That nothing of a totally new nature *can* be received into the mind; it is impossible to give a new idea to minds not in some way prepared for it. Just as the plant can only assimilate the nourishment suited to it, so the mind can only accept elements to which there is already something analogous in its constitution. Where the new perception is only *relatively* new, has in it some familiar elements, it will be apperceived or received by that part of the mental system which is similar; and it is by this way of partial similarity or identity that the mind grows.

(2) What the mind sees depends upon what it already is. The town child who called a fern a pot of green feathers *could* not see what the country child or what the botanist would see, but saw what its past experience enabled it to see. Thus there is a tremendous tendency for the mind in receiving new experiences to change them into something more like what it already possesses. Indeed, in so far as it does receive them, it *must* so change them. The disappearance of the savage before civilization is said to be largely due to his sheer inability to "take in" all the new ideas and objects by which

he is confronted; the mind is killed by its futile efforts. But where the novelty is less overwhelming there is no limit to the ingenuity of the mind in interpreting, or misinterpreting, what it sees by what it already knows, so that it may come to some sort of understanding: a fact which is full of significance with respect to the success or failure of foreign missions.

This is what makes intercourse between people of different "upbringings" apt to be difficult, and should make us specially careful in placing our ideas before minds less developed (or differently developed) than our own, without making sure how they are interpreted. One man's meat is another's poison is far truer in the spiritual than in the physical world.

How does this tell on our question of social development? *Prima facie*, it seems to tend greatly against the possibility of our achieving any state of society in which the units shall be all the same; shall be, that is, individuals having the same views, interests, and mental experiences. For in the mental life differentiation is cumulative; not only do no two minds ever perceive an object the same way, but their perceiving it differently introduces a further element of difference into the mind which will affect all after experience.

And yet we all live in the same world, and *do* have similar views about it, and *are* able to come to some sort of understanding about our interests. That I take to be due mainly to two facts:

(a) That certain fundamental characteristics of affection and gregariousness form a common basis upon which all individual life is erected.

(b) That we are rational beings, and therefore share in a common mental organization which is reflected into our social organization. *Difference of detail does not involve difference of structure.* Two kinds of roses may differ in almost every external detail, but none the less both are roses.

I have only time to deal with the second of these facts,—that of our common mental organization. This is a conception which seems to have been entirely left out of sight by our Associationist Psychologists. J. S. Mill tells us in his

autobiography how he regards his father's most important work to be the fundamental doctrine of the formation of all character by circumstance, through the universal principle of association; through, that is, the association of pleasure with beneficial, and pain with injurious action. If this were a sufficient account of the matter, the well-trained dog or idiot should be as capable of developing character as the wisest man, for in both the principle of association can be made active.

But the once famous principle of association is now being relegated to its proper place as the mere machinery by which higher principles of organization develop. It is recognized that in proportion as the mind reaches higher stages of development it ceases to consist of mere trains of perceptions, thoughts, and ideas linked together by associations of time, space, and similarity, and has a definitely organized and complex content, dominated in its workings by definite interests and principles. *Noetic synthesis* is the term which Mr. Stout uses to describe this organization in the higher levels of intelligence. "In any given stage of thought," he tells us (Vol. II., p. 3), "the next step is partly determined by the controlling influence of the central idea of the topic with which the whole series is concerned, and partly by the special idea which has last emerged. In so far as it is determined by the special idea which has last emerged, the principle of association is operative: in so far as it is determined by the central idea of the whole topic, noetic synthesis is operative."

All purposive, rational thought and action, then, is guided by noetic synthesis; all casual, aimless speech or action, all chatter or punning or mere trifling, much narrative, and, again, all automatic action is guided by association alone.

Those who have listened much to the talk of uneducated women know what an aimless trickle of associated trifles it is apt to be. The listener can find no rational clue to the thought by which it is prompted; it is a narrative of utterly insignificant sayings and doings, only saved by some kind of observance of time sequence from descending into the meaningless jargon of the idiot. There is nothing to show that the minds of many men

do not drift in just the same way, though they find less ready utterance in speech. Their lives certainly show the same absence of "noetic synthesis;" day drifts after day in the same aimless fashion, all is ordered by habit, chance, association; nothing by purpose. Theirs is the very type of character formed by the great principle of association, for at every movement they sedulously avoid the immediately unpleasant and seek the immediately pleasant. Let us quote from Stout's "Psychology," p. 34.

"The varying degrees of noetic synthesis . . . broadly correspond to the degree of intelligence of the individual, either in general, or in special directions. The more developed it is, the less conspicuous by comparison is the part played by association. A person of disciplined intelligence in narrating an occurrence brings together the really relevant points as parts of a systematic whole, discarding whatever is superfluous. A country yokel seems unable to proceed otherwise than by casual associations of proximity in time and space. The important items are for him so embedded in a flood of irrelevant details that it is difficult to disentangle from his chaotic narrative the essential circumstances. In other words, there is present in the one case a mental synthesis which is absent in the other."

Now this mental synthesis corresponds to a higher and more complex grouping of mental contents. Experience, as it comes to a mind of this type, ranges itself in subordination to the principles and purposes which are dominant, and the conception of a mere stream of consciousness develops into that of a *mental system*.

We may picture this systematization of the mind as a grouping of mental elements according to the various topics or interests which predominate; much as in highly civilized communities men are grouped according to their interests into families, clubs, unions, nationalities, religious and political sects, and so on. The higher the type of mind and the development of character, the more complex and complete will be its organization according to interests and purposes.

If this newer conception of mental organization be a true one, it seems clear that the principle of association, as translated into a system of rewards and punishments, will not do more than develop a quite common-place type of character. It may be the best means we can use in certain directions towards restraining tendencies which would otherwise be in-

jurious to the community ; as a positive and educational principle it is of little use. All wise teachers, I believe, recognize now that the best way of dealing with naughty children is to absorb their whole attention with some *interest*, which will not only leave no energy to spare for naughtiness, but will of itself tend to organize their minds, to subordinate mental elements to a *purpose*, and so to develop character.

Again, why is it that some of us think it undesirable that rich people, or the state, should play the part of special Providence to the poor? The lazy answer reverts to the principle of association and says, "you must let them feel the consequences of being drunken, or idle, or improvident, and then they will strive harder against it." But this clearly applies only to some few among the poor, and even with reference to those few indicates only the beginning of the better things we hope for. The fuller answer is, that for every man interests naturally arise which are capable of organizing his life and developing his character, the interests of supplying his own wants—higher and lower—and those of his family ; and if these interests are taken out of his hands, without the introduction of others equally powerful, he is simply left to drift without the possibility of development. The only way of really helping a man is to strengthen him by education, timely assistance, opportunities, what you will, to meet his own difficulties and organize his own life ; and so also of any class in the community, only by their own activities can they develop progressive interests, and only by purposes and progressive interests can they organize their lives successfully.

We might apply the same idea to political education. We shall hardly make much advance in this direction until our politicians cease to appeal solely or mainly to the special desires of their constituents,—which is really nothing but the system of rewards (*i.e.*, bribes) over again,—and seek to interest them in wider issues. So far as people are encouraged and helped to devise ways of meeting their own needs they must necessarily find their way sooner or later to the wider issues ; but so far as material benefactions are forced upon them from without, they will no doubt accept them, but will

lose in progressive power more than they gain in material wealth.

Take as one instance out of many the question of old age pensions, which at one time threatened to become the chief political interest of the day. It is in no sense a scheme devised by the class which would benefit, nor have they shown any energy in pushing it or in devising ways and means. Of course they will take it when offered, and of course they will like a candidate for election better for offering than for opposing it. But for the very reason that it comes as a wind-fall from without, having nothing to do with their own plans, it may do little to really improve their position; while it will cut them off from one department of energetic development in which very good results had already begun to appear.

Finally, a conception which I take to be all important from the point of view of social progress is that of the wider self; or, as we may call it, the elastic self. What do we mean by the self? Some have been known to say it is the body, others that it is the mind or soul, others again, the mind or soul plus the body. From a psychological point of view it is enough to say that it is the mind or soul, and that includes the body and much more beside, for it includes all experience. The soul literally is, or is built up of, all its experience; and such part of this experience, or soul life, as is active at any given time or for any given purpose constitutes the self at that time and for that purpose. We know how the self enlarges and expands as we enter upon new duties, acquire new interests, contract new ties of friendship; we know how it is mutilated when some sphere of activity is cut off, or some near friend snatched away by death. It is literally, and not metaphorically, a part of *ourselves* which we have lost.

But if, then, all we know is self, what shall we do with our useful old words selfish and unselfish? For practical purposes, of course, we can use them just as before. The important point is that to a great extent we get rid of the apparent incompatibility between egoism and altruism, between the so-called self-regarding and extra-regarding conduct. The unselfish nature becomes now the self with wider interests, or the self in which

the wider interests predominate over the narrower. The father who feels himself more mutilated by loss of wife and family than by loss of a limb does so, not because he is specially altruistic, but because his family was a far more vital part of his self than his limb. The loss of reputation, or injury to the social self, is worse to many than the loss of health or injury to the material self. The patriot who sacrifices all private interests to the welfare of his country has subordinated the narrower self to the wider. We no longer, therefore, need to teach self-abnegation, but the enlarging of the self, the finding it in wider interests.

Here we are obviously at a point where psychology merges into sociology ; indeed, we cannot draw any line between them. Here we have two men whose more important interests are the same ; who strive for the same ends, are actuated by the same motives, and respond in the same way to a given stimulus. In so far as this is the case they have a common self, or their interests are so organized as to be correlative to each other ; they play into each other in such a way as to supplement and support, so that neither is itself without the other to complete it. This, of course, is the secret of family life ; and this, when we take it over a wider circle, is the justification for the theory of the general will of a community.

The self varies with time and occasion according to the mental elements or apperceptive masses which predominate. In other words, we are ruled by different motives, desires, and affections according to the circumstances under which we are placed. Sometimes we undergo the painful experience of having two sets of motives struggling for predominance, and according as the self is well or ill organized the result will be heroic or disastrous. Do we always realize how much heroism is involved in a strike in those cases where the men subordinate their own material needs and domestic affections,—not from fear of the union, but from a true recognition of wider issues ? They may sometimes be mistaken heroes, but they are heroes none the less ; and there is no limit to the possible progress of a community of men with powers such as these.

But this progress may be indefinitely retarded if the motives

by which they are actuated are not themselves progressive, and such as will lead to a continuously wider development of the self. Any propaganda, for instance, which appeals only or mainly to material needs, will fail to raise its followers to any high level of civilization or happiness, for it is concentrating the attention of the self on comparatively narrow and unprogressive issues. And any propaganda which thrives by the inculcation of class hatred and jealousy works for the destruction of its disciples as surely as for that of the community; for hatred and jealousy are disintegrating forces leading alike to madness in the individual self and civil wars in the state.

All one-sided and emotional teaching (*irrational* teaching) has this disintegrating effect. At first it may seem successful; the mind seems to acquire new experience and to respond to new motives, and only time can show whether the interests and the motives are such as will enable it to organize life successfully,—*i.e.*, in correspondence with the wider interests of the community. For instance, to illustrate by extreme cases, under certain conditions, such as the influence of some strong emotion, certain elements of the self can be maintained in predominance to the total exclusion of others, which are, technically speaking, *inhibited*,—prevented from coming into action. This is the explanation of one type of conversion, such as that practised by the Salvation Army. Experience seems to show that there is no permanence in conversions of this type, unless supplemented by the acquisition of really rational and organizing ideas. The bad self is merely stupefied or drugged, and sooner or later reasserts itself with all its old power. Cases of hypnotism are analogous; almost all the mental elements are lulled into stupor; the self becomes identified with one small group of presentations dominated by the operator, who thus acquires complete power over his attenuated victim. But influence of this kind can have no real organizing power over the true life; it works by suppression and not by development; and is always liable to be frustrated by anything which arouses the fuller and wider self.

So with much of the teaching which is offered to our

working-classes to-day. It gains its influence not by presenting them with wider issues and stronger sympathies, which would enable them to harmonize their lives with that of the community, and so to share in as well as to advance its progress; but by concentrating the attention of the class upon its narrower self, and by exciting disintegrating emotions. The elements of a prosperous and progressive community must play into, support, and recognize each other just as the elements of a sane and progressive mind must support and recognize each other. The growth of wider interests should mean, not the suppression, but the fuller development of narrower ones; and what is needed in social as in individual life is the introduction of organizing and not of disintegrating ideas.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

---

## THE MORAL LIFE OF THE EARLY ROMANS.

THE historian of morals sets about a task which is almost impossible. For its accomplishment several things are necessary; yet they can rarely be attained. He must know the forms in which, from time to time, the moral ideal presented itself, the adverse influences to which it was opposed, and the amount of the effort which the individual spirit made to reach it. These difficulties are so great that some have almost forbidden us to pass judgment upon the moral character of a single human being; much more, therefore, ought we to hesitate in passing judgment upon a whole nation. At any rate, we ought to express our conclusions in terms that answer to the uncertainty and difficulty of the argument. For we have to deal not so much with facts as with the relations that hold between them; not so much with actions as with their value. Everything depends, then, upon our applying suitable standards and upon our viewing things in their proper perspective. Hence we shall begin by marking off the place of Rome in the moral education of the world so that we may come to her life with the right expectation, and may not demand attain-

ments from her which only became possible when her career was already half done. After a short historical account directed to this end, we shall be able to go on and describe the moral life of the early Romans.

The history of the moral ideal has been sketched by Green in one of the most interesting portions of the "Prolegomena to Ethics." \* He sought, however, to lay down the principles of right conduct rather than to describe the life of the good citizen in its fulness and variety. He was thus led to dwell upon the contribution made by Greek thought to the moral life of the present, and to pass over what we owe to another source, the ancient temperament of the Romans. The Greek thinkers, as he says, have delineated once for all "the articulated scheme of what the virtues and duties are in their difference and in their unity." † And we might imagine that the bequest of Rome scarcely deserved to be set along-side of it. This, however, would be a mistaken idea. Sentiments which seem to have entered into the very fibre of the modern mind, and to all appearance are not to be marked off from the rest of our psychological heritage, can yet be traced to foreign sources as we travel up the stream of tradition, and we shall wonder, perhaps, to find so much that seems special to the Anglo-Saxon, anticipated in the primitive Italian. It might even be urged that in the realm of practice we owe more to Rome than to Greece. For while the Grecian moralists have influenced the leaders only of modern thought, the Roman ideal has been operating upon the general mind. The renaissance, in its wide-spread effects, has so far been Roman in the main; the Greek has yet to come forth from the very narrow field to which it is still confined. At first or second hand we have all been to school to Cicero and Virgil, Horace and Livy. The literature of modern Europe bears their imprint almost upon every page. And we have learned from them something more than the bare facts of Roman history, or the legends of Rome decked out with Greek mythology. We have acquired a point of view and a standard of judgment

---

\* Bk. iii. c. 5.

† Ibid. p. 249.

which we apply without remembering whence we drew them. Hence, while the form of modern ideas about conduct is of Greek origin, their content is largely Roman. This is more evident outside the field of literature of which it is so easy to over-estimate the influence. It is in the institutions and laws of the civilized world that the Roman spirit still lives. Above all, it has entered into the Christian religion. That the forms of the imperial administration were mirrored in the ordinances of the early church was but the symbol of something deeper. Nearly all that was best in the social life of the empire was assimilated by the Christian community. The early fathers recognized a spirit kindred with their own in the sanctities of the Roman family, and were met half-way by their antagonists of the better kind.\* The patriotic Roman, who dwelt fondly upon the religion of Numa and sought to restore it, could not overlook the resemblance between his aspirations and the new rule of conduct. Once more, it might seem to him, the marriage tie was regarded as sacred ; once more the minds of the young were shielded from pollution ; and the passionate communion with the dead upon which the religion of primitive times was based, revived in the life of the catacombs and the veneration of martyrs.

You object, perhaps, that there is too little evidence about the spiritual life of the earlier ages, and that such evidence as we possess in the extant literature is too far penetrated with Greek influences to be trustworthy. The answer is not far to seek. The influence of Greece upon Rome was on the surface. Outside the capital and the large towns the current of existence in Italy changed its course very slightly. To take the history of the city for that of Italy is like our habit of thinking that Paris represents the French nation. The fevered capital might spend itself in the huge schemes of ambitious generals, in the turbulence of the forum, in the vulgar excess which is the shadow of wealth quickly acquired, in the unscrupulous self-seeking which shrank from no sacrifice of life. But there was many a spot where the years were still

---

\* Aug. De Civ. v. c. 12, Lact. v. c. 5.

passed in a more tranquil fashion. The accents with which Virgil and Livy speak to us are those of the northern plains; where, it would seem, that the settlers of Piacenza and Cremona had transmitted to their descendants the frugality, soberness, and reverence which could be found even at Rome before the second war with Carthage. Horace, with somewhat less sympathy, describes the life of his neighbors in the valley of the Licenza; but the tone of the picture is almost the same. And Cicero in the essay on "Old Age" depicts a country life which resembles the ideal of the "Georgics" very closely. It is no mere accident that these four names that, for us, seem to sum up the world in which the Roman lived, are the names of men born in the country and steeped in its traditions. It was upon this treasury of wisdom, courage, and patriotism that Rome drew continually, and her downfall was begun already when she had exhausted the rural population of Italy.

It is possible to fix the moment at which the Romans passed from agriculture to the life of the large towns. During the long war with Hannibal the farmers suffered severely. Their land lay uncultivated. Their homesteads fell into ruin. Their fruit-bearing trees had been cut down; a serious matter in the case of the olive which required so many years to reach maturity. This disorganization of agriculture coincided with the opening up of new corn supplies; the harvests of Sicily and Egypt became the rivals of the Italian crops, just as, at the present time, Argentina and India compete with the farmers of Norfolk and Lincolnshire. The land passed out of cultivation into a wildness worse than primæval, or was worked in huge stretches by slave labor. Meanwhile the old population drifted to the capital or the nearest large town and was merged into the seething masses of hangers-on.

Of course, there were reasons, other than those of economics, for the ending of the ancient order. The world could not be governed by an assembly of farmers coming to their market-town from time to time. But the change, necessary as it was, brought with it grave dangers, and it is not altogether the professional pessimism of the moralist which leads the Augustan writers to speak in such bitter terms of the prevail-

ing degeneracy. The deeply-marked contrast between town and country helped to give weight to their indictment. And this contrast explains the methods by which the emperors sought to bring back the harmonious and peaceful social order of the early republic. The settlement of veterans, which plays so large a part in the politics of the empire, was an attempt to reproduce the colonization of the republican era. The agrarian measures of Augustus went hand in hand with his revival of the old religion and with the laws against luxury. The contemporary poets were pressed into his service, and they represented the virtues of the old yeomen in such a light that it seemed as if the one remedy for the ills of the state was to go back to the land, whereupon, as though by magic, piety, righteousness, and simple manners would once more flourish side by side.

There is no reason to doubt that Augustus was sincere in these aspirations; yet he still waits to have justice done to him. As the "*Idylls of the King*" limned somewhat faintly the amiable features of the prince consort, or as the "*Faery Queen*" presented three centuries ago the perils and triumphs of Elizabeth, so in the hero of the "*Æneid*" the understanding reader may apprehend the mystic figure of the emperor who hoped to find a cure for the wounds of the Roman world by recourse to the ancient springs of Roman life. The poet was nearer the truth than he perhaps intended. The buffetings which fate dealt out to Æneas were in some kind a prophecy of the gloom which gathered round the last years of Augustus. The successive deaths of his appointed heirs and the calamity of Varus chastened him with a melancholy that atoned almost for the license and savagery of his youth. But the sunset of his life carried with it the promise of a fairer future; the historian who lights upon the age of the Antonines as an oasis in the desert of human misery will not refuse to acknowledge the services of Augustus. He was the second founder of the city, the father of his country, the law-giver who reinforced the trembling hopes of the lovers of peace with the magic splendor of ancient ritual and the benign compulsion of a world-wide security.

Two centuries later, when the cycle of ancient civilization had attained its Indian summer and, under all the gorgeousness of its outward show, was hastening to decay, another emperor dreamed of curing the ailments of the state by recourse to the religion of Numa. Once more it was the fashion to enact the quaint drama of a ritual barely understood. But the interval that had elapsed since the death of Augustus had left its mark. The surging populace of the metropolis sought religious satisfaction in the worships that come crowding in from the east, and the revival of Marcus was exposed to a rivalry tenfold greater than that which befell the efforts of Augustus. While the somewhat cold statesmanship of the latter reflected in very deed the underlying spirit of the old order, Marcus Aurelius viewed the sacred tradition from the stand-point of the later Stoics, which was certainly not the stand-point of his subjects. For he combined with the practical instincts of the great ruler a strange aloofness of the spirit; a withdrawal from the world of actual life which anticipated the solicitude of the hermits of the Thebaid. The religious ceremonial, which seemed to Augustus the expression of a comely and ordered existence, was to Marcus but a concession to social needs and fell short of the cravings of the truly wise "citizen of the world," who knew himself to be a participant in the universal reason. For Augustus, the exterior conduct of life according to the ancient custom was everything; for Marcus, the interior experience had become so rich in capacities, vocations, duties, that the actual institutions of Rome retreated into the background as but a partial embodiment of the human spirit; venerable as conveying to us the voice of the wise past, and deserving to endure, but needing to be placed in subordination to the God who dwelt in each man's breast. The primitive life of Rome was echoed not inaudibly in the reforms of Augustus, but it could scarcely be recognized in the stoic ideals of the imperial solitary; while it was lost—only to resound more deeply—in the diapason of the Christian experience.

The reader is now able to measure the allowances that we must make in judging the moral life of the early Roman. We

shall begin by watching his religion at work.\* For in whatever guise the scheme of human duties presents itself to the moral philosopher, they have most authority over the average human being, and are acquiesced in with least reluctance, when they offer themselves as the ordinances of religion. The life of early Rome was a religious one throughout. Amid all its outward change and turmoil it was guided by powers of which we are told so little, just because they were so familiar. Each act was put under the protection of a particular spirit and therefore had a sanctity of its own. The minds which were susceptible to imaginative promptings lived in an unbroken fellowship with those spirits who drew near so punctually at each critical moment. The reaper in the fields, the vine-dresser on the sunny hill-side, the traveller about to commit himself to the dangers of fresh scenes; each, from hour to hour, invoked the kind offices of that mysterious being who watched over the undertaking of each moment. This belief joined with the respect for the traditions of the ancestors to render custom strangely rigid. If the citizen varied from the practice handed down from the fathers, he provoked the displeasure of the spirit whose help was needful for success. Life seemed, therefore, a perpetual sacrament in which every operation was consecrated and transfigured by divine presences. The good citizen who in those ancient times was also his own priest, and needed no intermediary, never put off his sacerdotal character. He performed acts of worship many times each day. In the light of this fact, no doubt can be felt by those who have watched the effect exercised by ritual upon the mind of the devotee, that the religious faith of the Roman—meaning by this a visionary realization of the objects of his worship—was exceedingly intense, if not very articulate, and operated upon every part of his being. Not only was his life guided by these somewhat formless powers, it was beset with a great society of departed kinsmen. The Roman lived in perpetual remembrance of his ancestors. Until the custom

---

\* The evidence for these statements about Roman religion will be found in the writer's "Worship of the Romans," pp. 52-73 and 134-136.

was forbidden by the Twelve Tables, they were buried near the dwelling. In later ages the wax masks of the deceased, which were disposed in small cases round the atrium, nourished the same sentiment as that more primitive custom which made a mortuary chapel of the home. Each day some fragments of the chief meal were set aside for the ghostly enjoyment of the dead. Throughout the year there were also stated festivals, in which resort was made to the tombs which lay beyond the city walls; on the solemn *Feast of the Dead*; the *Day of Violets*, when stocks and wall-flowers were laid upon the tomb; and the *Day of Roses*. The citizen was thus one in a great company of which the departed far outnumbered the living. If we wished to enter into his mind, we might well transport ourselves to one of those great burial societies, under whose forms the Roman Christians lived their hidden life. Nay, more; the early churches presented, as a whole, the profoundest likeness to the Roman family. For within the limits of the latter, life was lived, as in a religious community. Each family had its sacred traditions. The father of the family was guarded in his prerogatives by the jealousy which all innovations in religion aroused. The public sentiment forbade even the chief pontiff to tamper with the ritual of the Roman hearth. This respect for the living head of the house gathered up into itself the awe which attached to the memory of his predecessors, and aggrandized *the fatherly power* almost beyond all limit. But this power was continued only to the man who kept faithfully the custom of the elders whose representative he was, and a law, not the less powerful that it was unwritten, enjoined upon him in each moment of serious decision to take the advice of others who belonged to the same community.

Any act which threatened the well-being or the continuance of the family, aroused a resentment the strength of which was proportioned to the intensity of the family feeling. Although it is difficult to estimate the relative purity of manners, the infrequency of divorce under the early republic, seems to indicate that the marriage tie was observed very strictly, at least on the wife's part. The husband, however,

did not regard himself as bound to an equal strictness, and used the license accorded to him in all slave-holding nations, whether under the patriarchal conditions of ancient Palestine or in the Mohammedan countries of the present. In spite of this, the Roman home was the centre of a life self-reverent and self-controlled. The authority of the father—which continued to be exercised over the adult sons of the house—and the tranquillity which in the main marked the civil life of Rome, braced up the will, and the older city was less scorched by the flames of passion than the generation that knew Clodius and Fulvia, Catullus and Mark Antony. But when the ancient manners broke down, and some of the checks were removed from the hot Italian temperament, it found its expression in the wild dissoluteness of the capital and of the haunts of pleasure that arose round the bay of Naples.

Even the avarice, of which we shall see the evils, gained some dignity when it succeeded in handing down the patrimony unimpaired or even increased. Native wisdom tried to build ramparts against the spendthrift heir. "Generosity has no bottom." "Frugality is as good as a revenue," said another old saw. "What you do not need is dear at a farthing" was a favorite maxim of Cato. But if these hints failed, the indignant relatives might appeal to the prætor, and take control of an estate from the hands that wielded it badly. Another quality which at first view is repellent, the suspicious treatment of strangers, showed the same exclusiveness on the part of the family as that which characterized the state. It had its ground in the strict severance that limited the ritual of each family to its members. These habits of quiet self-mastery, of parsimony, of caution, are thus derivable, in large measure, from the constitution of Roman society. When the citizen wavered in the hour of deliberation he could fall back upon the custom of the elders, knowing well that on the whole it would serve his own best interests.

The religion of the Roman, therefore, while it depended in part upon his surroundings, was to a much larger extent the outcome of his temperament. For him religion was the vehicle by which each generation of elders imposed upon the

succeeding age its own modes of thought, feeling, and conduct. It was the national spirit forever embodying itself in the citizen. Hence the moral life, which was determined so much by his religion, was not imposed upon him only from without. It was the joint product of his nature, and of the environment upon which it reacted. We have reviewed the internal factor in this process. We have now to take account of external influences, of economical and political conditions. In proceeding to the first of these tasks, we shall be occupied specially with the moral effects of the agricultural system of early Rome.

Virgil, in two of the noblest passages of Latin poetry,\* claims boldly that the greatness of Rome proceeded from her farmers. "The country," he says, "was the last spot traversed by Justice in her wanderings before she left the earth forever. It was the home of piety towards the gods and of the family life. It was the teacher of temperance and of endurance, and imparted that best of gifts, peace of mind unruffled by care." Yet even while we are lulled by the chime of Virgil's verse, we must remind ourselves that he was above all things a consummate and conscious artist. His hand was practised (to change the figure) in portraying rural life with glowing tones. It is to his "Eclogues" that the country owes the fanciful glamour that has been cast over it, and the ancestors of the dainty figures of Watteau are found in the shepherds and ploughmen of Virgil. Even his shadows are relieved with changing hues and the contrast thrown by them is too faint. We must complete for ourselves the picture drawn by him and emphasize the dark patches which he passed over.

Rustic frugality lent itself to the growth of avarice of the worst kind. It was not content with bare hoarding. The yeoman with spare capital employed it in obtaining a lien upon the farm of his struggling neighbor. As he prospered, he sacrificed the duties of the patriot to the instincts of the money-lender and land-grabber. The poor farmer, for example, whose land had been ravaged by a hostile incursion soon

---

\* *Georg.* II., 136 ff., 458 ff.

had to regret the treacherous assistance of his neighbor. The high rate of interest made it impossible for all but a few to discharge their debts. The debtor lost homestead and land; while his disasters were crowned by slavery, his person passing as security into his creditor's power. The agitations caused by this odious slavery were already stirring the state to its depths in the years that followed the expulsion of the kings. On one occasion, as a levy was being held in the market-place, a centurion appeared emaciated and in rags, who was recognized as having performed some noted feats of arms against the enemies of the republic. His history was like that of many another. He had borrowed money to pay the war tax. He was unable to return the loan, and his creditors—acting, it is true, within their rights—had arrested him and imposed the hardest slave labor upon him. He escaped from prison, and presented himself amid his fellows just as they were about to take the field again. The rising feelings of the people compelled the government to take steps to remedy the injustice. It was a like fault of temper that in later times took greedy advantage of the privileges of office, and looted the provinces. The Sabine nurture which was sometimes compared with that of the Spartans, resembled it for evil as well as for good. The temptations of political service abroad were too much for it. The proconsuls who plundered Asia and Sicily were of the same bent as Pausanias and Lysander.

This hardness of temper was made more intense by the institution of slavery. An easy optimism may prefer to dwell upon those aspects of history which are merely interesting, and may use on occasion the tragedies of human lot to keep alert an idle curiosity. But in the Roman world there were abysses of suffering which spread downward, circle after circle, into a hell the mere sight of which, to a modern, is a torture. And although the condition of the Roman slave was not so bad in the days before the second war with Carthage, as it afterwards became, it would be difficult to paint it in too lurid colors. He was far worse off than in Greece, where the law stepped in to secure him from the worst forms of injustice. At Rome he was absolutely in the power of his master. The fierce verses

of Juvenal show us how the Roman owner regarded his relation to the slave.

"Crucify him !

"What is the slave charged with ? Where is the witness ? O listen ! No delay is too long if the matter is of a man's death.

"You are mad. Is the slave then a man ? Though he be guiltless, it is my will to punish. I command it. My caprice is reason enough !"

The Roman who was scrupulous in carrying out his lawful obligations, and in exacting their performance from others, had no guiding principle beyond the limits of the law, and the heart left thus to itself, *pectus sibi permissum*, revealed, as it were, the human tiger athirst for blood. The reader who thinks this an exaggeration, may be invited to consider all that was involved in the taste for gladiatorial shows. There seems some reason for holding that such a taste is the outcome of mental disease in the literal sense, and that the Roman temperament was abnormal in this particular. It is extraordinary that a nation in which the respect for law and for constitutional methods was great, should have reconciled itself to the violence which marked its political life. Assassination was a recognized party weapon. An advocate, in the presence of a Roman tribunal, enumerated as admitted precedents the successive murders of the Roman reformers from Cassius to Gaius Gracchus.\* This complacency, incredible and even fatuous as it appears now, was shared by his contemporaries. The horrors of the proscriptions and of the civil wars, in which the Roman nation literally committed suicide, bear many of the marks of insanity. Unless this fact is realized, the meaning of the downfall of the Republic is understood only in part. It is this failure to understand it, that has caused the charges of insincerity, which have been urged against the poets in whom the age of Pharsalia and Philippi found a voice. The denunciations of civil war and the praises of the ruler who promised to give peace to the world, have only too much meaning when they can be interpreted by the ruined solitudes of a once populous and flourishing country-side.

---

\* Cic. Pro Mil., 83.

It is a paradox of the moral life that great crimes may have for their authors those in whom great excellences are also found. For the sympathies may be blunted in some directions and retain their freshness in others. The Roman who was so great within the narrower limits of his tradition could yet come short of the social ideal to the extent that has just been indicated. But we must not be surprised beyond measure at his callousness. The progress of the humane feelings is a very slow one, and a year that has seen a Christian nation tortured to death with the connivance of the Russian foreign office, amid the sullen indifference of the rest of Europe, makes the task of measuring this progress somewhat difficult. It will be granted, however, that the Romans were backward. Even the sensitive Virgil finds no place in hell for the cruel slave-driver.\* The lesson of human equality and brotherhood had to be brought to Rome by the Stoics; one of those services of the Greek philosophy which may be set over against the ridicule which Roman wiseacres of the old school directed against it.

The fashion of being callous to the sufferings of the slave may be understood if we look at the institution for a moment with the eyes of a master. Slave labor in the ancient world performed many of the offices which are now taken over by mechanical inventions. For the building contractor it moved huge masses of material. For the merchant it rowed the cargo-boats when the wind failed. Even the cheapening of books, which we owe to the printing-press, was anticipated by the great companies of copyists who worked for publishers like Atticus and the Sosii. Such a civilization had a precarious footing, and moved, as it were, over the fiery ashes of a volcano. The rising of Spartacus had shown the masters what they might expect if their chattels gained the upper hand. Any sympathy therefore which might be expressed for the slaves was met by deep distrust. Only in this way can we account for the strange silence of the Roman writers in the face of so iniquitous a system.

---

\* Cf. *Æneid*, vi. 608, ff.

In matters of reason, however, the feelings are treacherous guides, and need to be sharply disciplined. We must free ourselves from the passion of the partisan and of the enthusiast if we would use the judgment of the historian. If, thus prepared, we ascend *the watch-towers lofty and serene rampired by the learning of the wise*, we may perhaps discern the confused tangle of human affairs ordering itself into the forward march of the race. The untold miseries of millions of slaves have gone forever to swell the mysterious record of pain which, so we would persuade ourselves, is kept somewhere. But these sufferings were not wholly in vain. They aided the establishment of a better condition of life. The sentimentalist, whose view of the whole of human affairs can always be blinded when he is touched by sympathy for the individual, may find in slavery an argument against the providential government of the world. Yet even here we may observe the slow harmony of discordant elements gaining strength as the civilization of Rome takes shape. Slavery was one of the means by which Rome absorbed into herself the neighboring populations that she might free them afterwards. More than this, the happy life of the country-side had been sustained by the labor of slaves. Through the alchemy of man's instinct for the ideal, however, the convention of a slave-holding class was transmuted in the verse of Virgil into the dream of an age of gold, and the poet traced, as with the hand of Fra Lippo Lippi, the delicate outlines of a pure and simple family life upon a background of vines and roses. The hues of this picture have entered into the beautiful mirage of universal happiness which sustains the hopes and efforts of the social reformer, and have become a possession forever. But those whose ears are quickened can catch the wail of the slave whose misery was part of the price by which so much was purchased.

We have thus traced some of the conditions of country life in their effect upon the Roman character. Let us now pass to the life of the town. Here, too, we shall find an ideal: the apparition of a perfect city hovering over the coarser reality. There is a somewhat curious relation between this and the picture Virgil had drawn of happy meadows and corn-fields.

The failings of the countryman strengthened by contrast the advantages which were offered by the life of great cities, just as the evils of the latter set in relief what was best in the country. When the Romans began to mingle in the politics of the Levant, they felt their uncouthness and want of tact before the more polished Greeks. The rough Italian homespun showed strangely against the particolored tapestry of existence as it was passed in the beautiful capitals of the East, where the human drama was enacted by characters less strong indeed but more sensitive and subtle. The Romans who sat at the feet of these foreign teachers sought to combine a native manliness with the new culture. The Latin language seized upon the special quality of the change thus brought about in the term *urbanitas*: the quintessence of city life wafted from the East. But the great centres of government, industry, and culture offered something more than finished manners. They impressed upon their denizens common interests and inevitable sympathies. Hence the visions of the religious and political reformer clothed themselves in the guise of some great city, where multitudes—the despised *many*—shared in common rights and duties. The *world city*, of which the earlier Stoics speak, and the *dear city of Zeus*, which Marcus Aurelius commends to the love of the good man, are extensions of the ideal city life to the dimensions of the world. The source of these visions is not far to seek. They are reflections from the great foundations of Alexander and his successors. Even the *New Jerusalem* of the *Apocalypse* is in great part a kaleidoscopic dream of Antioch and Ephesus, where various marbles were mirrored in the waters of the Orontes and Cayster, and where the streets were shaded for the passer-by with dark green foliage and golden fruit disposed against the dazzling blue. The difference between the old and the new is almost summed up in the passage from paganism, the religion of the village, to Christianity, the religion of the town; from the Rome of Numa to the City of God.

We are no longer concerned, then, with the merely material conditions of life. The economical changes produced by the assemblage of large masses yield in importance to moral

changes. It is only in the light of these that we can understand the political conditions of the Roman character in its successive developments.

Although a certain hardness of temper made it impossible that he should gain as much emotional stimulus from civic opportunities as the more sympathetic Greek, the Roman was more successful within the limits imposed by his nature. What he lost in tenderness and the sense of the infinite he gained in firm and clear perception. In justice to him it must be remembered that while the Syrian and the Greek furnished that enthusiasm of humanity which fused the ancient world into one, it was the Roman who guided this process by his laws. The very narrowness of the Roman's outlook by concentrating his attention upon his immediate business rendered him the best instrument for carrying out so vast a task. He had deduced the main regulations of communal life from the customs of the elders and from his own experience, and with the help of legal fictions had laid the foundations of a systematic body of law. To pass from the legal system of Rome to the happy hunting-ground of our own lawyers—that miscellany of empirical decisions which we call the English law—may measure for us the clearness of the Roman's moral judgment. The Greeks had nothing which answered to the achievements of the Romans in this field. The youth of high station was instructed regularly in the principles and methods of law as a chief object of interest. To say that he knew laws divine and human was high praise for a Roman. It was a true instinct then that drove him to the study and development of his law. Here he became conversant with the most striking expression of the national genius.

The Roman was freed by his law from those perplexities which torture the modern. He had a norm of conduct laid down for him in precedent which rarely left him hesitating between contending duties. He was almost proof against the tempter who sets the spirit flying hither and thither on curious wings, and spreads before its gaze the kingdoms of the unrealized. The Roman, content to move on solid ground amid the things he knew and could handle, looked with amazement

at the Greek who fluttered undecided between earth and heaven. We are now at the very centre of the Roman mind as we light upon his quality of calm soberness, *gravitas*, literally weight, as opposed to the lightness, fickleness, frivolity which he despised in the Greek. The Roman soberness was just the obedience to *the customs of the fathers*, expressing itself through the whole nature and giving a specific character to every emotion and habit. It bound the diverse elements of life into one, and made a universe out of atoms. For obedience in the spiritual sphere answers to the attraction of gravity in the physical.

Justice at Rome was simply that which accorded with precedent, and with the constitution of the state, and had no reference to natural rights. In the eyes of the Roman no such rights existed. The citizen alone could be invested with rights at all. The *status* of each citizen was, so to speak, a perpetual unwritten contract between himself and the other members of the community, in accordance with which, he conducted himself in a prescribed manner, and received like treatment in return. But the stranger with whom no such contract existed, was absolutely at the mercy of the first comer, and gained the notice of the law only when he came under the protection of a Roman citizen. In the legal phrase of early times, the stranger and the enemy were the same. The mere adherence to the letter of contracts led to a spirit of chicanery, and belittled the Roman character to such an extent that the historian sets in undue relief the few instances which he can find of generous dealing. Just as frugality degenerated into avarice, so adherence to precedent produced the pettifogger, and the most powerful nation of ancient times descended on occasion to the methods of a rascally attorney.

The reverence for custom explains why the policy of the Roman senate was so successful. Whenever internal and external affairs ran their regular course, the traditional forms supplied a sufficient outlet for the political instincts of the citizens. The annual elections of the great officers of state, allowed the multitude to feel that they had a part in the

government. But these officials, when they were once elected, were little more than the instruments of the ruling oligarchy. The political tension being thus relieved from time to time, the Romans were freed from that feverish tampering with the constitution, which is the amusement of modern democracies. It seems to have been felt that the main business of a government was to govern and not to pass laws about governing. Of course, as the ancient constitution proved itself more and more unfit for the changing needs of a world-wide dominion, the discontent of the unprivileged classes found expression in vague political ideals, and these looked away of necessity from the past to the future. But it was the senatorial government, acting in the main upon traditional lines, that brought the whole world under the sway of the city upon the seven hills. The members of the great governing families of Rome gave of their best from age to age, and were content to be merged in the long roll-call of the servants of the state. Neither Marius nor Pompeius nor Cæsar deserve the credit of originating the foreign advance of the empire: they came in and reaped the harvest after laborers whose very names are almost lost.

As the power of the republic grew, and its history receded ever with more majesty into the irrevocable past, the corporate feeling deepened and produced that pride of citizenship which found its voice in the famous saying, *civis Romanus sum*. To have that on the lips and to recall the innumerable acts of service and self-denial, which in the ancient world gave those words their tremendous force, was a perpetual incentive to fresh obedience, and combined in the inmost recesses of the Roman mind with reverence for the customs of the fathers. How alien was all this to the love of individual notoriety, which in later times took the place of a laudable desire of public service! Cicero confesses with the utmost frankness that his leading motive was the love of glory, and with the examples of his great military contemporaries before him, remarks in the *Offices*, that those men who are most distinguished by their greatness of mind, are also bent on being the first of all, or rather upon a lonely supremacy.\* No

---

\* Pro Archia, 28 de offic. I, 64.

Roman of the early republic would have so expressed himself.

The Roman, calm, statesman-like and proud, was also courageous. Faithfully treading the narrow round of custom, he was undisturbed by calls to this side and that, and the patriotism which led him to sacrifice his life in battle was only one example the more of an obedience for which his whole life was a training. In some curious respects the national character was reflected exactly in the Roman military system. The intrenched camp formed every night, seemed to be a new Rome, with all its claims upon the affections, from which her sons sallied forth and to which they returned. Again, just as the elders at home infused their spirit throughout the city, so in the fields the ranks of the reserve, the veterans, steeled the hearts of the new levies to something of their own temper. It was not so much impetuous valor as calm persistence in the path entered upon, that brought the legions to victory. Savage and unregulated courage was broken to pieces against the steadfast Roman lines. There was a proverb, *Rome conquers by sitting still*. The temper which insured victory so often was a safeguard also in times of anxiety and defeat. After a crushing disaster the senate could thank the Roman commanders that they had not despaired of the state, and it could pursue its course, unmoved by the presence of the Carthaginian victor at the gates of the capital.

Many circumstances worked together to maintain the freedom of the Roman citizen. The senate itself was in a manner elected by the people. For it was recruited from the ranks of the magistrates chosen by them from year to year. The wisdom and influence of this body subdued to itself the most ambitious of the generals and magistrates, and not before the end of the fourth century of the republic were there serious attempts to wrest the law and the constitution to the will of an individual. For centuries the state knew no master, no military dictator in the modern sense. For even the ancient office of dictator, like other magistracies, was bound by traditional forms. In theory the people assembled in the *comitia* not only elected the magistrates, but passed laws, decided upon peace

and war, and upon all questions affecting the status of a citizen. In practice, the senate, as we have seen, controlled the executive. Yet the power of the people was there, and was resumed from time to time. It was the proud consciousness of these prerogatives that maintained the liberties of Rome, and the politician who succeeded in giving the color of usurpation to any proposals was an invincible bar to their enactment. Freedom was regarded as a precedent to be maintained rather than as an ideal to be followed. The scrupulousness with which he conformed to his obligations made the citizen exact a similar scrupulousness from his fellows, and inspired him with burning resentment when he imagined that his rights had been trespassed upon. Even in trifles he watched suspiciously any appearance of unequal treatment. The usages of good manners by which vanity is kept from unnecessary wounds were developed to a high degree at Rome. The attendant who kept his master informed of the name of the humblest citizens he might meet, so that every one might be addressed by name; the elaborate epithets which in the orators accompany the mention of the least conspicuous citizen, bear witness to the proud sense of equality before the law which animated every free man. The love of freedom, however, was consistent with the determination to limit it as far as possible to those who already enjoyed it. It was no abstract equality that commended itself to the Roman. The great reformer, Gaius Gracchus, lost his supporters when he proposed to extend the Roman franchise to the rest of Italy.

The Roman therefore exhibited in a striking manner both the excellences and the defects of a life which is controlled by rule and not by principle. He was faithful to the obligations of which he was conscious, but he did not apply their principles to new spheres of conduct. Hence it is that in his history we meet with so few traces of enthusiasm for an ideal or, indeed, of the generous emotions at all. Compared with the sentimental Teuton, he seems hard and cold. In this, if we may believe Mr. Marion Crawford, he is well represented by the Italian of the lower classes in the present. Only

power and wealth commanded his respect. The practical Roman turned with disdain from the subtle half-prophetic speculations of the Greek, and remembered that a well-to-do centurion could buy up a hundred apostles of philosophy. But wisdom was justified of her children. It was the quickening influence of Greek ideas that enabled the Roman government to adapt itself to the rule of the world.

FRANK GRANGER.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NOTTINGHAM.

---

## SOCIAL LIFE AND MORALITY IN INDIA.

I OFFER no apology for discussing this subject, as all thinking minds in the West take a very deep interest in the social and moral life of Eastern peoples.

During my sojourn in England it has struck me that the people here know either too much or too little of us,—too much because the Anglo-Indians (officials and missionaries) pretend to know everything about our people, often more than we know ourselves; too little, because those Englishmen who have not been over to India are deplorably ignorant of us. I say deplorably, because I think it is only right that the British people should have a correct idea of the various races with which they have to deal politically as well as commercially.

I have lived in England for over five years, and during this period I have had ample occasion to see something of English social life. It has deeply interested me, and I dare say it may be interesting to the readers of this JOURNAL if I tell them about our Indian social life in my own way. I do not propose to dwell upon the various creeds of the Indian people; but our religions are so vitally blended with our social customs as well as with our moral code that I may be obliged to refer to them now and then. I wish to give as faithful a picture of our life as I can, with all its fine as well as its faulty points. I am

as willing to acknowledge our defects as I am anxious to have our virtues recognized and rightly appreciated.

No people are entirely virtuous, and none are entirely vicious; and though we all agree upon the common and principal virtues and vices, yet there are some with regard to which our standards differ a great deal, thus giving rise to certain differences in moral practice and social customs. Differences in methods of life determine many of the different social circumstances, and religious laws also account for many of them. Lastly, poverty, climate, and other similar causes have their due share of influence.

There are two principal communities in India, the Hindoos and the Moslems, with their respective religions. The Jains are socially the same as the Hindoos. The Parsees, though an influential community, are few in number and too exclusive to influence or be influenced by the rest of India. The Christians are too insignificant in number to be mentioned.

Those Englishmen who know anything at all about us do not deny that our moral and religious code of laws enjoins the ordinary virtues acknowledged by mankind. Lying, backbiting, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and selfishness are as strongly condemned by Islam and Hindooism as they are by Christianity. On the other hand, truthfulness, honesty, charity, and benevolence are urged with equal force. The difference is not so much in theory as it is in practice, and this I hope to show in the course of this brief article.

The first and most important question is as to the condition of women, which directly or indirectly includes many other social problems. The following are the different phases from which we can best study the question.

(1) Their freedom. The common impression in England is that our women are always kept secluded within the four walls of our houses, by what is known as the *pardah* system. This impression is, I believe, enormously exaggerated. It must be noted that the majority of Indians are extremely poor, and the women of that class (as Lady Dufferin has rightly pointed out), who form more than ninety per cent. of the whole female population of India, have no *pardah* system at

all. They walk about in the streets and go about at their business as the women of England do. They do not even wear the gauze veil worn by European ladies. It is only among the wealthier classes, whose number is very small, that the system at all obtains; and with them the *pardah* (or veiling) is of three degrees. First, the veil is only a fold of the scarf that hangs over the head covering the forehead, one end of it being drawn across the lower part of the face. Women with this partial veil go about as others do. The next is a complete veil, *burkah*, covering the entire person, with a cap fitting tightly on the head and two gauze squares in front of the eyes. The third is the real seclusion in the house. This is only practised among the chiefs and the nobility, while the second kind is used among the rigidly orthodox and the clergy and exists also among the Hindoos, but not so much as among the Moslems. From this it is evident that the percentage of women who are strictly secluded is very small.

The effect of this seclusion is quite as much exaggerated as its extent. Its injurious influence upon the physique is limited to very few women. Therefore, after all, it is not quite so bad as it is the fashion to represent, although we might be better off without it.

(2) Far worse than any *pardah* is the practical exclusion of women from what is known in this country as "society." It is true that with the Parsees and some educated Bengaleese women enjoy more and freer social intercourse, but these communities are limited in number as well as in locality. Their influence, therefore, is local and is not felt by the masses. In reality we are practically without any national social gatherings. We have, however, on festive occasions many meetings of a more or less social nature, which are not solely confined to men. Women adorn them with their presence and make them more enjoyable with their songs and conversation. On marriage occasions the gayety of these meetings is commensurate with the solemnity of the ceremony, the old vying with the young in enjoyment. This is more general among the Hindoos, for they even make their religious ceremonies occasions for festivity. The absurdities that take place at such

times in the way of fun and frolic altogether outdo what is usual at any other time. But however gay and free such gatherings are, they lack the high educative element which distinguishes the social gatherings in England.

The effect of this exclusive system is certainly more permanent and more deplorable than the *pardah*, and brings all Indian reformers face to face with a problem of vital importance and immense difficulty. The difficulty is twofold: on the one hand, they have to eradicate chronic and deep-rooted customs and prejudices; and, on the other, they are afraid of introducing a custom which along with blessings is liable to engender vices that would make freedom more degrading than elevating.

One cannot help noticing the great harm which this want of freer intercourse between men and women does to our country, in keeping our women in comparative illiteracy and ignorance. At the present time when India is producing young men educated in Western thought and life, she fails to produce women who would be their fit helpmeets and companions. Hence it gives rise to discontent, which (although it may bear fruit later on) is at present ineffective and harmful.

(3) Another thing that should be noticed is the existence of many proverbs derogatory to the fair sex. These proverbs work havoc in the minds of the masses, whose philosophy and education are limited to what they inherit from their parents. For instance, "woman is like a slipper made to order; wear it if it fits you, throw it away if it does not;" "you can never be safe from the cunning artifices of woman;" "woman is like a snake, charming as well as venomous," and so on. Now, one can imagine the pernicious effect of these proverbs when they form the principal part of a man's knowledge and education as regards women.

(4) I should now like to pass to a problem of more serious import, and one upon which opinions largely differ. I mean marriage,\* which includes early marriage, polygamy, and divorce.

---

\* The seriousness of this question depends on the fact that it is regulated by religious laws alone.

The word "early" as applied to marriage is rather elastic. In England it means any period between sixteen and twenty; whilst as applied to our communities it means any period from infancy up to the age of seventeen. Of course there are some marriages in India that take place at as early an age as eight or ten; but usually these, as well as earlier ceremonies, are merely betrothals. The Hindoos and the Moslems differ vastly in this custom as they do in other laws of marriage. The Moslem law practically excludes marriages before maturity; even betrothal is left to the marrying couple unless one or both happen to be orphans under guardianship. If their marriage or betrothal takes place before their maturity, it is abrogated at their option when they are of age. Among the Hindoos, marriage being a sacrament rather than a contract, and even more strict than it is in Christianity, it cannot be abrogated when once the ceremony is performed, whether the married couple are infants in arms or intelligent beings endowed with discretion.

Early marriages are, however, practised among the Moslems in defiance of their law. And when it is remembered that about ninety per cent. of Indian Moslems are of pure Hindoo blood, one cannot be surprised at this strange phenomenon, as the tenacity with which we Indians adhere to our old usages and customs surpasses even our reverence for our religious laws.

Early marriage among the Hindoos is principally practised by the middle trading-classes; and as they are very sedentary in their habits and live on scanty, ill-nourishing fare, it not only makes them puny and wretched, but enervates and dispirits them, and thus renders them unfit as a people. Among the Moslems it exists chiefly in village communities where healthy avocations counteract the physical mischiefs. Its inroads upon the morals of the people are also more marked in the Hindoo community. It debases marriage to a mere matter of necessity, and as it arises principally (or rather solely) from the parents' desire of seeing their children happily settled in their own lifetime, it sets parents scheming and planning; and not seldom they abuse their privilege and make

marriage a mere monetary affair. I know of a good many marriages among respectable Hindoo families where several thousand rupees changed hands as a price, so to speak, for the bride. This state of affairs is of course hopelessly low and debasing. I am glad to say that the Moslems are practically free from this usage, which is no doubt the result of the supremely practical nature of the teachings of Islam.

I might incidentally refer to an argument that is often brought forward by my countrymen in support of early marriages,—namely, that it prevents the youth from being led astray. Theoretically this appears to be correct, but practically I believe it is the parent of worse vices than would otherwise be produced.

The next problem in connection with marriage that we have to consider is polygamy. Polygamy though apparently more objectionable is not in my opinion fraught with such dangers and serious consequences as those resulting from early marriages. It is practised both among the Moslems and the Hindoos, but more among the former; it is not so commonly practised as people in this country imagine. Yet it is extensive and proportionately injurious, because it is often indulged in in defiance of the law on the subject. The chiefs and the nobility, whether Hindoo or Moslem, indulge in it almost indiscriminately, and they, as a rule, consult their convenience and desires rather than the principles of their respective religions. They certainly set a very bad example, but happily their practice is not approved of by other classes of the community. The really injurious influence of polygamy comes into play when the middle classes and the masses indulge in it; for in nine cases out of ten they, too, would set aside the teachings of religion and follow their own whims and desires. Not infrequently the parents are to blame, as the marriage which was arranged by them has perhaps turned out unhappily. One thing I must remark to the credit of our people: a polygamist is never much respected by them. This shows that they have an inherent repugnance for the injustice of the practice.

Although I have denounced polygamy as it is practised, I do not by any means condemn the law as it is embodied in

the teachings of Mohammed ; for I am thoroughly convinced that the law, if rightly carried out, is an efficient antidote to certain evils which are abundantly found in monogamous communities, and which with all the forces of civilization at their command they have failed to eradicate. There are many instances where polygamy has led to beneficial results. And, on the whole, I am not quite sure which of the two is less harmful to humanity,—a man marrying one woman and keeping one or more in defiance of his law and religion, or a man marrying two women in accordance with his law and his religion. In the one case the woman is degraded and the man is debased ; in the other the woman is elevated to the proud station of a wife and the man is saved from sin and self-debasement. In the one case woman is a mere toy of man's fancy and caprice, and can at any moment be cast on the world, despised and abandoned ; in the other she has a lawful protector and leads a good life, respected and respectable.

The Christian law is, that if a man is unfaithful to his marriage vows the marriage tie is broken. Thus in Christian countries the wife is degraded by being brought down to the level of a mistress. She is to be pitied, as she often has to continue that life, partly for the sake of her children and partly to evade the scandal of publicity. It appears very uncharitable on my part to indict a Christian people, but it is not the fault of Christianity if the people do not practise its teachings. There are, no doubt, men and women in England whose lives are models of conjugal felicity and self-denial. Yet there are not a few unfortunate women who with all the appearance of respectability are in reality deceived and deceiving.

While thus pointing out the abuses of monogamy, I do not ignore the abuses of polygamy. Nor do I uphold the view that the abuse of a system is no argument against the system itself, for I am thoroughly convinced that there must be some inherent weakness which leads to its abuse, the extent of which is proportionate to the weakness of the system itself. Monogamy is weak, inasmuch as it does not provide for certain cases where, by reason of unexpected contingencies

it becomes absolutely essential to withhold marital relations, while polygamy in providing for such cases is open to the weakness of abuse. When treating social subjects we should not gloss over facts. Unpleasant as they are, they must be faced and clearly realized. No one in European communities would be so blind as wilfully to ignore the manifold evils with which these communities are permeated despite their Christianity. Polygamist communities with all their abuses are comparatively free from such far-reaching evils, as their abuse is more on the side of virtue than on the side of vice. The virtual protection that polygamy offers to women (even when it is abused) saves our people from those pests of society whose only function is to pander to the passions of faithless husbands, to tempt those whose purity is yet unsullied, and to be a fatal rock for wavering chastity and an inexhaustible source of physical afflictions, whose havocs are not confined to the victim alone but carried down to his innocent progeny.

With regard to the causes that lead to the abuse of polygamy, it must be noticed that they principally arise from want of education and from ignorance of religion. With the advancement and diffusion of education and the widening of knowledge, our people will put a stop to early marriages, and woman will be a more prominent factor in the development of social life and no longer ignorant of her surroundings as she now is. And these changes, by revolutionizing our social conceptions, will effectively prevent the abuses of polygamy.

Another charge which is made against our community is the "facility for divorce." I cannot understand how people who know anything of our life can make such a statement with impunity. Among the Hindoos divorce has no existence. Once they are united they are united forever. It is the Moslems who are blamed, for it is said that they can divorce and marry wives innumerable. Such allegations can only arise from ignorance and prejudice. The Moslem law of divorce is peculiarly interesting from an ethical point of view and has a double fascination about it. It is as stringent as it is elastic, yet its elasticity adds to its stringency. Mohammed

distinctly and repeatedly said, "God hates nothing more than divorce, and he loves nothing more than the freeing of a slave." Can there be anything stronger than this dictum? The other aspect of our law is that it allows three distinct periods of separation before divorce actually takes place. In each of these periods the divorcing parties are enjoined to think deliberately over their differences, so that they may maintain rather than break the sacred tie that unites them. As these periods extend to three months, ample time and opportunities are given for the final decision. This clearly implies an intention of keeping the marriage tie unbroken as long as possible. Besides, it has the advantage of adaptability, which is entirely wanting in the Christian system of divorce. A wife can divorce her husband on the same grounds on which the husband can divorce his wife. Thus it is manifest that the very elasticity of this law makes it more binding.

With regard to the practice of divorce, it is not at all so common among us, and here I speak of the Indian Moslem alone. Among the orthodox, divorce always takes the form I have described above, though many do not take advantage of the triple period allowed. However, as soon as divorce is settled between them, they complete it by a declaration to that effect repeated three times. Considering, therefore, that divorce is rare among the Hindoos, and not common among the Moslems, and that the latter form only one-fifth of the whole population, our percentage of divorce cases must fall far below that of England.

Another subject to which I should like to refer is that of "widow marriage." This solely concerns the Hindoo community. In reality, the notion that widows should not remarry originates from the very highest ideal of love as expounded in Hindoo theology; but, like many other high ideals, its fascination is the mere fascination of form.

The originators of such ideals who embody them in law fail to consider their practical aspect, and thus the ideal remains unattained and unattainable. It is certainly hard to think that a young girl who has lost her husband even before she attains the age of maturity should be doomed to a life of

loveless solitude. The respect and kind treatment which are accorded to her by relatives and friends cannot compensate for the cruel repression of her natural love. Yet I do not think that practically this system has any very injurious effect upon the Hindoo community, apart from the hard life of the girl herself. There is, however, a movement on foot to introduce the remarriage of widows, and I sincerely hope it will meet with favor by the general community.

(5) Another important characteristic of the Indian people is the system of caste. This, too, is vastly misunderstood by the people here in England. I have often been asked, "How does the caste system work among the Moslems?" Now, I must make it clear that there is absolutely nothing like caste among the Moslems. Islam is the greatest leveller of caste distinctions and class differences. The influence of Islam in this respect is simply marvellous. We Indian Moslems, though we adhere persistently to our ancient Hindoo customs, at once give up all idea of caste on embracing the faith of Islam. Go to a Moslem community in Africa or in India, and you will find the workingman and the ruling monarch praying before God shoulder to shoulder without the slightest distinction of rank. This is not a mere matter of theory; it is in practice everywhere among us.

Caste in India, therefore, is confined to the Hindoos, and there, strange to say, in spite of its apparent defectiveness, it does not work so badly as people here imagine. After all, it is nothing but a determination of social differences to which every human community is naturally subject. The problem of labor and other social problems in Europe and America, which the best intellects of modern times are trying their best to solve, are, in a way, the same difficulties that led to the origination of the caste system among the Hindoos. It is true that it is rigid, and that it is almost impossible for a person of the lowest class to rise to the highest. Yet it is self-evident that there must exist even in Utopia itself "hewers of wood and drawers of water." No occupation that contributes to the development of society is ignoble. In Western countries, where people boast of their equality, I have observed that the

gulf between the classes is wider than that between castes in India. Of course it is possible for a person of the lowest class here to rise to the upper grade of society. Yet the practical lack of intercourse and fellow-feeling between the upper and lower classes makes equality more or less a farce.

The degradation and misery of the laboring classes here is ten times worse than the poverty and humble occupation of the low-class Hindoos, for the latter are not shunned by the upper-caste Hindoos. Mere expressions of philanthropy on the platform and in the press do not bridge over real class differences. We are not quite so profuse in our professions of sympathy, but we are equally zealous in doing all that can be done to ameliorate the condition of our laboring classes. Amelioration does not necessarily mean that a low-class person should rise to a higher stratum of society. It really means making a man a better citizen, better fitted for the social function which he has to perform. With this conception of real social advancement, one cannot help being struck with the fact that the low-class Hindoos are better fitted for their station in life and for the performance of their duties than are the lower classes of the West. Another remarkable feature of their life is their practical godliness. Whether Hindoo or Moslem, they are firm in their respective faiths, and carry them out so far as their circumstances and understanding allows them. In contrast with this, we find the lower classes, in England particularly, wanting in the spirit of religion. One has only to walk through the by-ways and slums of London to see the beastly traits of man in their typical form.

The busy surroundings of the poor in the Western countries, their hard struggle for existence, and their wants doubly multiplied by civilization, cannot permanently influence them for good. On the contrary, they are calculated to engender greed, selfishness, discontent, and a host of evils that make life wretched. It may be that I share the usual partiality which every man entertains towards the institutions of his native country. Yet I cannot help noticing the simple, contented lives of our poor people, whose wants are few and easily sup-

plied, and who, therefore, are comparatively free from the worldliness and callousness of the West.

One especially redeeming feature is the almost entire exclusion of alcoholic beverages. As people in this country well know, Moslems are total abstainers, and the Hindoos are not much in love with "the daughter of the grape." There are very few of them who drink at all, and they are usually temperate. I mention this fact to point out that those vices which are directly traceable to alcohol are not found among us. I have heard people here in England remark that what wine is to a Frenchman or whiskey to an Irishman, opium is to a Chinaman or to an Indian. I do not uphold the use of opium in India; but, although it has a very enervating and demoralizing effect upon the system, it does not excite to violence and madness. Its evils are more passive and more confined to the victim of the narcotic than are those of alcohol.

In conclusion, let me say a few words about our home life, as home life illustrates the character of a people even more than their public institutions. The home life in this country is represented by the members of the family sitting round the fireplace on a cold winter evening, when perhaps it is snowing hard outside. With us the idea of home life is to derive happiness and comfort from the warmth of genuine affection which unites the family. We have the most profound reverence for our elders, and the unity of the family is much stronger than in European homes. Brothers permanently live under the same roof till the end of their days; and, even if their vocations should necessitate their separation, they always return to the parental roof as their only home. Perhaps it does not bring out the quality of self-help to the fullest extent, yet it nurtures self-sacrifice and consideration for others.

A similar feeling binds us to our remoter relatives, and we look upon it as a duty to help them in distress. I need hardly refer to the fidelity which characterizes our friendships, in spite of what is said of the treacherousness of our character. This is equally true of Hindoos and Moslems.

Our hospitality is simply proverbial. A man can travel

from one part of the country to another, sure of food and shelter according to his needs. In England I have known young sons living with their parents and paying for their meals, a state of affairs repugnant to our feelings and altogether unknown among us.

Our society is essentially different from that of the West. We lack its merits, and, fortunately, we are also free from its vices. I have already referred to the freedom of social intercourse in England. The custom of dancing in low-necked dresses, for instance, is foreign to our community and inconsistent with our notions of modesty. If our people knew of the little *tête-à-tête* chats that take place behind the screen, they would be shocked at the lightness of conduct which this freedom leads to. Flirtation is another apparently harmless feature of English society. It is very pleasant, indeed, but is fraught with grave dangers. Flirtation always appears to me like alcohol. A small dose will lead to a larger one, and then its effects begin to tell on the unguarded youth who is rash enough to play with fire. I say this from no spirit of levity. I would like to put this honest and straightforward question to English parents, Do such things exist among you or not, and, if they do, are they really conducive to your moral welfare?

One feature of our modern society in India I cannot help mentioning,—namely, an attempt on the part of our young reformers to introduce the free customs of the West in an extensive way. They go out with their wives for walks, and thus offend the susceptibilities of those whom they wish to follow them. Their endeavors are misdirected, and they are doomed to failure. As they generally carry with them from England drinking and other evil habits, and ape the Anglo-Indian in not associating with their poor countrymen, they are by no means models to be imitated.

My last word will be to repudiate the idea that we do not respect our women. Our respect for woman is profounder than that which I have noticed in England. We make no show of our respect for them. At home or abroad we treat them the same way. Their backward condition arises from our igno-

rance, and not from our disrespect for them. Of course among the masses woman is looked upon pretty nearly in the same way as she is here, but among the better classes she sways the home. Is it possible that, in a society which is known to have been civilized from very old times, woman could be disrespected? Can a son disrespect his mother? If not, how can we Hindoos and Moslems be thought to be guilty of such an atrocious offence against humanity?

MUHAMMAD ABDUL GHANI.

LONDON.

---

### THE RELIGIOUS TRAINING OF CHILDREN.

THE struggle between the mechanical and spiritual views of the universe, carried on in one guise or another since men first became capable of coherent thought, is not now, and perhaps in the very nature of things can never be, definitely settled. It is, however, not less important here than elsewhere that the contestants should not be encumbered by their baggage. To save the main position, moreover, is more necessary than to keep possession of the outposts. Unfortunately, it has been left for philosophy to make an unpartisan stand for the spiritual interpretation of life. Too often religion, whose existence is staked on the same conflict, has contented itself with watching narrowly some special point which would soon prove untenable and worthless if the main battle went against it.

I propose now to consider religious education in the broadest light as an educational and philosophical, not a theological question. I regard the wakening and cultivation of the religious spirit as the important task, the critical task, and, alas, the neglected task. I shall not attempt, therefore, to outline a policy immediately applicable to any specific conditions. I shall not even consider the question of supplementing or modifying my argument or conclusion so as to adapt either or both to the requirements of any particular form of religious belief or worship. As far as practicable, I shall ignore racial

and historical connections, and leave it to subsequent consideration to determine how these omitted facts ought to influence the interpretation and application of such truths as I may succeed in laying bare.

The vagueness of this undertaking may appear to some to render it useless; but I cannot help thinking that, in these days of strong materialistic leaning, it behooves us, first of all, to secure the spiritual hold; and of that, except in so far as its security is supposed to be necessarily involved in the maintenance of special religious forms, almost no one seems to be thinking.

It may seem on its face absurd to discuss the question of religious training from any but a sectarian stand-point; but I am persuaded that, waiving the reason already assigned, there is no more useful exercise than the process of depolarizing the mind and viewing great issues in a more or less independent fashion, freed from the restrictions and conditions with which practical necessities hamper us. (The free play of thought about serious problems cannot but lead to a broader and truer treatment in the actual conditions under which these difficulties require to be met.) Moreover, consideration of this kind is apt to lead men to reflect on the infinitely various nature of truth, and to be tolerant of and sympathetic with ideas and ideals that they themselves reject.

The genuine religious sense is very loosely associated nowadays with external religious expression. It may exist strongly in men who have no manifest religious connection; very often, as the world knows, it does not exist at all where religious associations are most prominent. But if religious feeling is significant, either in the present or in some subsequent phase of existence, then I think its cultivation as a thing to be desired in itself well deserves our attention.

Religious instruction may be viewed from the stand-point either of the church or of the child. From the stand-point of the church it is based on the assumed necessity of maintaining institutional continuity. Those who argue in behalf of the absolute verity of a particular revelation of dogma, and those who merely believe impressiveness and efficacy depend largely

on the preservation and transmission of the historical form, practically agree, though for very different reasons, on the course to be pursued. The main effort of this course is to secure, in advance of its own judgment and experience, the allegiance and service of the growing child. But, as in the end this relation is designed simply to promote and assure what the church conceives to be the soul's welfare, and is defended solely on that ground, the former of the two stand-points may be allowed to merge into the latter,—that of the child.

Critically examined, then, from this stand-point, our religious instruction is obviously restrictive in its aim and effect, and is thus related to a social conception now obsolete. According to this discarded mediæval doctrine,—discarded, not indeed because absolutely false, but because its possibilities of usefulness are gone,—society, combining church and state, was directly responsible for the spiritual as well as the temporal welfare of its member. The halo which wrapped in mystery its origin and nature rendered this pretension for centuries practically unassailable. Persuaded, then, that the sanction of God approved its purpose and ideals, the mediæval state was thus bound to insist on their acceptance. Hence so-called religious intolerance, arising, in the first place, because circumstances forced society to believe itself charged to secure the individual's salvation, and because salvation was necessarily conceived to attach to a particular form of action and belief.

The religious school has never escaped this idea. To this day it maintains the ancient manner; it still aims at inculcating a special form as if with supernatural sanction; it still aims at fixing the child in a definite attitude, as if some special validity belonged to that. Though the separation of the church and state has destroyed the absolute despotism of a single idea, it has substituted what is perhaps in this respect little better,—the despotism of many petty princes, each seeking to be absolute in his own domain. This, I contend, is merely the recurrence of the mediæval idea of salvation by special form. The child's religious training is made to con-

form to the limitations of an historical product.) Admittedly, every phase of religious practice now existing is the complicated result of political, ethical, scientific, philosophical action and interaction. Centuries of contest have sharply defined and accentuated both outline and feature in these organic products. The letter, therefore, rather than the spirit, necessarily stands out in every instance as the distinctive mark, as the significant and efficient fact. Whatever our own theory and belief, these involved social products continue to be made, in altogether uncritical fashion, the vehicle—nay, the substance—of religious instruction; because, forsooth, each of them has been supposed at one time or another to hold the key to heaven.

We have outgrown this superstition. We no longer believe in a monopoly of truth. We recognize in every religious organization, as in every philosophical scheme, some glimpse of a reality that all are inadequate to express. We have ceased to attach essential importance to form. The idea of salvation has been spiritualized. We seek no bargains with the Almighty; we hope for no special favors. (We dedicate our living powers not to the sordid task of winning an agreeable hereafter, but to the splendid opportunities and demands of the abiding present.) Another and higher ideal has replaced the selfish faith of mediævalism. Plainly, then, the theory and method of religious training, as now conducted, involves us in grave inconsistency.

I have said that the necessity of self-preservation in slowly crystallizing communities is at bottom responsible for our inherited educational spirit and method. Although fiercely assailed now and then by the loud batteries of Socialism and Anarchy, the social instinct is now comparatively certain. (It behooves us, therefore, to bring our educational theory into harmony with a changed social order, behind which it has indisputably lagged.)

The bulk of our inheritance from the past is obviously unconscious, and, perhaps fortunately for us, unavoidable. In the somewhat narrow range of possible choice, it is assuredly not easy to define the exact limits within which we should

consciously attempt to devolve upon our heirs the complex network of ideas and feelings that make up our moral and social life. The problem is not simplified by the condition that the inheritance is to be regarded merely as tentative, pending the time when the inheriting individual can critically review the basis of his faith and conduct. Under the most favorable circumstances, well-nigh a third of his life will have been moulded by assumptions that are now granted to have been but provisional; and by no legerdemain can he again occupy an impartial attitude towards that which has thus been bred in the bone.

While, therefore, we must avoid narrowly binding a child to its environment, education is, on the other hand, compelled to contemplate a concrete problem: we cannot educate in the air, with a view thus to equip the child for every possible contingency. (There is no such thing as education in the abstract; it must, in the case of every child, be a practical, concrete, and definite policy. Thus, although ignorance is fatally and most narrowly restrictive in its effects on mind and character, almost necessarily forbidding the formation of new relations or the opening of new paths of social activity, culture is itself to some extent restrictive also, though in a different way and for a different reason.

But ethics, no less than practical wisdom, has something to say on the question of educational procedure. On the side of dogma and theory—I omit for the moment the question of conduct—religious instruction, as now carried on, tends strongly to fix prejudice and to barricade the mind against alien influences by a powerful rampart of fears, phrases, and ill-digested theological ideas. If an attempt were made to wrench the child's physical development in any such arbitrary manner, it would be denounced and prohibited as barbarous. It is no reply to say that the course of physical development is fixed, and any violation of it is immediately recognized as baneful. As a matter of fact, it is fixed only as regards the framework of the body. Nature looks after this. Beyond this, our own efforts must supply and maintain the conditions and materials required for healthy growth. The analogy to

mental development may, on further thought, prove closer than was suspected at first sight. It is therefore certainly worth asking, Is not this attempt rigidly to fix the child's attitude a fatal and unjustifiable invasion of its individuality?

I am, however, very far from urging the other extreme,—educational *laissez faire*. I am simply seeking for a line of cleavage,—a principle which may guide us rationally in a very complicated and difficult problem; and *laissez faire* it certainly is not. This would be comparable to the ostrich's hiding his head in order to escape being seen. We do not avoid danger or stumble upon wisdom by merely closing our eyes. Letting the child alone means simply that you are letting him alone. You deprive him of the guidance of those most deeply concerned, and leave him to the guidance of arbitrary chance. The place of intelligent direction is abandoned to capricious accident. . Who shall say what twist the curious, inquiring spirit may be given, while you are industriously and consciously letting it alone? What friend, what book, what chance influence in the air may accidentally direct the mind which you hoped might naturally grow? *Laissez faire*, to be brief, is a possible principle of action only in a perfect world.

We seem now to have effectually deprived ourselves of every possible principle of action. Practical wisdom and ethical injunction condemn the Procrustean bed, on the one hand, and the absence of effective guidance, on the other. Does this actually hand us over to mere caprice?

At the outset I conceded that the educational programme which has proven too narrow for our present purpose originated under the stress of social need. Education, be it remembered, is essentially a social, not an individual process. It contemplates, indeed, a particular end; but that end is the preparation of the child for an active career in a given social environment. There is, then, no such thing as an ideal educational programme, other than one appropriate to ideal social conditions, and for that very reason appropriate to no other. "The necessities of society determine the educational stress." Not culture, nor knowledge, nor symmetrical de-

velopment of so-called faculties, nor indeed any other single thing furnishes the educator's goal; but the political, moral, commercial plexus constituting the life of the community in which we live,—these must furnish not only the educational material, but the educational end. (The child, in a word, must be trained through the medium of its actual experience, in the broadest sense of the term, to comprehend and master the world in which he acts.) There is no other effective way of introducing him into the varied activity of this world than by following out, defining, expanding, systematizing the multitude of vague and disorderly ideas, impressions, feelings, and wishes that constitute his soul-life.

At a time when slavery, feudalism, militarism were beneficent institutions, education was primarily restrictive. But now that these restrictions have lost their justification, now that the centrifugal human units have learned their elementary social lesson, now that moral quality suffices to maintain social integrity, education must expand to larger freedom.

(It is, then, for life in democratic conditions that the child is to be equipped and fitted,—democratic not only in the narrow political and social, but likewise in the intellectual connotation of the term;) for a world in which, before the maturity of his mind and character, he may be required to enter into the mad struggle for a livelihood; for a world in which every bar has been let down, and every field of usefulness is a scramble for precedence; for a world in which the sanctions of custom and the influence of traditional example sit all too lightly; (for a world in which every variety of doubt, denial, and irreverence, every species of destructive and constructive ethical, religious, and philosophic opinion assails unceasingly the growing mind,) for a world in which, contradictory as it may seem, all this turbulent and passionate effort is seeking, however blindly, to establish in our life the love of truth and the love of law. As freedom is the striking characteristic of this period, so freedom is bound to be the striking characteristic of the educational endeavor,—freedom, and not restriction, and by freedom the child must be educated to freedom.

It is perhaps needless to point out that by freedom we do not mean license or caprice, but rather orderliness, rationality, the conquest of impetuous impulse, the supremacy of moral law. Strength of character and suppleness of mind seem to be the surest means of effectually meeting the demands of modern civilization. Neither the one nor the other can be contributed to or helped by catchword or formula. If education is to advance the formative, as opposed to the disintegrating tendencies discernible in our civilization; if sound moral, religious, and spiritual sense is to triumph over the disorganizing forces of materialism and anarchy, instruction must give up its attempt to protect by isolation and restriction, and must from the start prepare the child to pursue a rational course amidst the distracting influences and tendencies to which it will soon be pitilessly exposed. In politics, for instance, instead of trying to fix in the child's mind a party prepossession, which is all too likely to break down in the end and perhaps endanger civic faith and virtue, wisdom bids us to educate the political instinct, develop the sense of political responsibility. ( So in religion, instead of fixing the narrowest possible religious allegiance,—to a dissenting faction, indeed, rather than to a general Church,—an allegiance which is more and more likely to fail and involve in its ruin all religious affiliation whatever, how much wiser to look after the religious sense, which will endure, without a more limited religious connection, and will make for character perhaps more than any other imaginable influence.)

I believe, then, that our religious instruction must be completely revised in both its aim and method. For the narrow aim with which it now works must be substituted the broader one required by present conditions,—first of all, the development of the moral and religious sense as of transcendent importance. I speak of the religious sense, it will be observed, rather than of religion as a definitely elaborated body of doctrine and practice,—a sense that must be common to all creeds and churches,—the common well-spring of all sincere and active religious life whatsoever. It is not easy to define precisely what is, perhaps, at best, a state—a hue—a shade of

thought and feeling, rather than a distinctly conceivable idea. Neither morality nor philosophy nor cosmogony alone suffices. The religious sense knows these things in more or less definite terms, but it both feels and knows more than they. Perhaps, if we pause to analyze the purest and most disinterested piety, the spontaneous and unreflecting type of a bygone day, we shall find the religious instinct, vague though it be, locating the soul in time and space. Deprive the soul of this support, and it is lost. (It is the strength and certainty of religious feeling, not the definite promise of a creed, that ballasts the pious in the weltering sea, keeps them true to rudder and pilot, forbids despair.) It is not because they understand the why and wherefore, the whence and whither of things, but because their religious or spiritual sense steadies them, fixes them, seems to confer unity of plan on what would otherwise be an unaccountable and disjointed series of accidents. (The religious sense is, then, essentially the principle of unity, if we may speak so precisely, without which we are lost in this world of time and matter; and it is towards the awakening of this sense of spiritual unity, beneath the changing aspects of phenomenal life, that religious education must first of all strive.) Certainly such religious education cannot be deemed antagonistic to any religious organization or profession; it would be a curious implication of weakness, should any denomination fear religiosity as such.

Side by side with this altered purpose must come change of method. We are even now on the threshold of a profound and significant change in the art of education. Under the influence of Herbart and others, the point of emphasis in education is shifting from the subjects of study to the student, to the child. It goes without saying, in most schools and with most teachers, that the pedagogical treatment of a topic necessarily follows its natural, logical, or chronological development. Our text-books in every subject—history, geography, arithmetic, grammar, science—are built upon this assumption. Each presents, with a degree of thoroughness and completeness supposedly adapted to the age of the pupil, the coherent, systematic, logical unfolding of its chosen subject. The eye

of the author in these cases has been primarily fixed upon the matter in hand, and only secondarily, and as a guide in settling upon the degree of difficulty to be admitted, upon the child. Text-books have, in a word, been compiled by grammarians, mathematicians, geographers,—though but rarely have these been experts at first hand; it is but recently that we have come to know that the real authority and guide in these matters must be the psychologist,—the student of child-life,—though not the amateur student of child-life, now so much in evidence.

As the Herbartian idea in its most general form is destined to modify existing secular education profoundly, it occurs to me to be worth asking whether, in the sphere of religious instruction, it may not have a field as well. In the experimental German schools now operating the elaborate programmes of Ziller and Frick, the religious instruction of the daily school has been remodelled to conform to the Herbartian scheme. I dare say, in the fields of ethics and sacred history, we might profit by the suggestions of these curricula; but the conditions are, nevertheless, so totally different that, practically, we must ourselves settle our main difficulties before the experience of German schools will avail.

(The criticism already passed upon the daily school—that its course of study, its text-books, its methods, are, in the first place, constructed by architects who had very little concern for and absolutely no adequate knowledge of the human child—seems to me to weigh with equal severity against the religious school.) I make no distinction here between Christian and Jew. As far as my observation goes, religious spirit and the knowledge of religious history are distributed between them with absolute impartiality. In both cases the religious school is organized—though loosely organized, it is true—by theologians, and on a theological basis. The things that the child of a given denomination ought to know, not the knowers themselves, have dictated the course to be pursued and the divisions into which it has fallen. It is what children ought presumably to know—the concrete, presentable, although entirely unassimilable bullets of historical and

theological lore—that are, if not the sole, certainly the main objects of attention. And, to make matters worse, the teaching of this artificial scheme, based, in the first place, on an unsound notion, is intrusted to immature and unpractised young men and women, whose effort is even more rigidly and exclusively directed to the modicum to be drilled into the unresponsive child.

Such a method is bound to be vicious in its effects. If, on the one hand, the child be impressionable, who can express the dumb anguish to which it is doomed by the literal interpretation of its religious lesson? Witness the heartbreak of Waldo in the “Story of an African Farm.” “Surely,” says George Eliot, “if we could recall that early bitterness, the strangely perspectiveless conception of life that gave the bitterness its intensity, we should not pooh-pooh the griefs of our children.”

But if, on the other hand, the child is not easily susceptible, its religious consciousness is quite awakened. It is in nowise prepared to resist the materializing tendencies which the welfare of society requires to be combated. Its feeble equipment of phrases tends rather to confirm the irreligious wave, for, certainly, if this be religion, it is a hollow, verbal mockery.

The religious school thus becomes the fruitful mother of indifference. The disintegration of the religious consciousness is assisted by the very influences that should fortify and maintain it.

I have been aided towards these conclusions by the experience of thoughtful men and women with whom I have been able to discuss the question. I have tried, as far as I could be permitted, to learn their religious history without previous suggestion of my own view. In one case I have been favored with a striking account of individual experience, which exposes so fully, and at the same time so sympathetically, the defects that I have tried to point out, that I am happy to be allowed to quote freely from it,—

“I was always taken, or rather sent, to Sunday-school from the very first, except for the three or four years we lived in the mountains. I haven't any recollection one way or the other of my first Sunday-school, except as a vague

and pleasurable excitement connected with the learning of many texts and with seeing a great many children in their best clothes; I believe there was absolutely no real feeling connected with it then. Later I remember only my teachers and the way they impressed me,—very little of their teaching; not enough to know whether it was ethical, dogmatical, or historical; very little of the latter, I fancy, for I had almost no conception of the historical side of the Bible until I went to college. There was a good deal of the tamely ethical, adapted to children; but I think what Sunday-school really stood for was a place where it was eminently proper to go, and where it was worth while to know one's lessons, because it was appreciated and generally figured as a shining exception. It was not until I went into Miss X's class that religious teaching really began to take hold of me, and then chiefly, I fancy, because I was so closely attached to her and liked to do and feel as I knew she wished me to. I got, as time went on, more or less bias towards my parents' church as the church; but I really believe now that my joining it was through a child's fondness of imitating its elders in thought and belief, for I know that the first time I ever went to an Episcopal church I knew down in the bottom of my heart that that was what I really preferred and should have taken to, if I had been left alone,—had had nothing to contend with in doing so, I mean. The beauty and dignity of the service filled a need somewhere that the church I was used to felt quite unsatisfied. Next I had a long period of what Sunday-school books call religious fervor, when I went to church and Sunday-school devoutly, and then I got heartily sick of it all. There was so little of it. Nothing but ceaseless repetitions in all keys and guises, but the same thing at the bottom. It was barren and uninteresting, and I hate to remember even now all the sermons I sat through and the lessons I studied, bored almost beyond endurance, and hungry for anything but the same thing over and over again. (That is the way the average Sunday-school strikes me, then,—as a cheap, inadequate, and often stultifying solution of the most delicate and difficult problem in the world,—the unfolding of a child's mind. There is an even greater temptation there than in ordinary schools for the inefficiency and ignorance to shelter themselves behind catchwords, iteration, and surface dogmatism. The teachers have taken things for granted themselves, and they can only urge others to do the same. And as for some of the by-products in the way of influence, where the teachers are not like Miss X, and the frequent cheapening and vulgarizing of sacred things,—well, these might be made the subject of a philippic."

The details of a course of religious instruction such as would satisfy the criticism here made, I cannot now submit. (It demands, in the first place, properly equipped teachers,—teachers with a knowledge of infant psychology, with active and true religious feeling, and, lastly, with adequate store of religious learning. Even granted that these can be obtained,—I, for one, do not see how or where,—it would require years of experimentation to arrive at an acceptable result. Some

things, however, experience in other lines suggests. Instead of checking by rude suppression or satisfying with meaningless verbal formulæ the child's eager curiosity, which would naturally issue in religious feeling, a wise teacher will sustain and heighten the child's wonder; as an unsolved mystery, he will keep before the child-mind the sense of goodness, beauty, power revealing itself gradually, but always more and more as the child's power to grasp it unfolds. It is a woful mistake to suppose that a child's questions must always be categorically answered. Often the question reflects no distinctly apprehended problem, but rather a vague, incomprehensible wonder and awe. The management of the child-mind at this stage calls for the utmost delicacy, tact, sympathy. At times we must needs explain; again we must confess ignorance; and yet again we must gently postpone. Here, as elsewhere, it is the religious bent that we must preserve and encourage, without trying too narrowly to impart a special religious content.

Assuming that the Bible will continue to a large extent the source of religious education, its chronological and theological treatment must be abandoned. The child apperceives by means of previous experience; hence its material must be selected and presented according to conditions fixed beforehand by the content of the child's experience. The parables of the New Testament are constructed with consummate skill on this principle. This forbids once for all rigid and absolute teaching of special stories and incidents. The child's hold on both facts and interpretation must be gentle, as is its hold on its knowledge and understanding of other matters. Who would hammer into its young brain an account, for example, of the growth of a tree, and then try to keep it from revising this teaching by surrounding the revision with pain and penalty? On the contrary, we satisfy its inquiry about ordinary phenomena in such a way as to perpetuate interest and encourage revision; similarly it must be with the Bible story. The matter must offer no undue resistance to the reinterpretation and revision to which the child's whole stock of ideas is constantly subjected by its developing mind and in connection with its expanding knowledge, which thus grows in mass,

definiteness, orderliness, suggestiveness, and becomes a vital part of the soul, not a mere foreign, inactive encumbrance. It is in this sense that ideas give ideals and knowledge becomes a real power.

To the scheme here proposed it will perhaps be objected that I mean to bring children in contact only with philosophically sanctioned spiritual ideas. In answer I need only point out that this cannot be my intention, as it violates fatally the psychological principle. They must have the conceptions proper to their age and mental state,—crudely anthropomorphic at the start, as must be. But the point is that no one conception must be rigidly insisted on as absolutely valid and necessary either in the past or present. Growth out of anthropomorphism into higher and more spiritual forms must not only be unhindered, but must be skilfully promoted. (Doubt, instead of being repressed, must become a means of advancing spirituality.)

Again, it may be urged that children will outgrow their early training,—their own vitality may be relied on. This fundamental error of our present teaching is, as I have already contended, really largely responsible for irreligion, atheism, and agnosticism. (In childhood the religious sense was not touched, but the mind was filled with raw religious ideas. As their inadequacy was perceived, they were unloaded, and there was no active religious consciousness behind to supply the loss. The educational process, I repeat, must be organic,—connected; an educational policy that contemplates from the start a more or less abrupt break with the past at some future stage is totally opposed to the law of mental and spiritual development. From such a catastrophe a few escape with their spiritual lives; the multitude never recover from the shock.)

The religious school, as I have considered it, has an importance far beyond what its present meagre allowance of attention assumes. (I regard it, indeed, as a most positive misfortune that existing conditions make it impossible to unite religious with secular training, for its scope, practical and theoretical, is wide and essential.) By opening up the child's

view to the wonder, beauty, and order of the visible universe, by bringing him to feel the potential greatness and nobility of man, and at the same time the limitations and dependence attendant on his finitude, the religious school can lay the foundation of a true religious life. (Surely the highest powers of the human soul meet in that transcendent mood where science and ethics and philosophy, music, art, and poetry fuse to form the developed religious consciousness. And this developed religious consciousness, as I have tried to show, must be the main bulwark of humanity against the forces that threaten the disruption of society, for the supreme fact of the religious sense is spiritual unity. The practical difficulties in the way of the cultivation of this sense are indisputably great; but for that very reason it behooves us steadfastly to look away from the letter, steadfastly to fix our attention on the spirit. )

ABRAHAM FLEXNER.

LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY.

---

## LAW AND NATURE IN GREEK ETHICS.

IN a well-known passage of the "Ethics," Aristotle says that "things fair and things just are liable to such variation and fluctuation that they are believed to exist by law only and not by nature." \* Although much has been written, and well written, on this distinction, it still seems possible to throw a little fresh light upon it. It is easier now than it used to be to trace the thread of historical continuity in Greek thought, and to understand what the doctrines of Greek philosophers really meant to the men who taught them and heard them. And we can do this by looking at our problem in the twofold light of earlier speculation and contemporary culture.

I. To understand what the Greeks of the fifth century B.C. meant by φύσις,—a word very inadequately rendered by

---

\* *Eth. Nic. A*, 1094 b, 14, τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια . . . πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή.

"nature,"—we must cast a glance backwards upon those cosmological inquiries which had just reached their highest point in the Atomic Theory of Leukippos and Demokritos. I have shown elsewhere\* that the cosmologists from the Milesian School onwards had given the name *φύσις* to that primary substance which they were all in search of. It meant to them the most real thing, that which must underlie the world with all its manifold appearances and changes. To put the matter simply, science began with the child's question, "What is the world made of?" The answers that were given to this question covered the whole range from the Water of Thales to the "Seeds" of Anaxagoras or the Atoms of Leukippos. But the question was always the same, and every answer to it was a new account of the *φύσις* of things, or, as we should say, of the element or elements to which things can be reduced and of which they are composed.

This primary element was, of course, corporeal like the world itself. The time had not yet come when the bond of the world could be sought in an ideal unity. Even the Pythagorean "numbers" were spatial, and space was not clearly distinguished from body before the rise of the Atomic Theory. Now the fact that ultimate reality and the world of common experience were both regarded as corporeal had serious consequences. Both were of the same kind, and therefore comparison was inevitable. In proportion as the idea of *φύσις* was more thoroughly worked out, it naturally tended to become something more and more remote from common experience, and thus to make that experience seem by comparison more and more unreal and illusory. The Water of Thales was, indeed, something we know, and we could see without too much effort how everything else might be solidified or vaporized water. But now Parmenides has shown once for all that, if we are going to take the reality of *φύσις* seriously, we are bound to deny of it all motion, change, and variety. "It *is*," and that means that it always was and always will be,—or

---

\* "Early Greek Philosophy," pp. 10 sqq. I still hold firmly that we have no right to ascribe the term *ἀρχή* to the cosmologists.

rather that time is a fiction,—that It is absolutely continuous, homogeneous, and motionless. This makes the breach between the world we seem to know and the world as it is for thought complete. The “real” of Parmenides is in fact an extended and corporeal “Thing in itself,” which not only fails to explain the every-day world, but banishes it to the realm of the unreal. The Atomic Theory sought, indeed, to make the “real” yield an explanation of the world by multiplying the One of Parmenides into innumerable atoms, but this only served to bring out more clearly than ever the disparity between *φύσις* and our every-day experience.

II. This explains why the ethical problem, when once it was raised, took the form of a search for *φύσις*, for an underlying and permanent reality, in the vast mass of traditional morality embodied in the uses and observances which varied so strangely from city to city, to say nothing of the bewildering maze of “barbarian” institutions. These presented a problem precisely analogous to the problem of the manifold world around us, with its endless diversity and its never-ceasing war of opposites. And so the question soon resolved itself into a search for the *φύσις* or underlying reality of all the complex social arrangements and institutions we know. Is there anything in human life that corresponds to the One of the Eleatics or to Atoms and the Void?

Now, just as cosmological speculation had been forced to deny the reality of the every-day world because it sought for ultimate reality in something corporeal, so the new ethical speculation was soon forced to deny the validity of ordinary morality, and for just the same reason, because the underlying principle it sought was of one kind with the facts it was meant to explain. If we look for ethical reality in some code of rules which are “really” binding, instead of seeking it in that which gives binding force to the moral codes which already exist, we are bound to regard the latter as invalid and arbitrary. And further, just in proportion as we carry out the search logically, the poorer will be the content of our “real” code of morals. For in truth, however much we may disguise the fact, such a code is reached by abstraction. Just

as nothing was left by the Eleatics and the Atomists but extension and body, so nothing is left by the later "sophists" but brute force and the good pleasure of the individual. Morality, too, becomes an affair of Atoms and the Void.

III. The word which was used to denote the existing code of morality in any given state was νόμος, a word which originally meant "use," but covers also what we call "law." When the oracle of Apollo advised men to worship the gods, νόμῳ πόλειως, it is as if it had said "after the use of Sarum." Now we find that this word is used in a metaphorical sense by Demokritos to express the unreal character of our every-day knowledge of the world, and nothing can show more clearly the close parallelism between the ethical and cosmological speculation of the time. In making his famous distinction between "true-born" and "bastard" knowledge,\* Demokritos used these words,—

"By use there is sweet and by use there is bitter; by use there is hot, by use there is cold, by use there is colour. But in sooth there are Atoms and the Void." †

Why should what we call the "secondary qualities of matter" be assigned to the province of Use? The answer to this question will give us the key to the whole theory of Law and Nature.

It is evident that the great outburst of legislative activity which marked the preceding age had done not a little to foster moral scepticism. Just as the beginnings of applied natural science had brought men face to face with the problem of the world, so did practical legislation raise the problem of ethics. It had been possible to regard the customary laws of older times as something fundamental, or even divine. Their authority was questioned just as little as the reality of the every-day world. The kings might give "crooked dooms" (σκολιαὶ θέμιστες), but the existence of the "dooms" themselves,

\* That this is the true meaning of the γνησίη and σκοτίη γνώμη was first pointed out by Natorp (*Archiv.*, i., p. 355).

† Sext. *Math.* vii., 135, Νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν νόμῳ θερμὸν, νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ χρoή· ἐτεῖ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.

and the fact that they came from Zeus, was not doubted for a moment. All the old "taboos" and all the old rites were as real and unquestionable as the succession of seed-time and harvest or the rise of Ram, Bull, or Twins at the appointed season. Indeed, the regularity and constancy of human affairs was far more clearly apprehended than the even course of nature. Man lived in a charmed circle of law and custom, but the world around him still seemed lawless. So much was this so, indeed, that, when the regular course of natural phenomena began to be observed, no better word could be found for it than *δέσπη*. Anaximander spoke of the encroachment of one element on another as "injustice," and, according to Herakleitos, it is the Erinyes, "the avenging handmaids of Dikē," who keep the sun from "overstepping" his measures.\*

But a code of laws framed by a known lawgiver, a Zaleukos or a Charondas, a Lycurgus or a Solon, could not be accepted in this way as part of the everlasting order of things. It was clearly "made," and, therefore, from the point of view of *φύσις*, artificial and arbitrary. It seemed as if it might just as well have been made otherwise, or not made at all. A generation which had seen laws in the making could hardly help asking whether all morality had not been "made" in the same way.

That this really was the point of view from which the ethical problem was regarded is shown by the use of the word *θέσις* in much the same sense as *νόμος*. This word may mean either the giving of laws or the adoption of laws so given,† and it thus contains the germ, not only of the theory of an original legislator, but also of that known as the Social Contract.

The growing knowledge of the diversity of customs and institutions in the world, both Hellenic and barbarian, must have strengthened men's suspicion of the arbitrariness of all moral judgments. Herodotus is full of this feeling. The strongest proof he can give of the madness of King Cambyses is

---

\* "Early Greek Philosophy," pp. 51, 73, 147.

† According as it is referred to the active, *νόμους θείνειν* or the middle, *νόμους θεσθαί*.

that he laughed at the rites and customs of other nations as if those of his own were a bit less artificial. "If we were to set before all men a choice, and bid them pick out the best uses from all the uses there are, each people, after examining them all, would choose those of their own nation." So "it is not likely that any one but a madman would laugh at such things," and Pindar is right in saying that "use is king of all."

IV. We find, then, a close parallelism between the cosmological and the ethical problem of the fifth century B.C. The world of every-day experience was seen to be unreal in comparison with the ultimate *φύσις* of things however that might be explained, and the ordinary codes of morals were felt to be unreal in comparison with a similar abstract ideal of right. In both cases the error, or rather the inadequacy, of the views held came from the same source. The underlying reality of the world and that of conduct were sought *in pari materia*. The reality of the corporeal world was supposed to be a still more real body, and the reality of conduct was supposed to be a still more valid rule of life. Such is the real meaning and origin of an opposition which was natural and inevitable in the beginnings of philosophy, but which is surely an anachronism now. And yet it still lives on, and it is the same type of mind which would reduce the world to the interaction of vibrations and society to a compromise of "natural rights."

JOHN BURNET.

ST. ANDREW'S UNIVERSITY, SCOTLAND.

## DUTY.

THE phrase "I feel it my duty to do this" must often have passed the reader's lips. It suggests the question "Why do you feel it your duty?" The present paper attempts an answer. It attempts to explain the origin of the sentiment of duty. To feel a duty implies at least three things: (1) that a service is claimed from us; (2) that we feel the force of the claim; (3) that a certain effort is necessary to perform the service. The first of these implications needs no explaining; every dictionary attaches some connotation of service to the word duty. The second implication is the correlative of the first. No obligation can be imposed save on one by whom the obligation can be felt. The third may raise a momentary question. But if we think of it, the element of constraint which is implied in obligation and service is traceable in duty. On the other hand, where there is perfect devotion and perfect love, there is no feeling of constraint, no sense of subjection. In like manner, a being of perfect nature, free from our human infirmities, cannot be conceived as under duty. To this aspect of duty, as a principle always infected by transitoriness and imperfection, we will return by and by. Just at present we will give our attention to the two other aspects,—the call upon our service and our response. The questions to be answered are two: (1) What is it that claims our service? (2) Why do we feel an obligation to pay heed to the claim?

There is an immense variety in the actions to which a sense of obligation is attached. We speak of duty to a master, to parents, to one's neighbors and fellow-workers, to society, to the lower animals, to art or science, to ourselves, to God. In this multiplicity of duties, a common principle is not, at first sight, evident. But we shall get help by a little classification. A moment's consideration shows that they arrange themselves into two groups, which may be distinguished as "Personal Duties" and "Impersonal Duties," in other words, as

duties connected and disconnected respectively with deference to a personal superior.

One of the plainest cases of personal duty is that of a child to wise and sympathetic parents. Here we find in their most unqualified form all the elements of superiority,—social station, strength, wisdom, and virtue. We see the same sort of personal duty or loyalty in forms less pure in the relation of master to servant, soldier to officer, tribesman to chief, and workman to employer. In all these varieties we may find one or more of those elements of superiority that determine the service and obedience of a good son to a good father.

The personal form of duty is the most natural of all, and the essential features of duty in general are traceable in it. If we can get to understand this kind of duty, we shall not have much trouble with any other. We will, therefore, examine this feeling of deference and obligation of the inferior towards the superior, which we see in the workshop and the army, the family and the tribe, and in society at large.

The sort of character which in a high degree commands respect is one in which the qualities of eminent wisdom and virtue are found combined. Either quality will ensure a certain respect separately; but then one of them can hardly attain a high pitch apart from the other. True wisdom and righteousness are related more or less as theory to practice; and so their combination in one character is natural and probable, if not strictly necessary. Now, in explaining the respect which one shows to a very good man, we shall probably all admit that it is mainly an unselfish respect. The most cynical observer will not contend that we venerate a charitable disposition merely from a recollection of benefits received and an expectation of benefits to come. No doubt in many minds this selfish feeling does find a place. But in the main our attitude is what it purports to be, a disinterested admiration for a high type of character. It is often manifested towards persons from whom no material benefits can possibly be received, such as the saints and martyrs of the early Christian Church.

But the fact to be noted is that we do not stop at a passive admiration. When we come into personal relation with a

very good man, the mere contact produces in us a sort of obligation towards him. We feel that he is higher than we are, and his superiority carries with it a certain domination. We feel bound to treat him with tenderness and deference, not to slight his counsel, to defend him against wicked men, to be sympathetic to his calls upon our time and money.

In cases where to pre-eminent virtue is added pre-eminent wisdom, the claim upon us is enormously increased. Such men are the heroes and often the saviours of humanity. By a truly divine right they call for our allegiance, and the history of many a great religious or patriotic enthusiasm proves how great an obligation rests upon the rank and file of us to be obedient to the call.

Just as the higher kinds of personal superiority generate, as it were, the higher kinds of personal duty, in like manner to the lower kinds of superiority correspond lower forms of duty. The next source of influence over others which may be considered is that which is conferred by intellectual power, for there are many kinds of such power other than the supreme kind, wisdom. Foremost among them is penetration and rapidity of understanding. A man who comprehends at once what is said to him, who in an argument is quick to detect a fallacy and distinguish the main issue among irrelevant details, who pierces easily through a mask of pretence, and decides rapidly in emergencies, is one who, in modern society especially, must exercise a vast power over his fellows. This power is much enhanced if he possesses also good judgment or common sense.

Now, it is true that such intellectual power has a great fighting value. It makes its possessor a very formidable enemy. A good deal of the deference which lower natures feel for such gifts is very possibly due to fear. But it would be wrong to attribute to fear all the respect we feel for such a man. A great deal of it is nearer akin to reverence, as for a thing which is noble in itself. We may recall the phrase of Henry IV. of France respecting his wise Prime Minister Sully, "I am proud to serve that man."

Many of us have probably at some time or other meditated

on the nature of discipline, that subtle force which makes a troop of men or boys subject their wills to a master. Discipline no doubt is a very complex thing. Its highest form is near akin to reverence for a good and noble character; in its lowest form, as among a crew of pirates, it is the child of fear. But among average men, and even more among boys, an important element of it consists in a respect for mental force, above all, the force of rapid and trenchant judgment. With a very slight physical backing, a master with this gift can always make himself obeyed.

It is in the disinterested admiration for high intelligence that we may find an explanation of a very curious sentiment, we mean the sneaking regard one feels for a thoroughly able scoundrel, a scoundrel who is not wise, but is certainly clever. In real life the instinct and necessity of self-protection is commonly too strong for us, and we look on such men as vermin to be hunted down without mercy. But in literature we feel more free to indulge a sentimental, half-pitying admiration. Who is not rather pleased that Thackeray's Becky Sharp ends her days a respected dowager at Cheltenham? and what a stroke of art it is that the author of "Treasure Island" lets Long John Silver off at the end, and that consummate piratical villain escapes the hanging he so richly deserved.

It is hardly necessary to work through all the various sources of personal superiority,—strength of will, consistency of habit and purpose, and all the various excellencies of mind and temperament. We will go right down the scale to the lowest of all, bodily strength. Now in our respect for strength there is no doubt a larger element of fear than is connected with other kinds of superiority; but even here there is a great admixture of disinterested admiration. A strong physique is attractive by its manly beauty and marvellous adaptability to the needs of human life. We feel the same sentiment in regard to animals which are well-formed and powerful of their kind, even if their strength be of no personal advantage to ourselves. The fine proportions and sinewy limbs of a noxious beast, a tiger or an eagle, afford us an undoubted pleasure.

It would be an interesting little study to trace the history of

the value set upon bodily strength by successive generations of the human race. In barbarous and violent ages it has a monstrously exaggerated esteem. Savages almost worship it. The Iliad is full of muscular display. At every warlike epoch, as that of Napoleon, it seems to rise considerably in popular appreciation. In times of false refinement, as in the eighteenth century, the cultured world affects to think it brutal. Our own Victorian era, along with much rational culture of the body, so like the spirit of ancient Greece, has seen a great deal of fantastic adoration of mere muscular force, as witness many a neo-Homeric rhapsody in Charles Kingsley and others since his day. Of those who reverence strength in all its forms, Carlyle is the great exemplar. His justification is that he looks beyond the strong man to the Power who in its wisdom made him strong.

We may say a word or two on the nature of loyalty. It is simply personal duty whose object is placed in a position of recognized authority. By occupying such a position a man of natural superiority greatly increases his claims to our respect and obedience. He represents, as far as his office goes, that system of subordination which makes civilization and culture possible. We are all of us rulers and ruled in some, perhaps in several ways; in political life, in business, in the church, or in our homes; and though we should be flattering ourselves if we claimed that our obedience to pastors and masters is the fruit of pure loyalty, unmixed with self-interest or fear; yet it is certain that without loyalty and the principles behind it, subordination would cease and society would fly into antagonistic units and be destroyed.

To sum up, we may say that the essential feature in personal duty is a recognition of and devotion to a higher personality. The superior man by his mere superiority imposes on us a claim to serve him, and it is our duty to respond thereto. According as the superiority is the more pronounced, and according as its form is worthier, so is its claim on us the more stringent, and the more blamable are we if we slight the claim.

We need not linger over what we may call the semi-per-

sonal forms of duty,—*i.e.*, those whose object is a society or an institution. We find in them the same essential features as in personal duty. Our sentiment of attachment towards a corporate body of which we are members is due to more than one cause. It is part of the general human instinct of subordination. It is a kind of enlightened selfishness, as an interest in an association whose welfare involves our own. But in its best form it is, in a large measure, the same disinterested devotion to what is excellent that we find in personal duty. Take, for example, a scholar's devotion to his college. Apart from all selfish interests, it appeals to him as an agent in the great work of education. If its work is genuine, its claim upon him is high and authoritative. If, as we sometimes see, collegiate institutions have grown corrupt and learning has given place to sloth, the corporate spirit of the members must share the degeneration.

Having now explained our view of the duty which is connected with a personal superior, we go onward to those forms of it in which no such superior is concerned. It need hardly be said that the chief part of our duties is of this latter kind. Let a man run over the events of an ordinary day of his life and scrutinize all those acts in it which he performs with a sense of moral obligation—his acts of charity and self-repression, the performances and sacrifices of our daily round—and it will be evident that most of them are not done as an homage to personal excellence. Take, for example, an ordinary action, such as giving money to a man in distress. It may happen that we see in the recipient some worth of character that imposes on us an obligation to succour him. But more commonly this motive does not operate in us. We are moved to give, not because we admire the man, but because neglect of his distress would conflict with our moral ideal.

Here we touch upon the central fact of ethical experience. Every one who can be called a moral agent possesses a moral ideal, that is, a notion more or less explicit of the sort of conduct which he deems it good to pursue. We call it "ideal" for two reasons. In the first place, to mark its difference from actuality; it is what we approve rather than what we do. In

the second place, because of its concreteness; the ideal resembles a mental picture or vision rather than an abstract law or code of rules. Mere law, indeed, has but little power over conduct. What rules us is the concrete imagination or example of a worthy life.

The faculty of forming a moral ideal was, for convenience' sake, omitted in our account of personal duty; but personal duty, nevertheless, implies it. Where we are devoted to a superior, our devotion is not blind, but, in a measure, critical. A dog is faithful to his master by instinct, an idiot imitates and submits without discernment. But man admires or condemns, approves or disapproves, and his decision is not an instinct, but a judgment. This critical attitude on the part of rational man implies a criterion, a standard by which we measure the personal superior. We recognize him as superior in as much as he embodies and exemplifies an ideal.

But if idealization (to give a new meaning to an old term) is the primary fact in moral experience, it may be asked why we did not put it first in our study of duty. The answer is that the order we have followed is that which is natural to a straightforward observer. In the undeveloped stages of moral life, in savages and children, the ideal, though it is present and active, is not brought plainly before consciousness. It is latent, like the sense of grammatical propriety, which makes savages speak their language correctly without the formulation of grammatical rules. Personal duty, then, is the form which historically comes first and is most in evidence in the earlier stages. The ideal is embodied in a personal form; it is, so to speak, projected externally. But as man's mind grows more mature, as his habits of reflection grow stronger, the ideal becomes self-conscious. Man gets a distinct idea of the sort of life he admires and consciously strives towards it.

We said above that an examination of the personal form of duty would probably suggest to us the general principle which is at the bottom of duty of every kind. Now the effective element in personal duty is a homage to personal excellence. But when we come to consider the nature of impersonal duty,

we see that impersonal excellence has no less a claim. In fact, all duty is a kind of homage or devotion to excellence, whether actual in the external world, or ideal and created by the mind.

We may clear and define our conception of the moral ideal, if we consider how it works in certain kinds of moral experience, for example, where duties conflict. In such cases one element in our ideal prompts us to one line of action and another element to another. Let us take a concrete example. A man meets an innocent fugitive fleeing from his enemies and shortly after meets the enemies, who inquire whether the fugitive has passed that way. Now we have no interest in settling the point of casuistry as to whether a lie is justifiable. We merely want to throw light on the moral ideal by pointing out what goes on in the man's mind on an occasion like this. The man in this dilemma is, let us assume, a good man. The character he admires would hate either to tell a lie or to cause the death of a fellow-creature. To act up to this character, to realize this ideal is necessary to his peace of mind and self-respect. In the present case he must sacrifice one element or the other. He may nerve himself and do it hardily, but his moral sense will none the less feel the shock and pain. Readers of Motley may call to mind the case of the cultured Dutch nobleman of the days of William the Silent, who after a foray against the Spaniards would retire to his chamber and curse himself for a plunderer and a butcher. Such was the conflict in his mind between humanity and patriotism.

But it must not be thought that conflict of duties is a rare and exceptional thing. It does not often take such extreme forms as the foregoing, but milder cases of it occur dally even to the quiet citizen. Let a man run carefully over a day's experience and he will note that he has had to make quite a number of little moral compromises. Our ideal is always rather too exacting for our powers. We wish not to neglect our studies, and at the same time to cultivate our friends; to subscribe to philanthropic objects, but not to fall behind-hand with our household expenses. Unfortunately, the various elements of the ideal life are apt to stand in each other's way,

and we have to adjust and compromise with as little violence to the whole as we can.

A kindred fact, which illustrates the working of the moral ideal in our minds, is the different value we place upon different duties. A warrior in a savage tribe esteems courage above everything. His system of preferences and antipathies is dominated by the vision of himself as foremost in fight and covered with glory and applause after the victory. To fall short of this, to flee in the hour of danger and be mocked by the women and slighted by the men when he comes home, is to him the most miserable degradation. In ordinary life, too, most men have their pet virtue, as most men have their besetting sin.

What the moral ideal is in any particular man, and what the element is which he values most, depends partly on circumstances, partly on character. For no man, perfect or imperfect, puts an equal value on all. Some duties, as those of formal politeness, are of comparatively slight importance. A wise man, therefore, gives them little of his admiration; while others, such as charity and truth, bulk largely in his thoughts and are indispensable to his conception of a noble character.

This way of interpreting the varying stringency of various duties seems more logical than if we had recourse to the conception of law. There are many who hold that duty is not, as we believe, a homage to excellence, but the offspring of some sort of law. In the latter case, as it is evident that some duties are less imperative than others (and must give way in case of conflict), we must suppose that some moral laws, as that of veracity, are to be obeyed most stringently, while others, as that of formal politeness, claim only a limited obedience. But of this varying stringency we ourselves are sole judges; and the only ground on which we can judge some laws more stringent than others is, that they are more excellent and enforce a more important principle. In other words, we obey them not so much because they are laws, as because they embody excellence; which is substantially identical with our own position.

We have now in our explanation of duty got to a point of

view from which we see it as a form of appreciation of excellence. This appreciation is one of the fundamental facts of our nature. We cannot in any proper sense explain it; but we can show how fundamental it is. In the first place, it is near akin to self-preservation. A man's conduct is governed by his system of preferences and dislikes. If, therefore, in knowledge he admires the ignorant and false, or in action the feeble and the blind, or in art the ugly and meaningless, or in conduct those characters which degrade and those actions which lead to perdition, he himself must go the same evil road; he and his race must not only cease to make progress, but go backwards and perish.

All excellence, then, has a native claim on our admiration, but that form of it whose claims is best recognized is excellence of personal character. We must turn to the origins of society, if we would understand how rooted in human nature is our admiration of a superior man. However low we go down the scale of civilization, men are never found living solitary, but always in groups or societies. Every such group, to prosper, to feed itself and defend itself, needs leadership, and must appreciate and revere the qualities of the leader. Hero-worship is not a sentimental luxury so much as a prime necessity of social preservation.

Moreover, all through man's history another influence has worked potently in the same direction, the influence of woman. Among all races, or almost all, and especially among the lowest and the highest, woman has a great share in choosing her mate; and her choice is largely determined by those solid and valuable qualities which enable a man to feed and defend his family. In *Tierra del Fuego* it is the lover who is brave in fight and clever at hunting and fishing that prospers in his courtship. In modern England the qualities may vary, but the principle is the same; and so with all the ages and generations that lie between those far-divided stages of civilization. Hero-worship is rooted no less in the family than in society.

It is right to bring our appreciation of excellence into connection with self-preservation and race-preservation; most of

the spiritual parts of our nature have historically no more exalted origin. But it would be absurd to argue that these humble biological formulæ are as adequate to the maturer as to the earlier stages of our development. The effort towards perfection cannot be "reduced" to a mode of the struggle for existence. The historical method is a valuable help to explanation, but it is not an explanation by itself. The mistake it makes is to attach too much importance to the forms in which a tendency or principle first makes its appearance in the world. If we would really comprehend man's appreciation of what is true, good, beautiful, and strong, we must not limit our study to its lowly biological origins, but survey it from the highest point of view which our experience enables us to reach. From such a point of view this appreciation is an aspect of that general effort of the human soul towards greater fulness and more perfect harmony which we see active in every stage and every form of our development, and growing stronger as we rise in the scale. What the soul needs is more life, an experience ever fuller and richer, and therefore more free. It is the need of expansion which animates us in knowledge and in art, as in conduct; it is the criterion of fulness and harmony wherewith we discriminate right from wrong, no less than fair from ugly and false from true. If these considerations are valid, it is obvious how necessary is our appreciation of excellence, and the sentiment of duty which is based on it. Man is not a rational and artistic creature who also happens to be moral. Art, knowledge, and morality have not only a common biological origin. Spiritually they are all parts of one spring of effort and aspiration.

The last aspect of duty of which we must speak is its effort and strain. Duty is essentially the service of an imperfect nature. Sometimes, imperfect as we are, we reach a higher plane. Take as an example the artist's devotion to his art. In times of bodily depression, or when the lower nature revolts, or alien interests fill the mind, the call to study and create is, one would say, a call of duty. But when the artist is at his best his calling is a joy to him. So, too, in cases of

personal affection. No man is so happily circumstanced or so perfectly natured that the claims of his dearest even never tax him. But in those happy moments when love is unalloyed by sacrifice, we feel we have transcended the sphere of duty. We have passed out of restriction into freedom, out of conflicting claims and interests into harmony, out of compromise and imperfection into fulfilment. But this good time comes seldom and is quickly gone. Human nature is essentially imperfect, and "Duty" therefore must be our watchword, and subjection and service the natural and permanent order of our mortal life. But these moments of freedom, and the example of better natures whose devotion brings them very nearly at one with the purpose of their task, give us a vague comprehension and anticipation of a more perfect state, where Duty is swallowed up in Love.

HENRY STURT.

BUSHEY, ENGLAND.

---

## DISCUSSIONS.

### PROFESSOR PATTEN'S THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES.\*

THE "Theory, etc." says a good deal that is of importance to philosophy and to practical ethics and to sociology. Indeed, no one ought to leave it unread who is interested in the philosophy of the social question and in the historical evolution of that important branch of human knowledge called sociology. The sociology of to-day still shows traces of its association with the so-called *positive philosophy* and with the evolutionary and speculative biology of the century. The contents of the "Theory" are doubtless by this time fairly well known to many students of the economic and social sciences. Its definite contention may be held to be that sociology, being a psychological science, or a science of human nature rather than a physical science, must be based upon a true psychology of the social forces or social instincts of man, but that,

---

\* "The Theory of Social Forces," Simon N. Patten, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy, University of Pennsylvania. Publications of American Academy of Political and Social Science, December 31, 1895.

further, the foundations of such a psychology have not yet been laid either by sociologists or psychologists.

Both sociologists and psychologists, and especially psychologists, have, in the eyes of Professor Patten, devoted far too little attention to the motor side of man's nature, and altogether too much attention to the ideational or sensory side. Sociology, he virtually claims, cannot begin until we have a more complete psychology of action, or of "action-producing ideas." In opposition to this, one might allege two things. In the first place, the sociologist ought to fasten his attention at the outset upon whatever, in his eyes, constitutes the social consciousness or the social instinct or the social volition, altogether independently of the fact whether contemporary psychology has or has not taken into its sphere the psychical phenomena constitutive of or attendant upon social feeling and action. One of the most recent scientific treatises upon sociology in English, the "Principles of Sociology," by Professor Giddings, boldly builds sociology upon what it calls the *consciousness of kind* (kin—kinship—fellowship) that exists among human beings. In the second place, contemporary psychology is not destitute of a theory of the motor side of human nature, as Professor Patten supposes it to be.

It is not true that sociology cannot begin until psychology is more complete. Since the days of Herbart and Fechner down to the work of to-day of Wundt and Munsterberg and Ribot and James and Ward, psychology has worked almost more at the motor than at the ideational or mental side of man's nature. Contemporary psychology is, in fact, in advance of Professor Patten's social philosophy, in so far as psychology never thinks of mental activity, of our knowledge of the external world, or of our environment as even possible apart from our motor experiences, our attempts to correlate our movements to the necessities of our environment. Dr. Patten regards the original or biological stage of human (social) activity to be a stage in which motor activity was in a relatively high state of development; we are now, he holds, just coming out of a stage in which sensory activity has been in a relatively high stage of development, and where our energies have been devoted more to the avoidance of pain than the pursuit of pleasure. He looks for social progress in a development of the social forces rather than in the piecemeal construction of social ideals out of impressions and sensations and cognitions (understood in the traditional sense of "knowledge-producing ideas" which give us "information of the

environment"). His book is a plea for "action-producing ideas rather than knowledge-producing ideas,"—a fact of considerable importance to the *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*. The first part of his book is devoted to showing what he means by the former elements of human nature, and this in opposition to the old intellectual psychology and philosophy. The second part of it is an instructive study of the workings of social forces and of the limits to their working. Both parts are eminently suggestive. But the treatment throughout the book is hypothetical, owing to the overstraining of the opposition between knowledge-producing ideas and action-producing ideas. Psychologists and biologists know that there is, in reality, no ultimate distinction or radical separation between sensation and movement as psycho-physical phenomena in living beings [real knowledge of environment implies both of them]; but that all relatively developed organisms must be thought of as exhibiting to some extent both sensation and movement. These are recognized characteristics of animal life, others being nutrition and reproduction, phenomena of growth. Comment may well be made upon some of the interesting features of the treatment of the book.

The earlier part of the book seeks to clear the ground by contrasting knowledge-producing ideas with action-producing ideas. Those who are convinced of the importance of volition or motor phenomena, even in view of an intellectual philosophy—in view of the nature and content of our knowledge of the world as a whole—will find many interesting reflections upon the course of modern philosophy. Dr. Patten seeks to identify his "knowledge-producing ideas" with Locke's "ideas," and his "action-producing ideas" with Hume's "lively ideas," the feelings that produce belief and conviction. Another form of the comparison is of knowledge-producing ideas to primary nervous currents, and of action-producing ideas to secondary nervous currents. He thinks that "motor currents are stronger, move more rapidly, and make a more vivid impression on consciousness" than the sensory currents. He is obviously more interested in motor currents than in sensory currents, in action-producing ideas than knowledge-producing ideas, in beliefs and convictions than knowledge. He hardly seems to be aware of the extent to which it is perfectly obvious to psychologists that reality is simply that which is related to our practical experience, and that movement or adjustment of the organism to its environment is implied in the simplest or the most diffuse kind of sensation. But of this below. Philosophers

ought to be interested in some of his contentions about the reasoning of Locke and Hume on the powers of the mind. These philosophers "attempt . . . to discredit all ideas which do not have sense impressions going with them," it being wrong in Professor Patten's eyes to hold that the "small elements" (page 41) out of which "great things" come, "enter the mind only by one road,—the sensory nerves, which come directly from the outer world." "Taste, color, sound, and other simple sensations, are as much the product of a complex mental mechanism as are *the highest race ideals*." We may italicise the latter words, as they have more to do with Dr. Patten's main subject than taste and color and sound. His reason for referring to Locke and Hume is that their "principles . . . are accepted by most writers on social topics." The fact that sensationalism plus associationism is the philosophy assumed by most sociologists is to him the real reason why sociologists have not hitherto been able to justify the value of beliefs and forces, or even to see the immense importance of beliefs and forces. There seemed, as it were, to be no sense impressions upon which these things rested, or at least the impressions upon which beliefs and ideals and forces rested seemed to be,—as they do in reading Herbert Spencer and other sociologists,—so primitive and so erroneous (having to do, *e.g.*, with ancestor worship and the primitive mythology of language and imagination) that they ought to be discarded. This is instructive. It is doubtless because Herbert Spencer cannot see how beliefs and ideals and social effort have to do more with our motor than with our sensory powers that he does not tend to think we can do much in interfering with the merely natural or unconscious (biological) development of human societies or of human society. When psychologists and philosophers and sociologists definitely recognize that beliefs and ideals come—in the thought of Patten—from the sensations having to do with action rather than from analyzed sense impressions or from knowledge, they will then think of beliefs and ideals as expressing the conditions of the continuity and persistency of human effort, as expressive of the kind of reality,—social reality say, moral reality, the moral relationship of human beings with each other—which we are trying by our action to evolve. The "Theory" is instructive in so far as its tendency is to arrange a greater *rôle* to social forces and social beliefs, to force and belief and practical ideas in general, than to ideas or cognitions pieced together by the exercise of our senses and understanding. And the first part of the essay

is instructive in so far as it reflects indirectly upon what philosophy has lost by not being able to give a thorough *rationale* of anything in the mind that does not seem to have found its way thither along the ordinary paths of sense impression and the association of sense impressions. It may safely be affirmed, however, that philosophy in this regard is behind modern psychology, which is fully aware of the importance of motor phenomena, of the reactions of the motor mechanism of the mind upon reality, in the constitution of even our so-called knowledge of reality. It is true that the old psychology talked as if action followed impression; the new psychology—or biology, at least—always seems to speak as if action preceded impression, as if the mind or the nerve centres are naturally in a state of tension or relatively high instability tending, upon the slightest provocation or stimulus from without, to explode into action.

Dr. Patten signalizes Hume as the one man out of the whole school of associationists who gave the clearest analysis of the causes of belief. This is right, although it is probably a very common experience of those who have read and studied Hume to find that Hume, of all men, seems to make belief eminently absurd and irrational and unjustifiable. The fact that Hume saw at the same time the immense practical value of belief is the real reason of the consummate irony that he exhibits in treating of both belief and philosophical doubts about belief.

Schopenhauer\* is the only modern philosopher who has founded a whole system of philosophy upon the will or the motor tendencies of man, and intellectual philosophy will have to place itself at his point of view. A study of "The Theory of Social Forces" will also be useful in this connection.

I shall speak of only one or two other interesting points in this essay. They are to be found in the second or more positive part. While Professor Patten is convinced of the value of beliefs and ideals to the sociologist, he is not blind to the fact of the struggle for life that goes on in all societies and between all societies. He is against both sentimental philanthropy and extreme individualism. Of the latter, below. He speaks of the absurdity of the philanthropy of "democratic ideals" which assume that a life of "unalloyed pleasure" is the natural and reasonable thing for all human beings to have, which would dole out the benefits of civilization to all,

---

\* See "Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance," (*passim*), by W. Caldwell M.A., D.Sc., 1896. Blackwood, London. Scribner, New York.

without regard to "the merit or demerit of the individual," which rest on "two prominent thoughts, the gifts of nature and the oppression of men," but which are "silent" about the "pains and the obstacles to progress which come from the environment, and represent the cost of nature's bounties." In these ideals "the difficulties of production are lost sight of in the struggle over the distribution of the bounties of nature, and thus the obstacles to progress seem to lie in the latter and not in the former class of problems" (p. 140). These words carry the weight of truth and fact along with them—of truth and fact that are often forgotten in the multitudinous sayings and writings of sentimental philanthropists who have very little perception of the two truths, first that nothing in the way of success or progress or economy is achieved without *cost*, and, then, that *as* people "sow," *so* should they "reap." "The science of human progress must remain a study of the dominant race in its most favorable environment." This is true, if we remember—what Dr. Patten himself does not always seem to remember—that our environment is not something that is made for us, once and all, by an external nature or an unconscious physical necessity, but is essentially something that we ourselves can largely make, or at least modify or idealize. A study of art is of itself enough to indicate the fact that nature itself must be looked upon by man as—in spite of the suffering and failure incident to the development of the highest form of life and the highest form of social life—something that is already partly spiritual, as a stage upon which man may feel at home, as essentially adapted to the harmonious unfolding of his moral and social life.

The dreams of Godwin and other utopists of naturalism will always be dispelled by the Malthus or the Schopenhauer who points out the suffering and the illusion incident to all life—even to birth itself—but, nevertheless, these dreams express by their very existence, in a vague way, the fact that the system of things as a system is essentially moral and social, and even beneficent to all who truly observe natural and moral law. The "Theory" reveals a perception of this truth. One of Professor Patten's strong points is his perception of the implicit altruism of the æsthetic feelings and instincts. But he bows down before the Nemesis of natural necessity, or, rather, he is crushed by it. In spite of the fact of the very uniqueness of his position about the value of social forces and beliefs, he is at the end of his pamphlet crushed by the physical

necessity of external nature. He is brought to an abrupt stop by the thought of the natural limits to all human effort. Philanthropy can do nothing. It is only the few, the dominant society, that can survive. The reason for this will be immediately pointed out. But, first, a word about a way of fighting obstacles in one's environment that he does speak of.

This is the egoism or individualism referred to above. An individualist never makes an attempt to correct public abuses, but only to protect himself from any noxious influence they might have over his own life. He (*e.g.*) "avoids the evils of bad water by using filters," or perhaps even thinks of "establishing a private mail for himself." In condemning sentimental philanthropy, Professor Patten does not mean that we should take refuge in this kind of suicidal individualism. As a means of overcoming the selfishness of a *laissez-faire* indifferentism, he looks to the "growth of the æsthetic feelings." This growth will bring about the "differentiating tendencies which compel progress in city life." An æsthetic perception of the ugliness of certain evils will doubtless stimulate even the selfish man to work for their elimination by public instead of private measures. This is what Dr. Patten understands by the unconscious altruism of the æsthetic perceptions and instincts. "The æsthetic feelings lead to the development of citizens with high standards of life and civic instincts strong enough to drive those with lower standards into isolated localities" (p. 151).

It has been said that the "Theory" is intent upon making as much as possible of beliefs and of action and of forces. This is at once its strength and its weakness. It speaks (*cf. supra*) as if a relatively high motor development represented the original condition of human beings. This means a kind of animal strength, a copious, unimpeded energy, different altogether from our present condition of relatively high sensory and intellectual development, in which, with increasing knowledge, we seem to increase sorrow, to become alive to more sources of possible pain. The trend of the teaching of the "Theory" is that we are gradually working our way out of this pain-economy through "civic customs" and "civic ideals" and "civic instincts" through improved ideas of consumption and developed æsthetic and altruistic (religious and moral) perceptions and volitions. All the positive work of the "Theory" is woven through and around this teaching, and students will find in the central portions of the work much sound observation and reasoning upon the conditions of progress in this work-a-day—

half-pleasurable and half-painful—world in which we live. It is difficult, however, to disentangle the positive exposition of the "Theory" out of the hypothetical Procrustean framework upon which it is worked out. In his anxiety to exalt force and aggressive motor power as the great thing about human nature, Professor Patten has practically deified it (as the Greeks did a primitive chaos) and exalted it into prominence as the background both of physical and human nature. The consequence is that human force seems a very small thing compared with the force of animate and material nature, and that physical environment is made to circumscribe and limit the possibilities of human development. "The planetary conditions which limit progress are static, and the goal of progress is a static type of man fitted for the earth's best environment" (p. 129). "*A study with these limitations cannot rank with biology and psychology in the hierarchy of the sciences.*" Now, of course, even if sociology can never be very emphatic about the social end, this would be no reason for denying that it is just as much a science as psychology or biology. We cannot draw any limits as to what an improved knowledge of our environment as well as of human nature might result in for the human race. There may—despite Herbert Spencer and Dr. Patten—be a future for humanity as well as a present or a succession of presents (states of momentary stability) for favored races. Ethical faith and ethical practice, in a sense, demand that there shall be ; and we must think of even the physical universe as moral at bottom. Cosmic reform may consist in making—after the elimination of degenerate individuals and groups—a stable equilibrium or a growing equilibrium between human life and environment possible for the then existent humanity, a sum total of existing races. There is, however, some speculation in all this. I selected this notion of there being physical limits to race development only as an illustration of the danger of glorifying mere force and motor power over knowledge and action directed by knowledge. The opposition between a pleasure-economy and a pain-economy is another dangerous thing in the "Theory." And so is Dr. Patten's view of the human mind as "a complex resulting from the activity of a number of separate centres." Because he will persist in looking upon the mind as a complex, the mutual relations of action and knowledge are never stated or implied in a satisfactory way in the whole book. He does not, in writing of the mind, allow for the existence of a consciousness (a common or general consciousness) pervading all the

so-called separate forms of activity. Nor does he seem to figure to himself the possibility of a general consciousness pervading, in the form either of custom or law or government or natural or racial feelings, the whole of the body social. Perhaps this social consciousness, so far as the whole of humanity is concerned, is only "in the making," but there is no definite reason for prescribing limits as to the functioning of such a social consciousness of itself on the part of humanity as a whole. Once or twice Dr. Patten seems to speak as if he thought of the "natural state" of society—out of which we are just emerging—in some such way as the political philosophy of the eighteenth century is prone to do: the refractory individuals or units with the repellent forces, as it were, of their separate individualities, seem to be there, all engaged in an internecine war with one another. The original background of the human race, according to his language, is one of mere force. If it really were such, all his social forces and civic standards and art and morality would be unequal to the task of socializing it. Now the human mind is no more motor than it is sensory: we act and we know we act, at one and the same time. It is true that philosophers have on the whole made too much of knowledge, that they have written of our action as if we had a complete knowledge of ourselves. We have not this knowledge, and so long as we do not have it, ideals, and practical standards, and beliefs and forces are of supreme importance so far as social development goes. But we must never disparage the sensory or the knowledge side of the mind. Dr. Patten sometimes talks as if that were not an original portion of the mind at all—not the "older portion." Neither the sensory nor the motor is the "older portion" of the mind, and it is altogether fatuous to talk of the "mind" at a stage when it was not the mind, but something else. Sociologists will soon get tired of talking as if evolution must be regarded as a process that had happened in time; there is no need for doing so. A good deal of the "Theory," for this reason, is a solution of an imaginary puzzle. It is bent on showing how social forces can be grafted on to essentially unsocial groups of individuals. It is far better, however, to read it in a perfectly free way, unencumbered by its hypothetical phraseology and philosophy of history. If one does this, it is suggestive enough to the sociologist, to the philosopher, and to the student of practical ethics.

W. CALDWELL.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILLINOIS.

## THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHIC THEORY TO PRACTICE.

THE question of the relation of philosophy to practice has been discussed, either directly or indirectly, many times in the pages of this JOURNAL. Its directest treatment is to be found in the articles of Professor Mackenzie (July, 1893; January, 1894; October, 1894). While those articles were appearing I was in hopes that some one, of an authority and distinction to which I cannot pretend in philosophy, would take up the challenge thrown down very frankly and explicitly by Professor Mackenzie. Time has gone on and no one has appeared in answer to that challenge. Meantime many things have conspired to convince me that the point is one which is of interest not only to philosophers, *par sang*, but to many who approach the question from the practical side. I venture, therefore, to offer my contribution, moved thereto by my conviction of wide-spread need, as well as by my inability to agree wholly with what Professor Mackenzie has said, though I am in general and warm sympathy with his philosophical position. I do not intend in this note to labor the relation of my position to that of Professor Mackenzie, nor the relation of his position to that of the greatest thinker who has ever given his mind to the consideration of this point,—viz., Aristotle.

This I should be willing to do in a future note, meantime I would try to express, as directly as possible, what I conceive to be the relation between philosophical theory and practice.

A discussion of the point may not be without interest and value at a time like the present, when we have (*a*) a large and increasing body of persons seeking a rational authority as guide and critic in practical matters; (*b*) an increasing if not yet a large body of popular preachers and teachers pointing to philosophy not only as critic but as guide; and (*c*) here and there a philosophic writer prepared to deduce definite "commandments" or rules of conduct from "Ethical first Principles."

The current phrases "Ethical Culture" and "Applied Ethics" show a tendency to identify ethics not only with rules of conduct, but even with morals.

In all this history repeats itself; but the mental attitude indicated has never been characteristic of times of great practical insight nor yet of periods of pre-eminent philosophic power. It is not characteristic of times of practical insight, because at such times men have no need to turn to the philosophers for guidance. The mind

of such a time is too much alive, too much interested in its "stuff," too much an artist's mind to need or submit to dictation. Neither is the tendency indicative of philosophic activity nor of any intelligent respect for philosophic authority. Philosophy is the science of universals; and rules of conduct, with whatever show of logic they may be deduced, or however valid, within limits, they may be, are, in their nature, of limited application and temporary validity. Such rules, whatever else they may be, are not philosophy, and the great philosophers have no call to turn aside from their proper function to formulate them.

Has the moral reformer, then, as such, no concern with moral philosophy? If the hope of detailed guidance is illegitimate and illusive, may we not at least expect that a study of moral philosophy will cast a light on the general problem of morals?

The trouble is that problems of morals are always particular problems, upon which the profoundest study of philosophy will leave us helpless to form capable judgments, except we have at the same time a knowledge of the details of the particular problem to be considered as it is working itself out at a particular time and place, with all its individual, peculiar, conditions and relations.

But granted the special knowledge of the particular moral problem, will not an antecedent study of philosophy enable the person engaged upon the solution of the problem to form a truer and more valuable judgment in the case?

The answer here must, I think, inevitably be an affirmative, provided the study of philosophy has been intelligent. But the philosophic study will have helped the moral judgment more by its training of faculty than by any direct "light" that it will have afforded. The mind that has been trained to look for and to distinguish the essential thread of connection between ideas will be the most apt to arrive at valid judgments, whether in philosophy or in practical affairs. The question does not admit of direct answer whether the apprehension of that essential thread of connection in practical affairs is best sharpened by the study of philosophy. If, as I have said above, the study has been intelligent, the recognition of the supreme importance of discovering that essential thread must have been strengthened, but in the case of those who turn to philosophy in the hope of finding guidance in practical affairs the study is more likely to be a search for rules, or at best for "principles," capable of "application" to life, and with such students it may well be that their philosophic study actually unfits

their practical judgment for rational service. It will inevitably do so if it result in a mind loaded with principles or axioms rather than in a trained faculty of perception. The way of reflection is a long way round, compared with the direct route of practical insight. Not only is it a long way round, but the traveller by it is likely never to arrive just right. For all life is necessarily a discovery. That is its interest. The future can never "copy fair the past." It is the philosopher who has to accommodate his theory to the discoveries of the practical man, and not the practical man who has to accommodate his facts to, or even to shape his practical wisdom by, the theory of the philosopher.

As is the science of Logic to the perception of intellectual necessity, so is the science of Ethics to the perception of moral necessity. As is the science of *Æsthetics* to Art, so is the science of Ethics to practice. In all three practice is the forerunner of systematic reflection, not only in the early stages of human development, but from age to age. The discoveries of experience have been the new wine, bursting the old bottles of a too rigidly expressed theory. The development of judgment has wrought a fuller perception of the nature of intellectual necessity, and burst up the old logical forms, giving us modern logic. The development of romantic art compelled the re-expression of æsthetic first principles. Modern music grew up "behind the backs" of, and in apparent opposition to the theories of, the æsthetic writers of its time. The break-up of the Grecian city-states, the broad practical experience and diffusion of sympathy wrought by the spread of the Roman empire, pressed hard upon the narrower elements of existing moral theory, and brought about that full, that universal, reference, which makes the essential difference between Greek and Christian ethics.

What the study of moral philosophy can do for the practical man is to free him from prejudices, to rid his mind of superstitions, to give him wide, comprehensive, profound ideas of humanity. It teaches him the nature of his subject; it sets him in a right—*i.e.*, an intelligent—attitude to his world; it tells him life is so very complex that it would be impossible to apply directly and crudely any "first principle;" it teaches him the identity of the philosophic reason and the practical reason; it encourages him to look for the best material for the formation of a practical judgment in the real, living, knowledge of the working of the practical problem,—*i.e.*, in experience of life. But to the intelligent student of philosophy,

it is true, "experience" comes "with a difference." He apprehends his particulars more truly, *not* with slow reflective classification, or as calling for this or that first principle of action, but with an instinct that is the result both of practical experience and of reflective thought, and as such is an instinct "born again."

At the present time, moreover, there seems especial reason why the moral reformer should need the assurance of philosophy that the faith that is in him is no delusion, but the ground of a sure and certain hope. The explanation hitherto offered of moral faith having been for many discredited, some rational explanation has become necessary, some analysis of the fundamental realities of life, which will heal the laming division that has arisen between moral insight and the intellectual apprehension of reality.

The healing of this division, the slaying of the demon of doubt who, whispering to a man in temptation, paralyzes the moral will, the restoring to him of his world as a rational whole, the assurance that "the good" apprehended by him as a moral being belongs to one system of reality with "the true" apprehended by him as intellectual; this constitutes the unique service, the unequalled help, that philosophy can give to the practical man. It gives this help by its revelation to him of man as a spiritual being, as a member of a spiritual whole, and this places the man at the point of view, so to speak, from which things are seen in true perspective and true proportion. Having placed him there, it leaves him to apprehend and judge of each individual particular on its own merits.

To ask of philosophy that it shall supply us with rules, or even with a number of principles from which rules can be deduced, is to throw into rigidity that which has reality only as a living, growing tissue. The rigidity not only stops the growth, but it kills the life; the system we have made may be very complete, a beautiful skeleton, but it is dead, and soon it cumpers the ground.

Having by our philosophical criticism freed our minds from misconceptions, having understood our subject-matter in the light of past experience, we must not be afraid to face life without dogma, or "commandment," strong in a strength which is not that of a pupil applying the axioms of a master, but which is rather that of a skilled artist trained *to see*. Philosophy will help us to use the institutions and current ideas of our time, and will tell us how to criticise them. Having revealed to us what has "worked,"—*i.e.*, the great leading, vital, organizing ideas underlying the development of the past,—it will teach us that the question "What will work?"

is the test for action in the present. It does not so much reveal to us the goal as enlighten our intellectual acceptance of the goal common to all decent people,—viz., the development of character and the enrichment of life.

Philosophy cannot give us "faith," it cannot "prove" to us that goodness is goodness. But it can give us the *rationale* of our faith, it can tell us what is implied in our having it, it can by relating "the good" to "the true" and "the beautiful" give us what we are searching for, what we, under a misapprehension, call "proof."

Is not this enough? to rid our minds of prejudice and superstition; to put us in the right mental attitude; to give us the true point of view; to train us to "see;" to unify our world; and thereby to stablish and strengthen our moral faith?

The notion that philosophy is needed to prove to us that goodness is goodness is a new and comprehensive doctrine of eternal damnation for the majority of people. For, how few there are who can enter in at that strait and narrow gate!

Nevertheless, the study of philosophy remains the way of salvation, and the only way for all those who are conscious of contradiction between their moral judgments and their theory of life as a whole. I hope the foregoing will have shown in what ways it can help them, and in what ways it cannot.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

As far as I can make out, there is no real difference between the view put forward by Mrs. Husband and that which I have from time to time endeavored to state. Although she begins with a general reference to my view, and thus gives to her note the appearance of antagonism to my position, I suppose it is hardly necessary for me to state that with most of what she says I am in cordial agreement, and that several of her points have been emphasized by me in language almost identical with her own. There is perhaps some difference of emphasis; but I believe this is due to the fact that our criticisms are directed against opposite misconceptions. In the paragraph beginning "what the study of moral philosophy can do," Mrs. Husband seems to me to admit all for which I have ever contended; and I think she will find that in the articles to which she refers (and perhaps still more explicitly in the chapter on "The Commandments" in my "Manual of Ethics") I

have admitted all that I understand her to contend for. It may be, indeed, that some fundamental divergence of view is concealed behind our different modes of statement ; but my impression is that we are in reality at one,\* and that it is only special circumstances that have led us to lay the emphasis on opposite aspects. However this may be, I cannot but congratulate myself on having been the means of calling forth from Mrs. Husband so clear and careful an exposition of her views on this matter.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

---

### BOOK REVIEWS.

A SYSTEM OF SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. In Ten Volumes. By Herbert Spencer. London : Williams & Norgate, 1860-1896.

The third volume of "The Principles of Sociology," which has just been issued, completes the system of philosophy planned by Mr. Herbert Spencer thirty-six years ago. A small part of the original design, indeed—the part dealing with Social Progress—remains unwritten, but probably we are in possession of most of Mr. Spencer's ideas on the subject. At any rate, it is to all intents true that the work has now been completed as it was originally designed. It would be hard to find a parallel, in the whole history of philosophy, to the successful completion of so comprehensive a scheme ; and, though opinions will naturally differ as to the result that has been achieved, it must surely be impossible for any one interested in philosophical thought to withhold his admiration for the life of labor and self-devotion that has been employed, not without difficulties and discouragements, in the production of this vast treatise. Fully a half of the work, and probably not the least interesting and important half of it, is occupied with the discussion of ethical and social problems. Some portions of this have already been criticised in this JOURNAL, and it is possible that a future

---

\* I mean of course with regard to the main point. I cannot entirely agree with some of her more detailed references ; but a discussion of these would carry us too far. I believe, for instance, that theory and practice have reacted upon one another in the development of the moral consciousness to a greater extent than she seems disposed to allow.

opportunity may be found for the examination of the sections that have been recently added. But in the mean time it seems most fitting that this occasion should not be allowed to pass without an expression of our hearty congratulations to the illustrious author on the realization of the purpose of his life.

THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE.

THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA: A BOOK FOR ALL AND NONE. By Friedrich Nietzsche. Translated by A. Tille. London: Henry & Co., 1896, pp. xxiii., 488.

These things are an allegory: and the man who "spake" them is no kinsman of the Persian Zoroaster. Friedrich Nietzsche, the new wearer of that prophet's mantle, picked it up as he walked one day in January, 1883, along the wooded hills around Rapallo and looked on the fairest scenery of the eastern Riviera. He was then in his thirty-ninth year, and had for about seven years been a wanderer in search of health on the uplands of the Engadin and on the shores of the Mediterranean. In 1872 he had begun a career of meteoric brilliancy as a writer and a thinker on man, his aims, ideals, and illusions, and drew upon himself the attention, if not always the approval, of those who, throughout the world, fight under the banners of "advanced thought." This career came to an abrupt end in 1889 by a mental and bodily collapse, which has left the daring spirit a complete and apparently hopeless wreck.

The book, called "Thus Spake Zarathustra," consists of a series of chapters, composed in a figurative and fantastic prose, which caricatures rather than imitates the style of an Oriental sacred book, and is laden with a varied store of epigrammatic reflections on life and criticisms of morals and religion. It is divided into four parts. The first three, written during the years 1883-84, were published in 1886. The fourth part, a sort of interlude,—or satiric drama following on a trilogy of passion,—was printed for circulation among Nietzsche's friends in 1885 (having been written that same year at Mentone), but did not become public till 1892. To understand properly the utterances of Zarathustra-Nietzsche some knowledge of the life and letters of the author during these years would be almost indispensable, and this biographical material would have to be supplemented by a history of the movements in the world of thought and letters for the last twenty-five years. Some light as regards the personal element in the work may be derived from Lou An-

dreas-Salomé's "Fr. Nietzsche in Seinen Werken" (Wien, 1894), but for complete and authentic information more may be expected from the second volume, yet unpublished, of Nietzsche's life by his sister.

When the scene opens, Zarathustra is supposed to have spent from his thirtieth to his fortieth year in the quest of truth, making his home in a mountain cavern, with an eagle and a serpent as his familiars. He has at length resolved to go down from his hermitage and offer men the gifts won in his aerial meditations. These gifts are summed up in a new gospel, the gospel of a new humanity, which, instead of sacrificing the individual to the mass, and the earthly Here to a heavenly Hereafter, shall be realized on earth in a more than human race, which it is the present duty to prepare and make possible, a race for which society shall not be an obstacle, but, as it were, a fostering garden where they may grow in grace and strength, and for which deity shall be the inspiring faith in perfectibility, not a fixed power impending as a menace and a check upon the path of progress. The multitude, however, shows no taste for such revelations of spiritual truth, and prefers the marvels of charlatans. Zarathustra, accordingly, who does not wish "implicit believers," but fellow-workers who will "write new values on new tables,"—*i.e.*, will destroy the old misconception of good and bad and create other ideals of perfection, turns away from the masses and resolves to sing his song "to single and to dual recluses." These chants form some eighty chapters, more or less concordant in theme, but far from continuous or systematic: the outpouring of varying moods of gloom and gladness, hope and disgust; often wild and fiery in tone, with many traces of the struggle with self and with old associations, but often also gracious with quaint charms, and touches of tenderness.

European civilization, as Nietzsche sees it, is the victim of ideals which mislead it in two directions. On one side it is dominated by a low-toned Utilitarianism, whose watch-words are mass-happiness, comfort, conservation of general and individual welfare. To these ends learning and morality, enlightenment and virtue, are made alike subservient. To-day is the day of the masses and the vulgar. The "Philister" is supreme, and gives the key-note both to the science of the scholar and to the ethics of the just and good. On another side, civilization is attracted—and distracted—by ascetic and pessimistic ideals, which, according to Nietzsche, have found their typical expression in Christianity. These disparage natural impulses; instead of manly action they preach self-sacrifice, com-

passion, and, in general, an altruism which leaves no room for healthy self-regard. As against the greatest-happiness idea, Nietzsche insists on the view that self-conservation must not be identified with stagnation, and that the welfare of humanity has yet to be discovered and rightly conceived. Man, far from having surmised or learned his true meaning and drift, is still in the making: he is, as he stands, only "the rope between the animal and the superhuman." "What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal." His being has yet to be made by effort, suffering, and sacrifice. So far Nietzsche may seem to be an ally of ascetic morality. But he sharply disclaims the connection. Asceticism has in his eyes treated the body as something extraneous, which hampers, and only hampers, the spiritual life; its overstrained spirituality has dehumanized man, and set up a conception of truth and goodness which is hostile to the requirements of human nature. "Everywhere," he cries, "sounds the voice of the preachers of death."

"Dead are all Gods: it is now our will that the superhuman live," are the words which conclude the first part; and when Zarathustra, after months and years of renewed retirement, again, in Part II., utters his message, it begins with the same refrain: "The old God is dead," or, for those who have not yet gone so far, "*Deus est delendus*." "There was a time," as he puts it, "when, as men looked out on far-away seas, they said God," but the surmise thus uttered was according to Nietzsche one which paralyzed man's effort, set up an insurmountable barrier to his progress, and subjected his life to an influence of incalculable instability. Such a deity is—or rather is part of—the inscrutable power whom primitive man (if Epicurus and Nietzsche tell us true) saw haunting human life from lonely places and holds of darkness. And, perhaps, if man is to rise above his lower self, *such* a God *must* disappear. We may even say that, if this be atheism, such an atheism has many adherents among the followers of the true God. The godhead, which is to be, Nietzsche sees as the ideal end, consummating a process whereby the man of to-day, if he fulfils his true mediating position, will build up in many children of glory the kingdom of the superhuman,—the as yet undiscovered, but still-to-be-pursued, "land of his children and his children's children, in remotest seas." But if the gods of primitive tradition are to go, and leave man free space to create many exemplars of the godhead which is to be, other fetters on human development must go too. Foremost among these drags is, in Nietzsche's eyes,

the dogma of the eternity and immutability of moral rules and of particular moral ideals. All detached ethical precepts, all single and limited ethical ideals, all detailed moral standards, have in them elements arbitrary, provincial, temporary. The law which shall not pass away is not written with earthly pens or graven on earthly tables. *Nichts ist wahr: Alles ist erlaubt.* There is nothing in even the most sacred observances and institutions of human life which has not, when tested by history, a tentative and provisional character. Even the best of manners and customs, if allowed to reign forever, *i.e.*, beyond its implied conditions, would corrupt a world, the distinctive mark of which is to be ever on the march. Hear Nietzsche:

"Oh! my brothers! where lies the greatest danger for all men's future? Is it not from the good and just?

"For they are those who say and feel in their heart, We know already what is good and just; we have it, too. Woe to those who still seek for it! . . .

"Oh! my brothers! there was once one who saw into the heart of the good and just: and he said, They are Pharisees. But men understood him not.

"The good and just themselves might not understand him: their mind was fast in the stocks of their good conscience. Unfathomably shrewd is the stupidity of the good. . . .

"But the second who discovered their land,—land, heart, and world of the good and just,—he it was that asked, Whom do they hate most?

"It is the maker of new things they hate most: him who breaks tables and old values, the breaker. Him they call peace-breaker (criminal).

"The good, verily, they cannot make anything new: they are always the beginning of the end. They crucify him who writes new values on new tables: they sacrifice the future; they crucify all men's future. . . .

"Break, break in pieces the good and the just.

"Ye flee from me? Ye are scared! Ye tremble at this word!

"Oh! my brothers, when I bade you break in pieces the good and the tables of the good,—then first did I put man aboard to sail his high sea.

"Then only comes there upon him the great terror, the great looking about, the great illness, the great qualm, the great sea-sickness.

"False shores and false securities the good taught you: in good men's lies had ye birth and bield. Sly and awry have the good made everything to its very heart.

"But he who discovered the land Man, discovered also the land Man's future. So shall ye become my seafarers, valiant, patient.

"Walk upright betimes. Oh, my brothers! learn to walk upright. The sea is in storm, and many will fain hold themselves upright on you.

"The sea is in storm. Everything is in the sea. Up! up! ye old seamen's hearts. *Fatherland*, say ye? *Our* helm is set thitherwards where is our *children's* land. Thither, stormier than the sea, storms our great longing." . . .

Should any one, stimulated by the call of this patriotism of the future, to serve and to create a nobler posterity, be unwilling, like a prudent person, to throw away the old tables until he receives assurance of what is to take their place, should he ask, What is the way? and what are the signs which betoken the approach to truer goals? he will not find, I fear, much *comfort* from the new prophet. He does not reveal a way; he seeks fellow-travellers who are fellow-seekers. He knows that he is only a forerunner; and not very infallible even at that. If he be "a bridge unto the future," he is also—and that is his cross—"a cripple at the bridge." He knows that the work of self-teaching and self-discipline unto self-growth is a task not to be accomplished at a single stroke; knows, too, that every good quality, every nobility, has its defect and its temptation. "Whoso wisheth to learn to fly one day must first learn to stand and walk and run and climb and dance." There is no one infallible road either, because there is no single goal: "noble ones of many kinds are needful, if there is to be nobility." "That is *my* way" is his answer to those who question him as to the way. "*The* way,—there is none such." "By many ways and modes I have come unto my truth: . . . a trying and questioning of ways was all my going." Clearly, there are many dangers attending such experimentation in life. It cannot be tried "on a worthless thing;" the cost of the experiment must be borne by the living experimenter. This has to be borne by every one who, like Nietzsche, has felt: "I am of to-day and the past: but something is within me that is of to-morrow and the day after." Whoso goes on this path is not without his work. If he has broken the tablets of duties, he has still upon him the un-

written law of duty to the Man that is to be. Past and present forms of family may be in his view but provisional inductions; but the ideal of marriage still remains "the will in pairs to create the one which is more than those who created it. Mutual reverence name I marriage,—reverence before those who will such a will."

It was said by Francis Bacon of his Atlantidean sage that his look was of one who pitied men. And so may it be said of Nietzsche. Yet is his a mixed feeling: there is in it pity that men "bear so many strange things on their shoulders," and make their "life so hard to bear;" there is contempt that they sit so complacently resigned under their burden, and regret the irrevocable, and leave their existence a meaningless fragment; but there is also active energy urging to transform the future by a creative will. But of vulgar compassion Nietzsche is impatient. "What in the world," he asks, "has done more harm than the follies of the compassionate!" Setting more importance on relief of momentary pain and of temporary ailments than on the sure but protracted process of rebuilding health and strength, weakly and sentimental pity leads astray, and neglects the one thing needful, the development of the higher man. "Compassion makes dull and heavy air for all free souls." Its function in life is entirely secondary; and to allow it to claim more is high treason against the majesty of future humanity. So the master-builder who labors for the higher world he surmises and longs for, must often be hard,—sparing neither his neighbor nor himself in the rigor of his devotion. "Myself I sacrifice unto my love, and my neighbor as myself; thus runs the speech of all creators." Nietzsche's protest against the idolization of emotional pity and sympathy, which the sensitive and sentimental have sometimes spoken of as the essential teaching of Christianity, and which Schopenhauer dignified with the title of ethical principle, is not unneeded. And if we remember the extravagances of altruism, we shall better understand his emphatic counterblasts. "There is a wholesome and healthy selfishness which springs from mighty soul,—from mighty soul to which belongs the high body, the beautiful, victorious, refreshing body, around which everything is a mirror; the flexible, persuading body, whose image and epitome is the self-joyous soul." Such selfishness is not a light thing, any more than true compassion is identical with the gush of sympathetic emotion. "By all means," says Nietzsche, "love your neighbor as yourselves, but let me first see you such as

love yourselves." But "to learn how to love one's self is the finest and cunningest of arts."

To hear Nietzsche, one might sometimes think as if all that was needed for the seeker after higher life was to burst the bonds around him by an effort of vigorous will. "Willing delivers." But what if will itself be a prisoner? Gods and moral imperatives may be discarded; but the past stands irrevocable, menacing and marring the present, and man can, it seems, only gnash his teeth impotently, and seek in vain anger and vainer punishments to get relief for his vexation. Will beats wildly against its prison-bars and kicks against the pricks; and how is it to unlearn the spirit of revenge? "Who taught it reconciliation with time, and something higher than all reconciliation?" How is it to unlearn the pessimism which arises as it sees in all the past, in every "it was," a "fragment, an enigma, a dismal accident"? Only, replies Nietzsche, "when a creative will saith unto the 'It was,' Thus would I have it be." But for Nietzsche, at least, the "It was" has a further significance and a deeper horror than to the commonalty. Following out an idea which has again and again in different forms risen up to awe the inquiring spirit, he sees in all existence an eternal recurrence. The burden of the irrevocable past grows heavier as age is added to age. "A demon," so he puts it, "in an hour of utmost solitude thus whispers: This life, as thou now livest and hast lived, thou must live once more and countless times more; and there will be in it nothing new, but each pain and pleasure and each thought and sigh and all the ineffably little and big of thy life must return to thee, and all in the same order and sequence." And what retort does the tempted will make? Does it curse the demon who so spoke, or fall crushed to the ground in despair? or may there come a moment when it rises to the height of the awful decision and, in full amity with life, affirms its resolve to have this moment once more and countless times over again. From the depth of Nietzsche's pessimism—from the horror in which he shrinks at the ghastly idea of the "ring of existence," the "eternal recurrence"—there emerges the final utterance of the world-affirming, life-ascending will. The free spirit—the pioneer on the way to the super-human—is one who has so accepted the fact of life that "he will have it again, as it was and is, for ever and ever, insatiably calling *da capo*, not merely to himself, but to the whole piece and play, and not only to the play, but at bottom to him to whom this play is just what is needed, and who makes it needful, because he always

needs himself again, and makes himself needful. How? And—would not—this—be—*circulus vitiosus deus?*” The problem of life, it seems, has brought us round—by a “vicious circle,” perhaps—to God. Life, on the assumption of the demonic idea, can only be lived,—a paralyzing pessimism can only be escaped,—if the individual, born, as it appears, to struggle with an alien and irremovable sum of antecedents, as a mere incident and single fragment in the stream of time, boldly accepts and asserts his identity, in the root of his being, with the supreme freedom and unchartered spirit of life in all its range and sweep. We are now, it may be said, in the full tide of unverifiable metaphysic; or we have passed from morality—even Nietzsche’s morality—into religion. The final and fundamental step is a mystic *salto mortale*,—an act of faith,—by which the individual seems to reach what more pensive thinkers call the “beatific vision” and “intellectual love of God.”

It is principally in the second and third parts that these vaguely adumbrated ideas find a place: and they are not touched in Nietzsche’s other works except in passages such as Aph. 341, from the “Gay Science” (publ. 1882), and in the “Other side of good and bad” (Aph. 57). They are the evidence of the last stages of a Titanic struggle,—of the struggle which man seems inevitably compelled to make to give himself a secure standing-ground in the battle of life. In Nietzsche’s case they seem especially full of terrible pathos. If all life, as he holds, has been hitherto built and taught to rise by illusions, if man in his science, his art, and his morality has only clutched at semblances helping him to keep and foster life, if these creations of his mind are only something spread over existence to cheat or stave off an ineradicable pessimism,—it is hard to find anything solid elsewhere. Then the *circle* of inference is indeed *vicious*; and man only steps into the vacant place of God, or simulates the post of conductor in the chariot of life and nature, because otherwise he must perish. But, on the other hand, it may be urged, only by such declaration, of what the old thinker otherwise expressed by saying that all our movement, life, and being was in God, can art, science, and morality be made anything more than illusions and artificial perspectives. The creator of art, science, and morality, if they are to be real, and solid elements in a real world, and not mere devices and tricks to escape ruin,—a mimicry which deceives enemies in the struggle for existence,—must be a real superhuman or a real Deity. And by an inverted

path Nietzsche would have arrived at the old Greek dogma of man's essential divinity.

But these conclusions were not formulated by Nietzsche; he, at least, has not, like R. Wagner, recited a palinode; and we cannot say that any decided trace exists of the recoil, which the acceptance of a theo-centric, instead of an anthropo-centric, position for man seems to involve, had clearly presented itself to his mind. His hour apparently had come; his sun set when the great noon promised a fruitful evening, and his message hardly goes beyond that awakening of the sleepers, that stimulus to a new step in development, which thorough scepticism, honest and unresting, may give. The fourth part of the book is not properly a continuation of the rest. It is rather a grimly farcical indictment of those specimens of the higher culture and advanced thought, who fancied themselves, and at one time were fancied by Nietzsche himself, to be his comrades and fellow-workers in the emancipation of the human spirit. They are all, on closer inspection, somewhat cranky and ill-favored instances of the type higher-man,—suitable for doing odds and ends of rough work in the wilderness, but hardly genial and hale and gracious enough to enter into the land of promise. Towards the close of the book, they are all—the several types of the radical, emancipated, agnostic, and free-thinker—gathered in Zarathustra's cave, where the utmost they rise to is (in allusion to a mediæval caricature of religion) the worship of the Ass. Whereby, perhaps, is signified that although they have surmounted the gloomier depths of religious dogmatism, and surmised the presence of an ineffable simplicity in things, they have reached but a somewhat jejune and negative conception of the higher truth. But of the interpretation of these scenes, which are evidently not without the spice of direct personal reference, it would be out of place to say more than to hint that they occasionally sound a jarring note and offend against the canons of good taste.

In the main, this notice has contented itself with giving a brief exposition of the contents of this volume, without going into criticism or discussion. Some of Nietzsche's opinions are of such obvious extravagance, judged by common standards, that examination of them may be thought unnecessary. But of most, a much longer discussion would be required than could find a place here. Perhaps enough has been said on various points to excite a desire to hear more. Some, indeed, may think that these are

poisonous opinions and best left in silence and neglect. But to this it may be rejoined that the growth of such opinion is itself a symptom that certain corners in the fields of ethics and religion have been left to an abandonment which favors the upspringing of strange plants, with both weeds and good grain among them. Nietzsche is at least always honest, pure, and thorough. One of his faults is a natural perversity, if one may so style it, which positively refuses easy and flattering solutions of problems, and would always seek its rest on the hardest and barest of rocks, with inveterate suspicion of any suggestion that happiness and truth can lie down together. Another is a fatal facility to follow the track of epigram, and to wander in the pleasant but devious mazes of verbal conceits. It has been impossible in a bare abstract like this to give much of an idea of his style. Its variety and sparkle naturally tend to disappear in the monotony of a summary statement of his positions.

Of the translation it is difficult to speak favorably; but it may be admitted that, to translate Nietzsche well would be a task of no small skill.

W. WALLACE.

OXFORD.

**HAND-BOOK TO THE LABOR LAW OF THE UNITED STATES.** By F. J. Stimson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896. Pp. 365.

**LABOR IN ITS RELATIONS TO LAW.** Four lectures delivered at the Plymouth School of Ethics, July, 1895, by F. J. Stimson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. Pp. 145.

Two more serviceable volumes to the student of the "labor question" in the United States have not been issued in recent years than these of Mr. Stimson's. Law is the expression of the organized political conscience (or lack of conscience) of a society; it is so much of what is good and right (or the reverse) as the society makes up its mind to enforce. The study of the existing law on the labor question is very different from a theoretical study of that question, and may be far from yielding a practical solution of it; but it gives us, in conveniently objective form, what the organized community feels about it, and tells us what we have to reckon with in seeking to compass any changes that we may ourselves individually desire.

The value of these books consists (1) in giving a full and relia-

ble account of the law of labor in the United States, such as is nowhere else to be found in compendious form, (2) in furnishing a luminous commentary thereupon, and (3) in accompanying this with a running argument, conducted with much skill, in behalf of an idea dear, and justly dear, to every Anglo-Saxon heart,—that of individual liberty. The smaller volume is more fitted for popular use. The “Hand-book,” by reason of its more systematic form and abundant citation of cases, might well serve as a legal text-book, though the author says that his “chief object has been to make it a clear and trustworthy guide for laboring men and their several organizations throughout the United States.” But both should be read by those who wish to make a thorough study of the subject. “Labor in its Relations to Law” being specially valuable in giving more fully the author’s own point of view. Mr. Stimson is evidently friendly to the labor movement, though somewhat decided as to the methods it should pursue. The methods he advocates may be described summarily as non-political, and consist rather in the development and perfecting of voluntary combinations among the laborers (trade unions). While admitting that “the world has been organized always in the interest of the clever few,” and saying that the problem now is to “give the multitude their chance,” he adds that we must see to it that we do not “go back to the cruder remedies of earlier times,” by which he has in mind chiefly limitations of the right of free contract.

The position of Mr. Stimson is that there is an unwritten constitutional right, derived from the principles of English law, to make whatever contracts individuals may agree upon, so they be not criminal or immoral or expressly made illegal; that, even if this is disputed, most of our State constitutions specially recognize the right to acquire, possess, and protect property (though in some instances the language is not so explicit), with which the right of freely contracting is by implication connected, as the courts have uniformly held when the question has been before them; and, still further, that articles of the Federal Constitution look the same way (Art. IV., § 2, and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments). True, the phrase “freedom of contract” is not found in any constitution, but, says Mr. Stimson, “probably because the makers thought it unnecessary.” Inasmuch, then, as there are these written constitutional guarantees (the Constitution being the supreme law of the land, and not acts of the legislature as in England), the legislature, whether of the United States or of the separate common-

wealths, goes beyond its power in passing measures that abridge or deny freedom of contract, and, on this account, a large number of laws enacted by the various commonwealth legislatures, regulating the contracts between employers and employees, have been pronounced unconstitutional by the courts and made null and void. For the freedom of the employment contract follows as a matter of course from freedom of contract in general.

The right of unhindered contract is only limited, as Mr. Stimson explains, by what is known as "the police power of government." This Mr. Stimson designates as "an unwritten constitutional exception" to the general constitutional doctrine. The police power is "incapable of definition," but in general it may be described as the power of the legislature (national or local) to regulate or limit private rights whenever this is clearly necessary to the safety, comfort, or well-being of society. It must be admitted that this is a pretty large limitation, "safety, comfort, or well-being" being tolerably comprehensive terms. It is generally agreed, however, that the police power cannot be asserted against a liberty or franchise that has been "*expressly* protected by any constitutional provision" (so *People vs. Gillson*, 109 N. Y., 400). Instances of its practically undisputed exercise are health regulations, liquor laws, Sunday laws, laws regulating charges of persons or corporations in employments "affected with a public interest, or which enjoy from the public special rights, privileges, grants, or monopolies, and, in the domain of labor, general factory regulation."

There may be cases, then, in which it becomes a somewhat nice question whether the respect due to the rights of contract or regard to the public safety or welfare shall be allowed to be the controlling consideration; or, what is the same, whether the special liberty abridged or denied by a given statute, under an ostensible exercise of the police power, is to be regarded as "*expressly* protected" by the constitution. Mr. Stimson evidently does not feel that laws regulating the contracts of sailors and laws against usury are an infringement of the constitution; and I believe that they have never been called in question by the courts; yet they are plain violations of the abstract right of free contract. (Mr. Stimson thinks that they are not exercises of the police power, but rather derive their authority from ancient custom coeval with the written constitution itself; but if we ask for the reason of the custom, we shall hardly find it to be other than that desire to protect against injustice and to

secure the common welfare, which underlies the police power itself.) But if the constitution is not infringed in these instances, why should other laws not dissimilar in principle be summarily set aside on purely abstract grounds? Granted that the presumption is always in favor of liberty, both constitutionally and morally, why, when owing to special conditions the methods of liberty do not serve the public welfare but rather defeat it, may not liberty be abridged?

Let us take a concrete case, one from among the many cases of laws that have been set aside by the courts as violations of the constitutional right of free contract. The list of these is considerable; it includes eight-hour laws (for adults); truck acts (providing that employees shall be paid in money, not in goods or orders); screen laws (forbidding employers to measure wages by *screened* coal); weekly or fortnightly payment laws; laws forbidding employers to discharge employees for joining labor unions, etc. Let us take the last-mentioned. Truck acts and screen laws Mr. Stimson is inclined to justify as exercises of police power to prevent fraud; but the laws recently passed in ten of our commonwealths to protect employees from discharge on account of their membership in labor unions he waxes indignant over,—calling them “a tyranny in a free country.”

A distinction is here in place. Mr. Stimson himself feels that there is a difference between corporations and private employers. The former he recognizes as creations of the state, and as amenable (within limits) to state control. “Our states,” he says, “can indirectly compel corporations to do a great many things which it might not be constitutional for them to require of individuals; for the reason that all corporations are the creature of the state, and if they refuse to obey such orders, their charter is simply taken away (“Labor,” etc., p. 63). If the laws relating to the discharge of members of labor unions, on which he animadverts so severely, had been restricted in their application to corporation employers, I doubt if he would have expressed himself as he has; he might regard them as ill-advised, but hardly as unconstitutional invasions of freedom.\* But private employers stand in a different relation to the states, and if laws limiting their free-

---

\* I may be allowed to say that I have treated this subject at some length in a paper entitled “The Relation of a Municipality to Quasi-Public Corporations enjoying Municipal Franchises, particularly as Regards the Interests of their Employees,” which appears in “The Proceedings of the Baltimore Conference for Good City Government” (Philadelphia, National Municipal League, 1896).

dom of contract can be defended, it must be on more general grounds. Let us briefly examine the matter.

Unless our proverbs are all wrong, a labor union means a strength for its members which they could hardly have in themselves individually. This strength is not only morally but legally legitimate. Trade unions, Mr. Stimson says, were "never illegal in this country." But unhappily some of our employers are opposed to them, and labor under the mistaken notion that it is an advantage to themselves to keep their employees at a disadvantage. Hence they discharge their employees when they form unions, or at least the leaders in the enterprise. The question is whether the liberty to do this is consistent with the public welfare—whether it is not an injury to the body politic to have a considerable class kept thus artificially at an economic disadvantage. Considering the bad blood which such treatment breeds, the question may even be, Is it consistent with the public safety? If there were a "fair bargaining of both sides coming together with mutual power and mutual responsibility," such as Mr. Stimson desiderates, the problem would of course change, or rather it would not exist. But Mr. Stimson must know, as a student of facts and affairs as well as of law, that no such fair bargaining exists or is likely to exist, save as "black deaths," wars, or other plagues may reduce the numbers of the working-people, and make capable laborers as rare as capable employers are now. It is not an artificial but a natural disadvantage the working-people (speaking in general) are under, and it is a natural advantage (quite apart from all laws that may sometimes act in their favor) that employers have. If ethical motives ruled on both sides, all would be done that could be done. But because the unwritten law in men's hearts is not always sufficient, therefore the written law is sometimes added. This is the logic of all law. Those who do not rule themselves by love and justice have to be ruled by fear. The community does not wish to have some of its members kept at a greater disadvantage than in the nature of the case they need be; hence it says (in effect), no one *in* or out of employment shall be denied the right of association for legitimate economic protection or advancement, and any one who insists, as a condition of giving employment, on a waiving of the right of association, is guilty of a misdemeanor. So ten of our commonwealths have come to feel. There may be difficulties in the successful administration of the law as of other laws, such is the capacity of man for evasion and lying. But to set it aside

as an interference with free contract, comes near, in our judgment, to making a fetich of free contract, to forgetting the public welfare, which free contract itself is meant to serve, and in the main undoubtedly does serve, and to allowing in the name of liberty something very like slavery to continue in our midst. It may be that in another sense than the customary one we shall be obliged to say, if the courts continue to rule as some do now (the Missouri Supreme Court is the only one that has pronounced against a statute such as we have been considering, but it seems taken for granted that other States will follow its example), "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!" The sinister aspect of such judicial ruling in the eyes of the working-people is that with this formal freedom zealously assured to them, they have no real freedom, but are left practically helpless in face of whatever arbitrariness their employers may see fit to practise. They know that law in this case would be a charter of liberty to them (as laws have been to various classes in the history of the world before); they see law set aside in the name of liberty! They know the only liberty it could really interfere with is that of the employer; and so they think the courts rule in favor of the employing class. This is, of course, a mistake; but so it seems, and so it is in effect. The judges intend even-handed justice, but by not taking account of actual economic conditions their justice becomes unjust. Because they allow themselves to be ruled by formulas and abstractions, they do what they do not mean to do.

There is the same irony in the judicial rulings that have set aside anti-trust acts, screen-laws, weekly-payment laws, and so on. Speaking generally, these are all laws which the working-people want; they are no infringement of their liberty. The only liberty the courts in effect protect in setting these laws aside is that of the employer; and there are no end of employers whose liberty would not be affected by these laws, as their own sense of fairness would lead them to refrain from violating them; so that, in the last resort, it is only unscrupulous employers upon whom the courts confer any boon. As above stated, Mr. Stimson thinks that the courts may well change their minds in the case of anti-truck acts and screen-laws, and it is to be hoped that they may do so in some other cases. The Supreme Court of the United States once used language (not quoted by Mr. Stimson) which it is well to remember:

"While it may be conceded that, generally speaking, among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of contract, *yet such liberty is not abso-*

*late and universal . . .* It may deny to all the right to contract for the purchase or sale of lottery tickets; to the minor the right to assume any obligations except for the necessities of existence; to the common carrier the right to make any contract releasing himself from negligence; *and, indeed, may restrain all engaged in any employment from any contract in the course of that employment which is against public policy.*" (*Frisbie vs. United States*, 15 U. S. Supreme Court, 586.) The italics are ours.

How far Mr. Stimson is from being disposed to leave trade unions absolutely to their own powers of bargaining is shown by his saying, in connection with an argument for clearly-defined contracts for periods of time between employers and employees, particularly in the railway and telegraph service, that by all means there should be mutuality in these contracts, and the trade unions should see to this; but "if they cannot, it may be necessary to risk a statute requiring it" ("Labor in its Relations to Law," p. 77). The same logic essentially applies to the protection of all persons who, as the course of events may show, are unable to protect themselves.

But Mr. Stimson's main hopes are for an extension of liberty. He would extend liberty of combination to employers as well as employees, and hardly shares the "popular prejudice against trusts" ("Hand-book," p. 178). He notes the "curious fact," which does not bear out the notion that the law is always on the side of the rich, "that while the tendency of our laws is more and more to legalize combinations among employers and the laboring class . . . there has, at the same time, grown up the vast body of legislation prohibiting the corresponding combination on the part of the employer or producer" ("Hand-book," p. 187); though it must be admitted that the most striking instance of the latter type of legislation—the Anti-Trust Act of 1890—has never been used against combinations of employers, but has been used against combinations of workmen; the ground for complaint, so far as favoritism is concerned, being really not so much in our laws as in the administration and interpretation of them. Mr. Stimson is so optimistic in his hopes for liberty that he believes that "ultimately the courts will refuse to consider even sympathetic strikes unlawful conspiracies" (except in cases complicated by such peculiar provisions as are to be found in the Anti-Trust Law or the Interstate Commerce Law); and while stating that at present sympathetic boycotts are equally illegal, and appearing in one place to defend this view of them ("Law," etc., p. 94), in another (*Ibid.*, p. 115)

he suggests that the principle of a noted Pennsylvania case (*Cote vs. Murphy*, 1893) would make a sympathetic boycott (unaccompanied, of course, by threats or violence) permissible.

The present law of boycotts, it may be said in passing, offers a peculiar phenomenon to the student of ethics. Employees may combine for their own benefit and, for example, strike, as one means of carrying their wishes into effect; but if they do the very same things for the benefit of another set of employees, they commit an illegal act. In the one case they have what the law regards as a legitimate motive, that, namely, of bettering their own condition (see "*Hand-book*," pp. 291, 298). But in the other "there can be no possible intentions of benefiting the conspirators, but at best a desire to help their fellow-workmen; and *the law does not yet recognize altruism to this extent*" ("*Law*," etc., p. 92). This, that I have italicized, strikes one as delicious, and we presume the author is aware of the humor of it. Interested action permissible, disinterested action punishable! And this is "a free country."

Mr. Stimson thinks that the law of strikes and boycotts is, to a student of ethics, perhaps the most interesting in the whole domain of law,—not for the reason just mentioned, we hasten to add, but because here "a higher principle is enforced than mere legality." The question, in the case of a strike or boycott, is, he says, not so much what is done, nor even what results follow, but what is the inmost real intent of the persons engaged in doing it ("*Hand-book*," p. 200). The law punishes not for what the offender does, "but for what he meant to do and for the object he had in doing it." If one *means* and *conspires* to injure another person, one is liable, whether anything comes of the intention and conspiracy or not. This sounds very much like a moral judgment. But is it? Morally speaking, a single intention to injure is as bad as any number of intentions joined together. If it is a question of intention, the intention as such should be judged. But it is only when a number of intentions are joined together that they are judged. Why? The reason appears to be given by Lord Justice Bowen, when he says (*Mogul Steamship Company vs. Macgregor*, quoted in "*Hand-book*," p. 231) "a combination may make oppressive or dangerous that which, if it proceeded only from a single person, would be otherwise." In short, it is after all the effect, or possible effect, of the intentions that makes them an object of judgment, not the moral quality of the intentions themselves. Undoubtedly, the law regards motives here; so it does in dealing with murder, theft, and

most other cases ; but so far as its attention to motives in this instance is peculiar, it is because, while one injurious motive may be harmless, a combination of such motives is almost certainly harmful, *i.e.*, is certainly dangerous, and must have peculiar treatment, just as a mass of gunpowder must have peculiar treatment, while a single grain need awaken no concern. In other words, law still holds to its own domain actions, actual or possible ; and ethics alone judges intent as such.\*

---

\* By this I do not mean that distinctions of intent are not sometimes very finely drawn by the law. For example, a combination to drive A B out of business in a certain town is a criminal conspiracy in the eyes of the law, and this though the means employed are merely legal combination (*King vs. Eccles*, 3 Douglas, 337) ; on the other hand, a combination by other merchants in the town to get all the business in the town would not be a criminal conspiracy, even though the things done in both cases would be precisely the same, and as a result A B, in both cases, was driven out of business (*Mogul S. S. Co. vs. Macgregor*, L. R., 23, 2 B. D., 598). See "Hand-book," pp. 199 and 244 n. In accordance with these principles it would seem that a concerted effort of union men to prevent a non-union man from getting or keeping employment would be a criminal conspiracy ; but that if their object was simply to get all the work (in a certain line of industry) for themselves, without malice to any one else, then supposing even that they used precisely the same methods and that these did not include violence or intimidation, they would not be liable to the charge of criminal conspiracy. So of a boycott. Mr. Stimson uses the term exclusively in the criminal sense (or, at least, in one passage he says that he does, "Hand-book," p. 225),—that is, of an organized attempt to *injure* some one. But if we keep this terminology, we may none the less say that if an organized attempt is made to *injure some one's business or trade*, it is a criminal conspiracy, but if there is a similar attempt to *give and induce others to give all their custom to competitors of his*, then, though the acts be the same (supposing they include no intimidation or injurious language) and though the results be the same (that is, that he is driven out of business), those who combine are not criminally liable. Mr. Stimson does not draw these conclusions, but we presume that he would assent to them. If so, however, why should he say, as if it were a matter of course, that in a sympathetic strike the object is not to raise "the strikers' wages, etc., but to *oppress or injure the business of another person*." (*Ibid.*, p. 209.) This may be so in special cases, but why may not the object just as well be to help other persons (*i.e.*, those in sympathy with whom they strike) to raise or better their business—*i.e.*, get better returns for their work ? It is quite conceivable that their immediate and only real object is to help their fellow-workmen, and that whatever injury ensues to the employer of the latter is incidental. We are glad to find Mr. Stimson saying, "In the writer's opinion, this doctrine of malicious intent should, in the case of strikes, be very carefully restricted ; where it is clear that the strikers did have a legitimate object at all, such as the increasing their own wages, it does not seem the court should go into the analysis of possible other motives" ("Hand-book,"

One mode of arguing for the system of liberty, used by Mr. Stimson, strikes one oddly. I do not remember to have seen it soberly used before. It is that with individualistic industries, "everybody is continually embarking in enterprises in the hope of making a profit which may never be realized, but the laborer duly gets his wages therefor." Under trusts, only that labor is "employed which is really necessary for the amount of output, which is really necessary or profitable." If the state became one great trust, as the State Socialists propose, "there would be far less demand for labor than there is to-day." As in mining, so in industry generally, business is more or less a lottery, and the "money goes mainly to pay the wages of labor." For the sake of labor he would appear to say, "Let the lottery go on!" We confess that we have a great interest in the laboring class, but to continue a great amount of social waste simply or mainly for their benefit seems like asking too much. If Mr. Stimson would question the "Socialists" direct, he would probably find that they have a not very direful way of extricating themselves from the dilemma which he

---

p. 212). He adds, "In the case of boycotts it is otherwise." If "boycott" is defined in a criminal sense, this is of course true; but, as shown above, the substance and the effect of a boycott may be realized without "boycotting,"—and the doctrine of intent needs to be carefully guarded in this instance also.

The doctrine of intent plays an important part in Mr. Justice Harlan's review and in part reverse of Judge Jenkins' order of December 19, 1893, restraining the employees of the Receivers of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company not only from combining to quit the service of the receivers with the object of crippling the property in their custody, but *from so quitting as to cripple the property* (Farmers' Trust Co. *vs.* N. P. R. R., 60 F. R., 803, *cf.* Arthur *vs.* Oakes, 63 F. R., 310). Mr. Stimson's account of this case is not quite as clear and consistent as one would expect from his usual habits of accuracy. In one place ("Handbook," p. 215 n.) he says, "In Arthur *vs.* Oakes, 63 F. R., 310, the injunction was refused against defendants from persuading others to strike, except as to striking in such a manner as to cripple the plaintiff's business." But this is just that part of the injunction which Justice Harlan refused to allow; it was the injunction against striking *with the object of crippling the property* that he allowed to stand; the case is stated correctly (though not as clearly as might be desired) on pp. 210, 211, and 324, and the slightly confusing effect of saying in another place (p. 333), "such part of the injunction as forbade employees from *striking so as to cripple the railway . . . was annulled*" would be obviated by transposing the "so," and making it read "from *so striking as, etc.*"; the "so as" naturally suggesting intention, while "*so striking as*" simply refers to the manner of striking, which was the order of words in the original language of the court.

contemplates. They would simply say, there being a lot of labor demonstrably thrown away, lessen the hours of labor, and let each one have a chance to do at least some of the work that is really necessary. Unwittingly, Mr. Stimson gives countenance to one of the grave charges (from the economist's point of view) which Socialists bring against the present industrial system, namely, that it is not an economical system. He would preserve it, in part, for the benefit of the laborers; but the laborers begin to have thoughts of their own about how they may be benefited, and may possibly have a keener scent to their interests than their well-wishers. At the same time, every American workingman who wishes to be intelligent in his views and in his action should read Mr. Stimson's volumes—both of them.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

CHICAGO.

CO-OPERATIVE PRODUCTION. By Benjamin Jones. With prefatory note by the Rt. Hon. A. H. Dyke-Acland, M.P. Two vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.

For readers of discretion, these two handy volumes provide a store of useful information. Herein, as Mr. Acland points out in his prefatory note, much is preserved that might else have fallen into hopeless oblivion; and we have a record of the many efforts of the British working-classes in the present century to form societies among themselves for manufacturing, farming, or trading purposes. Some of the information, indeed, has already appeared in the *Co-operative News*, and the book is in part a collection of articles, not a clear and graphic history of a great movement. But it would be absurd to complain of an author for not performing what he has never promised, especially when he does give us, and in abundance, what he professes to give. And this Mr. Jones has done. Hopes and aims, successes and failures are industriously collected in these pages: the communities of work-people under the influence of Robert Owen; the "Christian Socialist" societies; the "Redemption Societies;" and, after limited liability was introduced, associations of workmen for all sorts of purposes,—baking, corn-milling, the manufacture of cotton, woollen, and other textiles, coal mining, iron manufacture, boot-making, printing, building, farming, and much else. A full index completes the usefulness of these two volumes as a book of reference.

Amid the facts are expressions of opinion, more or less contro-

versial, on justice, equity, and democratic organization ; while the conclusion in the last chapter of what the nation ought to do, in its character of consumer or user, seems to show a surprising trust in the integrity and competence of public bodies. But these are trifles ; the value of the narrative is great ; and Mr. Jones may rightly complain of unfair treatment in having been called a disbeliever in co-operative production, and his book an apologia for the desertion of co-operative principles by the leaders (he being one among them) of co-operative distributive societies. Whereon a brief explanation is necessary.

Now, according to the dictionary and etymology, co-operation may mean almost anything ; but in practice we may roughly distinguish two principal meanings. The first indicates the efforts of work-people to eliminate the employer, and thereby (it is hoped) raise them from the intolerable and hopeless dependence (as is thought) of being wage-receivers or hirelings. Such is the co-operation extolled in the pages of Mill, Cairnes, Fawcett, and other "classics," and is unhistorical and illusory.

The second meaning indicates the association of the working-classes in any operation of agriculture, cattle-raising, manufacturing, mining, transport, lending, or selling goods. In this sense co-operation is ancient, world-wide, of manifold efficacy, conspicuous—to take remote instances—in all parts of modern China, and amid the peasantry of Upper Italy from the tenth to the fifteenth century ; or again—to take proximate instances—conspicuous in the work-people's distributive stores in the north of England, the creameries of the Irish dairy farmers, the Raiffeisen societies and people's banks among the peasants of Germany and North Italy. And all this deserves our diligent study and, in most part, our warmest support.

- Now, in regard to those who are advocates of co-operation in the first of the two meanings aforesaid, Mr. Jones has indeed been the candid friend ; for, besides some very pertinent criticisms on profit-sharing, his book is in great part a catalogue of failures ; and the sober reader can draw the moral that any great movement, not to humanize employers, but to eliminate them, and to use working-men's associations, not as a supplement to our present social organization, but as a substitute, must come to naught. And practical men who know the consumers' associations or co-operative stores of the North, and the moral and financial benefit they have been to the work-people, will not quarrel with Mr. Jones for his enthusiasm

in their cause and his defence of their management, nor in any way be scandalized if these stores employ hired servants at fixed wages, when the servants work for reasonable hours at reasonable pay. Where is the harm? unless we are to become irreconcilables and take a line from Milton, with due adaptation, for our maxim :

“ Better to reign and starve than serve in plenty.”

CHARLES S. DEVAS.

MODERN CIVILIZATION IN SOME OF ITS ECONOMIC ASPECTS. By W. Cunningham, D.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. London: Methuen, 1896.

This is one of Messrs. Methuen's series of small volumes on “ Social questions of to-day,” and aims at being an “ elementary treatise on political economy . . . useful to those who are making a beginning in the consideration of modern social problems . . . intended for ordinary readers.”

Now precisely in this aim and this intention is the weak point of the book, which, like all else that Dr. Cunningham writes, contains much that is very valuable and suggestive, but for the trained student not for beginners. Clear definitions, easily-grasped classifications, and consistency at least in appearance, are the requisites for beginners; and these are not the characteristics of this volume. In particular, no raw student, or still less any general reader, could reconcile the seeming Malthusianism, individualism, and cultus of competition in some parts of the book with the ethical point of view and realistic regard for facts in other parts. For example, Dr. Cunningham says in one place: “ Monopoly is comparatively rare now . . . competition has forced its way into every department . . . in all departments of life and all along the line the triumph of individualism in industry and commerce has been complete” (p. 165 *seq.*). But in another place he says: “ Each of the great railways of the country is a giant monopoly. . . . There is a tendency at the present day for monopoly to arise as the very result of competition, and for giant enterprises to absorb the business that was done by small competitors” (pp. 206-7). Again he says: “ The economic man, who out of mere self-interest exerts himself to do his best, is unconsciously . . . promoting the material well-being of society” (p. 179). But, besides having instantly to soften his text in a note, he soon quits this conventional fiction, and both says and shows that “ there are many methods of com-

petition, which, though they may be for the immediate gain of certain traders, are yet injurious to the public" (p. 186). Finally, to complete my fault-finding, instead of starting with realities and making the family the economic unit, Dr. Cunningham writes in places as though each of us entered this world *enfant trouvé* and left it *célibataire*. The individual is taken as the starting-point, and then his supposed action is "modified" by a number of influences, the family among them. The reader is therefore shunted on the wrong track of a mistaken method, and, unlike the author, may never get off it.

But for advanced students, as I have said, there is much valuable and suggestive matter in this book, notably on monopolies (§ 25), on cost of production (§ 26), on unproductive consumption (§ 62), and on rent (§ 65). The chapter on the intervention of the state is well worth study, and has the good epigram, that we cannot make men moral by Act of Parliament, but can make them decent. Above all, in a society where the rule for riches seems to be irresponsibility tempered by confiscation, Dr. Cunningham is to be congratulated on boldly affirming the ancient Christian principles of the responsibility of ownership, the brotherhood of all races, the duty and dignity of labor (§§ 78, 79). I do not feel quite sure whether his distinction of Christian sentiment and Christian principle is the same as that of the counsels and the commandments of Catholic theology; for the terminology of the Church of England is obscure; but St. Thomas Aquinas himself would have put hand and seal to the following passages: "Christian principle recognizes no absolute ownership . . . insists that the rich man is merely a steward . . . condemns private attacks on property . . . denies any justice in the demand of the poor that they should share with the rich, but . . . insists on the duties which the rich owe to God and to man in the administration of their wealth . . . gives no countenance to the narrow patriotism which seeks to oppress other races and to grasp at every opportunity of self-aggrandizement . . . condemns not only the waste of things by extravagance, but the waste of time in idleness. From the pagan point of view work is an evil to be avoided . . . the ideal of life is leisure for enjoyment. The Christian, on the contrary, regards the work he has to do as the centre of his whole life."

CHARLES S. DEVAS.

ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND.

**METHODS OF SOCIAL REFORM.** By Thomas Mackay. London: John Murray, 1896. Pp. 363.

**CLASSES AND MASSES.** By W. H. Mallock. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1896. Pp. x., 139.

Mr. Mackay's essays are mainly critical, and are specially directed against politicians who have countenanced the extension of the facilities offered by the Poor Law (whether in the direction of outdoor relief or state pensions) to the economic dependence of the poor. The argument is familiar, but it has not often been stated with such completeness or abundance of illustration. Mr. Mackay, however, is more conclusive when he insists that "independence is a nobler ideal than dependence" than when he implies that the solution of the social question consists in throwing the poor upon their own "capacity for independence." As he himself admits, "poverty" is not a definite economic condition, but may simply signify a want of equilibrium between a man's habits and his conditions. What the poor want is not extensive relief, but better wages and better conditions of life. And it is on the more positive or constructive side of social reform that Mr. Mackay's policy is unsatisfying. It seems to reduce itself to "freedom of exchange," and to rest upon "an elementary truth in economics,—viz., that voluntary exchange brings a profit to both parties." But the transaction between an underpaid shirt-maker and a Hebrew pawn-broker is not, for all that, one that we can regard with complaisance. And yet it has all the elements of what Mr. Mackay calls a "bargain." For he considers that the "collective bargain" (of trade-unions) is a contradiction in terms,—apparently because it does not turn upon the "higgling" of the market,—and that the exchange of services, although "not precisely the same thing" as the exchange of commodities, is "necessarily subject to the ordinary laws of the market." Mr. Mackay may have some ground for condemning the trade-unionist "policy of restriction," but when he says that "the only danger which threatens the future of the workman" is "his excessive and superstitious faith in politics and trade-unionism,—occupations no more conducive to profit and content than the labors of Sisypheus,"—we are only the more convinced that Mr. Mackay has a profounder experience of poor law administration than he has of industrial facts or industrial history. We need only compare the amount of pauperism his poor-law reform might diminish with the amount that labor legislation and trade-

unionism have prevented, in order to realize the limitations to Mr. Mackay's programme of social reform, admirable as it is from the point of view of poor-law policy. And Mr. Mackay is surely using words either loosely or confusedly when he speaks of "the collectivist principle which lies at the root of our English poor-law systems."

One of Mr. Mackay's most instructive essays deals with "The Abuse of Statistics," and it has constantly occurred to our mind in reading Mr. Mallock's hand-book for popular speakers,—on the conservative side. Mr. Mallock's brief consists largely in skilfully-selected figures and often ingeniously-constructed diagrams, which are intended to "enable any one without any previous training" to assert "with confidence on a public platform" that, in spite of "the arguments and demands of agitators and excitable reformers," this is the best of all possible economic worlds, and more particularly that "the tendency of the present system, as shown in nine-tenths of the population, is to make the poor richer, the rich slightly poorer, and to augment the middle classes." Mr. Mallock, however, although he tells us that "the lot which is commonly called the lot of the poor is not, as such, a fit subject of any commiseration," being "the normal type of human life," grants that there is a "residuum," even in England, of some three millions,— "a large portion of which may be called miserable, and all of them may be called unfortunate." But they need not mar the symmetry of the argument, as we may "put them aside" as "not in any sense a sign or product of anything special in our modern industrial system;" as not being "absorbed" by it, they cannot form part of it.

Nor does Mr. Mallock allow himself to be disturbed by the fact that, even on his own graphic showing, considerably more than one-fourth of the working-class have only forty-three pounds a year or less on which to support themselves and their families; for this is a "state of things tending to disappear." Mr. Mallock succeeds in convincing us that statistics may be very abundant, but may miss the point after all; if he also shows us that it may be as useful for "Radicals and Socialists," as for "Conservatives and Individualists," to realize the fallacy of statistical generalization. The many economic questions that Mr. Mallock raises rather than answers are more appropriately discussed in an economic review; but if "facts," as explained by Mr. Mallock, make the theory of a minimum standard of living a snare and a delusion, so much the

worse for "the facts," with which we agree with Mr. Mallock, "it is most important that the political speaker should familiarize himself."

But Mr. Mallock holds not only that whatever is right, but that our social system is something fixed and unalterable; and this is the—not very modern—assumption underlying the whole of his argument.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE, AND ARMS, delivered in the University of Glasgow. By Adam Smith. Reported by a Student in 1763. Edited by Edwin Cannan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896.

These are a set of student's notes transcribed, in 1766, from an original of 1763. Their genuineness is well attested, and the internal evidence is all in their favor. The sentences have so characteristic a ring of the great author that we cannot fail to believe in the faithfulness of the original record. Indeed, our only wonder is that Mr. Cannan does not suppose the notes to have been first taken in shorthand. Shorthand was practised then as now. In the *Annual Register* for 1760 (page 68), a doctor in Reading "sent for his son, who wrote shorthand, to take down the words of a boy in a trance."

The programme of the course covered by these notes bears out the well-known description given by Millar in Dugald Stewart's "Life of Adam Smith." We may suppose it not impossible that the original notes were Millar's own. In any case the correspondence is exact. According to Millar, Adam Smith divided his course in Moral Philosophy into four parts, which we may sum up as (a) natural theology, (b) ethics, (c) justice (with natural jurisprudence), and (d) expediency (with political economy, and economic policy). The lectures on the first are lost. The "Moral Sentiments," 1759, embraced the second, and the "Wealth of Nations," 1776, presented Adam Smith's revised version of the fourth. The present notes give us the third, together with the first version of the fourth; and we are able in some degree to see how the philosopher passed from the one part to the other, and how systematic was his conception of what we should now call Social Philosophy. We see, too, how closely Montesquieu's example had been followed; a great portion of Part III. is the history of institutions.

The main interest of this happy discovery is the light it throws on the "Wealth of Nations." Mr. Cannan points out the changes made after Adam Smith's acquaintance with the Physiocrats and their teachings. The chief is that distribution received new prominence. It is not the case, we may observe, that "there is nothing at all about capital in the lectures, and stock is not given an important place." There is much mention of "stock" (pp. 206, 210, 220, 222, 223, 224, 231, 233), and "capital" occurs on pp. 151 and 208. French influence affected Adam Smith's diction quite as much as his thought. We have "concurrence" for competition (179).

Ethically, the chapters on the "Natural Wants of Mankind" (157 *seq.*) and on "Delinquency" (135 *seq.*) are among the most interesting. "The punishment of the offender is reasonable as far as the indifferent spectator can go along with it" (136). "Resentment seems best to account for the punishment of crimes" (152). "It is by the wisdom and probity of those with whom we live that a propriety of conduct is pointed out to us and the proper means of attaining it" (160). There are some outbursts of humanitarian feeling. "In a civilized society, though there is a division of labor, there is no equal division, for there are a good many who work none at all. The division of opulence is not according to the work. The opulence of the merchant is greater than that of all his clerks, though he works less; and they again have six times more than an equal number of artisans who are more employed. The artisan who works at his ease within doors has far more than the poor laborer who trudges up and down without intermission. Thus, he who, as it were, bears the burden of society has the fewest advantages" (163). "It is not so much the police that prevents the commission of crimes as the having as few persons as possible to live upon others. Nothing tends so much to corrupt mankind as dependency, while independency still increases the honesty of the people" (155). The following remark is acute, though now a commonplace: "When there is not enough produced to serve everybody, the fortune of the bidders is the only regulation of the price" (177).

The editing has been done with care, judgment, and learning; and the book will be an indispensable aid to the thorough understanding of Adam Smith. Of course this volume does not contain the treatise on "Justice" which Adam Smith himself planned in his later years. He evidently felt that such a book was needed to

round off his ethical and economical work. We have here only the first thoughts of his younger manhood. But we might have missed even these; and we must be grateful for the accident which has saved them.

J. BONAR.

LONDON.

**LOVE'S COMING OF AGE: A Series of Papers on the Relations of the Sexes.** By Edward Carpenter. Manchester: Labour Press, 57 and 59, Tib Street. 1896.

Mr. Carpenter's book is, for the most part, a reprint, with alterations and additions, of his three pamphlets: "Sex-Love," "Woman," "Marriage." The most difficult and delicate problems are treated with a startling frankness; there is a striking and often painful blending of high feeling with chaotic thinking. This sharp contrast between Mr. Carpenter's instinct as poet and his conclusion as thinker will not be new to readers of his writings. The essential purity of sex-love; the dignity of its place in life; the need there is for fuller recognition of that purity and that dignity; the idea that the way of salvation lies through the humanizing of the passion, that is, through the recognition of its true characteristic as a "symbol of deepest soul-union," as a co-operation in the most permanent issues of life,—these things Mr. Carpenter sets forth with eloquence and power. Yet we find him contemplating a future and more "developed" (1) society in which "the life of the Hetaira, that is, of the woman who chooses to be the companion of more than one man, might not be without dignity, honor, and sincere attachment." Mr. Carpenter expects that this "free" society will have "the good sense to tolerate a Nature-festival now and then, and a certain amount of animalism let loose;" he thinks it may recognize in some cases "a woman's temporary alliance with a man for the sake of obtaining a much-needed child;" he contemplates the possibility of "triune and other such relations" being permanently maintained. One feels a kind of despair when such things can be printed on the same page with the recognition that "the tendency 'from confusion to distinction' is in reality the tendency of all evolution, and cannot be set aside. It is in the very nature of Love that as it realizes its own aim it should rivet always more and more towards a durable and distinct relationship, nor rest till the permanent mate and equal is found. As human beings progress, their relations to each

other must become much *more* definite and distinct instead of less so,—and there is no likelihood of society in its onward march lapsing backward, so to speak, to formlessness again" (p. 120).

The discord in Mr. Carpenter's thought seems to come from his misconception of "freedom." Mr. Carpenter, like so many other socialists, is narrow, abstract, old-fashioned, just here. The authority of church and state is for him "artificial," "the subjection of sex-relations to legal conventions is an intolerable bondage;" he speaks of the "true and rightful significance" of the term "free woman" as a woman's "right to speak, dress, think, act, and above all to use her sex, as she deems best." Pure atomism can go no farther. Mr. Carpenter's "Free Society" is an impossible chaos. This is the more to be regretted as frequent passages of beauty, sympathy, and true insight render the book peculiarly attractive. These characteristics and the importance of its subject-matter alone justify its review in this JOURNAL.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM IN ITS PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE. By William Caldwell. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1896. Pp. xviii., 538.

The chief aim of this bulky volume is—not to expound or criticise Schopenhauer (though it to some extent does both), but—to connect him "with some few broad lines of philosophical and general thought, and with some few broad principles of human nature." With all his defects (and Professor Caldwell does not lack comminatory power in naming them), Schopenhauer has the merit of affording a text and texts on which it is not difficult to hang a large amount of comment and sermon tending to emphasize conclusions which Professor Caldwell considers to be much in need of affirmation or reaffirmation in these days. Idealist philosophy, he believes, has tended to spread a view that "knowledge is an end in itself." He therefore proposes to use Schopenhauer, as a man of light and leading, to help in "substituting a more real view of what knowledge is and does for man." Knowledge, he reminds us, is only a part, and a small part, of a "total organic sense for reality" which—whatever it may mean—we are credited with possessing. Instead of wasting our time, therefore, on what "is a poor thing at best," it is obviously better for us "to look at life directly and with our whole organic sensibility." It is apparently

only another way of indicating this new road to reality, when he declares (p. 86) that if one really wishes "to understand things, one must *feel* them, must to a certain extent *be* them." Either this is playing with words, or, if it is seriously meant that we are to *be* and to *become* things, the author would have conferred a benefit on many of his readers by indicating how it was to be done. Lotze, for example, had no conception of such legerdemain.

Professor Caldwell positively revels in this style of phraseology. "To know will, you have simply to be will" (p. 399). *Simply!* alas for S. T. C. and many others if they must *be will*. Still the difficulty is not so vast as at first sight it seemed. We may take heart from the assurance that "the only explanation of life is the fact of life itself;" were not the cup of comfort dashed from our lips by the immediately subsequent dictum that "the fact of life itself is that alone which philosophy enables us in a measure to understand" (p. 519). Why philosophy should trouble itself to undertake this work of supererogation is hard to see. Yet, after all, philosophy will have matters easy. For "the most philosophical thing to do by way of understanding and characterizing life is to let life answer its own questions." Wherein, perhaps, there is a subtle wisdom, if indeed we are so fortunate as to possess the magic sympathy with the "organic or unified whole" apparently implied in the discovery that "our natural and spiritual instincts to be, and to will, and to enter into the universal life of things, contain somehow within themselves the true theory of life" (p. 492). Oh! for the divining-rod which—whether from philosophy or elsewhere—would point to the spot where that virgin ore, that refreshing fountain, lies hid, and, oh! for the excavator—philosophic or other—who will bring it to the surface!

There are many pearls in the volume, perhaps, but as they appear in it, it is hard to tell them from less precious matters. It would be a work of longer and closer texture than the conditions of human life allow to weave a consistent and valuable doctrine from Professor Caldwell's successive chapters. Schopenhauer performs for him two not wholly consistent services. One is to serve as a lay figure on which he hangs, at times with very slight excuse, a variety of not very well-defined and not altogether unambiguously expressed views of his own. The other purpose is to provide him with a theme for criticism. It is not very difficult to understand the psychological or personal genesis of the present book. Like many students of philosophy, Professor Caldwell has begun by

receiving a general and formal, almost verbal, indoctrination in the tenets of philosophy, of such a character as to cut off (and in college class-rooms it is almost necessarily cut off) from the life and experience out of which it grew, and to present it as an abstract theory. Since then opportunity has been given him to study it in a more concrete and vivid form as an actual development by an actual thinker. For such a study, Schopenhauer, starting, as he does, not from an accepted tradition like the ordinary university teacher, but from the natural mother wit and unsophisticated questionings of common humanity, has many advantages. But at the same time, such a method of approach somewhat interferes with the general perspective. It creates a false impression that our philosophic guide has alone seen the truth and corrected the mistakes of all previous philosophers. What he has really helped to rectify are *our own* imperfect conceptions. He has given what *we* hitherto lacked,—the touch with reality. But it will require approach through other thinkers also, and reiterated study of these approaches, before we can get rid of the distorting and exaggerating influences of our initiator.

It would be an almost endless and, within narrow limits, a fruitless task to point out the inconsistencies and incoherences with which Professor Caldwell's volume bristles. To write as he does of Will is waste of paper until he can make up his mind whether will means "force or impulse" (p. 36), or "acting in an intelligent manner" (p. 182). To tell us that "our conscious actions can be explained as purely reflex actions" (p. 180) is a, to say the least, paradoxical way of indicating that "there is no real and ultimate conflict between the unconscious tendencies and the conscious actions of man" (p. 203). One almost begins to suspect that for Professor Caldwell any one proposition (by the help of an *at least*) can be made equivalent to any other. "It is desirable to develop to the full all our susceptibilities; and this is expressed in Schopenhauer's idea that the proper way of approaching reality is through will" (p. 520). So it is said; but really one cannot have so mean an idea of Schopenhauer's powers of expression as to credit him with any such failure to say what he thought. It is Professor Caldwell who mixes up two very distinct things,—one is a metaphysical theory of the real as will (in Schopenhauer's sense); the other is an ethical philosophy, or a philosophy of action. What he is driving at when he says that "the ultimate meaning of things is a moral meaning" (p. 308) is not what he says, but that it is through

the fulness of human personality that we interpret and estimate reality. When we are told, therefore (p. 81), that "in impulse we know reality directly," we need not take the statement too strictly. It has yet to be paraphrased. *All* impulse does not possess this revealing power. The impulse in question must, it appears, be *real*, must be *purposive* and *ideal*, must be "*rational and harmonious*," for, as we are assured (p. 408) (and perhaps rightly), "It is only through the *moral conversion of his will* that man will be enabled even to *understand* the universe." But as to what morality is, if it is to achieve this result, we fail, I fear, to get much light either from the philosopher or from his commentator. There are many glimpses of good and true things in Professor Caldwell's pages, but they would gain infinitely in force by judicious condensation and an effort after coherence in essential principles.

W. WALLACE.

OXFORD.

STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC. By J. M. E. McTaggart, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College in Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1896. Pp. xvi., 259.

To students of Hegel's philosophy, Mr. McTaggart's work needs no recommendation. It is a critical estimate of the nature, validity, and general result of that peculiar process of passing from one idea to another which has come to be commonly known as Hegel's Dialectic Method. And it is, in English at least, the first complete and direct attempt to form such an estimate. Its definiteness and hard-headedness well represent what we might expect to be the characteristic contribution of the Cambridge mind to English idealism. The point on which Mr. McTaggart is undoubtedly successful is his account of the change of method in the dialectic progression, and his explanation of the motive force of the process as "the discrepancy between the concrete and perfect idea implicitly in our minds, and the abstract and imperfect idea explicitly in our minds."

When we come, however, to a further contention in the same context, viz., that the presence of negation in the dialectic is a mere accident, we are in presence of something more doubtful. Mr. McTaggart's whole position begins to dawn upon us. Though he defends Hegel on the whole against Trendelenburg, Seth, and the criticisms implied in Mr. Balfour's stand-point, we are inclined to suspect that something of their spirit has entered into him. We

do not feel that he really cares for "immanence,"—the oneness of thought with sense and experience. We find almost a contradiction in his result, that philosophy can convince us that the world is rational, in the abstract, indeed, but not in every detail. Pain and evil, the time process, the alleged abstractness of mere philosophy, are for him not merely partly resolved appearances, but obstacles which we cannot even begin to transcend in detail.

It is hardly a mere accident that the law of contradiction is stated as if it excluded difference; as if predicates began by being contraries, and could only come together in the same subject by a synthesis which transforms their nature, and somehow abolishes their opposition. But surely it is a pity to state the law of contradiction as "whatever is A, can never at the same time be not A." Every judgment is in the form, A is B. Predicates begin by being differences, and only become contraries under certain conditions. And when those conditions are overcome by explanation or synthesis, they remain differences still, and negatively related, though not incompatible.

The point of this is, for the purpose of this JOURNAL, that it may be doubted whether Mr. McTaggart allows us to be sufficiently in earnest with the relative reality of appearances and details. If pain or imperfection *is*, he seems to say, it is hopeless to get away from it. You can, at best, believe, in general, that the whole may be well. We are reminded of Plato's complaint of those who cut away the stepping-stones between the particular and the universal. All real science rests on gradation.

I am aware that this is a very inadequate notice of a work of singular knowledge and ability. It is only meant to be an indication of the impression which the book made upon me, when considered with reference to ultimate issues. Professor Wallace's review in *Mind* for October, 1896, should be read by those who desire help in appreciating the problems involved.

B. BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

ÉTUDES HISTORIQUES SUR L'ESTHÉTIQUE DE SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN. Par Maurice de Wulf, Docteur en Droit, etc. Louvain. Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1896. Pp. 67.

This is one of those productions that add to human ignorance. Since 1879, when the Pope, in his encyclical *Æterni Patris*, wisely recommended to the Church the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas

as, better than any other, embodying her doctrines and deserving her attention, a number of officious persons have produced works aiming to show that Thomas was not only an original thinker, a "novateur" (p. 59), but that he was greater than any thinker, ancient or modern. Of such works the one before us is a conspicuously flagrant example. The aim of it is expressed in its closing words: "The conclusions of history show us that both ancient and modern philosophy err through defect, and we are, therefore, driven to this result, that mediæval æsthetics, of which St. Thomas is the most brilliant representative, is that which has best defined the general notion of beauty." St. Thomas's achievement is described thus (p. 58): "The ancients identified the beautiful and the good, because they saw in these two notions only an objective, ontological element. St. Thomas clearly distinguished the two, showing, by means of a more conscientious analysis, that the beautiful and the good contain a second element, no less important than the first, viz.: the subjective, psychological element." In other words, St. Thomas was the first person (1) to point out the subjective element in æsthetics and (2) to draw a clear distinction between the good and the beautiful. How utterly untrue this is any one acquainted with ancient æsthetic theories knows. It is only through ignorance of these that the author is able to deck his hero with stolen feathers. And, after all, the theory with which St. Thomas is credited is so beggarly, and so far removed from the truth, that he certainly would not thank Professor de Wulf for imputing it to him. One feels strongly inclined to stand up in defence of the "Angelic Doctor" (who can well afford to have the simple truth told about him) against his would-be friends.

The truth is, the author is so little acquainted with his subject that he confounds the good which is the term of appetite, and, therefore, an attribute of objects, with moral good, which is an ideal of personality, and, therefore, an attribute of the subject, of the will. Nay; he attributes this confusion to St. Thomas! And yet, how clearly Aristotle distinguished the two! What can be finer than his saying that, whereas the aim of artistic activity is a product, the aim of moral activity is moral action itself (*τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἄν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῇ ἡ εὐπραγία τέλος. Eth. Nicom., VI., 5*)? Our author even fails to distinguish the beautiful which bears the same relation to the senses of sight and hearing that sweet does to those of taste and smell,

from the beautiful which is the object of intelligence,—the artistically beautiful. But here he can fall back upon St. Thomas, who does the same thing and worse, telling us that "*pulcra dicuntur quæ visa placent*" !

Though Thomas is not so far astray as our author would make him out to be, yet he has no consistent æsthetic theory. The hints which he incidentally throws out show that in this subject he was far behind the best of the ancients, not to speak of the moderns. One can only smile, therefore, when he reads (p. 39), "If this interpretation is correct [!], the modern theories of the ideal in art put forward by Schelling and Hegel, and repeated by Taine, will be nothing more than a paraphrase and development of a text of St. Thomas Aquinas."

One finds many occasions for smiling in reading this work, amusingly, for example, when he finds it hinted (p. 21) that the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius may be by the convert of St. Paul (Acts xvii. 34) ; grimly, when he reads that the same "Christian philosopher pitilessly banishes from his metaphysics the [neo-Platonic] pantheistic filiation of being" (p. 46), the truth being notoriously the exact opposite (see Müller, "Kirchengesch," I., 286 *sq.* ; Harnack, "Dogmengesch," II., 437, and the works of Dionysius themselves), and so on.

We trust that this work, which swarms with textual blunders evidently not due to the printer, is not a fair specimen of the science dispensed at the University of Louvain.

THOMAS. DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

LA POLITIQUE DE SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN. Par Édouard Crahay, Avocat à la Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles. Louvain : Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1896. 8vo. Pp. xxiv., 153.

This work states, on the whole, fairly enough the political views of St. Thomas, but, like that of M. de Wulf, attributes to him an originality which he did not possess, and would not have claimed. After speaking of Taine's "*Origines de la France contemporaine*," he proceeds : "The object of St. Thomas's theories, which we are about to expound, is analogous to that of this minute work, but has a deeper import and a wider application. He undertakes to explain and reason out the most fundamental political institutions." The simple truth, on the contrary, is that St. Thomas accepts the political views of Aristotle, and then subordinates the state to the church.

This M. Crahay entirely approves of, as, indeed, he must do, if he is to be a good Catholic. Of course, books of this sort are in no sense scientific, except in so far as they simply report facts, for the reason that they accept certain foregone conclusions due, not to science, but to what professes to be a revelation. Science, on the contrary, can take no account of revelation except as a complex of phenomena to be studied and explained according to its own laws.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

**THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS.** By J. N. Figgis, Lecturer on History in St. Catherine's College, Cambridge: Prince Consort Dissertation for 1892. Cambridge: University Press, 1896.

The first object of Mr. Figgis's book—which has been rewritten and greatly enlarged since it was composed as a Prize Essay—is to give an account of the controversy waged round the theory of Divine Right under the Stuart dynasty, and to show its bearing on questions that still affect us at the present day. And this task Mr. Figgis has discharged with notable efficiency, though, with the zeal of an explorer, he is perhaps tempted to see more in what he brings back with him than others will be disposed to find.

The value of the book is still further increased by two preliminary discussions,—the first concerned with the controversy between Papalists and Imperialists during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; the second with the political theories which sprang up during the struggle between the league and the kings of France and Navarre during the closing years of the sixteenth century.

Mr. Figgis aims at showing that the champions of Divine Right inherited the arguments and the essential ideas of the mediæval Imperialists. And, so far, he may be held to have fairly proved his point. But when he maintains that their plea was directed no less against the Papists than the Protestant Dissenters and the claims of Parliament, his argument becomes more questionable. And when, in support of this view, he is led to assert that during the first half of the seventeenth century England was in no small danger of a Popish reaction (p. 89), he is surely going farther than the facts of the case can be said to warrant.

Such exaggerations, however, may readily be pardoned in view of the fresh significance which Mr. Figgis gives to an extinct controversy and the insight he shows in bringing a much abused theory into relation with the whole course of political speculation in West-

ern Europe during the centuries immediately before and after the Reformation. A further merit of the book, and one closely connected with the above, is the clear perception it shows that under the grotesque arguments of Divine Right was concealed a conception of sovereignty, of the need of recognizing some absolutely controlling power in the state, to which Locke and the other champions of individual rights were habitually blind. Whether Mr. Figgis might not have gone yet further and recognized, more than he seems disposed to do, that there was a truth contained in the assertion that government depends on "divine ordinance," is another question, and one on which his readers will inevitably differ. None, however, can fail to acknowledge the exceptional industry with which he has mastered his materials and the conspicuous ability with which he interprets them. All will unite in hoping that "at some future date it may be in his power to attempt a fuller account of the developments which political theory has undergone since the later Middle Ages." (Preface.)

C. VAUGHAN.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

ANTIMACHUS OF COLOPHON AND THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN GREEK POETRY. By E. F. M. Benecke. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896.

We have here a collection of unfinished essays by E. F. M. Benecke, the young scholar whose death occurred in Switzerland last year. Mr. Benecke's endeavor has been to show that "romantic"—that is, pure and impassioned—love between man and woman was practically unknown in Greece throughout classical times until the Alexandrian period. According to Mr. Benecke, it was the now obscure Antimachus of Colophon who introduced the reformation in lyric poetry, and he was followed in comedy by Menander. Mr. Benecke's work shows wide reading, considerable ingenuity and promise; but it cannot be said that he has done any thing to establish his case; and it is likely that his maturer judgment would have repudiated many of the conclusions found in this volume, would not have described Euripides, the poet *par excellence* of woman's devotion and self-sacrifice, as an author with only the faintest glimmerings of what love really meant, nor found in the weak sentimentalities of the Alexandrian writers the dawn of a nobler ideal.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

THE SCHOOL OF PLATO: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND REVIVAL UNDER THE ROMAN EMPIRE. By F. W. Bussell, B.D., B.Mus., Fellow and Tutor of B.N.C., Oxford. London: Methuen & Co. Pp. ix., 346.

Mr. Bussell has written the history of Greek philosophy from what he admits to be a peculiar and restricted stand-point. The underlying aim of philosophy is said to be "the selfish desire for personal happiness," "the search for the individual's freedom and happiness in a world not obviously calculated to ensure it."

And, further, Mr. Bussell has a practical aim, a certain view of life to maintain, develop, and illustrate.

"We shall witness a revival of interest in the personal, and of surprise at our recent love of the aggregate; we shall put aside preconceived notions of the rights, the liberty, the inherent goodness of man (in the abstract), and such like formulas; we shall correct that false sentiment which is the bane of modern reform; and reverting to history for a more accurate view, and especially to such epoch as the Roman empire, we shall seek to gain a fuller insight into the needs and aspirations, the hopes and the happiness of the personal spirit,—after all, and even if this appearance be an illusion, the only abiding reality to us in a world of change."

This is, after all, a great abstraction. It would rule out all systems of philosophy which have originated in a social impulse or merely disinterested curiosity, and it puts a considerable strain upon the interpretation of Greek philosophy. The arbitrariness that attaches to Mr. Bussell's reading of the problem of life asserts itself in the Introduction, more especially in his treatment of the social question as "simply a question of food." The reader must be prepared, accordingly, for an interpretation of Greek philosophy from a somewhat dogmatic and subjective stand-point,—or, rather, he must be prepared to be reminded on every page that what the author is really developing is a certain view of life and his conception of the Christian religion as the supreme solution of the philosophical quest after "personal happiness." The Plato of the *Timæus*, for instance, almost completely overshadows the Plato of the *Republic* in Mr. Bussell's exposition: the social reference of the Platonic philosophy sinks into the background, and its scientific side is somewhat readily merged in the "pietistic." In the same way, the self-centred aspect of Aristotle's ethical ideal is emphasized and no reference is made to the correction it receives in the *Books on Friendship*. But it would take us beyond the limits of a review, if we were to attempt to discuss either the validity of

Mr. Bussell's stand-point, or the details of its application to Greek philosophy.

Any one who wishes to study Platonism under the aspect selected by Mr. Bussell could not easily find a book better to his taste. The whole thesis is developed with great felicity, and at the same time with great sincerity. And if it tends to be somewhat reiterative, the argument is worked out in a way that cannot fail to interest a student of philosophy who can recognize the limitations of its method. Our gratitude to Mr. Bussell must include the sense of favors to come; and we look forward, with even more interest, to "the dates, analyses, contrasts, and personal details" he is reserving for a later volume. It would be churlish, under the circumstances, to complain of the absence of any index or any references. Mr. Bussell clearly wishes his book to be regarded as an essay rather than a treatise: it is as an essay that it should be estimated, and it is as an essay—of a more than usually genial and intimate quality—that it can be best appreciated.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

**SOME RECENT PROTESTANT THEOLOGY.** By Charles Strong, D.D.  
Melbourne: J. Haase, 17 Swanston Street.

This admirable little volume contains a series of popular lectures giving a sympathetic exposition of the more important views held by advanced Christian theologians of the present day. Dr. Strong's style is excellently clear and lucid; his matter deeply interesting and suggestive. He writes as a thinker convinced of the spiritual nature of man and the universe; it is to the development of the God-consciousness latent in each individual that he looks for the furtherance of religion, not to merely intellectual exercises, still less to the acceptance of doctrine upon authority. It would be instructive to compare his position with that maintained in a recent able article published in this JOURNAL, "The Necessity of Dogma," by Mr. McTaggart. And it is to be hoped that in some future book Dr. Strong may treat this question more fully,—the question, that is to say, of the relation between the intellectual and emotional elements in religion.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

NEW BOOKS.

LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE, AND ARMS, delivered in the University of Glasgow. by Adam Smith. Reported by a Student in 1763, and edited, with an Introduction and Notes, by Edwin Cannan, M.A. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1896.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION and some of its Implications. By Dr. George Cresswell, M.A. Second Edition. London: Williams & Norgate, 1896.

[Chiefly an attempt to popularize the philosophy of Mr. H. Spencer. It contains a chapter on "Evolution in Relation to Ethics."]

THE GREEK VIEW OF LIFE. By G. Lowes Dickinson, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1896.

RICH AND POOR. By Mrs. Bernard Bosanquet. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. Edited by R. H. Inglis Palgrave, F.R.S. Vol. II, F-M. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

[Contains articles on *Kant*, *Fichte*, and *Hegel*, by Dr. Bonar; on *Le Play*, by H. Higgs; on *Hobbes*, *Locke*, *Hume*; on *Method*, by Mr. W. E. Johnson; on the *Historical School*, etc. It is remarkable that a dictionary of such importance contains no article on Ethics in relation to Economics.]

THE THEORY OF CONTRACT IN ITS SOCIAL LIGHT. By W. A. Watt, M.A., LL.B., Ph. D., Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1897. Pp. 96.

[A sketch of an important section of the Philosophy of Law. It is written from the Hegelian point of view, like the same author's previous "Outline of Legal Philosophy;" and, like the latter, it is clearly worked out, and shows wide knowledge as well as much care and judgment. An indication of its general spirit is given in the closing sentence: "As Kant achieved his philosophy 'by reading Leibnitz with the eyes of Hume, and Hume with the eyes of Leibnitz,' so we must endeavor to find an adequate theory by making Philosophy and Jurisprudence criticise each other; by reading Hegel with the eyes of Savigny, and Savigny with the eyes of Hegel; by interpreting Dr. Caird and Sir Frederick Pollock, each in terms of the other; by following for ourselves, so far as we may be able, all the currents of thought, from whatever side they may come, and striving to determine what is the total result."]

OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By Wilhelm Wundt. Translated, with the cooperation of the author, by Charles Hubbard Judd, Ph. D. London: Williams & Norgate, 1897.

IL PROBLEMA DELLE ORIGINI DEL DIRITTO. Di S. Fragapane. Roma: Ermanno Loescher & Co., 1896.

DIE ENTWICKLUNGSTHEORETISCHE IDEE SOCIALER GERECHTIGKEIT: Eine Kritik und Ergänzung der Socialtheorie Herbert Spencers. Von J. M. Bösch. Lürich-Oberstrass: Verlag von E. Speidel, 1896.

AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND GROUND OF CHRISTIAN BELIEF. (A pamphlet.) By Rev. Islay F. Burns, M.A. London: T. F. Downie, 1896.

- COMMON THOUGHTS ON SERIOUS SUBJECTS. By the late Chester Macnaghton, M.A., Principal of Rajkumar College. With an Introduction by Robert Whitelaw. London: John Murray, 1897.
- RELIGIOUS FAITH. By H. Hughes. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1896.
- THE CHILD: *its Spiritual Nature*. By H. K. Lewis. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- THE EDUCATION OF THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM: *A study of foundations, especially of sensory and motor training*. By Reuben Post Halleck, M.A. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- GESUNDHEIT UND GLÜCK. Von Dr. Nikolaus Seeland. Dresden-Neustadt: Verlag der Diätetischen Heilanstalt, 1896.
- THE CLUE TO THE AGES. Part I. *Creation by Principle*. By Ernest Judson Page. London: Baptist Tract and Book Society, 1896.
- THE POSITIVIST REVIEW. Edited by Edward Spencer Beesly. No. 49. January, 1897. [Containing "Faith in Humanity," by J. H. Bridges; "Positivism and Theology," by F. S. Marvin; "The Religion of Marcus Aurelius," by Charles Gaskell Higginson.] London: William Reeves.
- WHAT IT COSTS TO BE VACCINATED; the Pains and Penalties of an Unjust Law. By Joseph Collinson. London: Published for the Humanitarian League by William Reeves, 185 Fleet St., 1896.
- NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. By G. W. Leibnitz. Together with an Appendix consisting of some of his shorter pieces. Translated from the original Latin, French, and German, with Notes by Alfred G. Langley, A.M. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.
- EXPERIENCE. A Chapter of Prolegomena. By the Rev. Wilfrid Richmond. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896.
- [A short metaphysical essay in three sections (I. Feeling, II. Proof, III. Reality), directed against various forms of Agnosticism.]
- KULTUR UND SCHULE. Von Dr. Alex. Wernicke. Osterwieck, Harz: A. W. Zickfeld, 1896.
- THE NEW CHARTER. A Discussion of the Rights of Men and the Rights of Animals. London: George Bell & Son, 1896.
- REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, 1893-94. Vols. I. and II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896.

## ERRATA.

- Page 314, eighth line from bottom, for "wakening" read *awakening*.
- Page 315, second line from bottom, for "of dogma" read *or dogma*.
- Page 316, twenty-first line from bottom, for "member" read *members*.
- Page 317, thirtieth line from bottom, for "involves" read *involve*.
- Page 318, sixth line from top, for "basis" read *bases*.
- Page 320, seventeenth line from bottom, for "connation" read *connotation*.
- Page 321, fourteenth line from bottom, add *with or before* "without."
- Page 324, twenty-first line from bottom, for "awakened" read *unawakened*.
- Page 325, twenty-second line from bottom, for "of" read *to*.
- Page 325, fifteenth line from bottom, strike out "the."

# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

---

J U L Y , 1 8 9 7 .

---

## THE ETHICAL SIDE OF THE FREE SILVER CAMPAIGN.

WHEN the news of the nomination of Bryan reached London, the triumph of the free coinage wing of the Democratic party had for some time been expected; but the name of Bryan was unknown. Coupled with the news was cabled the famous piece of rhetoric about the cross of gold, as the only clew from which to judge the man. Rejecting this peroration as a perfervid jingle, which England is more ready to expect than are we to admit as a characteristic of American political oratory, London set itself promptly to work to consider the situation seriously. The free coinage platform was accepted calmly, and city men and Parliament men merely undertook to discover what would be the results, primarily, to the United States, and, secondarily, to England and the rest of the world, if the free coinage principle prevailed. Conversation was addressed mainly to discussing what would be the practical effect of the free and unlimited coinage of silver by the United States government, on the basis of sixteen to one, without the co-operation of any other nation. So far as the writer heard, the question was never discussed in terms of right and wrong. That there was any moral delinquency attributable to one of two great American political parties in taking this position was never hinted within the writer's hearing. Used, as Englishmen are, to the instant supremacy of an act of Parliament,

familiar as are all subjects of sovereign governments with the theory that the regulation of money and coinage of metals is a prerogative of that sovereignty, the idea that there was anything dishonest about the proposition did not seem to occur to them. On the contrary, it was frequently pointed out that if ever any nation had the right to pay its bonds in silver rather than in gold, the United States had clearly secured such right as to its recent bond issues by foregoing a very high premium rather than making the agreement to pay in gold. It was generally recognized that, at least as to the bonds issued under Cleveland's administration, the action of Congress in refusing the gold clause had due effect to serve the fairest kind of notice upon all the world that they must take the chances of the action of future administrations and of the value of silver. While, doubtless, many holders of bonds or obligations of private or municipal corporations "viewed the future with disquiet," to use an English phrase, the general position taken even as to these was, that investors took the uncertainty of the investment, and might even then protect themselves by a speedy sale.

It was not the morality, but solely the expediency of free coinage that seemed, in London, to be discussed. Most of the conversation that one heard bore on the question whether by any possibility the United States alone could be expected "to maintain the parity" between silver coined without limit and the gold coin of the United States. It was very generally admitted, even among monometalists, that a victory for Bryan would have a very decided effect upon the price of silver. How long it would last, and how high the price would go, were the principal questions discussed. One heard the value of the ounce of silver in gold the week after the election of Bryan predicted as high as ninety-five cents and as low as seventy cents. Between those two limits the discussion seemed to range; and while it was thought that in the long run silver would again depreciate, unless some other nations came to adopt the same principle, it was generally felt that the example of the United States, as well as the consequences of placing its industries upon a silver basis, would

be a potent influence in bringing about such adoption. It was pointed out that the immediate effect would be to immensely reduce the cost of labor; that the United States would at once have a monopoly of the trade of the silver countries of South America and Mexico, and possibly of the East; that through free exchange with these countries upon a silver basis, and under the promised low tariff, and through the sacrifice of industrial classes at home in accepting their wages in silver dollars, the manufactures of the United States would, for some years, be largely stimulated. In brief, the general impression seemed to be that while there would be a temporary panic in bonds and shares, the United States would have thereafter several years of "boom," however much it might have to pay the piper later, and the moral side of it all was scarcely mentioned.

Coming home to New York and Boston, one found a most different state of the popular mind. In the East, at least, while there was some discussion of the economic results of free coinage, the main attack upon it was a moral one. Some of the Bryan newspapers feebly endeavored to discuss the question on its economic side, but the united attack of the Republican and Independent press upon the morality of the thing forced even them to meet the question on this ground. The McKinley campaign was conducted almost solely upon the moral issue. Instead of "price of silver," "rate of exchange," "rate of wages," "value of securities," the terms heard were "national honor," "faith with creditors," "cheating of widows and orphans," "ruining of depositors in savings-banks, pensioners, and persons in receipt of salaries." The extreme Republican press endeavored to take the position that nearly one-half of the American people had gone morally wrong; that the sole issue was one of the Ten Commandments; that the debtor class was trying to cheat the creditor, or, most mildly, the South and West attempting to oppress the North and East.

It is not my purpose in this article to discuss such injustice as would be worked to classes or individuals if the country were put suddenly on a silver basis. One may well conceive

that it might be very great indeed ; but the opinion of any dispassionate foreign observer landing in New York last August would certainly have been that the Eastern newspapers and the Western orators "forced the note." If it were really true that, approximately, one-half the voters in this country were consciously dishonest, one might well despair of democracy. If it were not true, it was disingenuous to say so for campaign purposes ; and the reaction to such charges is always dangerous. He who slanders the motives of a minority in this country of ours must be prepared to see that minority the more disposed to vindicate itself by holding fast to even a mistaken notion when it becomes a majority.

Admitting, therefore, that unlimited coinage of silver in this country would work injustice, but denying that the half of our people consciously wished to work injustice, how can their position be explained ?

When people's actions and opinions are to be ethically criticised, they are justly entitled to be judged not by the facts, but by what they think to be the facts ; not by the results or motives of the action they propose, but by what they think them to be ; not even by recent history itself, but by their view of recent history. While it is true that a small number of persons interested in silver mines may have consciously planned for extraordinary personal profit in free coinage ; while it is even true that a certain number of unsuccessful speculators, or insolvent mortgagors, may have consciously desired a cheaper money in which to pay their debts ; it is certainly true that a great bulk of voters, in the South and West, honestly believed that silver and gold coins at a certain relative weight had been the money guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States ; and that the value of the silver part of our coinage had, within recent years, been nullified by act of Congress and the action of other nations, and that at a time when, and partly because, there were recent large discoveries of silver in the United States, whereby such action was the more peculiarly unjust to this nation. They honestly believed that the money in which their mortgage debts had been contracted a few years ago was more plentiful, and had

a smaller purchasing power than the money which they were now called upon to pay. What they supposed themselves to seek was not a change, but a restoration. Incidentally, they recognized, and probably regretted, the special profit that the "silver barons" might make; but there was also a sort of "Judenhetze" in their minds. They had been led to think that there had, in fact, been a conspiracy among the bankers of the world; and that there is a class of money changers which owns little tangible property, which rarely enters directly into productive enterprise, which has no stake in the soil, but deals only in silver and gold counters, and had interest to make that kind of counters which it had recently been collecting the more exceptionally valuable by discrediting the other. Thus the unwished for, but unavoidable, benefit to the silver barons was more than equalized in their minds by the deserved justice meted to the dealers in credit. On the practical question they undoubtedly also believed that the mere enactment of a free coinage law by the United States would restore silver in the world's markets even to its intrinsic value of 1873 as related to gold. But we are now considering the ethics and not the economics of the case, and would merely urge that it is unjust to hold a great people honestly believing these things, however mistaken in their facts, to conscious moral wrong.

When we come to consider what economic conditions could have brought about such mistaken views, we approach the most interesting part of our task. In many respects, the various conditions which produced this state of mind have never all coincided before in economic history. The Western farmer and the Southern farmer, to a great extent even the American industrial laborer, produce the raw materials of life. As compared with the industries of Paris, even of Birmingham, the American producer would be classed with the peasant of Egypt or of India. Food-stuffs, cotton, iron, the most common world staples, produced by the commonest human labor, are what we mainly make. Now all the world can grow hog and hominy, cotton and rice, and all the world had, within a few years, been gathered together into one market. This is

all a commonplace, but it was not a commonplace to Southern and Western voters; the most of them had not found it out; the few that had were reluctant to admit it; for such is human nature. Still more is it the nature of the demagogue to be loath to admit that our troubles are caused by our own inadequacy, or even by laws of nature, rather than by the fault of others. Ten years ago the Western farmer blamed the railway for low net return of his product; last year, having forced the railroads to the point of bankruptcy, he welcomed with delight the silver explanation. Not until the answer of every ingenious demagogue is exploded, or has been pushed to the point of trial and failure, will he recognize that it is a thing no law can change. Agricultural depression, small wages for the maker of simple things, is the complaint of every highly civilized nation of the world to-day; but this the million of the voters did not know.

Another well-known condition that must yet be mentioned is the artificial money stimulus suddenly given the West and South a few years past, and as suddenly withdrawn. In old times it was not possible quickly to concentrate and pour the surplus of quick capital of the world, or even of England and the East, into one promising section of this country; but this is exactly what had been done in the West and South between 1873 and 1893. If money is the life-blood of trade, they were congested with it; and then, at the first chill of 1893, it flowed back to the hearts of London, or New York, or Boston, and left the extremities cold. The familiar metaphor is not too misleading.

But a generation had grown up, particularly in the West, which had come to look upon this continual flow of new capital as a normal thing. It had dealt largely in prospects and in futures; that is, in corner lots, in mines, in railroads through prairies, in brick buildings, in beginning cities. It had sold and re-sold to itself and to the East, or to England, these corner lots at continually advancing prices. Each advance had established a new standard of values, while the money profit really made by the Western speculator, or man of business (as he doubtless thought himself), remained in his pocket

for future ventures. This had made him unfamiliar with the very notion of intrinsic values. No Western man looked at what a piece of property would net in actual income, still less what it would net in periods of depression; he looked solely to the purchase price at which he could sell. And usually he did sell it, to an Eastern investor, or to a still more lucky Western speculator, or, more usually still, under the guise of a mortgage, to a mortgage company. He had seen twenty years of this without a break, until, suddenly, the silver panic of 1893 compelled him to view the possessions or equities he then happened to have in hand in the narrow aspect of their immediate earning power in cash. He was as much surprised as was his creditor to find this usually *nil*,—less than *nil*, if one took into consideration repairs and taxes, or wages and operating expenses. Nothing has been more common in St. Paul and Minneapolis, in Kansas City, Omaha, and Denver, than to find expensive buildings placed upon lots of land without the result of adding a dollar to the land's value. The panic destroyed the money factor in the equation of property against cash; and the wiping out of property values reacted back to cause further depression. The earning power of property, after all, depends mainly on the condition of the community where it lies; and this community had suddenly its purchasing power destroyed. Even what rents had previously been paid for stores and houses became an immaterial fact when there was no one in condition to pay rents at all. The West was full of men who had fancied themselves rich; who had owned blocks of buildings, quarter-interests in mines and ranches, almost everything, in fact, but railroad stock; and who really now had not, and could not procure, the money to pay their taxes.

All this is familiar; but it brings us to another point not so often made,—that is, that the far West had no home productive industry. This is very largely true of the towns west of the Mississippi, and even of the country west of the rain-belt in Kansas and Nebraska. In speculating they had gone upon previous precedents, upon the history of Illinois and Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin,—States where every acre

was admirably fitted for some form of agriculture, which is, after all, the only bounteous and permanent mother of wealth. Suddenly they found that this was not the case with Western Kansas and Nebraska, Colorado and Montana. It is an extraordinary fact that all this "boom" country had not yet been, in a true sense, wealth producing. It was actually the stimulus of foreign money that had fixed values; it was literally the management of foreign money that had been its industry. A recent English writer, with somewhat painful sarcasm, has said, in giving his impression of the one hundred and fifty thousand people in Denver in 1896, that "they derived a precarious livelihood by selling each other railroad tickets at reduced rates;" as if that were all the business that was left. But it is approximately true that the far West had but the cattle business, which was decadent, and the mining business, which only maintains itself as does the Louisiana Lottery. It is matter of common knowledge that, usually, more money goes into a gold or silver mining camp in the form of supplies than comes out of it in the value of the ore. It is the hope of the occasional prize that induces men to engage in labor certain to be unprofitable for the majority of them. Not only this, but mines consume their output,—that is, the ore goes away to pay for the food the miner eats and the clothes he wears. Other industries breed new ones; but the taking of the precious metals from the earth leaves nothing behind. Thus, while there was no farming population worthy of notice, the people in the towns and cities of the far West were nothing but dealers in money, making their living by commissions, building their Romanesque stone houses out of their profits in handling foreign money. When the flow of money stopped, their business ceased. There were no manufacturers, no artisans, no craftsmen, no owners of ships, no owners of solvent stocks, no workers in the infinite arts that make the wealth of European cities, even of the Eastern States, as they made the splendor of the Florence and Venice of the olden time, while, at the other extreme of the industrial system, there were few who tilled the soil.

Now, no industrial system can get on—or at least none has

yet got on—without a numerous class of the hewers of wood and drawers of water ; and we are likely to forget what a large advantage the early settlers of our country, in New England for instance, had in having a class system ready made to hand. This seems to me the most extraordinary novelty in the social and industrial system of the modern West,—one which, so far as I know, has never yet been noticed by the makers of books. Early New England is commonly spoken of as a democracy ; in politics perhaps it was, after the early theocracy disappeared ; but, industrially, the classes were as definite as in olden times,—the majority who worked in the fields or in trades, the few who were clergymen and lawyers, the increasing number who were traders. In the South, the slavery system at least gave a great supply of unambitious labor. In the earlier West the Germans and Scandinavians, as in the later East the Irish, Italians, or Hungarians, took the heavier and less attractive work to themselves and left the American-born a free hand to trade, speculate, enter the professions, or, at worst, become the superintendent of the labor of others. In fact, when we are not mincing words or talking at the primaries, we must recognize that the native American, as foreign immigration began, rapidly established a sort of industrial aristocracy ; rapidly and skilfully he rose in the social scale, until, as in New England and the middle West, all enterprises and industries are officered and governed by native Americans,—Yankees, let us call them,—the rank and file of the labor being of foreign birth or origin. That this has been the universal condition of affairs north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi no clear-sighted person can doubt ; while in the South, before or since the abolition of slavery, the Yankee had his negroes to work for him. Contrary, perhaps, to the prevailing impression, your Yankee is a lazy man,—that is, he particularly abhors work with his own hands if through some other person's head. A hundred years ago the Doomsday-book of New England, if there were one, would show all its farms occupied and tilled by Yankees, whose very names to-day have vanished from the soil. Fifty years ago New England mills were full of Yankee operatives ;

now they are Irish or French Canadian. It is not that the Yankee young man or woman is without occupation; but, decreasing as he is in relative numbers as compared with the total population, he has been enabled, partly through that, partly through his education and facilities, to secure for himself the higher positions, the more profitable places, or, at least, the less laborious,—such as clerkships or the work of brokers and salesmen. In other words, the Yankee has ceased himself to be the producer and has become the director of labor. He has demanded and secured for himself the officers' places in the industrial army. Now this tendency was most exaggerated in the newer West, in just the part of the country where there was no rank and file.

To the student of ethics this is a most extraordinary social phenomenon. A town, for example, like Denver was, before the last panic, composed of an almost homogeneous population; it was very American; it was even northern American; it was composed almost entirely of young men with something more than a common school education, who had emigrated from Eastern cities. Nothing quite like it has been seen in the history of the world before. A large city, where practically every male citizen was educated to the point of demanding the higher positions in life, and where there was no difference—in education, or in breeding, or in taste, or in desires—to make any of them willing to accept the subordinate places. Towns like Denver and Omaha were built and inhabited by citizens whose notions of life may be roughly summed up in the phrase that they wanted several thousand a year; that is, they expected to live each as a reputable citizen in a substantial brick dwelling, gratifying the reasonable demands of the average educated American, and sending their sons and daughters to college. No one of these men could properly see any reason why his neighbor, who was exactly like unto him, should maintain a proper standard of living and he himself accept a clerk's wages or a farmer's work. They had an entire society made up of captains, with no rank and file to base it; and, on the other hand, no generals or field marshals to moderate the captains' preten-

sions. The struggle for existence in such a state of things is something extraordinary. Only the beginning of it has now come, but it is destined to be the most extraordinary social feature of the twentieth century; for one cannot repeat too strongly or accentuate too often the immense difference that exists between the social condition of every state or society the world has previously known and this new state of things where, with a high average in ability, all have set themselves a scale of living known previously but to the few; and without great, healthy, unquestioning laboring masses to support it.

This was the extraordinary condition of the new West at the time of the late panic, and is still perhaps largely accountable for its slow recovery. Its citizens were all "captains of tens" and "captains of hundreds." They were all brokers in one way or another, middlemen; that is, they dealt in other people's moneys, or they sold real estate, or they promoted corporations, or practised law, or went to Congress. There was, one was told, a cotton mill, and there are important smelting industries in Denver; but not one man in a hundred that one met at its excellent club or its luxurious hotel was directly engaged in productive labor within the State of Colorado. To put it briefly, they were not at work. What local development was done came about through foreign capital; it had no roots in the soil; they were doing nothing "off their own bat;" and the income they did produce went to absentee capitalists, it was not spent at home; and this condition was almost as true of Kansas City and Omaha, of Sioux City, Seattle and Tacoma, and even of Minneapolis and St. Paul; though at these last cities one meets the vast Scandinavian farming population which surrounds them and makes a healthy local basis for some trade.

If there be a thing which, from an ethical stand-point, one may criticise, it is the view of debt and its contractual relation which exists in the recent West. It is here, if at all, that one may find fault; but the point of view is no whit peculiar to the West. It is a characteristic of all new countries which are semi-developed, we had almost said semi-civilized. Per-

haps nothing so much marks all those countries, which our school-books used to call "enlightened" from those which are at best but "civilized," as the general sense of the sanctity of contract; a thing which requires long generations of steady, saving burghers to breed into mind, and familiarity with the notion of permanence, of accumulation, of inheritance. There are other reasons; but the main one why a country like the Orient, or South America, or Spain, or even Italy, is not commercially prosperous, is that the generality of the people *have no sense of contract*. Hence there are no courts to enforce it, and, still more important, no merchants from whom to expect it; for that stability of trade is very slight which is dependent upon courts alone rather than the general sentiment of the community.

Upon the citizen of a new country where everything is developing, everything is speculative, everything is booming, the obligation of a debt sits lightly. Sure of being able either to pay it tenfold or not at all, the adventurer insensibly takes his creditor into his own hazard; and the non-ability to pay debts is so usual that the notion of blame or obliquity attaching to it comes to him with a feeling of surprise. The Western statute books are full of devices for enabling the debtor who cannot pay, or who finds it seriously inconvenient to pay, to protect himself against his creditor. The State of Texas has practically got to the condition recommended by Henry George, where no debt is legally collectible. The notion of exactness in money matters, if it prove inconvenient, strikes some Western men as mean; nay, more, as grasping and oppressive; while, to perform a money obligation according to its exact terms and on its precise date seems almost a thing to be proud of. The floating population, the lack of permanency in families, the shifting of residence and occupation, combine to make one look upon a debt as a purely personal matter. There is a certain liberality in this point of view, as it reduces all debts to something like a debt of honor; but it has the corresponding result that it is a matter personal to the borrower, which a general change even in his circumstances will morally discharge. We repeat that there is

nothing peculiar to the Western American in this; nothing which has not always been observed in countries of recent social and industrial development, particularly when subjected to the strain of a sudden vast increase in commercial or speculative affairs. The Westerner, still more the Southerner, does not really understand the importance of exactness and promptness in money matters. It has been said that Wall Street is the most honest place in the United States, and, if we take a certain dry view of the matter, this is true. The men on Wall Street are trained to exactness in money matters; furthermore, they are trained to be men of their word. The largest transactions have sometimes to be done without writing and rest upon a brief conversation between the two or three great bankers concerned. The speed and press of great business, large engagements resting solely upon exact amounts and exact dates, require both this exactness of statement and fidelity to promise, and the most precise carrying out of the letter of the contract. It is no disparagement, therefore, to the West and South to say that they have not been trained to this. Morally, many things may be done on Wall Street that are dishonest and oppressive beyond the power or perception of the farmer in the West; but, technically, Wall Street stands closer to absolute accuracy of contract, and the East more realizes its sanctity.

At the risk of some diffuseness, we have sought to show that the South and West have suffered no ethical deterioration, but are dealing with two or three problems,—one worldwide, the others novel and peculiar to their time and country. We have yet to learn what civic communities will do whose citizens are composed entirely, or nearly entirely, of what in other or older countries would be called the superior classes. We have seen the extreme industrial depression that may come on a country, or a part of a country, not industrially self-supporting to the scale it set for itself, and tempted for many years by an excessive stimulus of foreign money now suddenly removed. And while one or two States like Kansas may seem slower to learn, owing to the temporary dominance of an impossible political party, there is no reason to doubt that the

West in general has learned, as New England had to learn two centuries ago, that the only stable prosperity is that of productive home industries, not speculation on the prices that foreign speculators may give; and in the exchange of commodities having intrinsic value, not in dealing in prospects and futures. And, finally, that in the long run nothing is to be gained by weakening or taking lightly that sense of contract which has conjured into existence the industrial civilization of the Occident.

F. J. STIMSON.

BOSTON.

---

### THE CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY AS AN ORGANISM.

HEGEL'S tendency to exalt the state, and society generally, at the expense of the individual citizen, is one of the most striking characteristics of his system. It is one, moreover, in which Hegelians, as a rule, have faithfully followed their master.

The exaltation in question is not identical with a desire to largely increase the functions exercised by the state. It involves indeed, almost necessarily, the extension of those functions beyond the limits allowed them by the stricter Individualists. But it would be quite consistent with an amount of individual liberty which would prevent the result from being called Socialistic or even Communistic. And, on the other hand, it is quite possible to propose a system of the most rigid Socialism or Communism, and yet to entirely disagree with Hegel's view of the dignity of the state. This was, to a large extent, the position of the older Socialists, such as Robert Owen.

We may best define Hegel's position by contrasting it with its opposite. That opposite is the theory that the state and society are merely external mechanisms for promoting the individual welfare of the individual citizens. This theory does not, of course, involve that each citizen cares only about his own welfare. But, if he cares about the welfare of the others,

he regards them as an aggregate, each of whom has a welfare of his own, not as a whole, whose welfare is one and the same. Again, this theory does not assert that the state was formed by a compact of individuals who were before isolated, nor that the machinery, which the state and society give, could possibly be dispensed with by the individual. But, in whatever way the union was first formed, and however indispensable it may be, we can only justify its existence on the ground that it is a common means to the separate ends of the citizens. To this view Hegel opposes the assertion that society is more than such a merely external means.

My object in this paper is, without dogmatically maintaining the view that society is a mere means, to argue that there is nothing in Hegelian metaphysics which compels or entitles us to assert that it is anything more. The question of the precise relation of our present society to the individuals who compose it, is, I submit, one upon which philosophy affords us practically no guidance, and which can be settled only by empirical considerations.

The Hegelian view on this subject is generally expressed by saying that the nature of society is organic. This phrase, so far as I know, is not used by Hegel himself. And it does not seem to be very accurate. An organic unity is, in the ordinary meaning of the term, such a unity as binds together the different parts of a living body. And, whatever may be the unity which exists in society, it would seem clear that it cannot, on Hegelian principles, be the same as that of the parts of a body. Self-conscious persons, such as make up society, are far more individual than a hand or a foot. Now, according to Hegel, the greater is the individuality of parts, the closer is the unity which *can* be established between them, and the deeper must we go to establish it. It follows that self-conscious persons will need a deeper and more fundamental principle of union than suffices for the parts of a body, and, if they *are* joined by a principle adequate for the purpose, will form a unity far closer than that of the parts of a body. And to call such a principle organic seems unreasonable. It is true that it comprehends and surpasses the

principle of organic unity. But, if this was a reason for calling it organic, it would be an equally good reason for calling an organic unity mechanical, and for calling a mechanical unity a mathematical aggregate.

The use of the word organic, therefore, seems to me incorrect, and, not improbably, misleading. But since it is used by most of the writers of the present day who follow Hegel in this question, I shall adopt their phraseology while I am considering their views.

Hegel's own position in the matter is expressed in his taking the state (*Der Staat*) as a higher form of society than the civic community (*Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*). He expresses the distinction between them as follows:

"Were the state to be considered as exchangeable with the civic society, and were its decisive features to be regarded as the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interests of the individual as such would be the ultimate purpose of the social union. It would then be at one's option to be a member of the state. But the state has a totally different relation to the individual. It is the objective spirit, and he has his truth, real existence, and ethical status only in being a member of it. Union, as such, is itself the true content and end, since the individual is intended to pass a universal life. His particular satisfactions, activities, and way of life have in this authenticated substantive principle their origin and result." \*

Hegel does not, however, make any distinct attempt to prove the superiority of the state to the civic community. He points out that the unity is more close and vital in the state, and there he leaves the matter, the line of thought being, apparently, that, since it has been proved in the *Logic* that true reality is a perfect unity, the closer unity is always the higher form. For a more detailed treatment of the subject we must look to his followers. In particular, Professor Mackenzie, in his "Introduction to Social Philosophy," maintains the organic nature of society with such force and clearness that our best method of dealing with the subject will be to examine his treatment of it in some detail.

Professor Mackenzie defines an organism by saying that in

---

\* "Philosophie des Rechts." Section 258. Lecture note. Dyde's translation.

it "the relations of the parts are intrinsic; changes take place by an internal adaptation; and its end forms an essential element in its own nature." \* Here are three characteristics. The second does not require special consideration. Its truth, and the sense in which it is to be taken, seem to depend on the truth, and on the precise meaning, of the previous statement that the relations of the parts are intrinsic. The other two points of the definition seem to me to be ambiguous. If they are taken to imply that society is an end to the individuals who compose it, they would form an adequate definition of an organism; but in that sense I do not think that Professor Mackenzie has proved them to be true of society. On the other hand, in the sense in which he has proved them to be true of society, they appear to me to be quite compatible with a theory which should regard society as a merely mechanical unity, and as simply a means to the separate ends of its constituent individuals.

Let us take first the intrinsic relations of the parts to the whole. If this were to mean, as it might possibly be taken to mean, that to be in these relations was the end of the individual who was in them, and that this was his end, not from any further quality of the relations, but simply because they were the relations which united him to society, then, indeed, we should have an organic unity.

But this is not what Professor Mackenzie proves. He appears to be satisfied when he has pointed out that the individual's nature is *determined* in every direction by the society in which he lives, and that there is no part of his nature to which this determination does not extend.† This is unquestionably true. No man, indeed, is *only* the product of society, for it would be impossible to account for the differentiated result, if it did not contain an originally differentiated element. The co-existence of individuals in a whole may modify their differences, but cannot construct them out of nothing. But

---

\* "An Introduction to Social Philosophy," chap. iii. p. 164. My references are to the edition of 1895.

† Op. cit., chap. iii. pp. 166-171.

VOL. VII.—No. 4

this, I imagine, would not be denied by Professor Mackenzie, and it is impossible to dispute his assertion that no individual, and no part of any individual's nature, would be what it now is, except for the influence of the society to which that individual belongs.

But what does this come to, when it is admitted? Surely to nothing else than the assertion of the category of complete reciprocal determination, which is involved in organic connection, but is by no means identical with it. As soon as we realize that causal determination is complete and reciprocal, and that the distinction between essence and appearance is illegitimate, we are able to assert about any two things in the universe the relation which Professor Mackenzie has pointed out between the individual and society. No Englishman would, in any respect, be quite what he is now if the Reform Bill had not been carried, or if Dr. Pusey had joined the Roman communion. Granted. And no Englishman would be, in any respect, quite what he is now, if there was one more herring in the Atlantic. The influence in the first case is more important than in the second; but that is not a difference of kind, and will not entitle us to say that society joins individuals in any way which is, *in genere*, different from the way in which everything in the universe is joined to everything else.

What possible theory of the state does this truth exclude? It would exclude, certainly, any theory which said that the individual was not affected at all by living in society. But does any one hold—could any one hold—such a view? It has been asserted that society is the end of the individual. It has been asserted that it is a means to that end. It has even been asserted, by anchorites, that it was simply a hindrance to that end. But has any one ever said that man was exactly the same in society as he would be out of it? It has been asserted, no doubt, that the associated man is only superficially different from the isolated man, and that the two are fundamentally the same. But the difference between superficial and fundamental qualities is one which can only be intelligible when we know the end of the object which possesses them. The assertion

which would be denied by Professor Mackenzie's demonstration of "intrinsic relations" is not that society makes no fundamental difference in the individual, but that it makes no difference in him at all. And when we have disposed of this absurdity, all sane theories of the state are still left to choose from.

The intrinsic relations of individuals would also be incompatible, no doubt, with the theory which Professor Mackenzie calls mechanical. "A mechanical or dualistic view, again," he says, "would regard the individual as partly dependent and partly independent; as to some extent possessing a life of his own, and yet to some extent dependent on his social surroundings."\* It is impossible to divide any individual into isolated compartments, and if any part of a man's life is affected by the society of which he is a member, no part of his life can be wholly unaffected by it. But although this view may be fitly called mechanical, it is not the only view which deserves that name. It answers to the category to which Hegel has given the name of Formal Mechanism, but there still remains the higher category which he calls Absolute Mechanism. In Absolute Mechanism, if I interpret the Logic rightly, we discard the supposition that the internal nature of any thing can be independent of the relations into which it enters with other things. We see that the two sides are inseparably connected. On the one hand, the internal nature of anything is meaningless except in connection with its relations to other things, since it is only in those relations that the inner nature can manifest itself. On the other hand, relations to other things are meaningless except in relation to the internal nature of the thing. For a merely passive subject of relations is an impossible and contradictory idea, as the category of Reciprocity has already taught us. If A is *m n*, because it is related to B C, this is not a merely external relation. For it must be ascribed to the nature of A that B C produces upon it the result *m n* rather than the result *o p*.

Now the category of Absolute Mechanism is quite con-

---

\* Op. cit., chap. iii. p. 150.

sistent with the admission of intrinsic relations,—with the admission, that is, that there is nothing whatever in A which is independent of its relations to B, C, etc. But in admitting this, we have by no means passed to the idea of organic unity. No unity, it is clear, can be organic which is a mere means to the separate ends of its constituent individuals. And there is nothing in the category of Absolute Mechanism to hinder this from being the case. Each individual, it is true, is under this category determined throughout by the unity in which it stands with the others in the same system. But ends, means, and hindrances to ends, all exercise causal determination over objects. A man, for example, is causally determined alike by the moral ideal which he holds, by the dinner which he eats, and by the hatreds which he feels. But this need not prevent us from saying that the first of these is an end, good in itself, the second a means, which has value only in so far as it enables us to carry out the end, and the third a hindrance to carrying out the end, and, therefore, positively bad.

Accordingly, we find that those theories of society which carry individualism furthest are quite consistent with the category of Absolute Mechanism, and with the admission of intrinsic relations between the members of society. The hermits of the early Church regarded society as detrimental to man's highest interests, and consequently as an evil to be avoided as far as possible, and to be steadily resisted when unavoidable. A hedonist regards society as only justifiable in so far as it produces, for each of the individuals who compose it, a greater amount of private happiness than he would otherwise have enjoyed. Yet neither the hermit nor the hedonist have advanced anything inconsistent with the intrinsic relations which we have been considering. For each of them would have admitted that some society was indispensable, and each of them would have admitted that man was modified by the society of which he formed a part.

I have endeavored to prove that to say of society that the relation of its parts is intrinsic does not give us any help towards establishing its organic nature, since the proposition would be equally true of any real system, whether organic or

not. We must now consider the third clause of Professor Mackenzie's definition of an organism: "its end forms an essential element in its own nature."

Here, again, there seems to me to be a dangerous ambiguity. If this proposition meant, as it might mean, that the existence of the society as society was its own end, and also the end of the individuals who compose it, then, indeed, the unity in which it would bind those individuals would be so close that it might fairly be called organic, or even more than organic. But when we come to inquire into the precise meaning which Professor Mackenzie attaches to the phrase, we shall find that, in one part at least of his work, he gives it a much narrower meaning, and one which, however true of society, can give us no reason to consider society as an organism.

"That the growth of social conditions has reference to an inner end," he says, "is a point on which we need not here enlarge. That the movements of social development are purposeless, no one supposes; and that the purpose which it subserves lies within itself is equally apparent. What the end is, it may be difficult to determine; but it is easy to perceive that it is some form of human well-being." \*

Professor Mackenzie here seems to assume that "some form of human well-being" must lie within society itself. But this, though it may be true, is by no means necessary. All human beings are at present within society, but it is possible that they may cease to be so in the future, and that the human well-being which it is the object of society to promote may be one in which society is broken up, and the individuals isolated. (I am not, of course, arguing that this *is* the case. I am only maintaining that the fact that the present and actual human being is in society does not of itself prove that the future and ideal human being will also be in society.) †

---

\* *Op. cit.*, chap. iii. p. 176.

† Professor Mackenzie appears, in one paragraph at least, to recognize this. For, in the concluding passage of chap. iii. (p. 203) he admits, if I understand him rightly, that before we can properly call society an organism we must inquire whether the ideal human well-being, which is the end of society, is itself social. But since, in the passage quoted above from p. 176, he appears to assert explicitly

The end of a school, for example, is the well-being of the boys, and the boys form the school. Nevertheless, the school is not an end in itself. For boys leave school when they grow up, and the end of the school is their welfare throughout life, when they will certainly have left school, and may easily be completely isolated from all their old school-fellows.

Now what is undoubtedly true of this fraction of society may be, according to some theories, true of society as a whole. Let us take the case of a man who believed that society existed for the promotion of true holiness, as the highest end of man, while at the same time he defined holiness as a relation which existed between God and a particular individual, and which is independent of—even incompatible with—any relations between the individuals themselves. Now any one who believed this—and something very like it has been believed—would quite admit that the end of society was nothing else than human well-being, since he would conceive that the greatest human well-being lay in holiness. But the end of society would not be in itself; on the contrary, it would be something which could only be realized when society itself had ceased to exist.

Again, consider the case of a hedonist who should hold that the one end of society was to make the sum of pleasures felt by its individual members, taken as isolated beings, as large as possible. Such a man would hold that the end of society was a form of human well-being, but he would not regard it as an organic unity, but merely as a means for the respective ends of the various individuals who compose it.

My contention has been, so far, that it is useless and misleading to call any unity organic unless we are prepared to maintain that it (and not merely something at present contained in it) is an end to itself and to its own parts. If we do not do this, we shall include among organic unities systems which exist as bare means for the carrying out of ends which

---

that human well-being is, *ex vi terminorum*, social, I thought it well to deal with both positions separately. The view stated on p. 203, and developed in chap. iv., will be considered later.

are indifferent, or even hostile, to the unity. To call such systems organic would be improper, in the first place, because that word has always been employed to denote a relatively close unity, while such a use would extend it to all unities whatever. Every aggregate of individuals which were not absolutely isolated from each other, and in which the connection was not reduced to the level of mere *Schein*, would be organic.

And, in the second place, not only would such a definition depart completely from the ordinary usage, but it would render the term useless. When we said that a unity was organic, we should only say that it was a unity. It would be useless, for example, to say that society was organic. For we should only thereby separate ourselves from any one who should assert that the individual, or any part of him, is uninfluenced by being in society. If any person does hold this remarkable view, I am unable to say ; but it is certainly not of sufficient weight to render it worth while to appropriate such a convenient phrase as organic to express disbelief in it. Meanwhile, the distinction—of such cardinal importance in modern political theory—between those who admit and those who deny that society is an end in itself would remain without a suitable name.

I should suggest that the most suitable definition of an organic unity for our present purpose might be something like this: "a unity which is the end of its parts." This clearly distinguishes it from a unity which is merely mechanical. It also distinguishes it from a chemical unity, to use Hegel's phrase, in which the parts are regarded as mere means which may be discarded or merged, if that would conduce to the realization of the end. For here the end is the unity of the parts, and the parts therefore are an element in the end, as well as the means to it.

This definition appears to have the merit of coinciding with tolerable exactness with the ordinary use of the word organic, which is an important advantage when it can be gained without sacrifice of accuracy. The common application of organic is to animal and vegetable life. Now, the definition I have

proposed would include animals and vegetables, and would not include anything which did not bear a tolerably close resemblance to biological unity.

Such a definition would mark a division in our present subject-matter which would be worth marking. There are two theories at the present day as to the nature of society, and especially of the state, each of which has considerable practical influence, and for each of which much can be said that must be carefully considered by any student. They differ by the admission or rejection of the idea of society as an end in itself, and it would be convenient to refer to them as the organic and inorganic views of society.

Hegel's example would be on our side. For in the "Logic" he makes scarcely any distinction between the idea of an immanent end and the idea of life. And I imagine that this definition would not be disapproved by Professor Mackenzie.\*

Is society the end of man? This is the question which we have now to answer. Let us inquire, in the first place, what general information we possess regarding our supreme end.

If we turn to Hegel, we find that for him the supreme end is another name for Absolute Reality, which, *sub specie æternitatis*, is eternally present, but, *sub specie temporis*, presents itself as an ideal and a goal. Now, Hegel's conception of Absolute Reality is one which might very fitly be called a society. That persons are its constituent parts is, I think, the most probable hypothesis, though the subject is by no means free from obscurity. At any rate, it is clear that Absolute Reality is a differentiated unity, of which the parts are perfectly individual, and which, for that very reason, is a perfect unity. To call such a unity organic would only be incorrect because it was inadequate. And thus Absolute Reality would be the most perfect of societies. Just because the individual was such a complete individual, he would have all his perfection, and all his reality, in nothing else but in his relations to other

---

\* Cf. above, p. 421, note, and the "Introduction to Social Philosophy," chap. iii. p. 203.

individuals. Or, to quote Professor Mackenzie, "no attainment of the ideal of our rational nature is conceivable except by our being able to see the world as a system of intelligent beings who are mutually worlds for each other." \*

The end of man, then, is a society. But we are now considering "social philosophy," and not theology, and what we want to know is not our relation to the kingdom of heaven, but our relation to society as it is now around us, and as it may be expected to be in an earthly future. Now it is quite clear that, whatever this ideal society which Hegel makes our end, may be, it is not the society which we have round us to-day. Absolute Reality, according to Hegel, is eternal, and cannot be fully realized in any state of the world which is still subject to succession in time. Absolute Reality must see and be seen under the highest category only, and is still imperfect while any reality is unconscious of itself, or appears to others under the form of matter. Absolute Reality, finally, is incompatible with pain or imperfection.

This is clearly not the society in which we live, and we are not entitled to argue that the present society is an organic unity, because the ideal society is such a unity. But although they are not identical, the society of the present and the ideal certainly stand in some relation to one another. Can we, by a closer investigation of this relation, find any reason to consider the society of the present organic?

It might seem as if we had made an important step in this direction when we reflected that in a system like society, whose parts are self-conscious individuals, one of the strongest forces towards making the system organic is the conviction that it ought to be so. For it will be an organism if the individuals make it their end. Now it must be admitted that their conviction of what ought to be their end, will not always decide what their end actually is. A man's end may be above or below his theoretical opinion about it. On the one hand, he may acknowledge the higher and yet pursue the lower. On the other hand, he may explicitly acknowledge only the

---

\* Op. cit., chap. iv. p. 260.

lower and yet pursue the higher, moved by some vague impulse, which he can neither justify nor resist. Still, on the whole, the belief that anything is a worthy end has a great influence in making it a real one.

Can we, then, establish the organic nature of present society as an ideal, if not as a fact? Can we say that the society of this world ought to be organic, and that we shall do well in proportion as we make it so by regarding the various relations, natural and civic, which constitute it, as the end of our individual lives? The ultimate end, indeed, it cannot be. Nothing but the heavenly society can be that, and, since anything earthly must be different from absolute reality, our present society, even if improved as far as possible, could never be anything higher than the means to the ultimate end. But, in reference to all the activities and interests of our individual lives, it might be said that present society might rightly be considered as the end, since it is only by working in it and through it that we can progress towards the ultimate ideal which alone can fully satisfy us.

This, if I understand him rightly, is something like the position which Professor Mackenzie adopts. Having said, in the passage quoted above, that "no attainment of the ideal of our rational nature is conceivable, except by our being able to see the world as a system of intelligent beings who are mutually worlds for each other," he continues, "now, how far it is possible to think of the whole world in this way is a question for the Philosophy of Religion to discuss. It is enough for us here to observe that, in so far as we come into relations to other human beings in the world, we are attaining to a partial realization of the ideal which our rational nature sets before us. And there is no other way by which we come to such a realization. In so far as the world is merely material, it remains foreign and unintelligible to us. It is only in the lives of other human beings that we find a world in which we can be at home. Now in this fact we obviously find a much deeper significance for the organic nature of society than any that we have yet reached. For we see that the society of other human beings is not merely a means of bringing our own rational

nature to clearness, but is the only object in relation to which such clearness can be attained."\*

I must confess, however, that I am unable to see that the argument is valid. It is true that the ultimate ideal is a state of society which is organic. It is true, too, that only through our present society can that ideal be reached. For we must begin from where we are, and at present we are in society. It may be granted, too, that it is incredible, almost inconceivable, that a period of absolute social chaos should intervene between us and the goal, and that the progress to that goal may safely be considered as made continuously through society.

Yet it does not follow, I submit, that it would be well to regard our present society as an end. For although our progress to the ideal is through it, that progress is often negatively related to it. Our advance often—to some extent, always—consists in breaking up and rising above relations which, up to that point, had been part of the constitution of society. And so these relations cannot be regarded as an end. The fact that their value is purely derivative should be ever before us,—at least, in so far as we reflect at all. We must express ourselves by them as long as we find them the best expression of the absolute end, or the best road to it, but only under the reservation that we are to throw them aside as worthless when we find a more adequate expression or a more direct road.

The abstract form of society, indeed, remains. In whatever way we work out our destiny, we work it out in one another's company. But if the particular relations which constitute our present society at any moment are to be looked on as means, to be discarded when better ones can be found, this is sufficient to destroy the claims of present society to be considered organic. For the abstract fact that individuals are somehow connected can never be sufficient to unite them in an organic unity. Individuals can never find their end, which must be something concrete, not abstract, in the bare fact

---

\* *Op. cit.*, chap. iv. p. 260.

of their connection with one another. It is only some particular connection that they can accept as their end, and it is only in respect of some particular connection they are organic. And if, as I suggested above, any particular relations which we find in the society of the present day must be looked on as mere means, it will be impossible to regard that society itself as organic.

The correctness of this assertion remains to be considered. My object, as I stated at the beginning of this paper, is not to assert that our present society cannot be regarded as an organism, but only that there is nothing in the Hegelian metaphysics which can be fairly taken as proving or even suggesting the organic nature of present society. It will be for the other side to prove, if they can, that the perfect society of Absolute Reality will be found to be constituted on the same plan as our present society, joining and sundering in heaven those who are joined and sundered on earth.

No attempt has, so far as I know, been made to do this, nor is it easy to see how it could be done. Indeed, there is a strong presumption, to say the least, that the opposite is true. For when we come to consider what determines the actual relations in which men find themselves in society,—the relations of family, of school, of profession, of state, of church,—we find that overwhelming weight is exercised by considerations which we cannot suppose will have overwhelming weight in that ideal society in which all our aspirations would be satisfied. Such accidents as birth of the same parents, birth on one side or the other of a treaty-made frontier, a woman's beauty, a man's desire, a crime which unites A with B in its commission, and C with D in its suppression—such are the causes which often determine, in our present society, what individuals shall be most closely related together. All these things are no doubt real, in some degree, and therefore are to some degree represented in the ideal; but to suppose that they are as important there as they are here, would be to forget that in that ideal we are to find "a world in which we can be at home." No doubt the society of the present is the natural and inevitable introduction to the

society of the future, but it is so only in the same way as everything else is. Of everything which has ever happened in the world,—of anarchy as well as society, of sin as well as virtue, of hatred as well as love,—the fact that it has happened proves that it was a necessary incident in the movement towards the ideal. But this can give it no more than a derivative value. I find myself associated with Smith in a Parish Council. This no doubt is a stage in my progress (and Smith's) towards the ideal society of heaven. But there is no *a priori* reason to regard it as more vitally connected with that goal of all our ambitions than anything else, good or bad, social or isolated, which happens to either of us. Whatever heaven may be like, it cannot closely resemble a Parish Council, since the functions of the latter involve both matter and time. And it is by no means improbable that the results of my joint labors with Smith on earth may be the attainment of a state in which I shall be linked most closely in heaven, not to Smith, but to Jones, who comes from another parish—perhaps even from another county.

The vast majority of the relations which make up our present society are of this kind,—relations which have their origin and meaning only with reference to the conditions of our present imperfect existence, and which would be meaningless in the ideal. It is true, if we pass from kind to degree, that society may provide us with relations both higher and closer than fellowship in a Parish Council. But differences of degree will not help us here. For the difference between the highest and the lowest of the bonds which social life now offers us vanishes into insignificance compared with the difference between every one of them and the perfection expressed in Professor Mackenzie's carefully restrained words, "the attainment of the ideal of our rational nature."

It is possible—the subject is too large to go into now—that we might find, on further consideration of the nature of the Absolute Reality and of our own lives, some elements in the latter which seemed to directly belong to the former,—something which did not merely lead to heaven, but *was* heaven. On this point I do not desire to risk an assertion. But sup-

posing that this were so, and that we found in our present lives some element of absolute value, then it would be more hopeless than ever to regard our present society as an end. For, supposing that such elements exist, they certainly do not get their way in being allowed to arrange the world entirely after their own model. Society, taking it all round, blandly reverses Arnold's sentence, and remarks that "distinctions *they* esteem so grave are nothing in *my* sight,"—or at least very little. And it is perhaps for this reason that the deepest emotions are apt, if they have any effect on society, to have a negative and disintegrating one, at least as far as our present observation will carry us. They may bring peace on earth in the very long run, but they begin with the sword.

Now, surely, nothing could so effectively degrade present society from the position of an end to that of a means, tolerable only as leading on to something else, than such a state of things, if it should prove to be true. If we have, here and now, partial experience of something whose complete realization would give us utter and absolute satisfaction, how can we regard as an end a state of society which refuses us that supreme good? For I presume it will scarcely be denied that utter and absolute satisfaction is not an invariable accompaniment of social life as we at present find it.

To sum up the argument so far. I have endeavored to prove, in the first place, that we gain nothing by calling society an organism unless we are prepared to assert that it is the end of the individuals composing it. And, in the second place, I have endeavored to prove that there is nothing in Hegel's metaphysical conclusions which entitle us to assume that our present society is, or ought to be, an end for its individual citizens. We might, perhaps, go further and say, the true lesson to be derived from the philosophy of Hegel is that society cannot be an end, for any one, at least, who rightly holds that philosophy. For Hegel has defined for us an absolute and ultimate ideal, and this not as a vain aspiration, but as an end to which all reality is moving. This ideal we can understand,—dimly and imperfectly, no doubt, but still understand. And to any one who has entertained such an

ideal, society, as it is, or as it can be made under conditions of time and imperfection, can only be external and mechanical. Each of us is more than the society which unites us, because there is in each of us the longing for a perfection which that society can never realize. The parts of a living body can find their end in that body, though it is imperfect and transitory. But a self-conscious person can dream of perfection, and, having once done so, he will find no end short of perfection. Here he has no abiding city.

I do not think that this view leads either to asceticism or to the cloister. Not to asceticism ; for there is nothing in it inconsistent with the great truth, so often neglected, that a limited good is still good, only limited. A bottle of champagne is as truly good as the beatific vision could be. The only reason why we should not take the satisfaction produced by champagne as our end is that it is neither all-inclusive nor eternal, and a self-consciousness which is once awake will not be satisfied with anything less. But the fact that we cannot stop till we get to heaven will not make our champagne on the road less desirable, unless, of course, we should see reason to regard it as a hindrance to the journey.

Nor have we found any reason to suppose that our proper course would be to isolate ourselves from society, even the imperfect society of this world. For if society is only a means, at least it is an indispensable means. If it is not a god to be worshipped, it is none the less a tool which must be used.

But has philosophy any guidance to give us as to the manner in which we shall use such a tool ? It might be supposed that it had. "Let us grant," it might be said, "that the fact that the Absolute is an organic society does not prove that our present society is or ought to be organic. Yet our present society will become perfect in so far as it approaches the Absolute. And therefore we have at least an *a priori* criterion of social progress. Whatever makes society more organic is an advance. Whatever makes society less organic is a mistake."

This argument seems to me fallacious. For we must re-

member that, while the Absolute is a perfect unity, it is a perfect unity of perfect individuals. Not only is the bond of union closer than anything which we can now even imagine, but the persons which it unites are each self-conscious, self-centred,\* unique, to a degree equally unimaginable. If, on one side, we are defective at present because we are not joined closely enough together, we are defective, on the other side, because we are not sufficiently differentiated apart.

These two defects, and the remedies for them, are not, of course, incompatible. Indeed, Hegel teaches us that they are necessarily connected. None but perfect individuals could unite in a perfect unity. Only in a perfect unity could perfect individuals exist. But Hegel also points out that our advance towards an ideal is never direct. Every ideal can be analyzed into two complementary moments. And in advancing towards it we emphasize, first, one of these, and then, driven on in the dialectic process by the consequent incompleteness and contradiction, we place a corresponding emphasis on the other, and finally gain a higher level by uniting the two.

This is the Hegelian law of progress. To apply it to the present case, it tells us that, in advancing towards an ideal where we shall be both more differentiated and more united than we are now, we shall emphasize first either the differentiation or the union, and then supplement it by the other, reach thus a higher state of equilibrium, from which a fresh start must be made, and so on, through continually repeated oscillations, towards the goal.

It would follow, then, that it would be impossible for us to say that a change in the constitution of society was only good if it drew men more closely together. For an advance in either direction will appear, till the corresponding advance is made in the other, to amount to a positive decrease in the latter, which has become relatively less important. If, in a given state of society, the unity increases while the differentia-

---

\* Self-centred does not, with Hegel, mean isolated. Indeed, the two qualities are incompatible.

tion is as yet unchanged, it will appear to have lost individuality. If, on the other hand, differentiation increases while the unity is unchanged, society will appear to have lost unity. And yet in each case there will be a real advance in the only way in which advance is possible, because the emphasis laid on one side furnishes the possibility—indeed, the necessity—for the eventual advance of the other side, which, for the time, it throws into the background.

Philosophy, then, can afford us no guidance as to the next step to be taken at any time. It can tell us that we are far below the ideal, both in unity and in differentiation. It can tell us that we cannot advance far in one without advancing also in the other. But it also tells us that the steps are to be taken alternately, and it can give us no information as to which, here and now, we have to take next. That must depend on the particular circumstances which surround us at the moment,—our needs, dangers, resources. It can only be decided empirically, and it will be just as often a step which throws the unity into the background as it will be one which brings it forward into increased prominence.

There is no want of historical examples which illustrate this alternate movement of society. The institution of private property, the first establishment of Christianity, and the breaking-up of the feudal system—each involved an increased emphasis on the individual. And each tended to make society, as it was, not more but less of an organism, by giving the individual claims and ideals which could not be satisfied in society as it was, and some of which—such as parts of the Christian ideal—cannot be satisfied on earth at all. Yet they were all steps in a real advance; for on the increased individuality of the parts which they gave there have formed, and are still forming, unities far closer than could have been attained without them. And if the Hegelian conception of the Absolute had been known when any of these changes was working itself out, we can see now that it would have been a mistake to have condemned the change on the ground that it diminished instead of increasing the unity of society.

And so, too, with the present. We are confronted to-day

with schemes both for increasing and diminishing the stringency of social ties. On the one hand, we are invited to nationalize the production of wealth. On the other hand, it is suggested that the relations of husband and wife and of parent and child should be reduced to the minimum which is physiologically necessary. I have no intention of suggesting that the second proposal is right, or—here at least—that the first is wrong. But I maintain that the question is one upon which philosophy throws no light, and which must be decided empirically. The ideal is so enormously distant that the most perfect knowledge of the end we are aiming at helps us very little in the choice of the road by which we may get there. Fortunately, it is an ideal which is not only the absolutely good but the absolutely real, and we can take no road that does not lead to it.

The result seems to be that philosophy can give us very little, if any, guidance in action. Nor can I see why it should be expected to do so. Why should a Hegelian citizen be surprised that his belief as to the organic nature of the Absolute does not help him in deciding how to vote? Would a Hegelian engineer be reasonable in expecting that his belief that all matter is spirit should help him in planning a bridge? And if it be asked of what use, then, is philosophy, and if that should be held a relevant question to ask about the search for truth, I should reply that the use of philosophy lies not in being deeper than science, but in being truer than theology,—not in its bearing on action, but in its bearing on religion. It does not give us guidance. It gives us hope.

J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

## WHEN THE "HIGHER CRITICISM" HAS DONE ITS WORK.

THE impending publication of the English "Polychrome Bible," in which such results of the "Higher Criticism" as have been accepted by the most competent scholars are to be placed within the reach of ordinary Bible-readers, and so, presumably, to affect their views of revelation, seems to render opportune an attempt to answer the question which is rising in many minds: When the "Higher Criticism" has done its work, what will remain of Christianity as a divine revelation?

To those who remember the cry of consternation and wrath that went up from Christendom after the publication of "Essays and Reviews" and of Colenso's "Pentateuch," less than forty years ago, the recent elevation of Dr. Temple, one of the much-reviled contributors to the former, to the Primacy of All England, cannot but suggest interesting reflections on the change that has taken place, in the interval, in public sentiment with regard to the Bible. And, indeed, no one who has watched the changes in recent thought can fail to see that the thinking portion of the Christian world is rapidly assuming a new attitude toward Christianity and the documents upon which its supernatural claims are based. This attitude, in contradistinction to the old churchly one of pious, unquestioning acceptance, may be called critical, and, in a good sense, sceptical, while, in contradistinction to the frivolous mockery of Voltaire and his school, it may be called earnest and reverent. It is, in a word, the scientific attitude.

To the change here indicated various sciences have contributed by showing the untenability of much that formerly, on the authority of the Bible, passed as undoubted truth. Apart from the objections which a sane philosophy raises against such unthinkable "mysteries" as creation, triune personality, and the like, astronomy has clearly demonstrated that the celestial theory of the Bible is untrue. Geology has done the

same thing for its conceptions regarding the formation of the earth; and Biology for its notions respecting the origin of the vegetable and animal (including the human) worlds. Thus, as far as regards the world of nature, the thinking men of to-day have passed from the barren theory of government by miracle, which is presupposed throughout the Bible, to the fruitful theory of government by law. It now seems almost as absurd to believe in a six-days' creation as in the geocentric theory of the universe. In the world of culture, too, the same process is going on rapidly. Historical research is showing us that the Biblical account of the origin and progress of civilization has no claim to historicity, while reflection on the conditions of ethical life is proving that the moral sanctions of the Bible, (1) an omnipotent superhuman will exacting formal atonement for all offences, (2) a promise of reward for virtue other than virtue itself, are far from the highest, belonging to an order of ideas which has long been outgrown.

All these results, and others like them, though familiar enough to students, have thus far exerted little effect upon the religious world in general. This is owing, in the main, to two causes,—indifference on its part, and the efforts of its official guides, whose mental bent and class interests lie in the direction of miraculism, and whose *ex cathedra* assertions are accepted without question. These still go on teaching the old doctrines, as if the infallibility of the Bible were undisputed, or else, forced to admit palpable errors, they help themselves out with such paltry subterfuges as that the Bible was not meant to teach physics or history, or that "we have our treasure in earthen vessels," without telling us how to distinguish the treasure from the vessels. When the inferiority of Biblical ethics is pressed upon them, they take refuge in sentimental platitudes about love to God and man,—as if feeling could ever be an ethical guide!—or else in invectives against those who dare claim that man has moral rights even against God, rights quite different from those that the clay has against the potter.

While this condition of things is still possible, despite the

revelations of the sciences of nature and culture, there has recently sprung up a science which threatens to put an end to it. This is the "Higher Criticism," which, by showing what the Bible is, and how it came to be what it is, makes its claim to infallibility ridiculous. The results of this science are now about to be thrown broadcast upon the world, and that, too, by clergymen of good standing in their respective denominations. The truth about the Bible is now about to be proclaimed, not by its enemies, but by its reverent friends. What is likely to be the result ?

Under this question are virtually included the following :

- (I.) What does the "Higher Criticism" mean and attempt ?
- (II.) What has it already accomplished ?
- (III.) What still remains to be accomplished ?
- (IV.) What will be the result for supernaturalism ?
- (V.) What form will the purified faith assume ?

We shall consider these in this order :

(I.) The "Higher Criticism" is simply the application of the ordinary canons and methods of literary and historical criticism to the books of the Bible, with the view of ascertaining their origin, authorship, date and mode of composition, historicity, and purpose. When this application was suggested by Dr. Jowett of Oxford, in 1860, it almost caused a panic in the religious world ; but it is an encouraging indication of the progress made in liberal thought during the last thirty-six years, that among the foremost of the "higher critics" to-day are several Oxford professors, canons of the English church.

(II.) Thus far the "Higher Criticism" has directed its chief, though by no means its entire, attention to the Old Testament. In this, by means of the most careful study, carried on by many scholars working independently, it has succeeded in distinguishing the various documents employed in the compilation of the different books, in fixing approximately their various dates, and in discovering the circumstances in which, and the purposes for which, they were written. Thus, in the book of Genesis, it has been possible to distinguish seven

different elements due to different sources and epochs.\* The literary contents of the Bible being thus arranged chronologically, and placed against their proper historical background, it has, for the first time, become possible to see their real meaning, and to reconstruct the true history of the Hebrew people, which is found to be very different from what is generally accepted as such, and far more living and interesting. We can now see the gradual development of Hebrew monotheistic, messianic, and hagiastic ideas, and see that they were the natural result of circumstances. We can now understand the nature and function of prophecy, as well as its relations to "the Law," to "Wisdom," and to apocalypticism. In a word, Hebrew history and thought, instead of being a series of supernatural miracles and revelations, now becomes a perfectly intelligible process of natural evolution, an interesting chapter in universal human history.

It is not possible here to give an exhaustive list of the results that flow from this scientific view of the Old Testament ; but a few of the more important may be mentioned.

Thus we learn,—

(1) That Hebrew history, as generally related, is almost exactly inverted, the period of "the Law" being placed before that of "the Prophets," whereas in truth, the law is the result of the teaching of the prophets (see Cornill, "*Der israelitische Prophetismus*," pp. 3 sqq.).

(2) That the "Mosaic Law," though embodying older documents, dates, in its present form, from the close of the Captivity, and that Leviticus and the whole of the "Priestly Code" were written at that time. Deuteronomy, in the main, dates from the time of Josiah's reformation, B.C. 621. (See Wellhausen, "*Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*," and Driver, "*Crit. and Exeget. Comment. on Deuteronomy*.")

---

\* In the "Polychrome Bible," the different documents are distinguished by different colors. An excellent, if somewhat conservative, account of the results of the "Higher Criticism" is to be found in Canon Driver's "*Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*." Compare Holzinger's "*Der Hexateuch*," in which the results reached by different scholars in the case of the Pentateuch and Joshua are carefully tabulated and compared.

(3) That little is known of the Hebrews previous to the days of Samuel, and that what passes for a history of earlier times is mostly tendentious legend, with a fixed formula: defection from Yahweh, oppression, repentance, restoration.

(4) That the accounts of the Creation, Fall, Flood, Call of Abraham, etc., are myths, mostly of Babylonian origin, intended to show the mission of the "chosen people" in the universal divine economy.\* (See Lenormant, "Beginnings of History"; Stucken, "Astralmeythen der Hebraeer, Babylonier und Ägypter"; Oort and Hooykaas, "Bible for Learners," vol. i.)

(5) That the histories of the Hebrews written under the Kings were recast during and after the Captivity, in order to give prestige and divine authority to certain theories and institutions,—to prophetism in Samuel and Kings, to priesthood in Chronicles,—and, in so far, robbed of historicity. (See Wellhausen, "Prolegomena," and Somervell, "Parallel History of the Hebrew Monarchy.")

(6) That "the Prophets," as we now possess them, are post-exilic compilations, due to the scribes, who often placed under one name writings belonging to different epochs and authors, as in the case of Isaiah. (See Cheyne, "Introduc. to the Book of Isaiah," and the "Polychrome Bible.")

(7) That the "Psalms" were composed after the exile for the services of the second temple, and embody ideas far in advance of those of David and his time. (See Cheyne, "Origin of the Psalter.")

(8) That the "Song of Songs" is a pastoral drama, written in northern Israel before the Captivity, and "Job" a poem composed about the close of the same, to encourage the faithful "Servant of Yahweh" whose representative Job is.

---

\* Abraham, Sarah, and Noah are exilic creations (see Cheyne, "Introduc. to the Book of Isaiah," pp. 195, 273). Adam does not appear in the Old Testament after Genesis V., but is named thirteen times in the Apocrypha. Moses, as a law-giver, seems to be a creation of the age of Josiah. Historically speaking, he is named first in Jeremiah xv. 1. (See Cornill, "Der israel. Prophetismus," p. 17, Sayce, "Lectt. on the Religion of Ancient Assyria and Babylonia," pp. 44 sqq.)

(See Renan, "Le Cantique des Cantiques," and Cheyne, "Job and Solomon.")

(9) That the "Book of Daniel" is a romance\* written at the time of the Maccabæan rising, probably in B.C. 164. (See Cheyne, "Origin of the Psalter," pp. 94, 105 sqq.)

(10) That Hebrew prophecy is choric poetry elaborately prepared, and strongly marked by explosive, Semetic enthusiasm for all that affects tribal or national well-being. (See D. H. Müller, "Die Propheten in ihrer ursprünglichen Form"; Dieterici, "Philosophie der Araber," I., 16-23; Robertson Smith, "Prophets of Israel," pp. 219 sqq.; Wellhausen, "Prolegomena," pp. 411 sqq. (3d ed.); "Skizzen u. Vorarbeiten," III., pp. 128 sqq.; Cornill, "Der israel. Prophetismus.")

(11) That prophecy always has reference to current events, and never to any far-distant future, and that the blessings it foretells are confined to the present world.† (See references to No. 10.)

(12) That *The* Messiah is a figure entirely unknown to the Old Testament, whereas messiah, as an appellative, meaning "anointed one," is applied to various subjects, to David and his successors, to Cyrus the Persian, to the Jewish high priest, to the "Servant of Yahweh," and to Israel, as a whole. (See Robertson Smith, "Prophets of Israel," pp. 302 sqq.; Cheyne, "Origin of the Psalter," pp. 338 sqq.; "Introduction to the Book of Isaiah," pp. 304-309.)

These few results, which might be added-to indefinitely, will suffice to show what a change has been wrought by the "Higher Criticism" in the current views regarding the Bible, its mode of composition, its authority, the history of the He-

---

\* I am surprised that any one can read the account of Daniel in the book which bears his name, and in Josephus, who uses other documents, without being struck with the fact that he and Zoroaster are one and the same person. The author evidently wished to claim a Hebrew origin for Zoroastrianism (as did the author of Matthew, ii. 1-12), and there are reasons for believing that he was right.

† There is no clear allusion to immortality in the Old Testament, till we come to the "Book of Daniel," written under Zoroastrian, and perhaps Greek, influences. (See Lessing, "Education of the Human Race;" Cheyne, "Orig. of the Psalter," pp. 381 sqq.)

brews, the nature and scope of prophecy, and its relation to *the* Messiah. It is now no longer possible to look upon the Jews as, in any special sense, a chosen people, and as depositaries of a special revelation, or to maintain that the prophets prophesied of Christ. Whoever finds Christ in the Old Testament must first have read him in to it, as many will do for a long time to come.

The critical results thus far obtained for the New Testament are less definite and final than those obtained for the Old, and, indeed, there is evident, among some of the higher critics, a tendency to pat themselves on the back for their courage in dealing with the latter, and on that ground to hold themselves excused from laying hands on the former. Just in proportion as the support of prophecy is withdrawn from the messianic claims of Jesus, do these men increase the awesome solemnity of their tones in speaking of his divinity and redemptive work. They thus—involuntarily, no doubt—help to create the soothing impression that, when the "Higher Criticism" has done its worst for the Old Testament, the fundamental beliefs of Christianity will remain intact, nay, perhaps, be even more impregnable than before. But how vain this flattering unction is must be evident to any one who knows the relation of the New Testament to the Old, and how completely Jesus' messianic and divine claims are based upon the former. The demon of criticism, once evoked, can by no conjuring be prevented from doing for the New Testament what it has done for the Old; and the dread of this is causing no small apprehension in certain quarters. However little sympathy one may feel with the spirit of Professor Sayce's recent attack upon the higher critics, one cannot but admit the extreme pertinence of his question, how their views "can be reconciled with the deity of Christ." \*

(III.) The task still remaining for the "Higher Criticism" is to apply its principles and methods to the New Testament, and present its final results in the "Polychrome Bible." Although such results have not yet been reached in matters of detail, the

---

\* Contemporary Review, November, 1896.

work has advanced far enough to show their general outline, and the more important of them may be stated with confidence. It is now clear,—

(1) That the New Testament is a compilation gradually formed, partly from older documents, during the second, third, and fourth centuries; that its contents were different at different times; that its component treatises underwent frequent, numerous, and important changes at the hands of harmonizers; and that it did not assume its present form until near A.D. 400, some additions, such as the story of the adulteress (John vii. 53; viii. 11), being made even after that.\* (See Harnack, "*Dogmengesch.*," I., 304–328; "*Chronol. der altchrist. Litt.*;" Jülicher, "*Einleitung in das Neue Testament*," pp. 273–357; Westcott and Hort, "*New Testament in the Original Greek*," pp. 113, 241; Tregelles, "*Canon Muratorianus*.")

(2) That we have no account of the doings of Jesus from an eye-witness, none of our gospels, even in their earliest form, being of earlier date than 70 A.D., and none of them having claimed apostolic authorship until some way into the second century. (See Harnack, "*Dogmengesch.*," I., 311, n. 2; "*Das Neue Testament um das Jahr 200*".)

(3) That, generally speaking, the books of the New Testament, with the exception of certain epistles of Paul and, in their original form, the synoptic gospels and the Acts, were not written by the men whose names they bear, these names having been given to them, as a mark of apostolicity, at the time when the church was trying to compile an authoritative canon, in order to give unity and stability to herself and her teachings, as against the innovations of gnostics and new prophets,—Montanists and others. Of course, as long as the Christians expected the almost immediate return of Jesus (see Matthew xvi. 28; Mark ix. 1; Luke ix. 27; 1 Thessalonians iv. 16, 17; 2 Thessalonians ii. 1–12), they could have no object in writing down accounts of his former life. It was only when,

---

\* Of the nature and extent of the changes made in the New Testament even in the fourth century, a striking illustration is furnished by the recently discovered Syriac translation of the Gospels.

after the death of the apostles, this hope vanished, and they had to assume a new attitude to life, that they did so.

(4) That Paul, the earliest Christian writer, knows nothing of the miracles of Jesus, accepting even that of the resurrection\* only because it is "according to the Scriptures" (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4; cf. Weizsäcker, "Das apostol. Zeitalter," pp. 109 sqq.).

(5) That the "Acts of the Apostles" was written to bridge the gulf between the synoptical gospels and the rabbinical Christianity of Paul's epistles, and to legitimize his claim to apostleship; and that its account of him is in many respects incompatible with what he relates of himself. (See Harnack, "Dogmengesch.," i., p. 312, n. 1; Weizsäcker, "Das Ap. Zeitalt.," pp. 57-70, 199-212; Jülicher, "Einleit. in das N. T.," pp. 259-272.)

(6) That the gospel of John is a philosophic romance, composed under Greek mystic influences about A.D. 100. (See Weizsäcker, *al sup.*, pp. 514 sqq.; Jülicher, "Einleitung," pp. 238; Harnack, "Chronologie," pp. 656 sqq.)

(7) That, before our era, there were current among the Jews several conceptions of the Messiah, chief among which were (1) the old preëxilic one, found in the later prophets, which looked on him as a Davidic king, who would restore the kingdom of David, and make the just triumph; (2) the apocalyptic one, found in the later Palestinian apocalypses, which made him a heavenly being, existing from all eternity, who would establish a universal empire of eternal peace, with Jerusalem as its capital, and the Jews as governors.† (See Westcott,

---

\* Resurrection must not be confounded with existence after death. The former, a Jewish notion, first met with in Daniel (xii. 2; cf. Charles, "Book of Enoch," pp. 51, 139, note), was repellent to all Greek thinking. (See Acts xvii. 32, and cf. Chiappelli, "*La Dottrina della Carne nei primi Secoli della Chiesa*," Naples, 1894.) That Paul believed he had seen the risen Christ—not, of course, in his natural body! (see 1 Cor. xv. 44)—is clear. As to the meaning of this, see Weizsäcker, *ut sup.*, pp. 6-17. As to the entire unhistoricity of the resurrection-legend, see Brandt, "Die evang. Gesch. u. der Ursprung des Christenth. auf Grund einer Kritik der Berichte üb. die Leiden u. die Auferstehung Jesu," Leipzig, 1893.

† The latter conception, like other apocalyptic ones,—angels, resurrection, judgment, etc.,—was probably derived from Mazdeism, which expects a Divine

"Introd. to the Study of the Gospels," pp. 110-173; Schürer, "Hist. of the Jewish Peop. in the Time of Jesus Christ," II., ii., pp. 126-187.)

(8) That Jesus, combining these two conceptions through a third, whose elements he found in the "Servant-of-Yahweh" passages in Isaiah, especially chap. liii., and in Psalm cx., worked out a conception of the Messiah, according to which, claiming to be a son of David, he would attempt to establish an earthly kingdom in Jerusalem, be baffled, led, as a lamb, to the slaughter, make his soul an offering for sin, make his grave with the wicked, and with the rich, sit down at the right hand of God, and thereafter return, with divine glory and power, to establish an eternal messianic kingdom.\*

(9) That the picture of Jesus presented in the gospels is very largely composed of traits derived from prophecy, misinterpreted in a messianic sense by scribes and rabbis.† (See Strauss, "Life of Jesus.")

(10) That, while the Palestinian Jews looked for salvation through a Messiah, the "Dispersion" rather looked for it from a personified "Wisdom" or "Word," often mentioned in the "Wisdom-Literature," and conceived as the eternal assessor and helper of God; and that, in the gospel of John, Jesus is identified with a somewhat Hellenized form of this,—hence the Logos doctrine, which made Christ's claims intelligible to the Greeks, and dogmatic theology possible.‡

(11) That Jesus, in his recorded sayings, makes no reference to "the Fall," which seems to have been introduced into

---

Messiah. See Cheyne, "Orig. of Psalter," pp. 400, 438 n. ff; Zend Avesta, passim.

\* This is the only programme that adequately accounts for the conduct of Jesus, and nothing is more wonderful than the single-mindedness and heroism with which he carried it out. One readily understands why he lays such stress in faith.

† For the messianic prophecies in the New Testament, see Westcott, "Introduction to the Study of the New Testament," pp. 169-173.

‡ There is no mention of the Messiah in the Apocrypha or in the works of Philo, both belonging to the "Dispersion," whereas "Wisdom" and "the Word" are well known. For "Wisdom" see Proverbs viii. 22 sqq., Job xxviii. 12 sqq. On the relation of "Wisdom" to "the Word," see Drummond, "Philo Judæus," ii. 201 sqq.

Christian thought by Paul, whose demonology was very elaborate. (See Everling, "Die paulinische Angelologie u. Dæmonologie.")

(12) That the historic Jesus, whose mental history is, on the whole, clear, made no claim to deity, and refused to work miracles (Matthew xix. 17, xii. 38-40, xvi. 4), the later attribution of which to him is fully accounted for by the conditions under which the gospels were written.

(13) That the rise and spread of Christianity can be satisfactorily explained without recourse to any agencies other than those at work in the ordinary course of history.

(IV.) It is obvious, from what has been said, that one chief result of the "Higher Criticism" will be to eliminate the miraculous, the supernatural, the wilfully inscrutable, from human history as well as from nature, and to discredit, as superstition, anything that pretends to be a divine revelation not explicable by their laws. It will thus contribute to hasten the final triumph of pure science, whose successive victories over theology have recently been so admirably rehearsed in Dr. Andrew White's "History of the Warfare of Science with Theology." And this triumph means that, in dealing with man and nature, we shall cease assuming that we have any privileged information regarding the nature or ulterior purposes of the supernatural author of these, and shall realize that the principles governing the world can be reached only through rational induction from the sum of human experience,—that is, through science. Abandoning the attempt to explain the world of experience by a foregone conception of its first principle, we shall try to discover what sort of first or universal principle experience, at any moment, justifies us in assuming, at the same time recognizing that our conception of that principle will change with the widening experience to account for which it is assumed. It will then be clearly seen that the God of "revealed" theology is only a naïve, unconscious induction from an exceedingly crude, narrow, and unsystematized experience, such as existed before the rise of modern science, and that the contradictions and mysteries found by later thought in his nature are all due to this fact. Instead of regretting the

obsolescence of this God, every rational human being will rejoice to find him replaced by a God who, being the very principle of explanation of all that is known, must be the most scrutable and intelligible of beings, no matter whether he prove impersonal, superpersonal, personal, or multipersonal.

(V.) And so the purified faith of the future will be one which, eschewing the supernatural and the miraculously revealed, takes its stand on science,—science of nature and of that for which nature is,—viz., spirit. To those who have been wont to find comfort in an attitude of indolent adoration and blind trust toward a mysterious unknown, this will, and must, seem a cheerless outlook; for persons of inactive mind find more satisfaction in the boundless void of mystery, and the unchallenging hopelessness of contradictions presented as facts, than in the clear definiteness of the most assured truth. Such will feel that, bereft of supernatural revelation, they are thrown back into the waste, howling wilderness of paganism, which seems very terrible. But surely it is not so sad a thing to be in the position of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, and those other earnest, humble truth-seekers, who fearlessly sought to penetrate the riddle of existence, and to lead worthy lives,—lives that shame those of most believers in revelation. And, after all, we are in a much better position for solving the enigma than they were. Between them and us lie two thousand years of human experience, richer than any they knew, two thousand years of philosophic thought and sharpening of the faculties of intelligence, and two thousand years of education of the moral sense. Much that was impossible for them, with all their labor, may be, and certainly is, possible for us. Indeed, it is only a distrust, fostered by sycophantic supernaturalism, of “mere human reason,” as a guide to life, that prevents us from reaching, by its means, a far deeper insight into the truths that give life its meaning, than any that revelation ever offered. That existence is moral to the core, and that every spirit is infinite, eternal, and, therefore, also free,—free through knowledge, righteous love, and beneficent will, to work out an eternally increasing blessedness for itself and others,—are truths which the best thought of the present day

is capable of placing beyond any doubt. And what more can we ask for? Shall we weep and mourn because there is no unjust omnipotence to snatch us from our cowardly intellectual and moral sloth, and place us in an equally cowardly heaven of eternal, useless dalliance? Virtue will not do so!

"She desires no isles of the Blest, no quiet seats of the Just,  
To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky.  
Give her the wages of going on, and not to die."

And such wages she certainly will have in a moral world.

But the purified creed has many advantages, besides certainty, over the old supernatural one. A few of these may be enumerated:—

(1) It can retain, in ennobled form, all that was valuable in the old creed, even the doctrine of the incarnation, now extended to all men, and the sublime figure of Jesus, now made available as an inspiring example, by being placed on the human level. Not what he did, but the spirit in which he did it, will be eternal.

(2) It can be taught in our schools, as a basis for ethical life, which demands virtue, not for the sake of some slothful satisfaction beyond itself, but as the one eternally desirable thing in the universe. In this relation it will do away with that numbing doubt and that frivolizing aimlessness which mar so much of the life of the present.

(3) For its intelligent acceptance, it will demand the exercise of our highest intellectual faculties, which, atrophied by disuse, or corrupted through perversion, under supernaturalism, have left the lower faculties of sense, self-interest, passion, and greed to run riot.

(4) It will form an ethical and religious foundation upon which all men can meet and, in the end, agree, thus putting an end to the unbrothering hatreds and internecine horrors that mark the relations of hostile supernatural creeds, incapable of reconciliation.

(5) It will blot out the cruel line now separating religious from "merely moral" life, and make duty the one, universal religious rite.

(6) It will be capable of endless development, growing with the growth of science, and strengthening as life becomes more moral and refined.

These advantages,—and they might easily be added-to,—while they will deprive us of the privilege of being lazy, thoughtless, and superstitious, suggest an outlook which ought to make us welcome the results of the “Higher Criticism,” not merely without suspicion or dread, but with the utmost confidence and enthusiasm, as the conditions of a new era in human history.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

---

### THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS.\*

I SUPPOSE most of you remember a sarcastic utterance of the present Prime Minister with respect to what his great political opponent described as the Concert of Europe. Lord Salisbury said that it was unfortunately an assemblage in which every performer was playing a different tune. In political matters I am afraid that there is still too much truth in this somewhat cynical epigram. But, fortunately for humanity, politics do not cover the whole field of civilized life. Outside of politics there is on many points such a thing as the Concert of Europe. The Concert of Europe, as I will interpret the term, means a consensus of international opinion in a given direction or on a certain definite subject. Such a consensus of civilized opinion must always carry immense weight. An expression of national opinion may be biased and vitiated by national prejudice, or national circumstances, or national idiosyncrasy. But, when an opinion becomes international, when it becomes the common conviction of the vast majority of civilized mankind, then it comes home to us with overwhelming force and power. Now, if you consult the opinion of almost all the most experienced writers, jurists, administrators, and statesmen among European communities,

---

\* An address delivered at St. Martin's Hall, London, 1897.

you will find all of them say without exception that our present methods of penal administration are to all intents and purposes a failure. It is not from one country that we hear this complaint. We hear it from every quarter of the civilized world. We hear it from France, we hear it from Italy, we hear it from Germany, we hear it from America, we hear it among ourselves. It is not long since one of the most eminent of Her Majesty's judges said that our existing system of penal laws was a hundred years behind the times, and we have it on the authority of commissions and committees appointed by the government and Parliament that the existing methods of carrying out these laws not only fail to reform offenders, but produce a deteriorating effect upon them. You will say that this is exceedingly strong language; and so it is. But it is the exact words used by Lord Kimberley's Commission in 1878, and repeated by Mr. Herbert Gladstone's Committee in 1895. You have, therefore, to face the fact that at the present moment your penal methods not only fail to do the offender any good, but, on the contrary, do him an immense amount of harm.

Whether we agree with the *Times* or not, it will be admitted by everybody that it is a very powerful organ of public opinion in this country. The *Times* newspaper represents the average opinion of the ruling classes. It is not without importance to know what a newspaper like the *Times* thinks of our existing penal machinery. With respect to this machinery, the *Times* says that "it is difficult to resist the impression, after reading the testimony of experts, that the present remedies, in the shape of prisons, are little better than quack remedies. Either they resemble the patent drastic doses of a barbarous age, which killed or injured the patient more often than they cured him, or they have as little effect as the panaceas of a quack who prescribes some colored water or fanciful grotesque concoction for the worst diseases."

What are the remedies, or rather what is the remedy, for crime, which the *Times* denounces in such vigorous language? It is an immense machine, constructed almost entirely for the purpose of inflicting pain. It has been believed in the past, and

is believed now by large sections of people, that if you inflict a sufficient amount of pain upon the person who violates the law, you succeed in frightening him from transgressing in the future, and that you also frighten others from doing as he has done in the past. The reason why this huge machine for inflicting pain exists, then, is because it is believed to be a useful instrument for frightening people. If this pain-producing instrument had the effect of frightening people, and of keeping them within the limits of the law, all would be well. It would serve its purpose in the same manner as a steamship serves the purpose of transporting passengers from one part of the world to another, or as the power-loom succeeds in producing vast quantities of cotton cloth. But, supposing your steamship will not take you to your journey's end, and supposing your power-loom will not produce a yard of cotton cloth, what would you say? You would immediately tell us that these machines are useless. You would immediately say that they do not fulfil the purpose for which they were made. You would say, We want something which will work, we want something which will do the thing it was made for; we don't want a machine which always breaks down whenever it is put in operation.

Now your machine for inflicting pain has broken down in the same way as a steamship which won't stir out of dock, in the same fashion as a power-loom which won't weave a yard of cloth. Some people will tell you that it has broken down because it does not inflict a sufficient amount of pain. If the knives of this machine were made still sharper, if they were constructed to cut still deeper into the flesh, if the agony was made still more acute, then it is said the object of the machine would be secured. People who reason in this way always remind me of the celebrated Dr. Sangrado. You will doubtless remember that this worthy was a great believer in bleeding for all sorts of diseases. No matter what a man was suffering from, Sangrado was convinced that a free application of the knife would cure him. No amount of facts or arguments could shake him out of this conviction. The whole art and practice of medicine consisted in bleeding your man.

The result of Sangrado's method was that his patients died like flies. But this appalling fact did not shake his faith in bleeding in the very least. On the contrary, he said the real reason the people died was because they had not been bled enough. Now the only effect of severe punishments is to still further humiliate men who are already humiliated, is to still further degrade men who are already degraded, is to still further demoralize men who are already demoralized. These severities instead of having the effect of making men better have the effect of making them worse. If the only result of your severities is to make a bad man worse and a weak man weaker, these severities must be condemned as useless, no matter what test you care to apply to them. It is not to more harsh methods of treatment that we must look for light in dealing with the criminal population.

The more I examine the causes which produce the criminal population, the less belief I have in severity of treatment as a remedy for crime. Here is a child of the slums. He has been born and bred amid the most wretched, moral, and material surroundings. He is the offspring of degenerate and degraded parents. All his life has been lived in a polluted atmosphere of vice and crime. He becomes a petty criminal in youth. He develops into a hardened criminal in maturity. We read of his misdeeds in the newspapers. Of his past we know nothing, except the number of times he has been in prison and penal servitude. We despair of such a man. People instinctively say, No punishment can be too severe for him. But, let us ask, what are the causes which have made this man such a hardened wretch? Is it not as plain as day that these causes are the wretched circumstances of his birth and the equally wretched circumstances of his upbringing? In apportioning responsibility for crime, let us be just. Let us not throw the entire blame on the individual. Let us recollect that there is such a thing as collective responsibility. If the condition in which many children are born into the world and have to live in it are such that they have no social opportunities whatever, are they not likely to turn their backs on a society which has turned its back upon them? The

reason these people are criminals is, because they have had no chance in life, no social opportunities. Will your punishments open out a chance for them? Will a prolonged course of severities and degradations confer the virtues of industrious and orderly citizens on these unhappy men? On the contrary, the more harshly you punish them, the more you reduce the human element which still flickers in their hearts, the more you punish them, the more certainly do you doom them to the awful existence of a habitual criminal. In his day, John Bright said a great many true things. John Bright once said, Force is no remedy, and, as far as the criminal population is concerned, this remark is literally true. Force, in the shape of punishment, no matter how severe you make it, will not keep down crime. If the penal laws of the past teach us anything, they teach us that crime cannot be put down by mere severity. Consult the statute books, and you will find that hanging, branding, burning, mutilation, used to be the punishment for offences which are now dealt with by a petty fine. Did these atrocious punishments put a stop to the crimes they were directed against? We know, as a matter of fact, that they did nothing of the kind. Offences against the criminal law were just as rife when these penalties were in force as they are to-day. These penalties had no effect whatever in diminishing the volume of crime. These penalties had no effect, because crime springs from conditions which punishment cannot touch. It springs from disorders in our social system, and until these disorders are healed or alleviated, crime will continue to flourish in our midst, no matter how severe and stringent you may make the penal law. Some of these disorders consist of physical or mental infirmities; some of them consist of economic hardships and vicissitudes, and some of them in the low standards of life and conduct which prevail in our midst. The true method of diminishing crime is to pluck it up by the roots. And the only way to pluck it up by the roots is to alleviate the social disorders by which it is produced. It is to social remedies and not to penal legislation that you must look for the radical treatment of crime.

I do not wish you to infer from this that no good can be

got out of a better method of penal legislation and penal administration. I believe, on the contrary, that the problem of crime would be very much minimized if we had better penal laws and a better prison system. At the present time the most urgent need in connection with the penal law is to increase the number of substitutes for imprisonment. We are far too fond of putting people into prison for petty offences. In this respect I freely and gladly admit that matters are mending. Imprisonment is not nearly so much resorted to to-day as it was even twenty years ago. Substitutes for the prison, in the shape of fining, sureties, educational institutions for juveniles, and probation or admonition for first offenders, are being more and more used by judges and magistrates. But there is still room for improvement. The existing substitutes for imprisonment might be made more elastic. They might be largely developed. The number of these substitutes might be increased. We might have a dozen alternatives to imprisonment instead of only four or five.

I urge the importance of substitutes for imprisonment because it has been proved that these substitutes are much more effective remedies for crime than the silence, solitude, and monotony of the prison cell. I do not wish to burden your minds with figures. But all statistics show that offenders who have been convicted but not imprisoned are much less likely to offend again than men who have been sent to jail. They are much less likely to become habitual offenders and to swell the ranks of the permanent army of crime. These facts are proved by the returns relating to the operation of the First Offenders Act in England and the returns relating to a similar Act in Belgium. No doubt these Acts have not been in operation for long, and it is possible that our opinions with respect to them may have to be modified by the light of larger and fuller experience. But they promise well. And there is every reason to believe that they will continue to work well.

Prisons contain a very large number of juveniles under the age of twenty-one. Most of these young people are the inhabitants of towns. Many of the offences for which these juveniles are at present committed to prison do not imply the

existence of any deep-seated criminal propensities. They are in many cases mere ebullitions of youthful folly. They are transitory and not permanent elements in the character. As these young people grow older these follies pass away. In many cases of this character it would be a great boon if we had some such penalty as forced labor without imprisonment. Penalties of this kind exist in some continental penal codes. In some cases the working of these penalties is not all that could be desired. Still they embody a sound principle, and I see no reason why a properly organized system of forced labor, without imprisonment, should not succeed. As a matter of fact you have this principle in operation at the present moment in your day industrial school system. Most of the children in our day industrial schools are committed to these institutions by the magistrates. The children are detained in them from eight o'clock in the morning till six o'clock at night. Of these schools as a whole the late inspector says that they are without exception going on well and do really good useful work at little expense to the treasury. It is always a pleasure, he continues, to go into these schools, and to see the order apparent everywhere, and the children almost invariably looking bright and cheerful. If compulsory detention and compulsory labor are so successful when applied to children committed to day industrial schools, there is considerable reason to believe that a system on somewhat similar lines would be equally successful if applied to juveniles convicted of certain kinds of petty offences. Children of this class are as a rule the product of large cities, and it is in large cities that some form of compulsory labor, without imprisonment, could be most easily applied. If a penalty of this nature became a part of the criminal law, and was fairly successful in operation, it would possess many distinct advantages. It would still further reduce the number of juveniles who are at present committed to prison. It would be an alternative to imprisonment in cases where the offender or his parents were unable to pay a fine.

I also incline to the belief that an extension of the probation system which exists in several States in the American

Union would be of great value in dealing with many classes of juvenile offenders among ourselves. In some of these States when a juvenile is convicted before the magistrates, he is handed over to an official, who is called a probation officer. If it is found that the juvenile has a home and that the home is not altogether a bad one, he is returned to his parents, but he is kept for a certain time under the supervision of the probation officer. One of the results of this system is that the juvenile remains under the parental roof and in the midst of natural surroundings. All experience shows that a very indifferent home is better for the future welfare of the young than the best of institutions. Another important consideration is that this system of supervising the child under the parental roof is very much cheaper to the community. At the present moment our corrective institutions for juvenile offenders in England and Scotland are costing about half a million pounds per annum. Under a system of home supervision a good deal of this expense could be cut down, and I believe with better results.

Another useful method of dealing with offenders is to combine fining with imprisonment. According to the existing provisions of the criminal law an offender who is fined, let us say twenty shillings or twenty days' imprisonment, must pay the whole amount of the fine, even if he has spent five, ten, or fifteen days of the alternative sentence in prison. It very often happens that a convicted man or his family is unable to collect the money for the fine till he has spent a certain time in prison. In cases of this kind the sentence, instead of being a penalty of twenty days or twenty shillings, becomes a sentence of ten or fifteen days' imprisonment and a fine of twenty shillings in addition. In other words, the severity of the sentence is increased, as the case may be, one-quarter, one-half, or even three-quarters, owing to the temporary poverty of the offender. In some cases it may be increased even more, but in every case it is increased when a portion of the alternative sentence of imprisonment has been served before the fine is paid. When a magistrate passes a sentence of so many shillings fine or in default so many days' imprisonment, it is not

his intention that the convicted person should be imprisoned part of the time and likewise fined the full amount. But under existing statutes the magistrate has no option. He is powerless to prevent a mode of punishment from being inflicted which he did not decree, and which is more severe than the punishment he did decree.

It would be easy to remedy such an anomaly in the criminal law. The amount of imprisonment endured should count towards the reduction of the fine. If this simple expedient were adopted, a man who is sentenced to a fine of twenty shillings or twenty days' imprisonment would have his sentence reduced by one-half on payment of one-half of the fine. Assuming that the punitive equivalent of twenty shillings is twenty days' imprisonment, it is only reasonable and just that the payment of ten shillings should diminish the duration of imprisonment by ten days. This was the conclusion arrived at by a departmental committee appointed by Sir George Trevelyan, when Secretary of State for Scotland, to inquire into the best means of dealing with habitual delinquents. The report of the committee states that "prisoners committed to prison in default of payment of a fine should be permitted to work out their sentences by a combination of fine and imprisonment. It should not be necessary for them, having worked out half their term of imprisonment, to remain in prison for the full term unless they pay the entire fine. They should be liberated on any day of their imprisonment on payment of such proportion of their fines as the term of imprisonment still to be undergone bears to the entire sentence." "We are informed," continues the committee, "that this system was at one time prevalent in Scotland, but it was given up because it was found to be illegal."

As an illustration of the hardships of the existing law, the committee mention the case of a woman who was sent to Greenock prison for thirty days in default of payment of a fine of forty shillings. After she had been twenty-one days in prison her husband died. Her husband belonged to a burial society. In order to procure her liberation, her friends borrowed forty shillings on the security of the sum she was en-

titled to from the benefit society, and the fine was paid. "Had that woman when convicted," says the report, "possessed forty shillings she would not have gone to prison at all. But being moneyless at the time of her conviction, she had ultimately to expiate her offence by payment of the full fine imposed, and three weeks' imprisonment into the bargain. Now, the law in imposing a fine as a penalty for an offence, and prescribing imprisonment only in default of payment, evidently meant to mitigate and not to aggravate the punishment."

The Scotch committee, with the thoroughness which characterized all their proceedings, put their suggestions to a practical test. Mr. Napier, the governor of Greenock prison, received five pounds, with instructions to apply it in illustration of his scheme. The following are the cases with which he dealt: "W. J. C., a case of assault, committed for five days in default of payment of seven shillings and sixpence. After being three days in prison succeeded in raising three shillings, and the balance of four and sixpence being provided out of the fund, he was liberated, and two days of his imprisonment were saved. J. S., a case of assault, committed for ten days in default of payment of a fine of twenty shillings. After five days' imprisonment raised ten shillings, and the balance being paid out of the fund, five days' imprisonment was remitted. E. M., another case of assault, committed for twenty days in default of payment of a fine of forty shillings. After five days' imprisonment raised thirty shillings, and the balance being paid out of the fund, fifteen days' imprisonment was remitted. At a cost, therefore, of twenty-four shillings and sixpence to the fund, forty-three shillings was collected in the shape of fines which would never otherwise have been got, and the state was saved twenty-two days' maintenance of a prisoner in jail. Mr. Napier thought that it would be waste of money to continue the experiment, as to secure it full justice it would be requisite that the system should be generally known. But he expressed his belief that if it were known that less than half the fine imposed would be accepted, a large number of prisoners, probably one-half, would take advantage of it."

One of the immediate advantages of increasing the elasticity of the criminal law in the direction of combining a fine with imprisonment would be to reduce the proportions of the prison population. According to the Scotch committee's report, close on thirty-five per cent. of the prison population in Scotland are incarcerated because of inability to pay in full the fine imposed upon them. If, as is estimated, one-half of these prisoners took advantage of a provision which enabled them to reckon imprisonment as wiping out a part of the fine, the prison population would be diminished to this extent. Inasmuch as each prisoner costs the country twenty-five pounds a year for maintenance, a decrease of the prison population means a corresponding decrease of public expenditure on penal establishments. A reduction of the average daily prison population to the extent of one thousand ultimately means a reduction of expenditure on prisons to the extent of twenty-five thousand pounds per annum or thereabouts. This is a consideration not to be lost sight of in estimating the advantages to be derived from adding to the elasticity of our present methods of imposing and collecting fines. It is also to be recollected that the additional fines collected, if the system here advocated were in operation, would amount to a very considerable sum. The sum would also go towards reducing criminal expenditure.

In short, the proposal to combine fining with imprisonment, instead of merely using the one as the alternative of the other, as is done at present, is in the happy position of possessing a maximum of advantages with an almost entire absence of corresponding defects. These benefits may be summed up as consisting of a reduction of expenditure on crime, a reduction of the number of people shut up in prisons, a rational adjustment of substitutionary penalties, and a diminution of punishment unaccompanied by a decrease of social security.

I will now mention another point. In these days we hear a very great deal about long sentences and the evils of long sentences. Sir George Trevelyan's committee, after examining a large number of experienced witnesses, arrived at the conclusion, to use their own words, that long sentences of

imprisonment effect no good result, and they say that to double the present sentences would not diminish the number of habitual criminals. As soon as punishment reaches a certain point, whether in intensity or duration, it has such a damaging effect on the prisoner that he is unfit for social life when released, and has, as a matter of necessity, to fall back upon habits of crime.

Long sentences strike the imagination more than short sentences, but in my opinion the abuse of short sentences is at the present moment as great an evil as the abuse of long sentences. According to the latest returns one hundred and sixty thousand cases, in round numbers, were committed to prison in England and Wales in the year 1895-6. Of these cases considerably more than a third were sentenced for a week and less—61,912. Now, it is very probable that under a proper system of penal law most of these sixty-one thousand nine hundred and twelve cases need never come to prison at all. In imprisonment, to use a French expression, it is the first step which costs. A very considerable number of these sixty-one thousand cases would consist of first offenders. If we want to keep down habitual crime we must do our utmost to keep the first offender out of prison. Over and over again I have heard old and hardened criminals say, "If I had not got that three days or six days when I was a boy, how different my career would have been!" Some people will tell you that they do not think the prison brand means much as a hindrance to an ex-prisoner's future life. In this opinion I think they are mistaken. I believe that the prison brand is more or less of a detriment to every man. In a very considerable number of cases you will find that the ex-prisoner seeks the company of those who have been in the same plight as himself. A bond of sympathy exists between them. Many an ex-prisoner seeks the company of criminals, not because he is fond of the company of criminals, but because he knows the past cannot be thrown in his teeth. It is not pleasant to be told that you are an old jail-bird. The ex-prisoner is spared this uncomfortable feeling so long as he makes ex-prisoners his associates. The prison, in fact, has the effect of creating

what one might fairly describe as a criminal caste. A sort of ostracism by the rest of the community unites this caste in common bonds of fellowship and sympathy. The members of this caste have suffered together, have common experiences, common recollections, a common ground on which they all stand. That common ground is the sinister fact that they have all been in prison. One of the supreme aims of penal law should be to keep down the numbers who belong to this caste. It is useless to deny that this caste is a standing danger to the community. One of the most effective means of keeping down the criminal caste is to keep people out of prison as long as you possibly can. The most effective method of doing this is to make the largest possible use of substitutes for imprisonment.

I now come to the manner in which criminals should be treated when they are committed to prison. If the object of imprisonment is to protect society and to prevent the offender from returning to prison, you must not subject the prisoner at every turn to meaningless and unnecessary degradations. He is, as a rule, degraded enough before he enters the prison cell. Certainly, if you want to reform him, you will not attain your purpose by subjecting him to the operation of a code of regulations which are calculated to extinguish every spark of humanity he may happen to possess. The late permanent Under Secretary of State for the Home Department saw this obvious fact quite plainly. "I regard," he says, "as unfavorable to reformation the status of a prisoner throughout his whole career: the crushing of self-respect, the starving of all moral instinct he may possess, the absence of all opportunity to do or receive a kindness, the continual association with none but criminals, the forced labor, the denial of all liberty. I believe that the true mode of reforming a man or restoring him to society is exactly in the opposite direction of all these." The Committee of Enquiry, before whom these remarkable words were uttered, endorse them, and say in their report, "As a broad description of prison life, we think that this description is accurate."

As a remedy for this unsatisfactory state of things, the com-

mittee suggest that the prison system should be made "more elastic, more capable of being adapted to the special cases of individual prisoners; that prison discipline and treatment should be more effectually designed to maintain, stimulate, or awaken the higher susceptibilities of prisoners, to develop their moral instincts, to train them in orderly and industrial habits, and wherever possible to turn them out of prison better men and women, both physically and morally, than when they came in." This may be accepted as an excellent ideal. The question is, How is this standard to be attained? It would be impossible with the limited time at my command to go into details upon this point. But I believe an immense step forward could be taken in the realization of this ideal of prison treatment if prison discipline were made as far as possible synonymous with industrial discipline, and if prisoners when under detention were treated in much the same manner as an employer treats his workmen. I had an interesting letter the other day from Mr. Herbert Spencer on this subject. Mr. Spencer, as most of you are aware, dealt with the subject of prison reform more than forty years ago, and I am glad to say that he is as deeply interested in the question as ever. In his letter to me Mr. Spencer says, "I am glad to observe that you put in antitheses the industrial mode of treatment and the militant mode of treatment. I had not myself observed that the system now in force is a militant system appropriate to a militant state, and that the system which I have myself advocated, and which your experience leads you to advocate, is the system appropriate to an industrial state. I wish that people could be made to pay attention to the evidence, but when men are once wedded to an idea, no evidence has any effect upon them."

One of the reasons urged against industrial discipline is that it would not be severe enough. This is an illusion. The severest task to which you can put the average prisoner is a task in which he will be compelled to make an intelligent use of his hands and his head. Unproductive hard labor, as it is called, does not involve any intelligent exercise of either hands or head. In reality, it is not nearly such a severe ordeal

as labor which demands the exercise of a certain amount of sense and skill. In addition to this the consciousness of having done a useful day's work has an elevating effect upon a man, and on the other hand the knowledge that all his labor has been wasted has a depressing and degrading effect upon him. It is possible that half a century ago when the standard of education and the standard of life was much lower among large sections of the population than it is to-day, that degrading methods of prison treatment did not cut so deep into a convict's soul as they do now. But it may be taken as a principle of penal treatment which admits of no exception that in proportion as the standard of life is raised in the general community the standard of prison treatment must be correspondingly raised. If this obvious principle is overlooked, you make the contrast between prison life and free life so great that the sense of human dignity in a prisoner is completely extinguished, and he becomes when he is liberated a perpetual enemy of society.

But with the best of systems there is a residuum. What are you to do with them? What are you to do with the man or woman who cannot help getting into prison? It is distressing to see such cases. Perhaps if we looked far enough back into the past history of these unfortunate creatures we should discover that their life has been a sad one from the very beginning. We should see that they have had no chance. We should probably find that they are the victims of hereditary infirmities of body or mind, or that their lot has been cast in such unpleasant places that it is almost impossible for them to do well. Anyhow, here they are in our midst. Imprisonment has no effect upon them except for evil. To send these people time after time to penal servitude is far too severe an ordeal. The public conscience is decisively opposed to it. In such circumstances, what is to be done? I believe the only satisfactory method of dealing with the small residuum in the population, who are hopelessly unfitted for the strain and struggle of competitive life, is to confine them in some sort of industrial settlement. In this settlement the inmates would be detained for an indefinite time. They would be

detained in fact until some competent tribunal decided that they were fit for liberty. The treatment of the inmates would be mild in character. It would have to be recognized in dealing with them that they were largely the victims of an evil fortune. If I may use the expression, asylum treatment, rather than penal treatment, would be the appropriate method of dealing with them. If this method were adopted, the public mind would feel at ease, even if these people had to be confined in the industrial settlement for a considerable time or an indefinite time. This seems to me to be the only method of dealing with the hopeless residuum.

I feel that I have only been able to touch the fringe of a great subject. The conditions which produce crime and the treatment of the criminal when he is produced are a vast and complex question. In fact, if we look at it long enough, we shall see that it is only one branch of the great social problem which is at present confronting the civilized world. We shall not solve the problem of crime or alleviate its intensity until we have made some progress in solving many of the other social difficulties with which it is inextricably bound up. Yet it is a satisfaction to feel that every step forward in the path of genuine social reform renders the problem of crime less difficult to solve. All who are laboring for better conditions of existence for the workman, the woman, and the child, are at the same time engaged in diminishing the proportions of crime and in reducing the number of unhappy creatures who spend the best part of their existence in the gloom of the prison cell.

WILLIAM DOUGLAS MORRISON.

LONDON.

## PHILOSOPHIC FAITH.\*

OUR age is an age of criticism. Not merely the philosopher, but "the man in the street," assumes, as by second nature, a sceptical attitude. We are tentative; we demand proof; we appeal to experience; we question authority. The old, easy acquiescence through custom or indifference has been shaken; consent and belief wait upon conviction. Credulity has diminished; respect for science has increased. But the spread of positive knowledge is slow, and the human spirit cannot sustain itself upon a bare interrogation. Scepticism, therefore, too often degenerates into a positive denial issuing in a new dogmatism, or it drifts, through the habitual ignoring of certain fundamental realities of life, into an unconsciousness of, or even disbelief in, their existence, and this, though these realities may be such that life would not be worth living without them, or without them would even be impossible.

When a clear conception of habitually ignored realities concerns only philosophy, we may, for the present, and so far as this occasion is concerned, acquiesce in the ignorance. But when the realities habitually ignored are the very breath of life of every one of us, when to doubt is to faint by the way, when to disbelieve is to paralyze all action and all thought, then it is time that the popular criticism that has seemed to throw discredit on so fundamental a necessity of life should be pushed a little farther, and that the danger of a little knowledge should be overcome by the homœopathic cure of a little more.

One of the fundamental necessities of life, on which a too shallow criticism has thrown a paralyzing discredit, is religious faith. There are many among the more enlightened and more earnest who have come to believe a rational religious faith to be impossible; there are many more, among

---

\* Given as a lecture before the London Ethical Society.

orthodox Christians, who hold a conception of religious faith which is wholly irrational, and therefore wholly impossible to any enlightened human being. But these two groups of persons, intensely opposed to one another, as each believes, are, nevertheless, at bottom making one and the same mistake. Each group is misapprehending the nature of religious faith; their misapprehensions, moreover, are identical.

What, then, is religious faith? I shall try, as far as I can in popular language, to give the answer of idealistic philosophy to this question. It would be interesting (and necessary in order to give that answer fully) to connect the faith which is at once the condition and product of the moral life with that faith which is the condition and product of the intellectual life, and with that which is similarly related to the life of the artist. These three are but different aspects of one and the same attitude of mind and heart. But in the space at my disposal I shall necessarily confine myself almost wholly to the first of these.

What do we mean by religion? We mean a man's consciousness of his relation as a human being (*i.e.*, as a thinking, willing, being) to the world or system of things in which he finds himself; we mean his devotion to the best he knows in himself and in that world. Such a consciousness implies, at its fullest, a philosophy of life, and is capable of using all knowledge as means to its development and enlightenment. But it is also a consciousness which is possessed in its essence by the humblest being who is capable of morality. The human mind is one, and the impulse that issues in the profoundest philosophies is but the fuller development of the self-same faculty which enables a man to know so simple a matter as that he will want a good dinner every day, and which enables him to will to work in order to provide himself with those dinners. In other words, each of these two persons—the philosopher, on the one hand, and the man who lays his plan to provide for his dinners, on the other—believes the world to be an ordered system which he can, at least to some extent, understand, and over which, therefore, he has, to a greater or less extent, power. The man who

plans to provide himself with dinners believes that recurring hunger will be a characteristic of his life. He believes that certain stuffs which we call food will continue to satisfy that hunger; he believes, if he be a member of a civilized community, that there exists an organization of society, in virtue of which a certain amount of work can be exchanged for a certain amount of money or of food-procuring power, and he determines to find that work and procure that food. Now, this simple fact, that a man can and does lay a plan by which he may provide himself with food for a week or a day, involves within itself belief in a continuous order or system in the world in which he finds himself, and belief in himself as bound up with that order, as being acted upon by it, and as reacting on it.

It makes no difference to my point if the man's plan fails. He would not on that account be justified in concluding that no plan could have succeeded. If he fails, his hunger will remind him disagreeably of how certainly he can rely on the permanence of at least some human characteristics. Even if we are forced to conclude that in his circumstances no man could have laid a plan which would have issued in success, still, we are not justified in concluding that the universe is a chaos. If it were a chaos, that is, if things had no permanent characteristics, the man might have eaten a stone, or have forbidden himself to grow hungry. But it may be said, "That is nonsense." It *is* nonsense. A reduction to absurdity is absolutely the only alternative left us if we deny the order of the universe. There must be an order even to make failure possible. We cannot lose a game except there are laws of the game, constituting it a game, and making success possible. We cannot even *think* that there is no order in the universe, except by virtue of the order that enables us to think.

We may then perhaps take it for granted that there is an order in the universe, and that practical belief in it is implied in our every thought and every act. In every thought, I say, as well as in every act. For the initial act in all thought, even in perception, is *attention*, and attention is an act of faith,

that is, it implies the practical belief that there is something to be attended to, something real, something that can be known. Without this belief we should never attend to anything, and without attention we should never perceive anything, never think anything.

But practical belief is one thing and conscious joyous assurance is another. Two truths grow clearer and clearer as the world grows older and the human mind penetrates farther into its meaning. One is that the universe is an ordered whole; and the other is that, being an ordered whole, it must necessarily be good, and we may therefore trust the soul of it. But the stage which we have reached in our argument is a long way off these shining heights. These mark our goal.

We are, however, I hope, agreed, that a practical belief in the order of the universe is involved in every thought and act. Now this practical belief is faith. It means that we reckon on finding things pretty much as we have found them hitherto. It means that we are convinced that, if we find unexpected changes, those changes are connected in some way with what went before, "they have been *caused*," we say. And this means that we have a practical belief, that is, a belief on which our action depends, in something which cannot be presented to sense, and this is Faith. Faith is *not* opposed to reason. It is not credulity. It is not a capacity for believing on authority something which contradicts experience or knowledge.

If you say to me, "But that which the churches call faith *is* opposed to reason, it *is* a capacity for believing that which contradicts experience and organized knowledge," then I can only say, if that is so, so much the worse for what the churches call Faith.

But it is well to try to be just to the mother who bore us, even when we think we discover her in serious fault. The Christian religion in some form or other has been the spiritual mother of us all. We owe her an immeasurable debt for a spiritual nurture, the value of which but grows the more apparent as we separate the wheat from the chaff. We must

be uncompromising with the chaff, if we would save the wheat from being thrown away with it.

In the doctrine of faith commonly taught in the Christian churches there are two easily distinguishable elements which have an absolutely inverse value. The one element is a certain attitude of mind and heart. It is the spirit that dares greatly and persists unconquerably because it believes in the communication to it of a strength not initially its own, but capable of being made its own by the act that reckons on the strength being given. There is nothing irrational, nothing occult, nothing mystic, in this faith. It is a practical belief in the moral order of the universe. It is the belief that if we only will what we ought, we shall always will what we can. It is the belief that man was meant to grow, and that man can and does grow by trying. It is the belief that to try to do the best we know is to develop according to our nature as human beings. It is the belief that just as the atmosphere, the sunshine, the chemical properties of the soil and water, enter into the plant and give it a strength not of itself but communicated to it, so the moral atmosphere in which we live, the characteristics of the community of which we are members, enter into us, and communicate to us a strength not our own, but capable of being made our own by thought and action.

This is the truly valuable element in Christian faith. This is a doctrine which we prove to be true every day we live.

We shall be on solid ground so long as we appeal to experience to prove to us the existence of this faith and the justification or verification of it in daily life. The man who feels quite certain that goodness is goodness, that it is better to be sober than drunk, better to be honest than a rogue, better to be pure than evil-hearted; the man who feels that it lies in him to will the right and that he will grow stronger and more capable the more he tries to do the best he knows; this is the man who can, and the only man who can, do what is right. By faith we are saved from moral and intellectual impotence, not by faith in the irrational, but by faith in ourselves and in the possibilities of our nature.

Now faith in the possibilities of our nature is faith in an ordered universe, or system, of which we are parts. The man, therefore, who believes in the reality of goodness, and who believes at the same time in an ordered system or world (and these two beliefs are really inevitable in the normal and unsophisticated mind), this man believes, whether he knows it or not, that the soul of the universe is good, that he can trust it and can identify his will with it. Every time he wills what is good he does thereby identify his will with the power of the universe. This identification, when it is conscious and rapturous, is religion.

As I have said, we are on solid ground, whether we be Christians or free-thinkers, in appealing to experience to prove our dependence on faith. But the human mind is so constituted that it is forever on the quest seeking a reason for the faith that is in it, seeking for some explanation of that which it finds. Many have been the attempts to explain this moral faith, and many have been the failures. The explanation with which we are familiar in the churches is one of these failures. When historic Christianity first tried to give a reason for its faith, this faith had already reached a very advanced stage of development. Attention had been centred on it. It was felt to be the central fact in life. It was seen to be the essential element in morality, the essential element in religion. Finding themselves face to face with an antagonistic and sceptical intellectualism, the Christians were forced into an attempt to account for that faith which, spreading as it did like wild fire in hearts ready to receive its message, was yet to the learned Jews a stumbling-block and to the learned Greeks foolishness. The gospel became identified with its greatest teacher. But that teacher was so great, so simple, so profound, that his followers failed to grasp his doctrine as it was. The profoundest truths are often so simple in their expression that we, in our learned ignorance, scorn their simplicity. The message of Jesus became an *ipse dixit*. He was not regarded as a link in a chain of natural spiritual development; he was not looked upon simply as our greater brother; he became something abnormal, something miraculous; he drew his

inspiration from a source not open to other men; he attested his unique authority, it was said, by miracle, *i.e.*, by acts in direct opposition to, in direct contravention of, the order of the universe. The ultimate appeal, therefore, for belief in the doctrine of Jesus became an appeal for belief in these "proofs" of his authority, of his superiority to humanity. His words were readily misconstrued to fit with this view. "My Father and I are one," said Jesus, uttering the profoundest truth of all philosophy and of all religion. But this was understood to mean the special differentiation of Jesus from all humanity, not—as it ought to be understood to mean—the universal inclusion or participation of all humanity in the deity. This spiritual doctrine was the explanation given by Jesus of the moral life. "My Father and I are one" is the highest point touched by the religious soul. This implies a spiritual universe in which we, as spirits, play our part. It is this universal spirit in whom we live and move and have our being. It is because of this, because of the spiritual nature of reality, because of our participation as spirits in that reality, that knowledge is possible to us, that we can think, that we can lay plans and act upon them, that we can grow in goodness, strength, and knowledge, and that we can feel that action, knowledge, and growth are possible.

But this is a doctrine which in its purity is not easy of acceptance by the natural man. One can understand how, under the magnetic influence of a great personality, it would be acquiesced in unquestioningly by religious and uncritical natures. One can imagine how the tremendous, unrivalled, and unsurpassable, power of the doctrine to inspire and console would carry all before it in a world in which sin and sorrow always abound.

In days when natural science was not taught in elementary schools, in days when scientific primers could not be bought for a few pence, and when every man did not think himself as well entitled to an opinion on every subject as anybody else, it did not matter that these wonderful glad tidings were bound up with a necessary acceptance of miracle. It did not matter—and it does not matter to thousands to-day—that the

doctrine, as conceived by them, was and is pure mysticism ; it does not matter to such folk that they can't understand how it is true, or what the *rationale* of the doctrine may be ; it brings joy to their hearts and strength and efficiency to their lives ; it makes them better men and women to believe in it ; when they live the life they are convinced of the doctrine, and—for them of the olden time—if the curious or sceptical asked questions, was there not an organized and recognized body of expert teachers to whom such questions could be referred, and whose authority as to the trustworthiness of the doctrine in the eyes of the learned was a sufficient guarantee to the unlearned in any stirrings of criticism which might occur ? When such a body of authority existed, when the value of the doctrine was proved every day in practical life, what more could any one want ?

I am not sure that many of us would want more than such assurance. But in process of time the authority of the teachers to whom I have referred has been shaken. Natural science has grown with rapid development and been greeted with eager welcome. And natural science refuses its acceptance to much that has been accepted by theology and bound up by theology with the spiritual doctrine of Jesus. A new authority has been established, a rival who disputes the supremacy of the old.

What now becomes of the unfortunate person who has no time, and perhaps no capacity, to investigate the ultimates of either theology or natural science ?

Of authority it is apt to be true, whatever it may be of love, that "Unfaith in aught is want of faith in all." The man who believes a teacher, the value of whose teaching he has on other matters been taught to doubt, is apt to believe on extraneous evidence, or else to reject the teaching altogether. In other words, the teacher has lost authority. Now this has been largely the case with theology. Its claims and its teachings have been disallowed over and over again by teachers of natural science, and theology has bowed to science, has accepted the rebuke, and stands, on its own confession, a discredited authority. The teachers of natural

science, on the other hand, carried away, perhaps, by their own success, and by the triumphs of their own methods within their own province, have overstepped somewhat the limits of the sphere to which those methods properly belong, and within which they are properly absolute, and they have not been slow to throw doubt upon, if not to meet with downright denial, that spiritual doctrine of Jesus which it has been the special business of theology to defend and explain.

The simple person then finds himself in this dilemma. He cannot any longer accept the authority of theology. That authority has been discredited by a powerful and triumphant rival, and theology has owned itself discomfited. At the same time he acknowledges that all that was best in life centred round the teaching of theology. Its great rival, on the other hand, is either silent on this central interest of life, or it induces a doubt as to the reality of that out of which joy and hope and strength have flowed. What can he do?

Some have clung to theology because of the "comfort" of it. But a comfort, the reality of which one can by any possibility doubt, is precisely the kind of comfort that will fail us when we need it most. Some have accepted the *impasse*. There are things, they say, we cannot know. We must accept our ignorance; morality remains; we must try to promote the general happiness.

Far be it from me to say that a good and noble life cannot be lived by those who adopt the latter position. That it can be and is so lived by many, I know well. But for such as these there has passed away a glory from the earth. When we are well and active, when our interests are vivid and our lives busy, we may not miss greatly that which we have lost. But our hours of reflection do not bring us the old solace, we fight what we feel may be a losing battle. We are at best, in the figure of John Mill, a band of brothers hand in hand against an inscrutable, it may be a hostile, fate. We are continually thrown back on the endeavor to form empirical judgments of life. We arraign the great unknown power of the universe before the bar of our own moral standard. We ask ourselves whether we should have had the hardihood, if

we had had the power, to bring into existence a world like this with sorrow and suffering and uncertainty all about? And our answer is not reassuring. We feel continually that hope is what we are most in need of. We find that belief in human nature and its possibilities is that without which we cannot get on; but we find that this is precisely that which it is most difficult to get.

Here, then, is another attempted explanation which has failed.

Theology, we found, had failed, though it held the clue in its hand. It failed because it sought its answer in the wrong direction. Natural science, we now find, while discrediting the answer of theology, sought its own in a precisely similar direction,—*i.e.*, it asked the historical antecedent of our moral faith, and found itself embarked upon a course that ended in agnosticism. Now, whatever else agnosticism may be, it is a frank confession of failure to answer our question.

Are we then committed to the failure of agnosticism? Is our only alternative a blind leap into the arms of superstition? I do not think that we are left so forlorn.

I have said that theology held in its hand the clue. But it is assuredly not theology that is capable of appreciating its own treasure or of demonstrating its value.

The spiritual doctrine of Jesus, "My Father and I are one," is not unique to the carpenter of Nazareth. We may well yield all honor to the name of him who made it current coin; but this doctrine of the spiritual nature of the universe and of our participation as spirits in that nature has been the common property of idealistic philosophers from Plato's time to our own, and is taught with irresistible power by that philosophy. This is a sure and certain ground of hope; this is a sure and certain ground of trust. But our problem to-day is, how to make it current coin again. I do not know how that will be done. But I do know that it needs doing. It may be done by the preaching of a purified Christianity. It may be done by the gradual development of a body of authoritative philosophic teaching which will play the part in practical life that theology was called upon to play, but failed in playing.

It may be that some poet will be born for whom once more the heart of the universe will be musical; who, having seen life steadily and seen it whole, can report that all is beauty; who, being a poet of our own time, can resolve our discords as the wisdom of no forerunner can resolve them, and educe therefrom a fuller, richer, profounder, harmony than the world has yet rejoiced in.

This, then, is in baldest outline the explanation given by idealistic philosophy of that temper or practical belief which you and I know we have when we are at our best, which we know as characteristic of all the best people we know, and which is necessary in some degree, at least, before any single thought or conscious act, even the smallest, is possible. The most careful analysis of this faith shows it to be possible only to a spiritual being developing in time and identical in kind, though not in degree, with the great world-spirit in relation to which we live and develop.

The world remains the same, whatever be our creed. Society surrounds us and moulds us by its demands, its gifts, its refusals. The same duties are laid upon us and the same fields of interest are open before us. But the spirit in which we meet the world will make all the difference. Is the world alien and hostile? Is it "a charnel-house" or—"my Father's"? Are we and our fellows hopeless and helpless in face of an inscrutable fate? May truth be perhaps a delusion, and beauty only a snare? or—may we know that the world means intensely and means good? May we have the assurance that the universe is ultimately rational, and that to be perfectly rational means to be perfectly beautiful and perfectly good? May we have a rational justification for this sublime and soul-inspiring faith? I believe with all my heart and soul that we have this justification. If we live the life we shall know of the doctrine; the life has two sides, and these sides are true and faithful living and bold and faithful thinking.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

## THE PLACE OF PLEASURE IN A SYSTEM OF ETHICS.

IN so far as hedonistic theories claim that the whole of morality is confined to a calculation of the excess of pleasures over pains, or to a preference of one pleasure to another of less intensity or degree or to a pain, their claim is open to serious objections. Yet the existence of these theories is itself evidence that pleasure is widely recognized as an essential part of any system of morals which aims at completeness. The place of pleasure in a system of ethics becomes thus a problem of interest wholly apart from the controversies waged between thorough-going hedonists and their opponents. It is to that problem that I ask attention.

In order that our investigation may be as free as possible from an ambiguity lurking in the term *pleasure*, we ought to distinguish at the outset between the psychological and material aspects of pleasure. Failure to recognize this distinction has brought confusion into many of the discussions of the problem on which we are engaged. Reflection shows that we use *pleasure* in two quite different senses,—whether justifiably or not we need not ask; it is sufficient for our purpose, and important, too, that we point out the two uses as actual. Pleasure is often used in an abstract psychological sense to denote an aspect of the feeling side of all psychological activity without regard to the causes of this feeling or the concrete objects into which it may be projected. When so used the word signifies simply that a certain psychological activity is attended by a feeling of a certain quality. This quality is called pleasure, and is regarded as a quality of the activity and not of its causes or the results at which it is aimed. The use of the word pleasure in this sense I call its psychological use. On the other hand, pleasure is used in a wholly material way to denote the concrete things which are the objects of human desire. These things awaken in us the desire to possess them or use them, and this possession or use is called a

pleasure. This pleasure is not regarded as a mere quality of psychological activity, but as a quality of the things desired, and just as much a quality of them as are their sounds, tastes, odors, colors, or surface structure. In the use of the word in this sense we discover the material aspects of pleasure. In short, just as sensations have both their psychological and material aspects, so also has pleasure.

Interesting considerations follow from this distinction. In the first place, it is to be noted that pleasure in its psychological aspect is related to individuals only and not to society. We indeed often speak of the psychological activities of society and the popular feelings attending them, but in so doing we speak figuratively. We often regard the social organism as performing functions analogous to an individual organism, but in transferring to these functions the terms of psychology, we do not forget that society has no nervous system in the sense that the individual has. As then the psychological aspect of pleasure refers only to individuals, there is no possibility of founding universal hedonism upon it. In the failure to recognize that fact appears to lie the source of all the confusion and debate with regard to the possibility of passing from egoism to altruism and from egoistic to universal hedonism on a psychological basis. So long as it is not recognized that psychologically pleasure refers only to individuals, this confusion and debate are possible. With the recognition they vanish. So long as we limit ourselves to the psychological aspect of pleasure, all activity, so far as pleasure is involved, is concerned solely with the individual's pleasure, it is egoistic. Altruism applied to it is meaningless.\* Thus the distinction we are emphasizing seems to throw a clearing light on a portion of one of the vexing problems of ethics.

In the second place, the distinction shows clearly why what is called psychological hedonism is naturally criticised as non-moral. When we limit ourselves to the psychological aspect

---

\* Many theorists in discussing this question seem to consider pleasure in its psychological aspect when speaking of the individual, and under its material aspect when speaking of society.

of pleasure, there seems to be but one conclusion possible with regard to volition and its attendant feeling,—namely, that volition is always attended by the feeling of greatest pleasure. The contradictory of this statement is often insisted upon as inconceivable. Yet why it is inconceivable has often proved a puzzle just because the psychological and material aspects of pleasure are confused. What is inconceivable involves a contradiction. Now it most certainly does not involve a contradiction to say that of two material pleasures a man selects the less and consciously selects it, simply because it is presupposed that a man does and can choose between them. Besides that, we have ample experience to show that such choices are consciously made. To insist that after all there is only delusion here is to put the person so insisting beyond the pale of rational discussion. It is only the possibility that men may consciously select less material pleasures for greater that makes hedonism at all intelligible. It is then clearly in the psychological aspect of pleasure that the inconceivability insisted on can be found. In other words, it involves a contradiction to say that in the conflict of possible reactions with their attendant feelings which is necessary to constitute volition, the triumphant action is not attended by the triumphant feeling. That this feeling is pleasure, and, because triumphant, the greatest pleasure *possible in the conflict* is revealed by introspection. No man can say that in a conflict of possibilities he deliberately chooses that possibility which is attended on the whole with less satisfaction (pleasure) than another which he is equally free to choose, because such activity is not what he understands by choice. Choice and that line of activity which amid conflicting possibilities is most satisfying (that is, attended by the greatest pleasure) coincide. When they do not there is no choice. Just as we say that the greatest amount of energy is disclosed in doing the greatest work, so also we say that the greatest pleasure is disclosed in the act of choice. These things go together because we find them together. We have made our definitions accordingly. The heavier weight turns the beam of the balance. But we also say that the weight which turns the beam

is heavier. Likewise we say that choice is the line of action attended by the greatest pleasure, and also that the line so attended is choice. Just as the turning beam is an index of the weight, so is the greatest pleasure an index of the choice. On that our definitions are based and our science built up. Back of such fundamental determinations it is not likely we shall ever go. Consequently, just as it is inconceivable that the beam does not turn with the heavier weight, so is it inconceivable that choice is not attended with the greatest pleasure when we consider pleasure simply as a quality attending psychological activity. Thus it is clear that psychological hedonism, if based on the conception of pleasure here discussed, is non-moral, for we are not pointing out the moral characteristic of volition when we point out the invariable psychological characteristic of all volitions, moral or otherwise. As Professor Sidgwick\* says, "A psychological law invariably realized in my conduct does not admit of being conceived as 'a precept' or 'dictate' of reason. This latter must be a rule from which I am conscious that it is possible to deviate."

More than this follows. Not only is psychological hedonism within the limits we have confined it clearly not a moral conception of conduct, but also is it equally clear that pleasure viewed strictly in its psychological aspect has nothing whatever to do with morality. As the previous argument covers this point, I do not dwell upon it. I simply point out the conclusion that it is pleasure only in its material aspect that can have any place in a system of ethics.

When this conclusion has been fully recognized, we are able to formulate with greater clearness than would otherwise be possible the positions of hedonism. Pleasure in its material aspect points, as we have said, to the concrete objects of human desire. All such objects have a varying value set upon them; they have no absolute value. Still, they are generally regarded as advancing from the least to the most desirable. It is clear that this advance is not determined by

---

\* "The Methods of Ethics," fifth edition. London, 1893, p. 43.

any calculation of the amount of material satisfaction the following of these desires may bring. Our highest desires, or our desires for what we call the highest and best things, are generally recognized as impossible of anything like complete satisfaction, while our desires for what we call low are usually easily satisfied. As this is the case, there is a natural tendency to select the low, or we may say the lesser pleasure in preference to the high or greatest pleasure. We are apt to choose a low value the attainment of which is assured, rather than a higher value the attainment of which is doubtful. It is just at this point that egoistic hedonism presents its principle. It says, in spite of the discrepancy between high desires and their satisfaction as compared with low desires and their satisfaction, the high desires *ought* to be followed, and the high desires of the individual, because value is thought to be fundamentally an individual matter. The appeal made is an appeal to the individual, and unless the appeal is recognized as binding, it can have for him no possible justification. It is clear, then, that as far as egoistic hedonism is concerned, pleasure cannot be the whole of ethics. That principle involves in the first place a choice between objects of desire, and in the second place the fact that the objects of high desires are less easy of attainment than the objects of low desires. The choice between these two cannot rest on a calculation of the possible attainment of material pleasure involved, but on a fundamental belief that the one set of desires ought to be chosen rather than the other. Without this belief the principle is meaningless.

Again: the material aspect of pleasure shows us how it is possible to set over against the pleasures of the individual those of society. While from the psychological point-of-view there is no such thing as the pleasure of society, from the material point-of-view there is. Society as society and the race as the race simply, have material pleasures of their own. There are abundant illustrations of this, but the clearest are those which concern the pleasures of posterity. Posterity, and not immediate posterity only, is concerned with things in which the living individual shares only in the most limited

and precarious sense. That is true also, even if to a less extent, of the pleasures of the community in which one finds himself. The state, the church, all forms of social organization, make demands on the individual for their own sake, and these demands often interfere with the individual's private pleasure. To work for society and posterity, to adopt social instead of private ends for one's conduct, often involves a sacrifice on the individual's part. It is natural that the individual should be disinclined to make the sacrifice. At this point universal hedonism presents its principle. It sets itself against the common disinclination, and claims that society *ought* to be regarded before the individual. This claim, as in the case of egoistic hedonism, is simply an appeal to the individual. If he does not recognize it as binding, it can have for him no justification. Thus we are forced to the same conclusion as in the discussion of egoistic hedonism,—namely, granting universal hedonism its full due, pleasure cannot be the whole of ethics. When the alternative is presented between private and public happiness, the choice, in so far as it can be called moral, rests on a fundamental belief or conviction that the one rather than the other ought to be chosen. It does not rest upon an estimate of the material gain in the way of pleasures to the individual. A similar line of argument might be pursued with regard to the higher and lower pleasures of society, and this would lead to a similar result.

The preceding argument may be summed up under the following points: (1) The distinction between the psychological and material aspects of pleasure shows that it is only with the material aspect that morality can be concerned. (2) When material pleasures are arranged in an ascending scale of values from the lowest for the individual to the highest for society, the scale is not determined by a calculation of the amount of material pleasure which a pursuit of these values affords.\* (3) Consequently, when we insist on the choice of

---

\* It seems to me that this scale of values is fundamentally determined by no calculation whatever, either hedonistic or logical, but is simply the natural product of man's development, varying as widely as that development varies.

certain of these values, the reason for our insistence cannot be the pleasure resulting from the pursuit, but is rather a fundamental belief that the values insisted on ought to be chosen rather than others. (4) This amounts to saying that an ethical theory in order to be complete ought to take into account not only the pleasures involved in human activity, but also the belief which stamps certain of these pleasures as obligatory. Thus the argument leads to a factor in morality which hedonistic theories either take for granted or overlook.

Still, this conclusion does not deny to pleasure an important place in a system of ethics. It remains true, I think, that the supreme moral desire of the individual is a desire for his highest happiness, and that it is impossible to conceive of such happiness except in terms of society. Highest happiness is thus the *summum bonum*, not highest happiness in the psychological sense of satisfied deliberation, but in the material sense of the most valued objects of our desires, both their possession and their use. All that is so obvious that it seems strange that it is ever questioned. But this conclusion is not a return to hedonism. We have still to raise the important question,—why is it that the individual conceives his highest happiness to be something in which he, by no possibility, can as an individual actually share? The answer seems to be this—moral activity is itself one of the factors which in man's development have helped to determine what highest happiness is.

Mill's alternative between a pig and a human being, between a fool and Socrates, is suggestive here. Clearly, it cannot be better to be a dissatisfied human being rather than a satisfied pig, if satisfaction is our sole criterion of what is better. The dissatisfied human being is better because human nature adds to satisfaction an element not possessed by the pig's complete content. The dissatisfied wise man by his wisdom adds an element to pleasure unknown to the fool. So the dissatisfied

---

He develops into a being with this scale of values. It is thus not these values but his attitude towards them which determines his morality. Compare Paulsen, "*System der Ethik*," *dritte Auflage*, Berlin, 1894, I. 224-241.

moral man, *just because he is moral*, has an entirely different conception of highest happiness from what the immoral man has. Thus it is clear that while all activity has for its aim, so far as there is consciousness of an aim, some sort of pleasure, the highest pleasure for any one is determined not by a calculation of pleasures, but by the kind of activity exercised. The question which ethical systems have to meet would seem then to be, not what is the *summum bonum*, for that is happiness, but what is the distinctive mark of moral activity, what characterizes man as a moral being?

One leaves the statement of a question with reluctance unless he attempts some answer. In the present instance I attempt the answer, the more confidently because I believe that it has been repeatedly given in history. The following discussion is thus my own understanding of very old considerations.

In stating the hedonistic theories it was pointed out that an *ought*, an obligation is necessary in order to render them intelligible. Now, morality and the conduct which ought to be are identical, but on one important condition,—namely, that this *ought* is thought to be free from purely private desires, that it is universally binding under the conditions of human life. Investigation may show that there is no such conduct. But such a result would indicate only that there is no unconditional morality possible for man. It would not show that the conception just given of morality is wrong. Whether there is conduct universally binding under the conditions of human life, is one question. Whether men act on the presupposition of such conduct and call such action moral, is another. We may answer the first negatively, but we cannot so answer the second. It is just the impossibility of so answering the second that points out clearly the presence of morality as a factor in civilization. Answer the second question negatively, and morality has ceased. When we reach that stage,—and I do not intend to raise the question of its desirableness,—when all actions are directed without the presupposition that there is conduct universally binding under the conditions of human life, we shall have reached a stage where there is no morality,

where morality has ceased to be a factor in civilization. We might still speculate as to the expedient, the useful, the conditionally necessary ; but it would be absurd to speculate about the moral, except as a factor in ancient history. So I take the only intelligible conception of morality to be—conduct thought to be universally binding under the conditions of human life.

This rather cumbersome statement may be simplified. Before attempting the simplification, however, let it be noted that the difficulty the student of morals finds in trying to show that specific lines of conduct may be made perfectly conformable to this principle, is no valid objection to it ; for the principle is subject to differences in civilization and differences of individual temperament. This fact serves to show the character of the principle. In spite of differences in morals, the conception of morality remains the same. What morality is to accomplish and what the reasons for being moral are vary, but morality does not vary. On the basis of this fact the conception as formulated may be simplified.

Amid the recognized differences in morals, morality itself is not self-evidencing, any more than amid differences in scientific theories, science or knowledge is self-evidencing. Just as science and knowledge rest on certain beliefs, so does morality. The claim that there are laws of conduct universally binding, is analogous to the claim that there are propositions universally true. Whether these claims are valid, or how far they have been verified, is not a matter of concern here. Each of these claims involves a belief. In the case of knowledge, it is the belief in an ordered system of things which man may never completely know, but with which he may bring his knowledge in ever closer agreement. The same is the case with morality,—it involves belief in the reality of a purpose governing human life, a purpose which man may never completely realize, but which he may constantly approximate. All life is the development from a germ. Morality is the belief that in the case of man at least, the development ought to result in each instance in the production of the same type of life, because such a result is the meaning and purpose of

human development.\* Men are moral when their actions are the consistent expression of such a belief.†

The above considerations seem to indicate the place which pleasure has in a system of ethics. It appears indisputable that pleasure of some sort is the *summum bonum* so long as we remember that pleasure when so regarded is regarded not in its psychological but in its material aspect. It is not pleasant feeling that the moral man desires or aims at, but the possession and use of those things and opportunities which make up the values of human life. These values are what they are because they are human values. That seems their sole title to justification. Man did not make them by his skill or his calculation. They were made for him in his development (and by his development, if the reader will have this addition), just as the objects of man's scientific pursuit and

\* Perhaps I need not say that here and above also where I speak of the conception of morality remaining the same, I limit myself strictly to such a conception as the historian forms to cover data widely divergent in many particulars, yet having a common characteristic, that is a conception in the light of which the data can be understood. I do not mean that a definitely stated "categorical imperative" can be found wherever morality is found. Nor do I mean to imply anything with regard to the origin of the moral belief, or the source of the purpose governing human life, for these things are among the variants in moral development.

† I cannot here refrain from entering a protest against the very current objection that the conception given of morality is practically useless, an empty form. Kant's imperative held in *a priori* isolation may be useless, but in this very concrete experience of ours, we find no empty *a priori* forms. I cannot understand how anybody who has taught ethics and felt the moral sensibility of the average class, or who has had much moral experience of his own, can claim that the moral belief is of no use in practice. That belief, like every belief, is not a formula into which definite quantities can be cast and then equated. It is a foundation for action. Conduct gets its character more from the belief which in general prompts it than from specific acts. Before a man's conduct can be changed, the belief on which it rests must be changed. Before the conception of morality can be shown to be useless, it must first be shown that attitude of mind has no influence on conduct. And morality is more an attitude of mind than a measuring-rod with definitely known units. It makes a great difference in one's character whether he faces life with a belief in the moral destiny of mankind, or with a belief the opposite of this. The part that the idea of sheer duty has played in history is enough to brand the objection here criticised as completely superficial.

æsthetic appreciation were made. They bear the same relation to him morally as those other objects do scientifically and æsthetically ; that is, they are objects for his criticism, objects about which he may be employed. They are not the things which determine his morality. It is his criticism of them and his employment of them which determine that. Thus while no satisfactory system of ethics appears possible unless we have regard for the scale of material pleasures which are the objects of human pursuit, there is more to ethics than these pleasures. There is still the criticism of them, the activity concerned with them, the attitude towards them, the moral belief itself to be considered. And it is this second consideration alone which shows how far man is a moral instead of an unmoral seeker of these pleasures.

Consequently to leave out of consideration this second consideration of prime importance is tantamount to the substitution for the moral conception of conduct of some other conception, —a conception which is not moral, and which regulates life by other considerations than moral considerations. It is my conviction that the recognition of this fact serves to free those theories from the confusion of debate which surrounds them. They rest on other beliefs than the moral belief. If they are to be established, they must be established, just as the moral belief and the scientific belief, by such evidence as will bring home to men's minds the conviction of their truth. But to confuse them with morality is a gain for neither side. What the student of conduct wishes to have determined, is that conception of conduct which is best adapted to the needs and aspirations of men. It is no help to find a theory purporting to be moral, and yet suggesting that the word *ought* "ought to be abolished." It is no help to have historic and common-sense distinctions overloaded with a refinement of speculation which robs them of all their scientific and common-sense meaning. It is a help to recognize that other views of conduct than his own are held, and to see how these views differ from his own. It is a help to know that his choice in the present instance does not lie between a pleasure theory of morality and some other kind of a theory of morality, but

between a pleasure theory of conduct and a moral theory of conduct. If morality has outlived its day, if it is nothing but the vague aspiration of ministers, poets, and some metaphysicians, it is well to know it. It is not well to try to save morality by confusing it with something else. That does not help the clearness of vision we so urgently need in these matters.

FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

---

## DISCUSSIONS.

### THE IDEALIST TREATMENT OF EGOISM AND ALTRUISM.

It is possible to base the distinction of good and bad (1) directly, or (2) indirectly, on that of self and others. (1) The "self" may be regarded as the tendency to seek more or less immediate satisfaction, and as such constituting the element of evil; "others" as the universal power of good which gradually transforms this tendency and gives it something of universal scope and meaning. This is the view of Schopenhauer's school. (2) It is possible to regard the self and others as in their immediate or natural relations constituting the conditions within each individual of the development of a moral self which transcends the distinction of the former self and others. This is the Idealist view. With some obvious differences, it seems also to be the Utilitarian view, as is shown by the following quotation from Professor Sidgwick's statement of Mill's theory: "Assuming that the promotion of general happiness is the ultimate end of morality, how far should the moralist and the educator aim at making benevolence the consciously predominant motive in the action of the individual? how far should he seek to develop the social impulses whose direct object is the happiness of others at the expense of impulses that may be called broadly 'egoistic,'—*i.e.*, impulses that aim at personal satisfaction otherwise than through the happiness of others?"

According to this view, *direct* egoism—to use Professor Sidgwick's term—is not bad, nor *direct* altruism good; both are alike non-moral. We may thus have moral and immoral egoism and

moral and immoral altruism. It follows from this that the moral whole is not identical with the social whole. Morality must be defined as the realization of a life that transcends the distinction of the self and others, regarded as unities of particular desires or interests; its distinctions of good and bad will also correspond to that of opposed *ideal* selves, or worlds sought to be realized, and which will *alike* include "private" and "social" ends. If the terms egoism and altruism can be applied to these distinctions at all, they can only be so with the addition of another qualifying term, such as "mediate" or "moral;" and *direct* egoism and altruism come to mark a subordinate distinction of classes of non-moral interests within the moral life.

In spite of this, Idealist writers are prone, as the reader must have remarked, to identify the moral self *directly* with the social self. In proof of this, take the following quotations chosen at random from two leading writers: "If morality be conceived of as the identification of the individual with the universal life, the surrender of the private to the social self," etc. "We can realize the true self only by realizing social ends."

Two points thus seem to call for some notice: (1) That the Idealist cannot identify direct egoism and altruism with moral egoism and altruism; (2) that direct egoism and altruism are, for the Idealist, non-moral.

(1) If we analyze the ethical self (moral or immoral), we find (a) the form of self-consciousness, (b) a "particular" content of desires (or interests), and (c) a "universal" or ideal content. As (a) must be the same, and (b) may be the same in the moral and the immoral life, the differentia of morality must depend upon the nature of the ideal content. Such differentia may, further, be conceived of as dependent either on the fact that morality seeks to substitute one set of non-moral or "particular" interests for another in the self-life, or on the fact that it seeks to subordinate all particular interests to an ideal that cannot be defined in terms of such interests.

Non-moral interests may be differently classified; but it is a mistake characteristic of Individualists, seemingly a necessary consequence of their theory, to regard any class of interests, brought together for theoretical purposes, as the ideal world of morality. These interests may, with some show of reason, be classified as self-regarding and other-regarding. If, with a slight change, we adopt Professor James's classification, and divide them into (1)

material, (2) mental, and (3) social, what seems plain is that *all* these interests, of whatever class, enter, in some proportion and at all stages, into *every* rational life, whether moral or immoral ; so that, though they differ among each other in certain important respects, they cannot in themselves furnish the differentia of morality. Neither good nor bad can be identified with exclusive devotion to any one group, nor their opposition with the relative predominance of one group over the others in our life.

All such interests represent what, from the point of view of morality, must be regarded as the "immediate" element. That any such, all the way up from athletic to musical exercises and the ends of benevolence, should become moralized, there seems to be needed a break in the immediacy of the aim and the adoption or non-adoption of it as a constituent of an ideal world, a world that we would realize. Morality is a negation of *all* the world that is and the affirmation of a *whole* ideal.

Granting, then, that the ethical ideals (moral and immoral) involve a co-ordination of *all* particular interests, and as such cannot be identified with direct egoism and direct altruism, we may now ask how far and in what sense they may be described as mediate egoism and mediate altruism. According to the "empirical" generalization of the ordinary mind, there are two types of false ethical ideals,—viz., those of "pleasure" and "worldliness," or "ambition," which seem to correspond to the Scriptural ones of the "flesh" and the "world." In like manner Kant contrasts "self-love" and "self-esteem" with the "holy law." These terms tell us nothing ; but the "rational" generalization of the ordinary mind—viz., that the immoral man seeks satisfaction in *external* things—will give us some help. Put in that way, of course the explanation is, as regards form or category, unsatisfactory ; but it seeks to convey a truth. The life of the man of pleasure may be described as an accidental co-ordination of interests, held together merely by the natural unity of his own disposition,—a unity that leaves to the particular ends of life as much as possible the character of events, and thus their isolation and detachedness from the point of view of a rational life. The end of life is, outside all its parts, not a principle in them. Thus any ought-to-be is as much as possible identified with what is. Of course, there is an aim, but it is an aim more to seek an ideal in the real than to realize an ideal. This is really the life about which many of the Hedonistic statements concerning the *moral* life are true. The worldly man's

ideal is a co-ordination of interests that covers the whole of life. Moments and circumstances, that is to say, are not left in isolation, but are subordinated to a strenuous aim, an ever-present future. His ideal, however, is such as can find complete realization in events. Material interests are not so much to be transfigured as rearranged from a certain centre. His ultimate end is thus quantitative and must come into conflict with other such quantitative "infinities." Thus, though such a life does not leave its parts outside each other, itself becomes a part, which is "external" to other such parts as cannot be subordinated to itself on that plane of quantitative interests.

Now morality is not "internal" in the sense of being out of relation with the particular interests of life, but in the sense of being a removal of the above externality of men and moments. It thus really involves a further, truer appropriation of external things. The moral life is that which, in elevating itself above the sway of circumstance as such, makes circumstance more its own; it involves an absolute severance from the causal chain of events, only that it may appropriate nature on a higher level. The moral plane in relation to "others," moreover, is that on which there can be no conflict of interests, on which all externality has vanished, and the interest of one is the interest of all. A moral man is he who does that which is universally and absolutely good, or what the ought-to-be that exists for all demands at that point. It thus involves a perfect reconciliation of all moments and of all lives.

Thus the moral life, in being a life to the All of the moral order, moves on a plane on which the absolute ideal of each can be the absolute ideal of all, whilst the immoral moves on a plane on which absolute ideals, being quantitative, must collide. If we call the first moral altruism, we must bear in mind that it is also an ideal *self*; and if the second is named egoism, it also involves an ideal *world*. Thus the terms egoism and altruism are hardly applicable, seeing that "private" and "social" ends alike are subordinated to an ideal order which we would realize. The distinctions of morality do not correspond to those between self and the world, but to those between different selves and between different ideal worlds.

These considerations seem to help us to get rid of two difficulties, in particular, which idealist writers create for themselves. The first difficulty is that of reconciling devotion to so-called "personal" interests with devotion to the interests of others; the second is that of reconciling special devotion to one's own sphere of social

relations with the claims of all upon him. The first difficulty is seen to vanish *on the moral plane* once we realize that the universality of morality is not quantitative but qualitative; consists, that is to say, not in the substitution of a nature that directly identifies itself with the particular interests of all, for one specially endowed, but in infusing this with the spirit of the all. Its specialty, in fact, is a condition of its doing its work in the whole. The moral order, so far from demanding the indefinite expansion of our nature on the plane of particular interests, may call for the elimination of some of these as a condition of its broadening out into the universal life. The same act that involves the checking of a particular desire on one side is duty on the other. What we have to do is to exercise our special aptitudes, private and social, in subordination to the demands of the moral All at that time and place. When we do this we live to others in the only true sense; and it becomes a subordinate matter, included in the larger one of our duty, or forming only the particular, finite condition of duty, whether we shall serve "others" directly or not. A clergyman, let us say, lives directly for others; a musician writes music: the moral universality of either conduct depends entirely upon its being what duty demands under the circumstances.

The second difficulty is only an extension of this. An eminent author writes: "With most men moral sympathy loses in intensity what it gains in width." Relations to others, however, are only a distinct class of particular interests, and the universality of morality here again consists not in the establishment of direct particular relations with all, but in giving to such as exist, or may exist, the character which they ought to have in the moral whole. Such re-creation, of course, may often demand a rearrangement,—the elimination of some as well as the introduction of other particular relations; still, only such readjustment as is needed in the order of things at that time and place. He who seeks to live directly to all lives to none, whilst he who does his duty to those with whom he comes in contact does what is demanded of him by all.

(2) *Direct* egoism and altruism thus come to mark a distinction that is of *ethical* importance only for Utilitarian theorists. When it is held that the goodness or badness of an action is partly to be judged of by its consequences, the *method* (not merely the *motive*) of life becomes of importance. Even for Utilitarians, however, the method is logically of importance only in so far as they abandon

the organic conception of the moral life; for it matters not how the *content* of the end may be viewed, whether as happiness or something else, if the end admittedly takes the *form* of duty for the individual; it is already more or less a differentiated whole, a discriminative universal, that selects some relations or interests and discards others. Not that the universal of duty ever fully illumines its path onward, spontaneously evolving from itself the means of its realization. That is especially not the case during periods of moral change and progress, when new adjustments have to be made, the effectiveness of which must be tested by the results. But when the conception, including, of course, some content, of duty has been formed, in which *self and others* are necessarily involved, the moral relations of self and others are so far defined, and any difficulties as regards the application of principles to new cases involve *the whole moral order*, and thus *all selves*. Thus, for an upholder of the organic theory of morality, the distinction of self and others can give rise only to the sub-moral difficulty as to whether one particular set of interests or another should have predominance under certain conditions of time, place, and temperament.

For what is meant by egoism and altruism in this subordinate sense? If we abstract from the moral order, what we have is a subordinate order of "selves," or exclusive groups of particular interests. On this plane self-interest and others' interests must be more or less opposed; each has to do his own work, which is *not* that of another. A transcendence of such opposition other than the moral—a transcendence which is direct and not mediated by the moral whole—is, however, possible. He is called the "benevolent" man who brings other "selves" or groups of interests within, without subordinating them to, his own; or else leaps across the boundary between his "own" interests and those of another and takes his stand at the other's centre. This kind of altruism, based on "sympathy," directly identifies itself with others and not with the moral order. Thus, what the use of the term "benevolence" seems to demand is *the appearance of a break* in the immediacy of nature. A "benevolent" action seems to furnish a proof that the self rises above immediate interests to reconstitute itself on the basis of a truer objectivity. Really, however, benevolence as above defined involves no such break or reconstruction. Altruistic action that is not yet moralized, or morally mediated, is as immediate as any other form of egoism. Such is,

from the point of view of morality, the same as egoism, seeing that it only finds an *accidental* ground of distinction therefrom in the fact that the immediacy of nature does not *normally* pass the bounds of distinct groups. That the distinction is not of greater ethical importance than that between different *classes* of interests within each group is shown by our use of the terms "disinterested," "unselfish," which are alike used of "benevolent" actions, and of actions which involve the sacrifice of a lower to a higher class of "personal" interests, such as when a man prefers music or study to the charms of gain and "worldly" success.

It would appear, then, that if we are to use the terms "disinterested," "benevolent," etc., to express moral approval, defining the form of conduct implied as one that involves a reconstruction of tendencies on a basis of true objectivity, then what often passes for "disinterested," "benevolent" action is as "interested" and "selfish" as can be. The only true disinterestedness, involving a negation of the immediacy of nature and the giving up of it to a *true other*, is found in morality. Some kind of otherness there must always be; every self must have some world. Mere otherness is thus of no value; true otherness is everything. It may be said that other persons and not things alone can constitute the *other* of morality; but, then, they do so only mediately, or as themselves actual or possible members of the moral order. Morality alone is truly altruistic, and altruism (or egoism), to be true, must be moral.

E. KERI EVANS.

NEWCASTLE EMLYN.

#### THE THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES.—AN EXPLANATION.

PROFESSOR CALDWELL's comments on my "Theory of Social Forces" cover too much ground to admit of a detailed reply. There are, however, one or two points of so much importance as to demand discussion.

The reader must be on his guard when Professor Caldwell attempts to interpret my ideas in the fields of morals and religion. He seems to use these terms interchangeably, or at least he makes no clearly defined distinction between them. When he speaks of "altruistic (religious and moral) perceptions," I understand him to mean that both the religious and moral belong to the general class of the altruistic. To me they are radically different fields and have little in common except certain historical associations which

must sooner or later break down. The ideal of morality is a complete adjustment to the environment. The moral goal is reached when earth's best environment is entered and men submit to the conditions needed to retain it. This means practically that men must become altruistic and submit to a multitude of "Thou shalt nots."

Herbert Spencer tells us that the moral ideal is a life of "unalloyed pleasure." This sounds well ; but I think few people realize just what such an ideal involves, and how its realization would restrict our activities. Suppose men decided to avoid places where the sun is hot, where the fingers get cold, or where the air is polluted. If they should resort to these and other means of avoiding pain, there would be but few places where the race could exist. Even in these places the seeker for uninterrupted pleasure would be obliged to throw about himself a multitude of restraints limiting his activities and restricting his choices. His food, his drinks, the air, light, and temperature must be modified, improved, and softened so as to shut out possible sources of pain. Activity chafes under these restraints, and its pleasures are too intense to be sacrificed for the mere relief of pain. Such an existence would be like a life in a sanitarium, with a trained nurse to watch every movement and to prevent possible intrusion of pain. Perhaps the best examples of attempts to realize such a life are furnished by those fond mothers who, inspired by modern kindergarten notions, try to create a life of unalloyed pleasure for their children. From the birth of such children to the time they escape from the kindergarten they spend their time staring at the reds and blues, the longs and shorts, the cubes and squares of an artificial world. A trained servant follows them to ward off pain and coddles them with bushels of sensory impressions.

Such a hot-house life is the necessary result of the growth of our sensory concepts and of the resulting limitation which knowledge puts on activity. Let the sensory side of the mind have its way and the "Thou shalt nots" would pile up until all activity is destroyed. It is, therefore, proper to say that the goal of such progress is "a static type of man," and that "a study with these limitations cannot rank with biology and psychology in the hierarchy of the sciences." Morality, as I use the term, has these limitations, and must have its scope fixed by planetary conditions and the best environment which these conditions permit. Its two ideals are the avoidance of pain and a life of self-sacrifice, both of which are

due to the conditions of a pain economy. Only those who have been oppressed by the terrors of a pain economy want a life of unalloyed pleasure with nothing to do. Nor would any one sacrifice himself except to relieve the misery of others. If "unalloyed pleasure" were not an ideal, self-sacrifice would not be so inspiring. Those in whom the one ideal is prominent want a haven of rest in which they will be cared for, petted, protected; while the others long instinctively for a life of self-sacrifice like that of the trained nurse, the teacher, or the worker in the slums.

Herbert Spencer says that the relation of a mother to an infant represents the ideal of morality. The child enjoys a life of unalloyed pleasure, and the mother gets pleasure in the sacrifice that produces it. It is, however, questionable whether this complete adjustment is in the interests of the race. It would probably be better for the mother to let her child be fed from a bottle so that she can ride a bicycle or attend a woman's congress. Vigorous children can survive on artificial food, and the mother who sacrifices herself to prolong the life of a weakling injures herself and the race as well. So long as the terrors of a pain economy were so severe that the average mother died at thirty and had to bear a half-dozen children to bring one to maturity, a life of complete self-sacrifice was demanded. But when the length of life is prolonged and the probability of rearing children increased, less sacrifice is demanded and the life of a mother may become normal. This sacrifice may in time become an evil because it merely prolongs the life of weaklings or leads to over-population.

It is necessary to emphasize these facts to show the limitations which are imposed on morality as soon as its scope differs from that of religion. *Pure* morality is a set of sensory limitations imposed by a *pain* economy. *Pure* religion is a group of motor activities by which these limitations of the environment are surmounted. Religion is often said to be supernatural, but it is more fitting to call it *super-environmental*. To understand this thought the reader should notice that I use the term "environment" to denote the group of sensory concepts which come to the mind over the sensory nerves. Morality is environmental. Hard facts constantly remind each person of the difficulties of a life of unalloyed pleasure and of the need of self-sacrifice. The sensory nerves quickly tell us by the presence of pain when their normal functions are disturbed. Religion is super-environmental, and there are no nerves which transform it into sensory impressions. It is due to motor phe-

nomena which find no counterpart among the sensory concepts. A condition of this kind is possible if the motor side of the mind is more developed and responds to the stimuli of a larger world than does the sensory side of the mind.

In speaking of motor reactions as the older portion of the mind, I do not mean that they existed before any external stimuli had the power to arouse consciousness. I do, however, desire to emphasize the fact that the development of the motor nerves through which psychic control is exercised preceded the development of the sensory nerves through whose aid objects in the environment are pictured. It is possible for very indefinite stimuli to arouse prompt and vigorous reactions, but the knowledge possessed by an animal thus limited would be small and vague, although its motor reactions might be as certain and its psychic control as complete as that of the higher animals. Many insects can jump farther than they can see, and thus every movement may land them in an unknown world. It would be suicidal for such animals to limit their activities by their well-defined sensory concepts. Their motor reactions adjust them to a greater world than that which their sensory concepts create. There is, I think, the same difference between the sensory and motor environment of the human race. Its sensory environment is the static crust of this planet. Its motor environment is much more extensive. I doubt if there are any persons who never respond to other stimuli than those which the colors, forms, tastes, and smells of the material world create.

The word "environment" has a double meaning which deserves emphasis. When it is said that men are created or controlled by their environment, everything is included in this environment with which they come in contact or against which they react. Otherwise the doctrine is plainly inadequate. Most evolutionists, however, assume a parallelism between the sensory phenomena they perceive and the external stimuli that act on their organisms. They thus infer that the things men perceive coincide with, or at least reflect perfectly, the whole environment against which they react and to which they are adjusted. A host of untenable propositions are based on this assumption. Men become agnostics by assuming that the sensory world is the exact counterpart of the real environment to which their motor reactions adjust them. The motor powers of men may, however, harmonize with this larger world, and men may act as though they were in contact with the greater humanity that inhabits the universe. Such impulses create

our religious concepts and permit the scope of religion to exceed the static bounds within which the sensory concepts of morality are inclosed.

SIMON N. PATTEN.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

A REPLY.

THIS "Explanation" hardly seems to me to deal with the main contentions of my "comments," except, perhaps, in one instance,—that of the emphasis I laid upon the real positive contribution of the "Theory of Social Forces." And Professor Patten rightly returns to this very point in his "Explanation,"—the idea of a larger world or a greater humanity with which we are in correspondence through our "motor powers."

I did not think my phrase "altruistic (religious and moral) perceptions" of very much importance to my comments. Still, Professor Patten thinks that the provinces of ethics and religion should be carefully distinguished. I agree with this, I am sure. Only I think that his whole line of thought is of more value to the science of religion than to the science of ethics. I am one of those who think that the whole discussion of ethical ideals in terms of pleasure and pain, and "sensory" and "motor" phenomena moves merely on the borderland of ethics; that, in fact, it is not ethics at all. I do not regard Herbert Spencer as a representative ethical philosopher. Aristotle is, and so is Butler; and so is Hegel or Cousin,—to take names from four peoples. These men all discuss "ends" of activity, or the equivalent of this, not the mere psychology of motives. And in general, I think, the "Theory" suffers from a tendency to make too much of biological psychology,—to separate in particular the sensory and the motor sides of the mind too far from one another. I heartily agree with the criticism in the present "Explanation" of the morality of the "Thou shalt nots" and of the moral ideal as "unalloyed pleasure." The main point of my comments was a criticism of the relations existing, according to Professor Patten, between psychology and sociology. There is not the slightest need of raising this now unless Dr. Patten desires to do so. I agree that this "Explanation" makes for overturning the whole pleasure morality of the senses, and it renders somewhat clearer the service of Dr. Patten in emphasizing the importance (*relative*, not *absolute*, to be sure) of the motor powers. I was really impressed with Professor Patten's criticism (in the

"Theory") of the inutility, for the purposes of sociology, of the traditional idealistic philosophy, having myself just recently published an examination of that philosophy.\* I hope he will develop, in a volume, his application of the philosophy of motor activity to the science of sociology. If he does, he will find in recent psychology more help than he at first supposed.

W. CALDWELL.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

"MORALITY AND THE BELIEF IN THE SUPERNATURAL."

IN the January number of this JOURNAL, Professor Ritchie elaborated, under the caption "Morality and the Belief in the Supernatural," a series of reflections which had already appeared in miniature in the November issue of the *Philosophical Review*. The connection between these two discussions is so close that a critic may, I suppose, without fear, attribute the same direct originating cause to both,—viz., Professor Pfeiderer's article in Volume V., No. 5, of the *Philosophical Review*. And inasmuch as Professor Ritchie, in her article in this JOURNAL, proceeds on a more independent line, dismissing all direct reference and debating the question for its own sake and on its own grounds, the critic of her position may likewise dismiss Pfeiderer's special article and draw from another source, in which he too has expressed himself on the same question,—for the most part, indeed, in the same words, but with greater elaboration. My references, then, to him will be found in his Gifford Lectures, Volume I., Lecture II.

I. The first point to be noticed in Professor Ritchie's article is a certain halting consistency (if one may not put it more boldly) in her argument. For example, we are told that her intention is not to indicate "the possible effect upon morality of such a strictly natural religion,"—the religion of those "who discard supernaturalism and the miraculous, . . . who yet regard their admiration and reverence for nature and its laws as a genuine and sufficient religion,"—but "to indicate what those ethical consequences are which flow from religion" conceived as implying "the belief in an entity or entities, a force or forces, in some sort lying outside of or transcending the facts, whether of mind or matter, which constitute what we call the world of nature." Now, I submit that an impartial estimate of her

---

\* "Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance." Blackwood (Scribner's), 1896.

article shows that these two questions have not been kept apart, but have really been discussed together. Nor can the writer evade the consequences of her argument by merely asserting, at the close of it (page 190), that "whether any great change in this direction will ever occur or not, whether the belief in the supernatural is fated to decline and ultimately to pass away, . . . or has such a justification and support in the real nature of the universe that, as time goes on, it will only be strengthened and deepened with the further growth and enlightenment of the human mind,—this is a question of which the answer lies beyond the scope of the present paper." Aside from the implied consequences of the article as a whole,—consequences which it takes no great logical acumen to discover, so plainly has Professor Ritchie written,—one can take her own words on the preceding page (189) as a refutation of her right to say what she does on page 190. We read, for example (page 189), "Morality is not a child of supernaturalism at all. . . . Those who regard the religious sanction as essential to morality in its higher developments fail to see that it is, in truth, an extra-moral sanction." And it is further stated, in the same paragraph, that ethical development is gradually supplanting the motives to moral conduct arising out of a belief in the supernatural. Moreover, one might, if he wished for a side-light on so momentous a question of belief, go to the *Philosophical Review* of November, 1896, and find, on page 621, the following: "Yet no thoughtful man could then (*i.e.*, when the existence of the divine omnipotent Father has been swept away) claim that he was released from the bond of duty. . . ." If there be, then, no necessary connection between the omnipotent Father and the moral life of man, and if the artificial and fictitious connection which the deep instinct for a supernatural explanation (*JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, page 190) produces, is being gradually dissolved by the growth of a self-centred moral life freed from supernatural sanctions, what ground, may I ask, has Professor Ritchie for putting beyond the scope of her paper such questions as she proposes at its close? These questions, it seems very evident to the present critic, she has already answered in no ambiguous way, and, if there is to be any further discussion of them, it can only be to reconsider her already given answers or to confirm them in the light of further evidence. To ask seriously, after what has been already claimed by the writer, whether the belief in the supernatural is to be "a permanent part of our human endowment," is to ask the awkward question whether human nature is so constituted as to be a permanent abode of un-

truth? Surely, the believer in an Eternal Reason and Omnipotent Father, in whose life the moral life of man is grounded, gains much in not having to ask himself such a question,—a question, considering its context, that severe logic would lead straight to philosophic despair.

Professor Ritchie thinks, then, that the belief in the supernatural plays no part in legitimating our ethical notions (p. 189), that the motives to the moral life which seem to issue from this source, however plausible they may be, are based on a fiction. The aim, therefore, of moral teachers should be to emancipate man from this servitude. And at the close of the same paragraph we are told that the effect on the "weaker brethren" of a sudden stripping away of the supernatural is to be feared, and that it is "highly important that the other sanctions—legal, social, and ethical—should be strengthened as far as possible and enabled to take its place" during the transition. But why the legal sanctions? Can they get ultimate vindication except at the bar of the ethical? Or, if they are to be taken, for the time being, abstractly, apart from direct ethical reference, can they take the place of the supernatural? Is the eye of the human judge equal to the "all-piercing" eye of God? So, too, of the social sanction. Are not my social motives beckoning me on to "the pursuit of an ideal social self, of a self that is at least worthy of approving recognition by the highest possible judging companion, if such companion there be . . . ? This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the Great Companion." \*

II. My second criticism deals with what I would call Professor Ritchie's "unphilosophical method." The whole argument seems to be vitiated by this. The moral nature of man and the existence of God (if, indeed, He exists at all) are presented not as organically related elements in a unitary world, but as abstractions. They are split in two "as with a hatchet." It seems to be taken for granted that the autonomy of the moral will is incompatible with a supernatural basis for morality. God, if He exists at all, must sit apart in a kind of deistic remoteness from nature; or, if He does enter the sphere of human morality, he must enter in the guise of an external, omnipotent Will. But is this necessary? Is it not more reasonable to believe that there is no conflict between an autonomous conscience and the belief that its ideal rational character is

---

\* James's "Psychology," Vol. I., pp. 315, 316. Cf. also INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. II., No. 4, p. 507.

to be carried back in ultimate reflective explanation to the divine agent who created it? Is it unphilosophical to say that "the character of conscience may be the evidence (*ratio cognoscendi*) of God's nature, while God's nature may be the cause (*ratio fiendi*) of the character of conscience?"\* Besides, the autonomy of the conscience, in Professor Ritchie's sense, would weaken the very element in the moral life we are anxious to have strengthened,—viz., the feeling of obligation; and if put into operation it would be the forerunner of an autonomous individualism which would mean ethical anarchy. It would logically lead to the doctrine, "Do what you feel is right." We may agree with Kant's rejection of Heteronomy; we may admit that men are not made good when they conform through fear of punishment to externally imposed law; but, after all, "a law with no higher sanction than my individual will would not suffice."† A legitimate interpretation of autonomy carries with it no denial of the belief that God's nature is the source of our moral life. What it does carry is "the truth that a command, though the Lord's command, coming to us from without, would not make us moral beings unless we had a moral nature. . . . To be moral it must be self-legislated,—that is, the command must reach us through the conscience." The real basis of obligation is to be found neither in an abstract Heteronomy nor in an abstract Autonomy, but in some higher synthesis in which the two are reconciled. This is well shown by Mansel in the fourth of his Bampton lectures, and by Pfeiderer (Vol. I., pp. 62, 63, 65, 66).‡ It is stated with great clearness by Dr. McCosh in his "Method of Divine Government" (eighth edition, p. 298). It is also one of the fundamental features of the Christian doctrine of God's relation to man. Professor Ritchie shows no evidence of having sympathetically realized this point of view; she discusses the psychological question of *existence*, and gives the go-by to what might be called the real point at issue,—to wit, the metaphysical question of *meaning* and *validity*. And this is why her reply to Dr. Wilde in the January number of the *Philosophical Review* is a simple *ignoratio elenchi*. But if the question be taken over into the court of metaphysics (where alone it can be really discussed), is not Dr. Martineau's verdict one that better harmonizes with the world

---

\* Hyslop's "Ethics," p. 294.

† F. L. Patton in *Presbyterian Review*, January, 1886.

‡ Cf. also Martineau's "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses," Vol. IV., p. 310.

taken as a whole? "If it be true that over a free and living person nothing short of a free and living person can have higher authority, then it is certain that a 'subjective' conscience is impossible. The faculty is more than part and parcel of myself; it is the communion of God's life and guiding love entering and abiding with an apprehensive capacity in myself. Here we encounter an 'objective' authority, without quitting our own centre of consciousness . . . for an excellence and sanctity which He recognizes and reports has its seat in eternal reality, and is not contingent on our accidental apprehension; it holds its quality wherever found, and the revelation of its authority to one mind is valid for all."\*

ROGER BRUCE JOHNSON.

MIAMI UNIVERSITY, OHIO.

#### A REPLY.

MR. JOHNSON brings two objections against my article,—that it is inconsistent and that my method is unphilosophical. The first charge leads me to fear that I have not written as clearly as I ought to have done; if my meaning be apprehended, the supposed inconsistency will vanish. The reason why I stated that I would not consider the influence of such religion as is not supernaturalism was simply to make clear the limits of my subject-matter. This was the relation of supernaturalism to morality,—my aim being to show that while such connection has been very intimate, and, both for good and ill, highly important, it is yet not of such a character as to prove that the moral life sprang from or is dependent upon the belief in the supernatural. I would by no means call this connection "artificial and fictitious," although I think both reason and experience indicate that an ideally perfect morality can stand in need of no supernatural sanction. My critic objects to my holding this position, and yet asking whether the belief in the supernatural is a permanent one. Now this is just the question that I stated could not be considered within the limits of my article. It is an interesting but a very difficult problem, since to answer it implies a guessing at the lines which future intellectual development will follow. But suppose it is an "awkward question," are we therefore to cut the Gordian knot by the mere assumption that the most satisfactory solution to us must be the true one? I deny,

---

\* "Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II., p. 105. Cf. also William James, *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, Vol. I., pp. 351, 353 (April, 1891).

however, that supernaturalism must necessarily be conceived as wholly true or wholly false; it may be a very childish, inadequate, and imperfect representation of the relation between man and the universe, and yet may mark an inevitable stage of advance towards a clearer, more consistent, and more rational conception of reality. Perhaps it is but the glass through which the human imagination has caught a glimpse darkly of that truth which a perfected reason would see face to face.

In attempting to notice Mr. Johnson's second objection I am somewhat puzzled, because, while claiming to criticise my method, he simply denies the accuracy of certain statements,—most of which I have never made. Since I expressly avoided discussing the fact of God's existence, I certainly never wrote of His sitting apart in a kind of deistic remoteness. My subject was simply the influence upon morality of the *belief* in the supernatural. Such a belief has existed and does exist; surely it is legitimate to ask what is its relation to the moral life, without bringing in all the categories of metaphysical speculation. My critic does, I must humbly confess, take me out of my philosophical depth when he pronounces the question of existence to be psychological, while those of meaning and validity are metaphysical. Perhaps, if I could understand this, I might also know wherein my answer to Dr. Wilde is an *ignoratio elenchi*.

E. RITCHIE.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

#### A NOTE.

THE last number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS contained a review of my pamphlet "*Études historiques sur l'Esthétique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*," by Mr. Davidson. Noticing some confusion in the criticism there offered, I desire to suggest a few corrections.

My purpose having been historical,—that is, to determine St. Thomas's doctrine,—Mr. Davidson's scornful opinion of the great philosopher should not be taken as though it were my own theory that was in question. The Belgian press has, to some extent, made that mistake, hence I wish to call attention to it.

Two of my conclusions as to St. Thomas and the ancients are impeached by Mr. Davidson. (1) I state: "Greek and mediæval writers before St. Thomas confined themselves almost exclusively to the *ontological* element in the beautiful; St. Thomas treats both

the *ontological* and the *psychological* elements." This is a *fact* in regard to which Mr. Davidson and I take directly opposite views. (2) I assert "that the ancients identified the beautiful and the good, because they saw in those two notions specially an objective, ontological element. St. Thomas clearly distinguished the two, showing that the beautiful and the good differ by a subjective or psychological element."

This the reviewer denies, citing Aristotle to sustain his denial. (τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἔτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῇ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. *Eth. Nicom.*, VI., 5.) To this, I observe, first, that my position is the position held by many able writers. For instance, MM. Fouillée, of your editorial committee ("La Philosophie de Platon"), and Bénard ("L'Esthétique d'Aristote et de ses Successeurs") hold that the ancients *generally* identify the *good* and the *beautiful* (not only the *moral* good, as Mr. Davidson says),—that the Socratical *καλοκαγαθία* is commonly applied to the beautiful and the *moral* good.

Secondly, the test of Aristotle has no bearing on the point in question. He often uses the word *ποιεῖν* (in opposition to *πράττειν*), and he understands by it *any (every) exterior action*, not artistic activity *exclusively*, *πράττειν* denoting merely an internal, psychical activity.

Finally, the reviewer misrepresents my meaning in some minor points. He says I hint that the works of the Areopagite may be by the disciple of St. Paul. When I refer the first time to these writings, I speak of them as *attributed* to St. Denys (p. 8 of my pamphlet). I speak of the controversy about their authenticity on page 28, but I *expressly abstain* from accepting either conclusion. I say there: "*Quoiqu'il en soit* (de l'authenticité ou de la non-authenticité), ceux qui revendiquent pour St. Denys la propriété de ces ouvrages, comme ceux qui la lui contestent, sont d'accord pour affirmer la ressemblance indéniable entre la doctrine qu'ils contiennent et les théories des néo-platoniciens." My aim did not require me to take a position, since it is not the *author* but the *doctrine* which comes into question in regard to St. Thomas. The point to establish is this: These writings contain no *æsthetical doctrine* which is not found in neo-platonic works; and I cite, as agreeing on this point, both those who agree and those who do not agree on the question of authorship.

The reviewer takes a position on the question of the doctrine, by denying that the works banish the pantheistic (neo-platonic) filiation of being. The question as to the pantheism of the pseudo-

Dionysius is an open one. A similar controversy exists in regard to Ruysbroeck and other mystic authors.

M. DE WULF.

UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN, BELGIUM.

---

### THE LATE PROFESSOR WALLACE.

PROFESSOR WALLACE's death is too recent, and the sense of personal loss still too keen amongst those who knew him best, to allow yet of any adequate estimate of his work as thinker and teacher. But it is right, perhaps, that the various philosophical journals should publish articles which, though in a certain sense inadequate, serve to illustrate different aspects of his influence and to remind us how many-sided in his greatness he was. The perfect simplicity and honesty of his character, together with his rare power of sympathetic insight, enabled him to enter into the meaning, and to grasp the underlying truth, of much which to lesser men appears merely self-contradictory. This catholicity was a characteristic note of his teaching; for he was incapable of pretence, or show, or special pleading, and his whole work was a faithful manifestation of the man himself.

It is with more special reference to his influence in Oxford that these few words are written. The writer is old enough to have "heard Green," but young enough to have come for two years (as an undergraduate) under the influence of Wallace's teaching. Perhaps nothing can bring out better the relation between him and his predecessor, and the task he felt lay before him to fulfil, than the concluding words of his inaugural lecture in December, 1882:

"It is well occasionally to look back with grateful affection to the great traditions of our past. It is even more needful to prepare ourselves to take a worthy part in moulding the age to come: solicitous that by the full measure of our abilities, unbiassed by merely scholastic interests, the Oxford of the new generation may be, not perhaps more learned or more dignified, but wiser in discerning the main line of public good, readier to co-operate in the movement towards making life beautiful, true, and honest, and more generously zealous to become to England, without distinction of rank or sect, a high court of intellectual and moral justice."

It is as a judge in this high court that Wallace will be best known as time goes on. While it is as impossible, as it is inappropriate, to

try to describe such a man in a single phrase, yet the words "intellectual and moral justice" do strike the key-note of his life and work. They bring out both his strength and also the limitations he set himself. He put forth no independent system of philosophy as his predecessor did. He seems rather to bear witness to the truth he believed in through exposition of views taught by other thinkers, into whose meaning he enters with sympathetic insight and whose witness to the truth he shows forth with impartial fairness. He thought himself into the mind of the writer he was explaining; he never criticised him from his "own point of view" outside. To him truth was sacred, its attainment an "inspiration;" but no school has the monopoly of it. "The unifying, systematizing power of reason is that light which never was on sea or land: it is the consecration which thought gives to the world." To enter into this spiritual reality in its various manifestations was the goal of his personal striving; to help others to see it with clearer eye formed the privilege and the responsibility of his office.

In discharging this duty his influence was stimulating in the highest sense. An old pupil (who continued to attend his lectures after taking his degree) once said to me: "I have listened to Wallace for seven years, and he has never once repeated himself." Knowledge with him was a living thing, a growth, not the mechanical attainment of a set of Shibboleths. A student himself, he showed the way to other students; he enlightened their understanding, but gave them no code of rules, no barren table of results. Often this stimulus was given by means of some humorous phrase which, at the moment, seemed to be nothing but an avoidance of the difficulty.

In practical matters he took but a small part, but there are few voices in Oxford which carried more weight. "I hadn't intended to speak, but it seems I am expected to" were the opening words of his speech at a meeting at Balliol College shortly before his death. They bring out alike the confidence in him felt by others and his own conception of his proper function. He held with Green that the work of a philosopher is analysis and reflection, and that he is of most use when confining himself to his proper task. How he fulfilled this task, his published works testify to the world at large; but only those who enjoyed personal intercourse with him can fully realize his power to "help the soul to rise above the region of distraction between competing authorities, or between authorities and an inner law, to a region in which it can harmonize all the authori-

ties by looking to the end to which they, or whatever is really authoritative in them, no less than the inner law, are alike relative." "Proleg. to Ethics," § 327.

W. H. FAIRBROTHER.

OXFORD, ENGLAND.

---

### BOOK REVIEWS.

**RICH AND POOR.** By Mrs. Bernard Bosanquet. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

This book is the outcome of a careful and intelligent study of the conditions under which the poor live, especially in East London. It is not difficult to locate the parish to which Mrs. Bosanquet, the author of this book, refers, and to which she went, we believe, when, as Miss Dendy, she left Newnham for life among the poor. As a painstaking investigation of the actual facts of East London life, we can give the book almost unqualified praise; for Mrs. Bosanquet, in the preface to the book, anticipates one or two objections which would naturally have been raised. Apologizing for the lack of technical detail, for which she refers the reader to special handbooks, she deprecates, at the same time, any approach to economic controversy. One conviction, however, the writer allows herself, and that is, to use her own words, "character is one among other of economic causes, and as such cannot fail to have an economic effect." No sane person can doubt this. It is only when the secretary of that well-known organization with which Mrs. Bosanquet is connected says "character is the condition of conditions" that controversy begins to raise its head. The thought that vitiates much of the work done by the Charity Organization Society's officials is, for the most part, an individualism which largely ignores the social factor in the making of character. We do not say that Mrs. Bosanquet ignores it, although here and there are traces of a conviction that the poverty and evil of East London are to be removed in no other way than by the action of individual upon individual. Still, it is possibly an ungenerous criticism, for ample allowance is made for the effect which public and local authorities may have on the life of the people, and there is no mistaking the human-hearted sympathy which pervades every line and lifts the study of those conditions which make for happiness

or sorrow in the lives of the poor out of the range of routine and stereotyped inquiry on to the plane of thoughtful, kindly, well-directed effort. With regard to the stolid indifference displayed by the working-classes in London to the religious life of the church she gives an altogether unusual explanation. "I believe it to be largely," she says, "because the ministers of religion (and here I refer to all creeds alike) have allowed the spirituality of their work to be swamped by the material needs around them. . . . Almsgiving has been regarded by the church as a mere accessory to religion, and too often as a means of promoting attendance at its services and classes." This, no doubt, is a just criticism of church-work in East London ; but it is not the explanation of the indifference and sometimes antagonism which large numbers of thoughtful artisans display towards the church. The real explanation is much more probably the indifference of the church to the just and righteous demands of the people. The people ask not for more spiritual food, not for doles of charity ; but for justice, and the contention is that the clergy and the ministers of religion and the whole of the church organizations are the stronghold of the rich man, or the middle class man, who is deeply interested in the perpetuation of the present social system. One experiment which the writer of this book would like to make, if she were autocrat over London and could play at "Arabian Nights" with it for a few months, would be to transport some West End inhabitants into East End habitations, and *vice versa*, and take careful observation of the result. Mrs. Bosanquet remarks that she would not expect to find, on the one hand, much expansion and elevation of character from placing the poor in better surroundings, while on the other hand she conceives it would be difficult for the West-Enders to impress a stamp of refinement and high living on the new home. The experiment would obviously be of little value, for neither East-Enders nor West-Enders live a healthy normal life. The experiment *we* should like to see made is that of surrounding both sections of the community with all that makes for health, happiness, and comfort, with few superfluities and luxuries, and an honest piece of work to do day by day : this is an experiment we believe ought to be made. And whereas, in the first case, both the West-Enders and the East-Enders would inevitably degenerate and sink still lower, it is our conviction that the second experiment would slowly and gradually lead to an immense improvement in the lives of all concerned. This, however, is quite by the way, and is said merely to fix the point where

we should feel compelled to diverge from the writer. Close observation marks the whole book. Her sympathy with the wife of the poor man in her cooking, she explains, is partly due to the difficulties the poor have in storing their food in their little cupboards, or buying in sufficient quantities; "straight from the shop to the table is the only plan, and probably it is the healthiest in houses which are so closely packed with humanity." The absence of any cooking-range is also pointed out as a defect in a large proportion of rooms occupied by the working-classes of London, and to crown it all comes in the terrible ignorance of the housewife. The faith of the London poor in "doctors' stuff;" the large number of cripples who owe their infirmity to the negligence of parents; the evil of an irregular wage; the danger and temptation of the pawnshop; the difficulties of the working-woman and the factory-girl,—all these things are touched with a sympathetic hand by one who has watched the struggle and tried to help. As is quite natural, the remarks of Mrs. Bosanquet on the position of women and girls are of great value, especially so far as their economic position is concerned. Complicated as it is by the question of marriage, only two remedies present themselves,—one is the best possible training to all the girls of a family, whether they expect to be married or not, and the other is the substitution of the skilled for the unskilled worker. Among women, quality instead of quantity must be the desideratum: the intelligence of the woman must be brought into play and all the faculties exercised to their fullest extent. Education, however, is *the* remedy. "Nothing short of an altogether higher standard of civilization can raise them out of their bondage and give them at least the possibility of a life worth having." This little book, beginning as it does with a few remarks relative to the danger of looking at extremes, goes on to describe, first, the institutions of the parish, and then the people who live there, closing that section with a description of the amusements of the poor, a chapter which all should read, if only for the genial spirit which is displayed. The other half of the book is especially concerned with suggestions for workers, and most of the suggestions are useful and practical, although we must confess to some disappointments; in fact, its value as a contribution to the problems of East End life consists in the indirect suggestions of the first rather than the direct constructive ideas of the second part. Nothing, however, seems to us so good in these chapters as the whole-hearted condemnation of the position taken up by some philanthropically disposed people, that

it is bad policy to aim at curing poverty, and that there is "something preordained and right in the social dependence of one class upon another." Her sweeping censure of the good lady who said about the working-classes, "It won't do to make them too independent; they go and join trade-unions; and a friend of mine lost quite a lot of money because his workmen joined a trade-union," is quite delightful, and on a par with her other story of the Lady Bountiful, who, in considering the question of placing her *protégés* on a permanent and independent footing, remarked, "I don't think it is a good plan; they would get too independent. I like them to come to me when they are in difficulties and ask for what they want." This spirit is criticised in that it signifies not the desire which we all ought to have that the poor should be placed beyond the need of asking, but merely the enjoyment which the benevolent patron gets in being asked for what is required. "The true link," the writer adds, "between rich and poor is not the kindly dole with its accompaniments of patronage, but the sense of mutual service and respect, upon which alone sympathy and friendship can be securely based." The general conditions under which the rich and leisured can help the poor are, first, the recognition that any attempt to work in defiance of great moral truths will bring great moral defeat, and the second is like unto it,—namely, there must be a high ideal of what the relations between rich and poor should really be, work being done from an unselfish motive. The third postulate is that the same kind of devotion and thoughtful energy shall be put into the task of helping the poor as would be given to the pursuit of wealth and knowledge for themselves. I should like to add a fourth, and that is a frank recognition of the fact that the position of both rich and poor is abnormal and unethical. Having laid down these conditions, the writer proposes to show some of the various branches of public and charitable work from among which almost any one with common sense and the right spirit could choose a fitting task. It is not our purpose to discuss these methods of helping our poorer neighbors, for most of them are obviously necessary under present conditions; but it would be just as well to state, in conclusion, her final position, with which we shall all agree, whatever our economic convictions: "In the first place, we must keep in touch with actual facts, and, in the second, we must keep our minds open by the study of wider issues, . . . to interpret the facts of to-day in the light of experience, and to recast and enlarge experience by help of the facts of to-day,—this is the only

path of progress." We can heartily commend this book to all workers among the poor.

PERCY ALDEN.

MANSFIELD HOUSE, LONDON.

COSMIC ETHICS, OR THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVOLUTION : showing the full import of the Doctrine of the Mean, and containing the Principia of the Science of Proportion. By W. Cave Thomas, F.S.S. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1895. Pp. xix., 296.

The doctrine which this book attempts to set forth and maintain is suggested in a sentence from Dryden, quoted on the title-page: "There is a mean in all things, and a certain measure wherein the good and the beautiful consist." The work is "designed to form an exhaustive argument in support of that grand generalization [that] the FORM of phenomena, of experience, is *quantitative*, in support of that grand generalization which resolves all relation fundamentally into *quantitative* relation, into *definite proportional relation*, and all design in Nature and in Art into adaptation of proportion to purpose." In elucidation of the meaning of this statement, we are told in a note that "the word *form* is here used in its philosophical sense;" but this seems to conduce as little to getting rid of ambiguity as if we were to explain that, *e.g.*, Nature is used in its theological sense, or Justice in its political sense. We are informed that the Mean has been recognized "from time immemorial as the common measure of rightness in Nature," and this is adduced as "one of the strongest evidences of the truth of that important generalization" above referred to, with confirmatory references to Pythagoras, the early Freemasons, and Confucius.

"All exact knowledge," it is said, "thus becomes that of *definite proportional relation*," and Evolution "may be defined as the becoming of the proportioned, and the at-mean-ment of Nature the goal of progress."

We further learn that the "doctrine of the mean" applies in all departments of knowledge,—not only in Mathematics and Astronomy, but also in Æsthetics, Hygiene, Education, Politics, Natural Theology, etc.

It is, of course, obvious that in various departments examples of excess and defect are continually occurring; but the tendency of things is said to be ever to redress the balance, to compensate an error made in one direction by a corresponding error in the oppo-

site direction, by a series of equilibrations or compensations; and it is from this point of view that the title of "Cosmic Ethics" has been chosen.

The application of the doctrine of the Mean in the various departments above enumerated is considered in the several chapters of the book; that one (Chapter IV.) which considers *Proportion as the Basis of a science of Æsthetics* being much the longest and most elaborate, while Chapter II.—*The Principia of Just Proportion and of the Mathematical Theory of Evolution*—is in form suggestive of Newton's "Principia," or Whewell's "Novum Organon Renovatum," and consists of a series of forty-three axiomatic statements—e.g., "2. The form of phenomena, of experience, is quantitative, therefore all knowledge is fundamentally mathematical; all knowledge is the knowledge of correct measure and of definite proportional relations."

"16. Everything is either as it ought or as it ought not to be,—that is to say, is either proportioned or disproportioned. Right and wrong, perfection and imperfection, therefore, inhere in right and wrong measures and proportions."

"20. As every species of phenomenon fluctuates within definite limits, the sum of the measures of all its possible variations divided by the numbers of those variations would yield that mean or average which experience demonstrates is its right or perfect measure, etc."

Without going into the particulars of the detailed consideration, it may suffice for our present purpose to discuss, generally, the import and value of the doctrine of the Mean which is thus offered as a kind of universal clue and test.

Admitting that quantity is a necessary category of the object of thought, that for mathematics it is primary and fundamental, and that for many purposes relations of quantity or proportion are important and interesting, it by no means follows that the quantitative mean is "the goal of all right formative activity," "the central and recurring measure of rightness and proportion . . . throughout existence," the fundamental relation into which all other relations can be resolved. So far from this being the case, relations of quantity cannot be even apprehended, still less stated, apart from relations of qualitative diversity.

This seems clear if we analyze the import of judgment, or refer to the obvious consideration that any quantity must be a more or less of somewhat that is distinguished from other things primarily by its quality as distinguished from its quantity.

When the author says that “*The quantification of the predicate*, about which, some years since, there was so much discussion, was an inevitably necessary consequence of the fundamentally quantitative nature of our experience,” he seems to imply (1) that this doctrine has met with general acceptance, (2) that its acceptance involves a purely quantitative interpretation of the import of propositions.

But neither of these implications can be allowed. The utmost that would generally be conceded to quantification of the predicate is that it is a necessary stage in conversion; even in quantified propositions, the relation of diversity of quality as between subject and predicate is indispensable to significance of assertion; and what was at the bottom of Hamilton's advocacy of the doctrine was probably a sense of the very important logical difference between relations of Terms (subject and predicate) and relations of Classes.

The way in which *obiter dicta* of stray writers apparently in favor of the author's view are quoted, as though conclusive on the question, suggest an inadequate conception of the kind and degree of proof necessary for establishing principles of such importance. *E.g.*, we have the following: “More recently . . . the fundamentally quantitative *form* of our knowledge has dawned upon the mathematicians, as may be gathered from an article in the ‘*Athenæum*’ of April 4, 1874: ‘Dr. Boole converted logic into a mathematical calculus, and Professor Jevons has shown how it may be made a purely mechanical process. . . . Surely the mathematicians are avenged upon their adversary.’ And again, ‘It is well that we should be enabled to see what is the issue of reducing alike knowledge and existence to quantity.’”—What does this prove except that a writer in the *Athenæum* can occasionally talk nonsense?

“If knowledge and existence are quantifiable,” the author further remarks, “all resemblances and differences are resolvable into *quantitative* resemblances and differences.”

But surely the antecedent here by no means justifies an inference to the consequent.

Further difficulties appear when we ask, How far are we to regard the Mean as actually realized, and how far as tending to be more perfectly realized in the future?

On the one hand, we are told that, for instance, in the solar system “any temporary aberrations in the movements of the planets

are redressed by that law of compensation, of complementary adjustment, which obtains and which preserves the mean immutable through all the vicissitudes of the solar system."

"That excess in one direction should inevitably be either accompanied or succeeded by a defect in another, in any species of phenomenon, is a necessary consequence of that inexorable law of the libration of compensation which pervades nature." "Nature always averages right."

On the other hand, we learn that "All progress, in the sense of improvement or betterment, is towards the proportioned [the mean], and the exposition of this becoming nothing more nor less than the exposition of the mathematical theory of evolution."

"Nature is modifiable. . . . It is therefore man's paramount duty to take advantage of this plasticity or modifiability and to rectify, to restore, all within his power, etc. . . . The rectification of nature in measure and proportion definitely expresses man's formative mission, his divine mission."

"The observance of the golden mean will gradually come to be recognized. . . . A tendency towards moderate counsels may be observed to be growing amongst nations." "The mean is the mathematical expression for that perfect measure in which nature is to be reconstituted by the undoing of excess and the making good of defect. This universal *at-mean-ment* is the goal of evolution, and adumbrates the rectification of all things."

But if the Mean actually *is* preserved immutable in Nature by the operation of her own laws, what need is there for *betterment*, what room is there for *evolution*?

The most serious difficulty, however, occurs when we are called upon to regard the Mean (the principle of moderation) as the common and immutable measure of *rightness* in nature (and elsewhere). The doctrine of the Mean (the proportioned, the medium between excess and defect) is, "as the central principle of *rightness*, supreme in the kosmos." The Mean is the measure of the *right* in physics and in mental and moral phenomena also.

But what meaning can we attach to the phrase, "rightness in physics" or "in nature"? Is there a right and wrong in chemical affinities and repulsions, or in the attraction of gravitation? What is "*rightness* and proportion in the spheres"? The Mean, it is affirmed, is "the mathematical expression for rightness, for perfect well-being throughout the kosmos." But can "rightness" or "perfect well-being" receive adequate mathematical expression?

We may, of course, have *more* or *less* of right or well-being ; we may have a certain proportion of elements which we approve as right or perfect ; but there seems no reason to hold that the mere mean between the extremes of actual experience is necessarily a desirable quantity, and if one quantity is preferable to another in any case, it can only be so with reference to the circumstances of the case and the kind of qualities concerned. Of some things we can never have too much, of others the smallest instalment may be more than enough.

When it is affirmed that the proportioned is the ideal,—the right, the true, the beautiful,—if what is meant is the *rightly* or *duty* proportioned, the assertion is indisputable ; but it is also circular and begs the question. If we make Right, etc., depend upon any other and *mere quantitative* test, the view is plainly inadequate.

I conclude, then, with regard to the general doctrine of the book, *first*, that it is not only unproved, but also unprovable, that all relations can be resolved into relations of quantity ; *second*, that the author has pressed the doctrine of the Mean beyond what it will bear, and has not kept clear the distinction between what *is* and *what is coming to be*, or between the *actual* and the *ideal*. The exaggeration here given to quantitative considerations is a striking instance of the “human too much,” which, by such a strenuous advocate of the doctrine of the Mean, ought to have been avoided.

E. E. C. JONES.

GIRTON COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS. Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford, in the year 1895, on the foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton. By Thomas B. Strong, M.A., Student of Christ Church. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896.

This is a good and interesting book. Mr. Strong regards his subject from the point of view of one who adopts the traditional Christian position. For him, the main point is that Christianity gave to man a new spring of moral life, because it admitted him, “in proportion to the certainty of his faith in it, into a clear and decisive knowledge of the spiritual Divine order.”

Mr. Strong is in sympathy with the ruling ideas of modern philosophical ethics. He holds the unity and solidarity of mankind. He sees that the individual can have no moral life apart

from a social universe in which to live and move. But he also detects the latent paganism of much of our modern ethical thought. He sees that religion is often treated as a thing which "belongs to the taste and speculative powers of particular individuals." The state has come to be regarded as "the true home and natural sphere of action of the human spirit." Hence the separation of the highest and most spiritual part of man—his religion—from the whole of his life. The general relation of religion to life has been lost.

This result is inconsistent with the claim of Christianity, as well as with the teaching of a sound philosophy; for "Christianity makes a complete and supreme claim over the whole life of man throughout all ages," and the unity of human life is destroyed.

Mr. Strong's solution of the problem is that the church, not the state, should be the sphere in which the moral activities of the individual should find their fullest exercise, and that the church should set itself to the production of Christian character by means of discipline.

To many this will seem a mere return to mediævalism. To others it will seem an ecclesiastical dream, and nothing more. Yet can there be any doubt that Mr. Strong is, on the whole, philosophically consistent and that the conception of the church as moral universe is far grander and far nearer to the ideal than the conception of the state?

Lecture VI. is devoted to an interesting discussion of "Morality and Reason." Mr. Strong protests against the disparagement of reason which marks some recent books. But it may be questioned whether his own position differs very much from that of the writers he censures. To appeal to faith in the wisdom (or reason) of God can scarcely be regarded as a rational (in the scientific sense of the word) justification of human life. To fall back upon superhuman reason when human reason fails is hardly inconsistent with the doctrine of Mr. Balfour and Mr. Kidd.

But, surely, the controversy is ultimately a battle of words. The reason which justifies morality is not the reason of science, the abstract intelligence. To claim for reason a higher exercise and more concrete function is undoubtedly necessary, but it is well, when we make the claim, to understand that we have given another meaning to the word.

CHARLES F. D'ARCY.

BALLYMENA, IRELAND.

THE GOSPEL FOR AN AGE OF DOUBT. By Henry Van Dyke. New York : The Macmillan Company, 1896.

Dr. Van Dyke, on being invited to deliver "The Yale Lectures on Preaching," for 1896, departed from the custom of his predecessors who had sought to tell the divinity students how to preach. He applied himself to the more important question of what to preach. The result is an exposition of the new orthodoxy, which often rises into a noble eloquence. Though addressed to students, the style is never dry or scholastic, and Dr. Van Dyke is always vital and stimulating.

In stating his problem the author is fair and frank. He confesses the failure of technical theology to interest or to help the modern man. "Tradition is powerless. Dry systems of dogma cannot quicken the soul." . . . "Our age has its own character, its own perils, its own needs, its own hopes and aspirations. The only gospel that it is worth while to preach must stand in vital relation and speak with vital power to the present age." . . . "Already the dogmatic systems in which the inductive method is ignored or subordinated (whether made long ago or constructed yesterday as modern antiques) are out of date."

There is a powerful chapter on "An Age of Doubt," in which the author collects the confessions of modern thinkers in their moments of depression. The picture is, however, not quite fair, for it would be just as easy to make a collection of the lamentations of the saints as of the sceptics. Augustine and Bunyan and Jonathan Edwards had their moments of gloom, when everything seemed hopelessly black. The ages of faith were not, as a matter of fact, ages of optimism.

Dr. Van Dyke finds the gospel for this age, not in a book, nor in a dogmatic system, but in a person. Like all writers of the "Christo-centric" school, he speaks nobly and persuasively of personality, and then by some process of logic, so rapid that the reader cannot follow it, he identifies personality with Jesus of Nazareth, and him in turn with the ideal Christ—an ideal which has been the growth of many centuries. It is easier to follow all this with the spirit than with the understanding.

The new theology has the defect of the old, that it is apt to produce its effects by deepening the shadows rather than by really enhancing the light. In spite of his broad sympathies, like most other Christian apologists, Dr. Van Dyke magnifies Jesus at the

expense of the great men who prepared the way for him and of the race to which he belonged.

"It is as if the heavens were swept bare of stars ; and suddenly, unexpected, unaccompanied, the light of lights appears alone in supreme isolation. Nor is there anything in his antecedents, in his surroundings, to explain his appearance and radiance. There is nothing in the soil of the sordid and narrow Jewish race to produce such an embodiment of universal love."

If the historian refuses to accept this conception of the life of Jesus, the student of ethics must also challenge the statement which follows. "Alone among his followers who kneel at his command to confess their unworthiness and implore forgiveness, he stands upright and lifts a cloudless face to heaven in the inexplicable glory of piety without penitence. Moral perfection of this kind is not only without a parallel, it is also without an approach. Men have never attained to it, and there is no way for them to climb thither." One must question whether the contemplation of an unattainable perfection is a gospel for an age of doubt.

The exigencies of the Christo-centric theology lead to the dangerous expedient of treating the ethical earnestness of avowed sceptics as a mere survival of an outgrown faith. Thus the author says of men like Scherer and Morley that they adhere "with proud but illogical persistence to the ethical consequences of the faith with which logic has broken ; like a son disinherited, but resolved to maintain the right of possession by the strong arm." This raises the whole question whether there is any natural basis for ethics.

But the book, apart from its apologetic character, to which one may take exception, has real power. There are few pages without sentences which at once arrest attention by their beauty and suggestiveness. The chapters on Liberty, Sovereignty, and Service are especially strong.

S. M. CROTHERS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

**MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHILD AND IN THE RACE ; Methods and Processes.** By J. Mark Baldwin, Ph.D. (Second Edition.) New York and London : Macmillan & Co., 1897. Pp. 496.

A book which has passed into its second edition within a year after publication, which has been discussed in every country where psychology is studied, and which is being translated into both

French and German, needs no introduction. There is, however, good reason for looking briefly at the ethical implications of the theory which it represents, if for no other reason, because the book has been so little criticised from this point of view. The author's forthcoming work entitled "Social and Ethical Interpretation of the Principles of Mental Development," recently crowned by the Royal Academy of Denmark,\* will give a much fuller exposition of the sociological and ethical purport of the theory,—*i.e.*, of the so-called circular reaction or imitation theory of mental development, but the discussions in *Mental Development* are also suggestive.

The deepest questions in the philosophy of morals are connected with the imperative character which duty everywhere assumes. Scholastic discussions placing the essence of morality in the submission of the will to reason are unpsychological in the divorce which they maintain between the will and reason. Modern evolutionary theories have seemed probable only by ignoring the imperative entirely, assuming from the start that there exists no difference between man's sense of expediency or prudence and his sense of moral obligation. Kant founded the Intuitionist School, we may say, by teaching that the imperative is simply one of the given things of practical reason and is ultimate, demanding as a postulate the existence of an intelligible ego, the realm of freedom and immortality. We have in the view of the author an evolutionary view of consciousness in general, and the first question which arises in many minds is, Does this, too, begin with ignoring the fundamental fact of man's moral experience,—*viz.*, the categorical nature of the sense of duty?

The discussion begins from the same point of departure as the discussions of Spencer and Romanes on the same subject,—*viz.*, from the relation of the individual to his environment. In opposition to the view of Spencer and Bain, that the stimulus is the main factor in the development of the organism, the author sides with the view of those who maintain that the organism reacts to stimuli, not according to the nature of the stimuli, but according to its own nature. Perhaps Pflüger had the same thought in mind

---

\* The report of the Danish Academy containing an analysis of Professor Baldwin's work has appeared in the *Bulletin de l'Académie de Danemark* for 1896. It was prepared by Professor Høffding, who was a member of the committee of award.

when he said that the source of an animal's need is also the source of the movements which go to satisfy that need. The organism does not so much wait for stimuli, as go out to get those stimuli which are beneficial,—*i.e.*, pleasure giving. All stimuli tend to get themselves repeated or inhibited according to their pleasure-pain quality, the motor correlate of pleasure being expansive movement, and that of pain, contraction. By circular reaction, the author means the fact that all stimuli tend to get themselves repeated or inhibited according to their feeling worth for the organism. Habit represents the tendency of the organism to keep in touch, by means of movement, with beneficial stimuli. Feelings are not all pleasures and pains, nor compounds of these. Rather they develop from the pleasure-pain consciousness along with the higher stages of consciousness. Conceptions arise as certain habitual channels of motor discharge get themselves established: they are the results of habit, representing the fixed ways of reacting into which the attention has "fallen." All things are united in consciousness only in so far as they have motor elements in common; assimilation, association, classification, all arise as results of sameness in motor discharge,—*i.e.*, as results of motor habit.

Belief is the readiness of the attention to react to a given stimulus in an old way; disbelief arises whenever the stimulus will not be reacted to in an old way, whenever something refractory will not fall under the rubrics of old and accustomed discharges. Belief is motor attitude. Emotion is stated in terms of the worth of habitual reactions to the psychophysical organism. The æsthetic emotions arise with the conceptual or reflective consciousness, and are always, like simple pleasure and pain on lower stages of mental development, the mind's sense of the worth of attention-reactions. The author's theory of emotional expression is a development of that of Darwin,—*viz.*, that expressions in man are survivals of muscular reactions once useful to the organism. His view differs from that of Darwin in that the author regards contraction as the original correlate of pain and expansion as the original correlate of pleasure, the latter representing heightened nervous energy as a result of the stimulus which gave the pleasure and now gets itself renewed by the expansive movement which it occasions, and pain representing the opposite.

The most characteristic feature of the work, probably, is the architectonic principle which, according to the author, underlies and explains all mental development, the principle of circular reac-

tion or, less adequately, of imitation. The principle referred to, however, is neither the imitation of Tarde as maintained in "*Les Lois de l'Imitation*," nor the imitation which Bain and others regard as a secondary result characterizing certain stages of mental development. The process so designated is not only instinctive, it is the law of organic and psychic growth. According to this principle, the fundamental fact of mind is a reaction determined not by the stimulus alone, but by the pleasure-pain consciousness, both pleasure and pain being primal factors. When the organs of sense have been sufficiently developed to give the organism "copies" for imitation from without, it may get such copies from the conduct of other individuals as well as from itself.

Such being the principle of psychic growth, the genesis of the social consciousness is the first step towards the development of the moral sense. The social consciousness begins to show itself along with the sense of self,—*i.e.*, as soon as, among the habitual reactions of the attention, one has been formed which always takes place in the presence of any excitation, subjective or objective, which possesses the worth of a self to the pleasure-pain consciousness. This is not the "consciousness of kind" of Giddings any more than it is the feeling of sympathy, etc., of Spencer. The latter two theories of the rise of the social consciousness are very similar in certain important respects. Both assume that the original attitude of the organism towards its kindred is an egoistic one, that individualization or isolation is the original tendency of organisms; but this involves a consciousness of kind, as it seems to us, from the start. Animals are supposed to be forced by the necessities of food and shelter, etc., to associate, and, as a result of such association, the pleasures in each other's companionship and sympathies for each other's sufferings which go to make up the social consciousness are supposed to arise. The theory of our author, on the other hand, implies, as we understand it, that the rise of the social consciousness is due at bottom to the same factors that all other conscious developments are due to,—*viz.*, to the law of imitation. It seems to assume that the individual organism exists from the start in close touch with others of his kind. Let us imagine two primitive organisms, A. and B., existing in the immediate vicinity of each other: A. is approached by some hostile object, X., with which B. also at some time or other has had to do. X. approaches A., and B.'s glimpse of him revives his own past experiences with him. There is a revival pain, fear, and movement of flight on B.'s

part. Suppose, however, that this flight does not suffice to relieve B. of the sight of X. approaching and, let us say, attacking A., so that no movement of flight puts an end to the revival experiences of B. Excitement, which means heightened discharge, gives rise to variations of movement, and all the time the movements of A. are setting copies from without for the reactions of B. The law of imitation implies that B.'s conduct under such circumstances will resemble A.'s ultimately. Let us again suppose that together they succeed in driving off X., and enjoy together the feelings of relief—*i.e.*, of pleasure—which follow. Here is a copy in the direction of co-operative conduct set for future imitation. Perhaps such copies would in time grow numerous, and through tradition become the social habit of those organisms with which the young first come into contact. There is room here for the development of untold co-operative and organized conduct on the part of the members of the same group of organisms (such as bees or ants, for example). The author further traces the development, through what is a sort of disillusioning process, of the organism's dawning sense of the difference between its own subjective states and the real objects of its social and material surroundings (for the author maintains that the original reference of the psychoses of the organism is intensely objective, the direction of development being, first, the realization of subjectivity, and, later, of objective subjectivity in the kindred organisms with which it comes into contact). This sense of subjectivity develops as the reflex of those established habits of social co-operation and organization which have already been formed; the social consciousness is the sense of self in relations with other selves. The two sets of copies become conscious together, the sense of self being the consciousness of certain fixed sets of motor reactions to certain stimuli which for the organism mean other selves. It is therefore permissible to infer that, whenever such stimuli are present and the organism for any reason fails to react in accordance with the sense of self, there will result a sense of unself, a recognition of the fact that the reaction cannot be assimilated to any of the habitual reactions which together underlie the sense of self. As it was pleasure which directed the growth of those habits of reaction, so the failure to perform the accustomed reaction to a present stimulus must result in pain consciousness; and the anticipation of that result ("saturated" by a feeling of worthlessness *a priori*) would be the initiatory sense of remorse and self-condemnation. At this stage of development the pains and pleasures of the individual will

be of a social sort, resulting in every case from the acquaintance of the individual's companion with his actions. Publicity will be the source of both rewards and punishments for the individual, and hence the importance to the individual (unemphasized by ethical writers before) of *publicity* of conduct. The law of Kant, "So act that the principle of your conduct may be fit for universal law," is to the individual, subjectively speaking, so act that all the members of the social group to which you belong—*i.e.*, all your other selves—may know your conduct without pain to yourself. This publicity factor of the ethical consciousness is to be emphasized, I am informed, in the author's forthcoming work called "Interpretations."

Finally, what of the imperative nature of duty as a psychological phenomenon? As all concepts—*i.e.*, all organized systems of motor discharges—are prior to any particular discharge and determine its form, and as all beliefs are motor attitudes prior to any action in accord with those attitudes, so the sense of self and the feeling that an unconditional duty is real, are prior to any specific movement in accord with or in opposition to the self-feeling; so far as any particular instance of conduct is concerned, the feeling of the reality of an unconditional duty is *a priori*, for a priority in this view has just this genetic meaning, that present motor discharges, whether reactions of the attention or movements, *can be assimilated* through their resonance to old reaction copies; our feeling of their worth is determined by the question whether any particular action can or cannot be so assimilated.

The theory leaves entirely out of discussion the epistemological question of the validity or the nature of the sense of duty, as also the same question in regard to other conscious processes.

G. A. TAWNEY.

BELOIT COLLEGE, WISCONSIN.

**ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY.** By G. F. Stout. 2 vols. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896. Pp. xv., 289, and v., 314.

In these two fine volumes we have a thorough, interesting, and comprehensive treatment of general psychology approached by the traditional British method,—analysis. Mr. Stout proposes, however, to supplement it later by another work on "Genetic Psychology," in which, indeed, he declares his main interest to lie.

The work is devoted so largely to questions of purely psychological value, and has so little immediate interest for students of ethics, that I shall content myself with recommending it to the readers of this JOURNAL, with certain leading indications merely as to its teachings.

The first thing that strikes the student is its fundamental divergence from British tradition in the matter of the great law of Association. The last few years have seen the lines drawn sharply between the older Associationism and the newer Apperceptionism. The latter has gained the ascendancy, and is likely to hold it as contrasted with the earlier statements of the Associationists. There is now, however, a tendency, under the lead of certain important men, to reconstruct a new Associationism which will be true to the facts of "apperceptive synthesis," and yet not go over to a doctrine of "mental activity" as revealing itself in consciousness by a special "sense of activity as such." In this discussion, it was Ward's cyclopædia article which first broke ground in England for the reception of Apperception, and Mr. Stout, growing up in Cambridge, naturally follows Ward in discarding the tenets of the Associationism of the British school, led to-day still by Professor Bain. Mr. Stout has an original and interesting attempt to interpret mental activity—using in part the terminology of the apperceptionists of the Herbartian school—which goes, as it seems to me, beyond the position of Ward. It is true that Mr. Stout stops with what he calls "noetic synthesis," as a final term of description of the union of elements in a single cognitive state of consciousness. In this, as I said, his doctrine seems only to emphasize the break with Associationism; but yet he does not fully appreciate the resources of the later development on the motor side of mental life, with the help of which a certain sensational basis may be found for synthesis, and in so far a naturalistic account be given of it. It would be hardly well to call such a doctrine Associationism, and, seeing that he is himself short of it, Mr. Stout is, no doubt, wise in clinging to the term apperception.

It is interesting to note, with this doctrine of noetic synthesis, a decided tendency to treasure empirical investigation, seen in the genetic intentions and the anthropological impulses which Mr. Stout reveals. This will save him no doubt in such a stronghold of Associationism as Aberdeen University, to which he has now gone as Lecturer on Comparative Psychology. Possibly it is this contrast between the higher and the lower—the noetic and the

genetic—which has caused the omission from the work of Mr. Stout of all those higher topics which would have had very fruitful discussion from the noetic side, but which might have imperilled the author's freedom when he comes to write his book on the genetic. At any rate, it is one of the present writer's main points of curiosity to see what Mr. Stout will do with his doctrine of mental activity when he interprets the minds of the animals, the insects, and the *amœbæ*. And if he had only committed himself in this work to views on the ethical, the social, and the religious, it would have excited the same curiosity to see their later application in the fields of ethnology. But here he has left himself a free hand, to the great impoverishment of the present work, as it must be confessed.

Ethical readers will be interested in the chapters on Attention, Conation, and Belief, which are among the best where the level of all is high, and less interested in that on Pleasure and Pain, which is the poorest where none are poor.

J. MARK BALDWIN.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. Translated by S. W. Dyde, M.A., D.Sc., Professor of Mental Philosophy, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Bell, 1896. Pp. xxx., 365.

Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" or "of Law," the work here translated, forms the eighth volume of the collected works as published after Hegel's death. It consists, as the translator's preface informs us (why, however, is not the original "editor's preface" reproduced in the translation?), of "paragraphs" and "notes," both from Hegel's own hand, constituting the work as published by Hegel in 1820; together with "additions," drawn from students' notes of the lectures, which appeared for the first time in the posthumous edition of 1833.

The work of 1820 was itself a reproduction in fuller form of a portion of the third division of the "Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences," which appeared as a whole in 1817. Its three divisions were the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Mind. The last of these fell into three portions or subdivisions: Mind Subjective (what we might call Mental Philosophy,—Anthropology and Psychology), Mind Objective, which coincides with the Philosophy of Right, including what we might call Jurisprudence and Moral and Political Philosophy; and Mind Absolute, covering

the ground of art, philosophy, and religion. The Philosophy of Mind has recently been translated by Professor Wallace; and his volume, with its luminous introductory essays, will be an almost indispensable companion to the Philosophy of Right, which is now before us.

The place of the Philosophy of Right in the total Philosophy of Mind reveals one great aspect of Hegel's conception of the subject. Law, Will, and Society appear as stages of man's endeavor to find his true self, to realize all that his mind has in it to be. He grows into these manifestations *pari passu* as he becomes an intelligence and a will, and so we find them to be the culmination of anthropology and psychology. But even the State is not ultimate, and behind and above it we see the deepest and highest modes in which man has grasped at the universe, modes which are prior to any individual State, and survive it, and embody the eternal which no State can wholly attain. The State was merely mind objective; but these are the modes of mind absolute,—art, philosophy, religion.

And the inward structure of the Philosophy of Right reveals an analogous progression,—a progression not in time, but in grades of adequacy or perfection. Abstract law—the right before which all are *prima facie* equal, is the simplest condition of realized will or social being. Beyond and over against this comes the sphere of morality; the will that claims to be good by its pure intention, by the mere fact that it is the utterance of individual conscience; as the reconciliation of these two tendencies we have thirdly the realm of social ethics—life organized in institutions and ordinances through which man finds his will,—what he really wants,—*i.e.*, what in some degree makes possible for him a satisfactory life—in a detailed system of rights and duties. In these his will is still his own, and individual, but yet the organization of his relations and purposes brings him into harmony with the orderly fabric sustained by law.

It will be seen how far-reaching is Hegel's view outside the realm of law, morality, and politics, and how profound is the continuity which it suggests within that sphere. It is a great thing to have such a work in an English version; and Professor Dyde's translation will convey the essential purport to the reader, though he has permitted himself a degree of inaccuracy in detail which the demands of free rendering do not seem to justify.

B. BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

**THE HISTORY OF MANKIND.** By Professor Friedrich Ratzel. Translated from the second German edition by A. J. Butler. With introduction by E. B. Tylor, D.C.L., F.R.S. With colored plates, maps, and illustrations. Vol. I. 8vo. Pp. 486. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Under the title above given we are presented with a translation of the "Ethnographie" of Professor Ratzel. Why the more appropriate title of the original was discarded, does not appear. The book is certainly not a "history" in the usual sense of that word. It is a description of the physical appearance, arts, sociology, religions, and culture of the various tribes and races of mankind; and this first volume is confined exclusively to the races of the great island world of the Pacific, the Polynesians, Australians, and Malays, beginning with some chapters devoted to the general elements of the science of Ethnography. The following volumes will take up the remaining branches of the human family.

It is almost needless to commend Professor Ratzel's diligence in seeking information, and his care to select good authorities. He has received high commendation for these qualities from the reviewers of his native land, and every section of his work justifies such praise. His volumes were not made to order by paste-pot and scissors, but were the outcome of a prolonged, earnest, even enthusiastic study. He has been fortunate in a translator, one who knows his German and can write English, qualities by no means universal in translators. For a high class, popular book, there is none other on the subject the equal of Ratzel's. The publisher has also done his work finely, the illustrations being well printed, and the maps and plans ample for the purpose.

This praise is well deserved; but it must be tempered by some less favorable observations. The author cites no authorities, which renders his book of little use to the actual student, as he is deprived of the means of controlling the author's statements. Special theories, evolved by the author, are sometimes presented as those generally accepted by specialists in the branch, a procedure which is objectionable (*e.g.*, concerning the races of the Pacific, Book II.).

Ratzel can scarcely be placed among the advanced thinkers in the science of man. He is not, for instance, nearly so comprehensive in his conceptions as Bastian. The endless chain of facts and the constant pressure of environment obscure his perceptions of the

psychical element in human nature as that which is peculiarly causative. His descriptions of the religion of the primitive tribes are almost wholly external, throwing little light on the psychic motives at their source.

In the development of arts and institutions he undervalues or scarcely appreciates the identity in mental evolution, which is the real cause of most of those analogies which he and others trace to contact. Indeed, the chief weakness of his work is on the psychical side. His descriptions are such as we might expect from an intelligent traveller, not from one intimately admitted to the lives of the social units he mentions. It is scarcely, therefore, the work to be consulted by one in search of solutions of the deeper problems of human culture, but excellent for him who seeks acquaintance with its outward forms.

D. G. BRINTON.

PHILADELPHIA.

**LE PREMESSE FILOSOFICHE DEL SOCIALISMO.** Memoria letta alla R. Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche della Società Reale di Napoli, dal Socio residente, Alessandro Chiappelli. Napoli: Tipog. della R. Università. 8vo. Pp. 95.

This is a very able essay by one of the most acute, comprehensive, and dispassionate thinkers of the present day,—a man who deserves to be far better known than he is. I have seen no work which gives so fair an account of the origin, meaning, philosophy, and aims of “scientific socialism” as this. It shows that socialism, in its principles, is a travesty of Hegelianism, employing Hegelian dialectic, but substituting for Hegel’s idealism a crass materialism, and positing, as the fatalistic force in the process of history and culture, the form of economic production. The gratuitousness and one-sidedness of all this the author makes clearly manifest. And yet he writes sympathetically, evidently feeling that materialism and fatalism are not essential to socialism, and that, if it would slough these off, it might have a future. Perhaps I cannot do better than translate the closing sentences of the essay:

“If I am not mistaken, communistic socialism, when it confidently asserts that the proletariat, when it arrives at power, will be satisfied with collectivism of property, is too absolute, and too clearly betrays its philosophic origin not to suggest the famous words of Hamlet to Polonius [Horatio?]. In truth, in the world and in life, there are many elements and aspects besides those

which a merely economic view of society and history embraces. Socialism professes to be materialism, yet is, at bottom, idealism. And it is natural and proper that it should be so. But it abandons idealism when it forgets that there is but one force, a force operating in the depths of the human heart, that can guide the nations safely to good.

"The social conditions of our time present this singular antinomy: in that portion of our society which officially adheres to the traditions of religion and of the church, the ideals of life have, to a large extent, vanished or turned pale, whereas that portion which is seeking to rise up and innovate in the name of social materialism and an economic conception of life, is hungering and thirsting after social righteousness, and aspiring to an end which closely corresponds to the social ideal of Christianity. Now, certainly it is permitted to no one to prophesy what future lies in store for humanity. But any one who has faith in human destiny, and who looks about him serenely and calmly, will be forced to recognize that socialism, unless it lays aside the rigid form imposed upon it by the inflexible postulates of social materialism, and gives scope to the manifold vital energies of moral idealism which lie latent in its bosom, can never govern the social force of the proletariat, or guide it towards that ideal goal which socialistic thought, with undaunted faith, pursues."

I am sorry to add that the typography of this pamphlet literally swarms with errors, some of them *sinnstörend*.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

**FAMILY BUDGETS: BEING THE INCOME AND EXPENSES OF TWENTY-EIGHT BRITISH HOUSEHOLDS, 1891-94.** Compiled for the Economic Club. London: King & Son, 1896.

This is a small book, but not of small value. It contains an introduction of ten pages, signed by Mr. Charles Booth, Mr. Ernest Aves, and Mr. Henry Higgs; then fifty pages of description; and, lastly, seven pages of figures. This is not much, little more than would be comprised in two of the elaborate monographs of Le Play and his school; but in these few pages an immense amount of information is concentrated; and, above all, the root-principle is emphasized, that the family is "the fundamental social fact, and the true economic unit."

The book endeavors to follow, "humbly and at some distance,

in the footsteps of Le Play." And perhaps it was wise in a first attempt, and while yet feeling the way, to avoid the definite statement of principles, the strict classification of kinds of workmen and kinds of engagements, the elaborate divisions and subdivisions of sources of income, all of which are seen in Le Play's monographs, and which enable us fruitfully to compare the real situation of workmen in all parts of the world. Moreover, these family budgets being limited to Great Britain, it is possible for the authors to assume for English readers a knowledge of the social conditions and environment, that else, as in Le Play's monographs, must needs be described. Still, I may be allowed two criticisms, not as any complaint against the present work,—this would, indeed, be ungracious,—but as a suggestion for the future much-needed volumes of family budgets that I hope will spring from the present one.

First, then, many of the descriptions are so short that much of their value is lost. Thus, the reader hungers and thirsts for more information about the London painter's laborer and his family (No. 3), or the Scotch painter (No. 16), or the Sussex journeyman carpenter (No. 23), and many other families to whom so few lines of description are given.

Secondly, some of the families can hardly be called typical. For example, the widow with a private income of seven hundred and fifteen pounds a year (No. 8), or that other widow alone in her cottage on the Surrey hillside (No. 22), or the prosperous assistant relieving-officer, with free house, coals, and gas, and ninety pounds a year salary (No. 4). A sample family from among the Lancashire cotton-workers, the Yorkshire woollen-workers, the Birmingham iron-workers, or East Anglian farm laborers, would have been more instructive.

But these, let us hope, are good things to come. Meanwhile, we can most profitably study the pictures of life in this book; mourn over the pitiable and undeserved trials of the London jobbing plumber and his wife (No. 1); rejoice at the prosperity of the Scotch artisan, who tells some home truths about his fellow-artisans and their womankind (No. 15); and we can almost feel as though we were dwelling in the Leicestershire colliery village, so graphically is it described.

For economists, the points of interest are manifold in these welcome monographs,—the supreme importance of family life; the need of good housewives, if the workmen are not to lose all the fruits of high wages and low prices; the need of consumption being well

ordered and rational no less than production ; the blessings of a secure dwelling-place ; the risk of falling a prey to drink or to usury ; the horror of the Poor Law ; the touching prevalence of mutual help among the poor, who ever appear the most generous of almsgivers.

There is, indeed, no "economic man" nor "economic rent" to be found in these pages, nor any other of the fantastic shadows that flit through the pages of the dismal science, but something more worthy of our attention,—namely, living men and women. And let us hope that so good an example in English speech may arouse emulation on both sides of the Atlantic, and that the gifted economists who are now wasting their powers on fruitless verbal strife (witness the portentous literature on "marginal utility") may turn to real life, and give us, for every industrial district in the British Isles and for every State in North America, an exhaustive monograph and a family budget worthy of *Le Play*.

CHARLES S. DEVAS.

THE IDEA OF GOD AND THE MORAL SENSE IN THE LIGHT OF LANGUAGE. By Herbert Baynes, M.R.A.S. London : Williams & Norgate, 1895. Pp. xiii., 239 and 104.

The aim of this book is, by employing the methods of comparative philology, to throw light upon the notions of God, of good and evil, etc., as conceived by the different races of mankind. Such a design would, if realized, be of great historical, and ultimately, perhaps, of philosophical importance. We fear, however, that neither the method nor the author's management of it is adequate to the task. The idea that it is possible by mere etymology (which alone is here meant by comparative philology) to arrive at a knowledge of ancient or foreign religions has long been abandoned by students of mythology. If we grant that the Indo-Europeans worshipped the sky, and that they named the sky from a root meaning "to shine," it nevertheless does *not* follow that "brightness" was their notion of divinity. On the other hand, many of the etymologies given in the book are obviously not the suggestions of an expert. In dealing with purely ethical concepts (Vol. II.) the author is on safer ground : not impossibly the study of language, combined with the study of literature, is competent to trace their meaning and development. But this is a laborious process, very different from the mere citation of etymologies.

We need only add that the book is written in a pleasing and

thoughtful style and testifies to philosophical reading. Selections are given from most known languages, and the languages themselves are characterized.

F. W. THOMAS.

KING EDWARD'S SCHOOL, BIRMINGHAM.

**THE GREEK VIEW OF LIFE.** By G. Lowes Dickinson, M.A.  
University Extension Series. Edited by J. E. Symes, M.A.  
London: Methuen & Co., 1896.

This book is intended to serve as an introduction to the study of Greek literature and thought, and is admirably suited to its purpose. And although the preface has modestly addressed it to those who do not know Greek, it cannot fail to be of interest to scholars as well, containing, as it does, an excellently clear, vivid, and accurate account of the characteristic phases of the Greek attitude towards life. The wide subject is treated under four heads,—Religion, the State, the Individual, and Art. The peculiar charm and the peculiar weakness of the Greek religion are plainly set before us,—the lovely forms of mythology that made the dark universe familiar and friendly to man's imagination, the splendour of ritual interwoven with the daily life, and the ultimate inadequacy of it all, its low conception of the divine (spite of deeper elements introduced by Plato and the poets), its inability to find a joy in death, its essentially external and non-spiritual character. Under the head of the state we have a similar balanced estimate of excellencies and defects,—the individual not crushed out by the state nor yet separated from it, but realizing himself as an active member of the corporate whole, and, on the other hand, the acceptance of slavery as a basis, and the necessity of a strict limit to the number of citizens.

The Greek moral system is treated in its connection with their polity. Their ideal in its sanity and balance, the full expression of all the manifold powers of human nature, physical, intellectual, æsthetic, social, harmonized under the guidance of Reason, is shown in telling contrast with the unreduced antithesis between the flesh and the spirit that has perplexed mediæval and modern ethics. At the same time Mr. Dickinson fully recognizes the imperfections in the Greek solution, its disregard of the majority, its dependence upon material gifts. As regards their conception of Art, it is refreshing to find stress laid on the too-much neglected truth that its very essence lay in the fusion of the æsthetic and ethical ideals; that

their artists were to them more than decorative craftsmen or stirrers of objectless emotion; that they were interpreters of life, at harmony with moral effort and religious belief.

The work is throughout illustrated by well-chosen translations; Mr. Dickinson's own renderings are so good as to make us wish for more.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

**CHARACTER AS SEEN IN BODY AND PARENTAGE:** With Notes on Education, Marriage, Change in Character and Morals. Third edition. By Furneaux Jordan, F.R.C.S. 8vo. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., 1896. Pp. ix., 126, 5 plates.

Dr. Furneaux Jordan recognises two leading temperaments,—“the active and less impassioned,” and “the reflective and more impassioned.” He finds that certain bodily characteristics are often correlated with these, and generalizes accordingly. But the only method of establishing such correlations is by an extensive series of statistics, and this is not the author's method. He supports his thesis by individual cases, from Cæsar and Cicero to Napoleon and Gladstone, and the reader is thus always entertained, if he is never convinced. The book abounds in clever insight and shrewd sayings, and, though it does not seem to us to prove anything in particular, it illustrates vividly that “character is not a chance collection of miscellaneous fragments,” but that “its items tend to group themselves in more or less uniform clusters.”

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

EDINBURGH.

**GENIUS AND DEGENERATION:** A Psychological Study. By Dr. William Hirsch. Translated from the second edition of the German work. 8vo. London: Heineman, 1897. Pp. vi., 333.

The purpose of this work is to analyze such terms as Genius and Degeneration. The author discusses “the limits of insanity,” “the psychology of genius,” “degeneration,” “secular hysteria,” and similar subjects, in a calm scientific way, reaching conclusions which, if they are not novel, impress one with their sound reasonableness. It is shown that Nordau and others have grossly exaggerated the occurrence of degeneration among civilized peoples. To write “journalese” is easier than to make a careful induction. Dr. Hirsch is no optimist, in the sense at least

of ignoring unpleasant facts, but he concludes that "mankind is not in 'a black plague of degeneration,' and that the world has as little need to be scared by stories of the *Völkerdämmerung* as by the prophecy of Herr Falb about the imminent destruction of our planet."

J. A. T.

**EVIL AND EVOLUTION:** An Attempt to turn the Light of Modern Science on to the Ancient Mystery of Evil. By the author of "The Social Horizon." 8vo. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1896. Pp. ix., 184.

With a literary ability worthy of a more reasonable thesis, the unknown author—a modern Manichean—attempts a rehabilitation of the Devil. "The Supreme Ruler, in His beneficent activity in the universe, is confronted by another power; . . . He is engaged in a conflict which to a certain extent limits His power, and the final issue of which *can* be wrought out only in the course of ages. In plain terms, there is a God and there is a Devil, and the two powers are in conflict."

J. A. T.

---

#### NEW BOOKS.

**APPEARANCE AND REALITY:** A Metaphysical Essay. By F. H. Bradley, LL.D. Second Edition, revised, with an Appendix. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897. [The new edition of this very remarkable book contains a long Appendix, in which the general point of view is summarized, and replies are made to most of the important criticisms, that have appeared. Much new light is thus thrown upon the author's fundamental positions.]

**A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.** By John Theodore Merz. Vol. I. *Introduction—Scientific Thought*, Part I. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1896. [An exceedingly interesting book. The first volume contains an Introduction, dealing with the general nature of intellectual progress, and five chapters on "The Scientific Spirit in France," "The Scientific Spirit in Germany," "The Scientific Spirit in England," "The Astronomical View of Nature," and "The Atomic View of Nature." Succeeding parts of the work will no doubt deal more directly with topics that concern the readers of this JOURNAL; but, as a survey of recent scientific development, the present volume can be cordially recommended.]

**BRITISH MORALISTS:** Being Selections from Writers, principally of the Eighteenth Century. Edited, with an Introduction and Analytical Index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge, M.A., formerly Fellow and Lecturer of University College, Oxford. In two volumes. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1897.

- MAN'S PLACE IN THE COSMOS**, and other Essays. By Professor Andrew Seth, LL.D. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1897.
- THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.** By William James. New York, London, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.
- GUESSES AT THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE.** By Goldwin Smith. New York and London: Macmillan, 1897.
- INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIALISM: A Lecture to the Glasgow Civic Society.** By Edward Caird, D.C.L., Master of Balliol College, Oxford. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1897. [A clear, weighty, and well-balanced statement, containing, among other things, a criticism of Mr. Sidney Ball's recent article in this JOURNAL.]
- GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY.** Six Lectures by Bertrand Russell, B.A. With an Appendix on Social Democracy and the Woman Question in Germany, by Alys Russell, B.A. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.
- DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY; OR, APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE.** By Lester F. Ward. Two volumes. Second edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1897.
- CHRISTIANITY AND IDEALISM: The Christian Ideal of Life in its Relations to the Greek and Jewish Ideals and to Modern Philosophy.** By Professor John Watson, LL.D. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons; London and New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897.
- HABIT AND INSTINCT.** By Principal C. Lloyd Morgan, F.G.S. London and New York: Edward Arnold, 1896. [A very important contribution to the subject. Some of the points have been already dealt with in the same writer's previous works on "Animal Life and Intelligence" and "Comparative Psychology;" but the present volume contains much new material. The point that will probably be found specially interesting to readers of this JOURNAL is the distinction between the action of natural selection and that of conscious choice, on which much emphasis is laid. This point is connected, in a highly suggestive way, with the views of Huxley in his "Romanes Lecture" and with those of Professor S. Alexander.]
- HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.** By Alfred Weber, Professor in the University of Strasburg. Authorized Translation by Professor Frank Thilly, A.M., Ph.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896. [One of the best of the smaller Histories of Philosophy. The author has a very decided philosophical position of his own. He holds that the ultimate reality is found in Will,—not, however, the *Wille zum Leben* of Schopenhauer, but rather the *Wille zum Guten*. "There is above our individual will a higher and more excellent will, which strives after the ideal." "Nature is an evolution, of which infinite perfection is both the motive force and the highest goal." In the light of this conception, Professor Weber is able to treat sympathetically the most opposite points of view, and to find elements of truth in them all. The translation, which seems to be well done, is enriched with a fairly complete bibliography of works in the various departments of Philosophy.]
- ON HUMAN NATURE: Essays (partly Posthumous) in Ethics and Politics.** By Arthur Schopenhauer. Selected and Translated by T. Bailey Saunders, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

- VITTORINO DA FELTRE AND OTHER HUMANIST EDUCATORS: Essays and Versions. An Introduction to the History of Classical Education. By W. H. Woodward, Lecturer in Education in Victoria University. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1897. ["It is a marked characteristic of Humanism to limit Philosophy, as a serious study, to Ethics, to the entire exclusion of Metaphysics. But by Ethics was meant little more than the common-places of Roman Stoic morality as expounded by Cicero and Seneca. It was avowedly practical in intent, but personal rather than social in its application. Reverence, self-control, modesty, truthfulness, and courage, the virtues of the individual, were dealt with in some detail and with copious illustration from classical sources. More complex questions, such as the relation of patriotic duty to personal ambition or opportunity, or the opposition between Christian self-repression and the self-assertion—intellectual and moral—of the Roman 'virtus,' or the nature of the ultimate sanction of morals, and the influence of religion upon it, all these are ignored. Here, as in certain other departments of practical inquiry, the fixed usage of the best age of antiquity is accepted as a sound working standard. It follows, therefore, that the method of teaching morals was mainly literary and didactic. Thus the study of Cicero, of Aristotle, and of Seneca, with illustrations from Livy, and above all from Plutarch, provided an important educational instrument." The book contains much valuable information and many suggestive remarks.]
- EDUCATION OF GIRLS AND WOMEN IN GREAT BRITAIN. By C. S. Bremner. With a Preface by Miss E. P. Hughes. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897. [A useful chronicle of the progress that has been made.]
- PSEUDO-PHILOSOPHY AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. By Hugh Mortimer Cecil. London: The University Press, 1897. [A vigorous criticism of Kidd's "Social Evolution," Drummond's "Ascent of Man," and Balfour's "Foundations of Belief."]
- JUVENILE OFFENDERS. By William Douglas Morrison. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1897.
- THE RATIONAL, OR SCIENTIFIC, IDEAL OF MORALITY: containing a Theory of Cognition, a Metaphysic of Religion, and an "Apologia pro Amore." By P. F. Fitzgerald. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897.
- CHRISTIAN INSTINCTS AND MODERN DOUBT. By the Rev. Alexander Crauford, M.A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1897.
- LE SOCIALISME ET LA SCIENCE SOCIALE. Par Gaston Richard. Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1897.
- LIFE AND LABOUR OF THE PEOPLE OF LONDON. Edited by Charles Booth. Vol. VIII. London: The Macmillan Company, 1897.
- ON BEHALF OF POSTERITY. A reply to Criticisms of "A Plea for the Unborn." (A Pamphlet.) By Henry Smith. London: Watts & Co., 1897.
- ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLIER PERIPATETICS: Being a Translation from Zeller's "Philosophy of the Greeks." By B. F. C. Costelloe, M.A., and J. H. Muirhead, M.A. In two volumes. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.
- THE ECONOMIC REVIEW. Vol. VII., No. 2. London: Rivington, Percival & Co., April, 1897. [Contains, among other things, articles on "Why are Betting and Gambling Wrong?" by Rev. A. T. Barnett, M.A., and "Moral Limi-

tations of State Interference," by E. F. B. Fell, B.A.; also interesting Reviews of Russell's "German Social Democracy," Giddings's "Principles of Sociology," and Wrixon's "Socialism,"—all by Mr. Sidney Ball, M.A.]

THE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. Vol. X. *A Genealogy of Morals*. Translated by William A. Haussmann, Ph.D. *Poems*. Translated by John Gray. Vol. IX. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Translated by Helen Zimmern. London: H. Henry & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1896.

SOCIALISM. Being Notes on a Political Tour. By Sir Henry Wrixon. London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

SUPERIORITY AND SUBORDINATION AS SUBJECT-MATTER OF SOCIOLOGY. By Dr. Georg Simmel. Translated by Professor Albion W. Small. Reprinted from the *American Journal of Sociology*, September and October, 1896. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. [Dr. Simmel urges that, if Sociology is to be a real science, it must fix upon some one aspect of life as the object of its study; and he suggests that the quality of mankind whereby they tend to "observe degree, priority, and place" might be taken as the aspect in question. But is not this too narrow? It would still no doubt leave Sociology somewhat wider than the science of Politics; but surely it is of the very essence of Sociology that it seeks to deal, not with any abstract aspect of social life, but with social life as a concrete unity. The idea that it is to imitate Political Economy and other sciences of that type in fixing on some abstract point of view is almost enough to make Comte turn in his grave.]

PROBLEMS OF BIOLOGY. By George Sandeman. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896. [A philosophical criticism of fundamental biological conceptions.]

TRUE WOMANHOOD. [Six Addresses.] By W. Cunningham, D.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, etc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896.

A STUDY OF KANT'S PSYCHOLOGY WITH REFERENCE TO THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By Edward Franklin Buchner. Lancaster, Pa.: The New Era Print, 1897.

LA SCIENCE SOCIALE. Par J. B. Maurice Vignes. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1897.

LA QUESTION SOCIALE EST UNE QUESTION DE MÉTHODE. Par Le Dr. A. Vazeille. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1897.

PROBLÈMES SOCIAUX CONTEMPORAINS. Par Achille Loria. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1897.

IL SOCIALISMO E IL PENSIERO MODERNO, SAGGI. Di Alessandro Chiappelli. Firenze: Successori Le Monnier, 1897.

IL RITORNO DELLE CHIESE CRISTIANE ALL' UNITÀ CATTOLICA. Di Raffaele Mariano. Napoli: Tipografia della Regia Università, 1895.

PSYCHOLOGIE DES BERUFSLODATEN. Von A. Hamon. Leipzig: Verlag von Aug. Dieckmann, 1896.

---

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:

Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.

Prof. Fr. Jodl, Gerstengasse 43, Prague, Austria.

Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Llwyn Celyn, Llanishen, near Cardiff, Wales.

Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

*Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice.*

## EDITORIAL COMMITTEE:

HENRY C. ADAMS, Ph.D., Ann Arbor.

FELIX ADLER, Ph.D., New York.

GIACOMO BARZELLOTTI, Ph.D., Naples.

STANTON COIT, Ph.D., London.

ALFRED FOUILLÉE, Ph.D., Paris.

HARALD HÖFFDING, Ph.D., Copenhagen.

FR. JODL, Ph.D., Prague.

J. S. MACKENZIE, M.A., Cardiff, Wales.

J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., London.

JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph.D., Cambridge, Mass.

*Managing Editor, S. BURNS WESTON, Philadelphia.*

## CONTENTS:

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION. JOHN WESTLAKE, Professor of International Law at Cambridge, Eng.; President of the Institute of International Law . . . . .	I
SETTLEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL QUESTION. PASQUALE FIORE, Professor of International Law, University of Naples . . . . .	20
IS THE FAMILY DECLINING? J. H. MUIRHEAD, London . . . . .	33
THE MORAL AND ETHICAL TEACHINGS OF THE ANCIENT ZOROASTRIAN RELIGION. A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON, Professor of Indo-Iranian Languages, Columbia University . . . . .	55
THE REFORMATION OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. RICHARD M. MEYER, University of Berlin . . . . .	63
DISCUSSIONS. "The Moral Aspects of Socialism," Sidney Webb, Sidney Ball, and F. Brocklehurst. "Hegel's Theory of Punishment," F. Melian Stawell. The Translation of "Sittlich," J. S. Mackenzie . . . . .	80
BOOK REVIEWS. <i>The Coming Individualism</i> , by A. Egmont Hake and O. E. Wesslau; <i>Socialism and Modern Thought</i> , by M. Kaufmann; <i>Essays and Notices Philosophical and Psychological</i> , by Thomas Whittaker; <i>Studies of Childhood</i> , by James Sully; <i>On Education</i> , by H. Holman; <i>The Great Didactic of John Amos Comenius</i> , with Introduction by M. W. Keatinge; <i>Les Caractères et l'Éducation Morale</i> , par F. Queyrat; <i>Sketches of Lessons in Moral Instruction</i> , by E. Reynolds; <i>Criminal Sociology</i> , by Enrico Ferri; <i>Parasitism, Organic and Social</i> , by Jean Massart and Émile Vandervelde; <i>Introduction to Political Science</i> , by J. R. Seeley; <i>An Examination of the State</i> , by W. W. Willoughby; <i>The Greek Theory of the State and the Non-conformist Conscience</i> , by Charles John Shebbeare; <i>The Religions of India</i> , by Edward Washburn Hopkins; <i>Buddhism: Its History and Literature</i> , by T. W. Rhys Davids; <i>Philosophy of Theism</i> , by Alexander Campbell Fraser; <i>The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green</i> , by W. H. Fairbrother; <i>Vivisection: Can it Advance Mankind?</i> by Charles Selby Oakley; <i>The Metaphysical Basis of Plato's Ethics</i> , by Arthur Bernard Cook; <i>Socrates and Athenian Society in His Day</i> , by A. D. Godley; <i>Nature versus Natural Selection</i> , by Charles Clement Coe; <i>Moral Pathology</i> , by Arthur E. Giles; <i>Rights of Man</i> , by Thomas Paine . . . . .	98

Philadelphia: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1305 Arch St.

London: SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., Paternoster Square.

Paris: FÉLIX ALCAN.

Berlin: SPEYER & PETERS.

YEARLY, \$2.50 (10s.). SINGLE NUMBERS, 65 CTS. (2s. 6d.).

ISSUED QUARTERLY.

Entered at Philadelphia as second-class matter.

Copyright, 1896, by S. BURNS WESTON.

# International Journal of Ethics.

## CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI.

### October, 1895.

- IS LIFE WORTH LIVING? WILLIAM JAMES, Harvard University.  
REFORM IN EDUCATION. W. MITCHELL, University of Adelaide, South Australia.  
THE REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE: THEIR RELATION TO THE INTERESTS OF LABOR IN SWITZERLAND AND IN AMERICA A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, Boston, Mass.  
THE CONSCIENCE: ITS NATURE AND ORIGIN. WILLIAM W. CARLILE, Woodville, New Zealand.  
THE DIFFICULTY OF TAKING SIDES ON QUESTIONS OF THE DAY. W. L. SHELDON, St. Louis, Missouri.  
DISCUSSIONS. *The Cosmic and the Moral*, J. Mark Baldwin. *Relation of the Ethical to the Cosmic Process*, Frances Emily White. *Mr. Ritchie on Free-Will and Responsibility*, J. H. Hyslop.  
BOOK REVIEWS.

### January, 1896.

- THE HEGEMONY OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. ALFRED FOUILLÉE, Institute of France.  
SOCIAL EVOLUTION. DAVID G. RITCHIE, University of St. Andrews, Scotland.  
THE ETHICAL LIFE AND CONCEPTIONS OF THE JAPANESE. TOKIWO YOKOI, Tokyo, Japan.  
THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN THE CATHOLIC CONGRESSES. JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS, Cambridge, Mass.  
NATIONAL PREJUDICES. JOHN CODE BAYLY, London.  
DISCUSSIONS. "Is Life Worth Living?" Thomas Davidson. *Professor James on "Nature,"* J. Arthur Thomson. *The Meaning and Origin of Societies*, William M. Salter. *Free-Will and Responsibility*, David G. Ritchie.  
BOOK REVIEWS.

### April, 1896.

- THE ETHICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFORMITY. HENRY SIDGWICK, Newnham College, Cambridge.  
THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM. SIDNEY BALL, St. John's College, Oxford.  
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW: A RETROSPECT AND A PROSPECT. HARALD HÖFFDING, University of Copenhagen.  
THE MORALITY THAT IS. ALFRED HODDER, Bryn Mawr College.  
SELF-REALIZATION.—A CRITICISM. A. E. TAYLOR, Merton College, Oxford.  
DISCUSSIONS. *The Ethical Theory of Value*, Christian Ehrenfels, University of Vienna.  
BOOK REVIEWS.

### July, 1896.

- IS PLEASURE THE SUMMUM BONUM? JAMES SETH, Brown University.  
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. LESTER F. WARD, Washington, D.C.  
RIGHTS AND DUTIES. J. S. MACKENZIE, University College, Cardiff.  
THE JEWISH QUESTION IN ITS RECENT ASPECTS. MORRIS JASTROW, JR., University of Pennsylvania.  
HEGEL'S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT. J. ELLIS McTAGGART, Trinity College, Cambridge.  
DISCUSSIONS. "The Moral Aspects of Socialism," Bernard Bosanquet and Helen Bosanquet. *Direct Legislation Defended*, Eltweed Pomeroy. *Spinoza's Doctrine of the Relationship between Mind and Body*, W. Hale White.  
BOOK REVIEWS.

Philadelphia: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1305 Arch Street.

London: SWAN SONNENSCHNEIN & CO., Paternoster Square.

YEARLY, \$2.50 (10s.). SINGLE NUMBERS, 65 CTS. (2s. 6d.).

Printed by J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY, Philadelphia, U.S.A.

# International Journal of Ethics.

## CONTENTS OF VOLUME IV.

### October, 1893.

- My Station and its Duties.** HENRY SIDGWICK, Cambridge, England.  
**What Justifies Private Property?** W. L. SHELTON.  
**The Effects of his Occupation on the Physician.** JOHN S. BILLINGS, M.D., Washington, D. C.  
**The Knowledge of Good and Evil.** JOSIAH ROYCE.  
**A Phase of Modern Epicureanism.** C. M. WILLIAMS.  
**Discussions.** *On the Meaning of the Term "Motive," and on the Ethical Significance of Motives,* D. G. Ritchie. *"On Human Marriage," a reply to C. N. Starcke,* Edward Westermarck. *"Moral Distinctions,"* Neville Tebbutt.  
**Book Reviews.**

### January, 1894.

- The Relation of Ethics to Jurisprudence.** JOHN GRIER HIBBEN, Princeton College.  
**Moral Science and the Moral Life.** J. S. MACKENZIE.  
**The Social Ministry of Wealth.** HENRY C. ADAMS.  
**An Aspect of Old Age Pensions.** M. J. FARRELLY, LL.D.  
**Italy and the Papacy.** RAFFAELE MARIANO, University of Naples.  
**Discussions.** *The Meaning of "Motive,"* J. H. Muirhead, J. S. Mackenzie, S. Alexander, and D. G. Ritchie. *Principle of Classification of Recent Ethical Writers,* C. M. Williams. *Spencer's "Principles of Ethics,"* J. S. Mackenzie.  
**Book Reviews.**

## CONTENTS OF VOLUME V.

### October, 1894.

- Luxury.** Professor HENRY SIDGWICK, Cambridge, Eng.  
**The Limits of Individual and National Self-Sacrifice.** F. H. BRADLEY, Oxford.  
**Women in the Community and in the Family.** MARY S. GILLILAND, London.  
**Ethics and Biology.** EDMUND MONTGOMERY, Hempstead, Texas.  
**National Character and Classicism in Italian Philosophy.** LUIGI FERRI, University of Rome.  
**Rational Hedonism.** E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, Girton College.  
**Discussions.** *The Practical Value of Ethics,* J. S. Mackenzie. *"Italy and the Papacy,"* Wm. Chauncy Langdon.  
**Book Reviews.**

### January, 1895.

- The Significance of Recent Labor Troubles in America.** Hon. CARROLL D. WRIGHT, Washington, D. C.  
**The Necessity of Dogma.** J. ELLIS McTAGGART, Trinity College, Cambridge.  
**The Juvenile Offender, and the Conditions which Produce Him.** Rev. W. D. MORRISON, London.  
**The Teleology of Virtue.** WALTER SMITH, Lake Forest University, Ill.  
**The Altruistic Impulse in Man and Animals.** I. GAVANESCU, University of Tassy, Roumania.  
**Matthew Arnold's Poetry from an Ethical Stand-Point.** ABRAHAM FLEXNER, Louisville, Ky.  
**Discussions.** *"Rational Hedonism,"* J. S. Mackenzie and E. E. Constance Jones. *Mr. Bradley on Punishment,* H. Rashdall.  
**Book Reviews.**

### April, 1894.

- Some Remarks on Punishment.** F. H. BRADLEY, Oxford.  
**Occult Compensation.** HENRY C. LEA, Philadelphia.  
**The Reality of the General Will.** BERNARD BOSANQUET.  
**The Combination of Capital.** Pres. E. BENJ. ANDREWS.  
**Relation of Ethical Culture to Religion and Philosophy.** FREDERIC HARRISON, London, and FELIX ADLER, New York.  
**"Italy and the Papacy."** Monsignor SARROLLI, Washington, D. C.  
**Discussions.** *Reply to Some Criticisms,* J. S. Mackenzie. *A Personal Explanation,* F. H. Bradley. *The Stand-point of an Ethical Society,* S. Burns Weston.  
**Book Reviews.**

### July, 1894.

- Naturalism and Ethics.** Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, London.  
**Effect of the Clerical Office upon Character.** Rev. LANGDON C. STEWARDSON, Worcester, Mass.  
**Religious Sentiment and the Moral Problem in Italy.** GIACOMO BARZELLOTTI, University of Naples.  
**The Limits of Casuistry.** Rev. HASTINGS RASHDALL, Oxford.  
**Practical Ethics.** WILLIAM KNIGHT, University of St. Andrews.  
**The Punishment of Children.** M. M. MANGASARIAN, Chicago.  
**Discussions.** *The Relations of "Ought" and "Is,"* Dickinson S. Miller.  
**Book Reviews.**

### April, 1895.

- Self-Assertion and Self-Denial.** J. S. MACKENZIE, University College, Cardiff, Wales.  
**Moral Forces in Dealing with the Labor Question.** WILLIAM M. SALTER, Philadelphia.  
**The Ethical Consequences of the Doctrine of Immortality.** W. LUTOSLAWSKI, Drodowo, Russia.  
**Philosophical Sin.** HENRY CHARLES LEA, LL.D., Philadelphia.  
**National Character and Classicism in Italian Ethics.** LUIGI FERRI, University of Rome.  
**The Motives to Moral Conduct.** A. DÜRING, University of Berlin.  
**Discussions.** *"Rational Hedonism,"* Mary S. Gilliland, J. S. Mackenzie, F. H. Bradley, and E. E. Constance Jones.  
**Book Reviews.**

### July, 1895.

- Free-will and Responsibility.** D. G. RITCHIE, University of St. Andrews, Scotland.  
**The Evolution of Religion.** BERNARD BOSANQUET, London.  
**Labor Troubles—Causes and Proposed Remedies.** J. H. HYSLOP, Columbia College.  
**Automatism in Morality.** J. G. HIBBEN, Princeton University.  
**Some of the Uses of Unemotional Music.** COUNTESS ELIZABETH PHELPS RESSE, Florence, Italy.  
**Discussions.** *Professor Huxley on the Relation of the Ethical to the Cosmic Process,* Dr. Frances Emily White. *Natural Law, Ethics, and Evolution,* Professor Josiah Royce.  
**Georg von Gizycki and the Science of Ethics.** FR. JODI, University of Prague.  
**Book Reviews.**

Per volume, unbound, \$2.50 (10s.). Single numbers, 65 Cts. (2s. 6d.).  
 Per volume, bound in fine cloth, \$3.50, postage prepaid.

Philadelphia: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1305 Arch Street.

London: SWAN SONNENSCHNEIN & CO., Paternoster Square.

# An Ethical Movement.

A VOLUME OF LECTURES

BY

W. L. SHELDON,

Lecturer of the Ethical Society, St. Louis.

12mo. Cloth. \$1.75.

## SUBJECTS OF THE LECTURES.

- |                                                                               |                                                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| I. THE MEANING OF AN ETHICAL MOVEMENT.                                        | X. THE VALUE OF POETRY TO THOSE WHO WISH TO LIVE IN THE SPIRIT.              |
| II. BEING RELIGIOUS—WHAT IT MEANS TO AN ETHICAL IDEALIST.                     | XI. MARRIAGE—IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW IDEALISM.                               |
| III. DUTY—TO ONE WHO MAKES A RELIGION OF IT.                                  | XII. THE FAMILY. CAN ETHICS IMPROVE ON IT OR OFFER A SUBSTITUTE FOR IT?      |
| IV. THE ATTITUDE WE SHOULD TAKE TO THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF OTHERS.           | XIII. LAW AND GOVERNMENT, AND WHY WE SHOULD REVERE THEM.                     |
| V. HOW PEOPLE OF MANY MINDS CAN USE THE WORD "GOD."                           | XIV. SOCIAL IDEALS, AND WHAT THEY SIGNIFY TO AN ETHICAL IDEALIST.            |
| VI. THE "ETHICAL" CHRIST.                                                     | XV. THE DIFFICULTY FOR THE IDEALIST IN TAKING SIDES ON QUESTIONS OF THE DAY. |
| VII. THE MESSAGE OF THE STOICS TO THE PEOPLE OF TO-DAY.                       | XVI. ON WHAT BASIS CAN ETHICS JUSTIFY PRIVATE PROPERTY.                      |
| VIII. METHODS FOR SPIRITUAL SELF CULTURE.                                     |                                                                              |
| IX. DOES HIGH CONDUCT IN THE LONG RUN BRING THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF HAPPINESS? |                                                                              |

The lectures have been chosen from those given under the auspices of the St. Louis Ethical Society. They are arranged in a series for the purpose of presenting the author's views on certain questions of the day. At the beginning of the volume there is an introductory chapter, giving a short account of the rise and development of the Ethical Societies throughout America and Europe.

"This Ethical Movement has met the cravings of my religious nature, and made up to me for what I had lost. It has given me something to live for and believe in."—*The Author*.

## PRESS COMMENTS.

"Much that the author says is well worthy of attention, even from those who do not accept his stand-point nor agree with his views."—*Critic, New York*.

"Attractively written and instructive."—*Westminster Review*.

"The handling of the questions under debate is able and skilful, the tone is always calm and candid, the view is broad and clear, the suggestions are practical."—*Boston Transcript*.

"No one can read these lectures on ethics without being impressed by their elevated and enlightened spirit. The appeal they make to a small body of advanced thinkers is a powerful one."—*Milwaukee Sentinel*.

"Can hardly fail to be helpful to many readers who seek guidance in the strain of every-day living."—*San Francisco Chronicle*.

"They are interesting lectures. The work done by the Ethical Society has been of the greatest value."—*Pall Mall Gazette*.

"For the temperance and gentleness of his arguments Mr. Sheldon cannot be too highly commended; they are qualities not often met with in reformers of equally earnest and radical views."—*Literary World*.

"Any one who follows the newest developments of the history of culture and philosophy, will find much in it that will repay a close attention."—*Edinburgh Scotsman*.

# The Journal of Political Economy

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY, IN DECEMBER, MARCH, JUNE, AND SEPTEMBER  
OF EACH YEAR, BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

Edited by the Department of Political Economy.

Editor, J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN.

Managing Editor, T. B. VEBLEN.

While not neglecting topics of a purely theoretical or speculative character, **The Journal of Political Economy** is established primarily to promote the scientific treatment of problems in practical economics, and devotes a large share of its space to such investigations and discussions as bear directly on business interests, touching banking, money, railway transportation, shipping, taxation, socialism, wages, agriculture, and the like.

## CONTENTS OF RECENT NUMBERS.

### VOLUME IV. NUMBER 1, DECEMBER, 1895.

- I. State Bank of Indiana . . . . . WILLIAM F. HARDING
- II. Income Taxation in France . . . . . H. PARKER WILLIS
- III. Short Route to Europe and Canadian Ports . . . . . ORLANDO PERKINS SHANNON
- IV. Hedonistic Interpretation of Subjective Value . . . . . HENRY W. STUART
- Notes.—Book Reviews.—Appendix.

### VOLUME IV. NUMBER 2, MARCH, 1896.

- I. Quantity Theory of the Value of Money . . . . . WESLEY C. MITCHELL
- II. Wages in the United States . . . . . EMILE LEVASSEUR
- III. Vienna Monetary Treaty of 1857 . . . . . HENRY PARKER WILLIS
- IV. Subjective and Exchange Value . . . . . HENRY W. STUART
- V. Notes.—Miscellanies.
- Growth and Character of the Commerce of the Great Lakes . . . GEORGE TUNELL
- VI. Book Reviews.
- VII. Appendix.—The German Monetary Treaty of 1857.

### VOLUME IV. NUMBER 3, JUNE, 1896.

- I. Credit Devices and the Quantity Theory . . . . . H. PARKER WILLIS
- II. Factory Legislation for the Protection of Women and Children in Italy.  
R. BROGLIO D'AJANO
- III. Transportation on the Great Lakes . . . . . GEORGE TUNELL
- IV. Subjective and Exchange Value . . . . . HENRY W. STUART
- V. Notes.—Miscellanies.
- French Income-Tax Bill of 1895 . . . . . H. PARKER WILLIS
- Recent Progress of Social Anthropology . . . . . CARLOS C. CLOSSON
- VI. Book Reviews.
- VII. Appendix.—Tables Relating to Transportation on the Great Lakes.

Price, \$3.00 per year for all Countries within the Postal Union.

Address, **The University of Chicago,**

University Press Division,

CHICAGO, ILL., U.S.A.

All Remittances should be made payable to the Order of THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

**EVERY LIBRARY**  
SHOULD CONTAIN THESE  
**Standard Reference Works.**

- Allibone's Dictionary of Authors, with Supplement.  
Allibone's Quotations. Three Volumes.  
Ancient and Modern Familiar Quotations.  
Blunt's Dictionary of Sects and Heresies.  
Blunt's Dictionary of Theology.  
Bombaugh's Gleanings for the Curious.  
Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
- Brewer's Dictionary of Miracles.  
Brewer's Historic Note-Book.  
Brewer's Reader's Handbook.  
Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable.  
Chambers's Book of Days.  
Chambers's Cyclopædia of English Literature.  
Chambers's Encyclopædia. Ten Volumes.  
Chambers's Concise Gazetteer.
- Chambers's Information for the People.  
Edwards's Words, Facts, and Phrases.  
Furness's Variorum Edition of Shakespeare's Plays.  
Furness's Concordance to Shakespeare's Poems.  
Gardner's Latin Lexicon.  
Great Truths by Great Authors.  
Groves's Greek and English Dictionary.
- Heath's Dictionary of Practical Surgery.  
Jenkins's Vest-Pocket Lexicon.  
Lempriere's Classical Dictionary.  
Leverett's Latin Lexicon.  
Lippincott's Biographical Dictionary.  
Lippincott's Gazetteer of the World.
- Longman's Pocket Dictionary of the German and English Languages.  
Pickering's Greek and English Lexicon.  
Pocket Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages  
Roget's Thesaurus.  
Soule's Synonymes.  
Thomas's Medical Dictionary.  
United States Dispensatory.
- Walsh's Handy-Book of Literary Curiosities.  
Worcester's Dictionaries.  
Writer's Handbook (The).

Write for a Descriptive Catalogue and Price-List of the above to the Publishers,

**J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY,**  
715 and 717 Market Street, PHILADELPHIA.

# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

*Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice.*

## EDITORIAL COMMITTEE:

HENRY C. ADAMS, Ph.D., Ann Arbor.  
FELIX ADLER, Ph.D., New York.  
GIACOMO BARZELLOTTI, Ph.D., Naples.  
STANTON COIT, Ph.D., London.  
ALFRED FOUILLEE, Ph.D., Paris.

HARALD HÖFFDING, Ph.D., Copenhagen.  
FR. JODL, Ph.D., Prague.  
J. S. MACKENZIE, M.A., Cardiff, Wales.  
J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., London.  
JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph.D., Cambridge, Mass.

*Managing Editor, S. BURNS WESTON, Philadelphia.*

## CONTENTS:

THE ETHICAL SIDE OF THE FREE SILVER CAMPAIGN. F. J. STIMSON, Boston, Mass . . . . .	401
THE CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY AS AN ORGANISM. J. ELLIS MC TAGGART, Trinity College, Cambridge . . . . .	414
WHEN THE "HIGHER CRITICISM" HAS DONE ITS WORK. THOMAS DAVIDSON, New York . . . . .	435
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS. WILLIAM DOUGLAS MORRISON, London . . . . .	448
PHILOSOPHIC FAITH. MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND, London . . . . .	464
THE PLACE OF PLEASURE IN A SYSTEM OF ETHICS. FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE, University of Minnesota . . . . .	475
DISCUSSIONS. <i>The Idealist Treatment of Egoism and Altruism</i> , E. Keri Evans. <i>The Theory of Social Forces: An Explanation</i> , Simon N. Patten. <i>A Reply</i> , William Caldwell. <i>"Morality and the Belief in the Super- natural,"</i> Roger Bruce Johnson. <i>A Reply</i> , E. Ritchie. <i>A Note</i> , M. de Wulf	486
THE LATE PROFESSOR WALLACE. W. H. FAIRBROTHER, Oxford	504
BOOK REVIEWS. <i>Rich and Poor</i> , by Mrs. Bernard Bosanquet; <i>Cosmic Ethics, or the Mathematical Theory of Evolution</i> , by W. Cave Thomas; <i>Christian Ethics</i> , by Thomas B. Strong; <i>The Gospel for an Age of Doubt</i> , by Henry Van Dyke; <i>Mental Development in the Child and in the Race</i> , by J. Mark Baldwin; <i>Analytic Psychology</i> , by G. F. Stout; <i>Hegel's Philosophy of Right</i> , translated by S. W. Dyde; <i>The History of Mankind</i> , by Friedrich Ratzel; <i>Le Premesse Filosofiche del Socialismo</i> , di Alessandro Chiappelli; <i>Family Budgets</i> , Compiled for the Economic Club; <i>The Idea of God and the Moral Sense in the Light of Language</i> , by Herbert Baynes; <i>The Greek View of Life</i> , by G. Lowes Dickinson; <i>Character as seen in Body and Parentage</i> , by Furneaux Jordan; <i>Genius and Degeneration</i> , by William Hirsch; <i>Evil and Evolution</i> , by author of "The Social Horizon" . . . . .	506

Philadelphia: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1305 Arch St.

London: SWAN SONNENSCHN & CO., Paternoster Square.

Paris: FÉLIX ALCAN.

Berlin: SPEYER & PETERS.

YEARLY, \$2.50 (10s.). SINGLE NUMBERS, 65 CTS. (2s. 6d.).

ISSUED QUARTERLY.

Entered at Philadelphia as second-class matter.

Copyright, 1897, by S. BURNS WESTON.

# Some of the Contributors to the International Journal of Ethics.

- Prof. H. C. Adams, University of Michigan.  
 Prof. R. Adamson, Manchester, England.  
 Felix Adler, Ph.D., New York.  
 Prof. S. Alexander, Owens College, Manchester.  
 Percy Alden, London.  
 President E. Benj. Andrews, Brown University.  
 Prof. W. J. Ashley, Harvard University.  
 Brother Azarias, New York.  
 Prof. J. Mark Baldwin, Princeton University.  
 Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, London.  
 Sidney Ball, Ph.D., St. John's College, Oxford.  
 John Code Bayly, London.  
 Prof. Giacomo Barzellotti, University of Naples.  
 John I. Beare, Trinity College, Dublin.  
 Dr. John S. Billings, New York.  
 Prof. E. Boirac, Paris.  
 James Bonar, LL.D., London.  
 Bernard Bosanquet, LL.D., London.  
 Prof. Maurice Bloomfield, Johns Hopkins University.  
 Prof. A. C. Bradley, University of Glasgow.  
 F. H. Bradley, LL.D., Oxford.  
 Dr. Daniel G. Brinton, Philadelphia.  
 Mrs. Sophie Bryant, D.Sc., London.  
 John Graham Brooks, Cambridge, Mass.  
 Prof. John Burnet, University of St. Andrews.  
 Prof. Edward Caird, D.C.L., Balliol College, Oxford.  
 Prof. William Caldwell, Northwestern Univ.  
 William W. Carille, Woodville, New Zealand.  
 B. Ritter von Carneri, Ph.D., Marburg, Austria.  
 Prof. Mary Emily Case, Wells College, N. Y.  
 Prof. J. B. Clark, Columbia University.  
 Prof. Herman Cohen, University of Marburg.  
 Stanton Coit, Ph.D., London.  
 Clara E. Collet, London.  
 W. C. Coupland, London.  
 Rev. Samuel M. Crothers, Cambridge, Mass.  
 Rev. William Cunningham, D.D., Trinity College, Cambridge, Eng.  
 Rev. Charles F. D'Arcy, Ballymena, Ireland.  
 Thomas Davidson, New York.  
 Charles S. Devas, Royal University of Ireland.  
 Prof. John Dewey, University of Chicago.  
 A. Döring, University of Berlin.  
 Rev. Robert A. Duff, University of Glasgow.  
 Arthur Eastwood, M.A., Bristol, England.  
 Christian Ehrenfels, Ph.D., University of Vienna.  
 E. Keri Evans, Univ. College, Bangor, Wales.  
 Prof. Roland P. Falkner, University of Penna.  
 M. J. Farrelly, Middle Temple, London.  
 Prof. Arthur Fairbanks, Yale University.  
 Prof. Luigi Ferri, University of Rome.  
 Prof. Pasquale Fiore, University of Naples.  
 Prof. Nicola Fornelli, University of Naples.  
 Prof. Alfred Fouillée, Paris.  
 Abraham Flexner, Louisville, Ky.  
 Christine Ladd Franklin, Baltimore, Md.  
 Prof. I. Gavenescu, University of Tassi, Roumania.  
 Muhammad Abdul Ghani, India.  
 W. H. Fairbrother, Lincoln College, Oxford.  
 Prof. Franklin H. Giddings, Columbia Univ.  
 Prof. G. von Gizycki, University of Berlin.  
 E. C. K. Gonner, University College, Liverpool.  
 Prof. Frank Granger, University College, Nottingham, Eng.  
 Rev. W. J. Greenstreet, Stroud, England.  
 Frederic Harrison, London.  
 Paul Hensel, Ph.D., University of Strassburg.  
 Fanny Hertz, Berlin.  
 John Grier Hibben, Ph.D., Princeton Univ.  
 I. Himmelbauer, Ph.D., Vienna.  
 Prof. Paul H. Hanus, Harvard University.  
 L. T. Hobhouse, M.A., Corpus Christi College, Oxford.  
 John A. Hobson, M.A., London.  
 Alfred Hodder, Bryn Mawr, College.  
 Prof. Harold Höfding, Univ. of Copenhagen.  
 Miss H. M. Hughes, University College, Cardiff, Wales.  
 Father Huntington, Westminster, Md.  
 Mary Gilliland Husband, London.  
 Prof. James H. Hyslop, Columbia University.  
 Prof. A. V. Williams Jackson, Columbia University.  
 Prof. William James, Harvard University.  
 Prof. E. J. James, University of Chicago.  
 Prof. Morris Jastrow, Jr., University of Pennsylvania.  
 Prof. Friedrich Jodl, University of Prague.  
 B. E. Constance Jones, Girton College.  
 Prof. Henry Jones, University of Glasgow.  
 Benjamin Kidd, London.  
 Prof. William Knight, University of St. Andrews, Scotland.  
 Rev. William Chauncy Langdon, D.D., Washington, D. C.  
 Robert Latta, University of St. Andrews.  
 Josephine Lazarus, New York.  
 Henry C. Lea, Philadelphia.  
 A. Lawrence Lowell, Boston, Mass.  
 W. Lutoslawski, Drozdowo, Russia.  
 Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, University College, Cardiff, Wales.  
 M. M. Mangasarian, New York.  
 Prof. Raffaele Mariano, University of Naples.  
 Prof. J. MacCunn, Univ. College, Liverpool.  
 Rev. S. D. McConnell, Brooklyn, New York.  
 Prof. J. Ellis McTaggart, Trinity College, Cambridge.  
 Prof. James Mavor, University of Toronto.  
 Dr. Richard M. Meyer, University of Berlin.  
 Dickinson S. Miller, Ph.D., Bryn Mawr College.  
 Prof. W. Mitchell, University of Adelaide, South Australia.  
 Dr. Edmund Montgomery, Hempstead, Texas.  
 Rev. William Douglas Morrison, London.  
 J. H. Muirhead, M.A., London.  
 Prof. H. Nettleship, Oxford, Eng.  
 Francis W. Newman, London.  
 Prof. Simon N. Patten, University of Pennsylvania.  
 Prof. Francis G. Peabody, Harvard University.  
 Prof. Otto Pfeiderer, University of Berlin.  
 J. Platter, Ph.D., University of Zurich.  
 L. L. Price, M.A., Oriel College, Oxford.  
 Rev. Hastings Rashdall, Balliol College, Oxford.  
 Prof. David G. Ritchie, University of St. Andrews, Scotland.  
 Eliza Ritchie, Wellesley College, Mass.  
 John M. Robertson, London.  
 Prof. Josiah Royce, Harvard University.  
 William M. Salter, Chicago.  
 Cardinal Satolli, Rome.  
 Prof. Leopold Schmidt, University of Marburg.  
 Prof. James Seth, Cornell University.  
 F. C. Sharp, Ph.D., University of Wisconsin.  
 W. L. Sheldon, St. Louis, Mo.  
 Prof. Henry Sidgwick, Cambridge, Eng.  
 Dr. George Simmel, University of Berlin.  
 Prof. Wm. Smart, University of Glasgow.  
 G. C. Smith, Manchester, Eng.  
 Prof. Walter Smith, Lake Forest University, Illinois.  
 Prof. W. R. Sorley, University of Aberdeen.  
 C. N. Starcke, Ph.D., University of Copenhagen.  
 F. Melian Stawell, London.  
 Leslie Stephen, London.  
 Prof. J. MacBride Sterrett, Columbian University, Washington, D. C.  
 Rev. Langdon C. Stewardson, Worcester, Mass.  
 F. J. Stimson, Boston, Mass.  
 G. F. Stout, M.A., St. John's College, Cambridge.  
 Henry Sturt, Bushey, Eng.  
 A. E. Taylor, Merton College Oxford.  
 William B. Thayer, Cambridge, Mass.  
 J. Arthur Thomson, M.A., Edinburgh.  
 Dr. Ferdinand Tönnies, University of Kiel.  
 Prof. C. H. Toy, Harvard University.  
 Prof. C. B. Upton, Manchester College, Oxford.  
 Graham Wallas, London.  
 Prof. William Wallace, Oxford, Eng.  
 Dr. James Ward, Cambridge, Eng.  
 Lester F. Ward, Washington, D. C.  
 Joseph B. Warner, Boston, Mass.  
 Sidney Webb, London.  
 J. Welton, Yorkshire College, Leeds.  
 Prof. B. M. Wenley, University of Michigan.  
 Leonard H. West, LL.D., Brough, Eng.  
 Prof. John Westlake, Cambridge, Eng.  
 Edward Westermarck, London, Eng.  
 Dr. Frances Emily White, Woman's Medical College, Philadelphia.  
 W. Hale White, London.  
 Rev. P. H. Wicksteed, London.  
 Miss C. M. Williams, New York.  
 Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, University of Minnesota.  
 Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Washington, D. C.  
 Maurice De Wulf, Louvain, Belgium.  
 Tokiwo Yokoi, Tokyo, Japan.  
 Charles Zueblin, University of Chicago.

# RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF THE American Economic Association.

## MONOGRAPHS.

### VOLUME X.

- Hand-Book and Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting.** Price, 50 cents.  
Nos. 1, 2, and 3. **The Canadian Banking System, 1817-1890.** By R. M. BRECKEN-  
RIDGE, Ph.D. Price, \$1.50; Cloth, \$2.50.  
No. 4. **Poor Laws of Massachusetts and New York.** By JOHN CUMMINGS, Ph.D.  
Price, 75 cents.  
Nos. 5 and 6. **Letters of Ricardo to McCulloch, 1816-1823.** Edited, with introduction  
and annotations by J. H. HOLLANDER, Ph.D. Price, \$1.25; Cloth, \$2.00.

### VOLUME XI.

- Nos. 1, 2, and 3. **Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro.** By F. L.  
HOFFMAN, F.S.S. Price, \$1.25; Cloth, \$2.00.  
No. 4. **Appreciation and Interest.** By IRVING FISHER, Ph.D. Price, 75 cents.

## ECONOMIC STUDIES.

### VOLUME I.

- Hand-Book and Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting.** Price, 50 cents.  
No. 1. **The Theory of Economic Progress.** By JOHN B. CLARK, Ph.D.  
**The Relation of Changes in the Volume of the Currency to Prosperity.**  
By FRANCIS A. WALKER, LL.D. Price, 50 cents.  
No. 2. **The Adjustment of Wages to Efficiency.** Three papers: *Gain Sharing*, by  
H. R. TOWNE; *The Premium Plan*, by F. A. HALSEY; *A Piece-Rate System*,  
by F. W. TAYLOR. Price, 50 cents.  
No. 3. **The Populist Movement.** By FRANK L. McVEY, Ph.D. Price, 50 cents.  
No. 4. **The Present Monetary Situation.** By PROF. W. LEXIS. Translated by PROF.  
JOHN CUMMINGS, Ph.D. Price, 50 cents.  
Nos. 5-6. **The Street Railway Problem in Cleveland.** By WILLIAM ROWLAND  
HOPKINS. Price, 75 cents.

### VOLUME II.

- Hand-Book and Report of the Ninth Annual Meeting.** Price, 50 cents.  
No. 1. **Economics and Jurisprudence.** By HENRY C. ADAMS, Ph.D. Price, 50 cents.  
No. 2. **The Saloon Question in Chicago.** By JOHN E. GEORGE. Price, 50 cents.  
No. 3. **The Personal Property Tax in California.** By CARL C. PLEHN, Ph.D. Price,  
50 cents.

Prices of the several volumes of Monographs, unbound, \$4.00 each. Bound in cloth,  
\$5.00 each for single volumes, \$4.00 for each additional volume. The set of ten bound  
volumes, \$41.00, sent prepaid. Any bound volume will be sent post-paid to members for  
75 cents in exchange for the unbound numbers, if returned prepaid in good condition.  
Copies can also be furnished, in half morocco, at 50 cents per volume additional to the price  
in cloth.

Separate subscriptions by non-members, libraries, etc., for the Studies, \$2.50 per year;  
or \$4.00 for all the publications. Any single monograph may be obtained at the price given  
in the list.

*One-sixth Discount to Members and Subscribers on all Orders.*

*Address applications for membership and inquiries to*

**THE SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION,  
Ithaca, New York.**

*Address subscriptions and orders for Studies and Monographs to the publishers,*

**THE MACMILLAN COMPANY,  
66 Fifth Avenue, New York.**

**EVERY LIBRARY**  
SHOULD CONTAIN THESE  
**Standard Reference Works.**

Allibone's Dictionary of Authors, with Supplement.  
Allibone's Quotations. Three Volumes.  
Ancient and Modern Familiar Quotations.  
Blunt's Dictionary of Sects and Heresies.  
Blunt's Dictionary of Theology.  
Bombaugh's Gleanings for the Curious.  
Brewer's Dictionary of Miracles.  
Brewer's Historic Note-Book.  
Brewer's Reader's Handbook.  
Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable.  
Chambers's Book of Days.  
Chambers's Cyclopædia of English Literature.  
Chambers's Encyclopædia. Ten Volumes.  
Chambers's Information for the People.  
Edwards's Words, Facts, and Phrases.  
Furness's Variorum Edition of Shakespeare's Plays.  
Furness's Concordance to Shakespeare's Poems.  
Gardner's Latin Lexicon.  
Great Truths by Great Authors.  
Groves's Greek and English Dictionary.  
Heath's Dictionary of Practical Surgery.  
Jenkins's Vest-Pocket Lexicon.  
Lempriere's Classical Dictionary.  
Leverett's Latin Lexicon.  
Lippincott's Biographical Dictionary.  
Lippincott's Gazetteer of the World.  
Lippincott's Medical Dictionary.  
Longman's Pocket Dictionary of the German and English Languages.  
Pickering's Greek and English Lexicon.  
Pocket Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages.  
Roget's Thesaurus.  
Soule's Synonymes.  
United States Dispensatory.  
Walsh's Handy-Book of Literary Curiosities.  
Worcester's Dictionaries.  
Writer's Handbook (The).

Write for a Descriptive Catalogue and Price-List of the above to the Publishers,

**J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY,**

**715 and 717 Market Street,**

**PHILADELPHIA.**














25271

ational journal of ethics. vol. 1.7

DATE

BY

上

DOES NOT CIRCULA

